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AN  
ARMY OFFICER'S  
PHILIPPINE STUDIES

BY

Captain J. V. Mason Blunt,  
U. S. A.

(RETIRED)

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MANILA, P. I.  
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UNIVERSITY PRESS  
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
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## EDITOR'S FOREWORD

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The publication of this book has been arranged for and carried through in fulfilment of a promise made to its author as he lay on his death-bed. But apart from thus satisfying an obligation of friendship, the editor trusts there is some warrant in his believing that he is also doing a service to his and to the author's American countrymen.

History has not yet said its last word about our war with Spain. The question of the Philippines has not yet reached a satisfactory solution, and, viewed in all its antecedent circumstances, cannot lightly be assumed to be of little moment or of no particular intrinsic difficulty. More light is needed on the subject. More clearing away of irrelevant matter is demanded. A proper pathway for the much desired meeting of justice and peace is yet to be made. For unbiased research and dispassionate judgment are by no means dominant characteristics displayed by many who, in the past, have treated themes handled in this work.

The late Captain Blunt was not a man to boast of possessing any extraordinary qualifications as a writer. But to all that knew him — and the number includes representative men of all classes and creeds — he was ever the soul of honor, just, generous, loyal, experienced in travel above the average, a keen observer and a painstaking student, a charming personality of unusual mark, and a gentleman of high ideals worthy of the traditions of his distinguished ancestry.

By his European education he was peculiarly fitted

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to appreciate at their just value the European elements and forces that played so important a part both for good and evil in the history of the Philippines. He seemed to possess an exceptionally well balanced faculty of analyzing not only individual character and action, but also the organized workings of groups and parties of men, and the motives, ideals, and passions that underlay, inspired, or directed their movements.

Because of this faculty and also by reason of his Catholic faith and of his loyalty to the Church—a loyalty that was as far removed from fanaticism as light is from darkness—he was in a position to state a great many facts about the present case of the Philippines, as few Americans have had them brought to their attention before. Not all, of course, will agree with him in his conclusions. But who can deny that it will be a boon to many to learn that a cultured American officer could calmly move amid the heterogeneous elements now composing the population of the Philippines, and could take account of the past government of the Islands, and of their relations to Spain and Spanish sovereignty, to Catholic Rome and to the Catholic Church, without finding cause for the rancor and hatred, the prejudice and injurious words, the opprobrium and injustice that so many of his countrymen have expended and heaped upon almost everything associated with the Spanish name and with the Catholic religion?

Other merits, no doubt, will be found revealed in the work, though the author himself considered it incomplete and regretted that he could not finish it to his satisfaction. For one thing, it clearly shows that the elements of practically every revolt against Spain in the Philippines were largely, if not entirely, dominated by unprincipled renegades and selfish "hungry adventurers." Had these men won the day, there would have been realized throughout the Islands, as one most undoubted result among several, the same wholesale plunder and spoliation of Church property that has



characterized the present "liberty fraternity-equality" governments of Portugal and France; only, as was amply evidenced by the Katipunero patriots, there would have been more barbarism and fiendishness brought into play in the final disposition of their helpless victims.

The absurdity of the assumption that the friars dominated or controlled the Spanish government and the courts is also made manifest. Of all the governors and other high officials at the head of affairs during the evolution of the crisis in the Philippines, there was not one but would properly have resented the imputation that he was not acting [on his own authority and responsibility. Furthermore there was hardly one of them, indeed it may be doubted is there was even one of them, that was a thoroughly practical Catholic. Of liberalistic political affiliations and largely imbued with the antagonistic sentiments of European Latin masonry, they would no more have submitted to the wishes of the friars in the direction and government of the Islands than a Protestant sect of today would go to the same source for counsel in their religious affairs and undertakings. No unbiased student, who knows even a little of the intimate life and habitual thought of Catholics, whether lay or clerical, can fail to grasp the significance and certainty of this position. When, for instance, it is charged, as it sometimes is, that the friars compassed the death of Rizal, it is therefore clear that the charge is mere malicious calumny without a shred of evidence to back it up.

Possibly another happy sequel to Captain Blunt's "Studies" may be some lessening of the tendency among a certain class of Americans to exalt our national dignity and superiority by the process of forever trying to sink Spain deeper and deeper into a veritable muckhole of alleged ignorance, incompetency, perfidy, and general cussedness, religious and political. Quite recently an American daily in Manila referred editorially to the

"past wherein the (Filipino) people in the mass had no rights and received no consideration". That is the stupid expression of such canting rant as few Spaniards, if any, however low and despicable, could be guilty of. If the latter were to point to the American Indians as a practical illustration of the benefits of American righteousness, justice, and consideration, Spain, in her treatment of the Filipino, would certainly not be a loser by the comparison.

May there be no further growth amongst us of the spirit that seeks to make our country great by a cheap and petty belittlement of a nation to which the Americas owe much, and whose deserving in any respect it were no disgrace to acknowledge, despite the traducing bigotry of many centuries that has left its sorry trail on many a page of English literature.

By an analogous process of reasoning, that same spirit ought logically to glorify our presidents and statesmen of today far above Washington, Jefferson, and other early immortals of the Union for some such paltry reason as that these didn't grant franchises to electric light and telephone companies, or never sat in a swivel chair, nor had any conception of the wonderful means of modern locomotion. And let it be borne in mind that when flaw-pickers, mudthrowers, and human tumble-bugs begin on America and the Americans, they are not one whit less provided with resources, or with reasons, motives, and material to work with, than the misguided publicists who, in respect to American ideals and operations in the Islands, ply their avocation and make a pusillanimous job of it, chiefly by vilifying Spain and the Catholic Church.

The text of the author's manuscript, partly emended by himself, has been revised, but along lines fully approved and sanctioned by him before his death, and in no wise affecting the substantial meaning of any, even the slightest, part of his work. In some cases notably in the last paper, the editor has added notes of his

own, whenever he thought they would serve to illustrate Captain Blunt's statements or convey additional apposite information. Occasional misprints and some variations in the use of capital letters have crept into the book, despite the vigilance of the editor, whose Filipino compositors had little or no knowledge of English; but it is hoped that the errors are not numerous enough to mar the work or to occasion any inconvenience to its readers.

There remains a word to be said about the life of the author, which, full of adventure, reads in many respects like romance. He was born in Washington, D. C., January 22, 1849. He was the son of Simon Fraser Blunt, who served in the U. S. navy, and of Ellen Key Blunt, daughter of Francis Scott Key, a lawyer and the author of the world-famed national hymn, "the Star-Spangled Banner." He was named after John Y. Mason, who was Secretary of the Navy and a personal friend of the elder Blunt.

At the age of twelve years, he was taken abroad by his mother. There he acquired the greater part of his scholastic education, distinguishing himself among other things by becoming fluent in the use of German, French, and Spanish. His linguistic ability was of great service to him in his later years.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, he desired to enter the Confederate Navy, and he was offered a commission by Admiral Semmes, but some obstacle arose preventing him from realizing his plans. He subsequently enlisted in the French army and became a member of the Red Cross Corps. Later he entered the Papal Zouaves. He served under the famous General de Charette and was among the last to surrender when the victorious Italians carried Rome. He next betook himself to Spain to enlist in the Carlist cause. He became a trusted member of Don Carlos' imperial guard. After some years of service there, when there were no further prospects for his patron, he went to England and joined the British army. He was assigned to the First Royal Dragoons. Later

through the influence of friends at home, he was released from his enlistment and returned to the United States, visiting the home of his uncle, George H. Pendleton, a senator from Ohio.

His connection with the U. S. Army began in the term of President Arthur, who appointed him a second lieutenant. His first appointment was to the Tenth Infantry. In 1896 he was transferred to the Fifth Cavalry, and a year later he graduated from the Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth. In 1898 he was made first lieutenant, and at the outbreak of the Spanish-American war, he was transferred to the Third Cavalry. He served for a time in the Quartermaster's Department in Cuba. He was made captain in the Fifteenth Cavalry in 1901 and sent to the Philippines. One year later he was retired because of physical disability.

Captain Blunt continued to live in the Philippines, however, and proved an efficient member of the Philippine Constabulary, in which he secured a position, serving up to the time of his death. Aside from his duties, which brought him into personal touch with many of the personages described, quoted, or referred to in his book, he still found time for research and for occasional literary work. Among other things he made an English translation of a geographical textbook, which was and still is in use in a number of private colleges. While in the regular army, he wrote a book entitled "Maxims for Training Remount Horses for Military Purposes."

His lamented death occurred at the Military Division Hospital, November 22, 1910, after he had received the last rites and sacraments of the Catholic Church. His funeral took place from the Church of Santo Domingo, Manila, November 27. A cavalry escort accompanied the remains from and back to the Army morgue. Major-General Duvall and his staff attended the services. The pall-bearers, all personal friends of the deceased, were Colonel Brainard, Colonel Bellinger, Colonel Harbord, Colonel Screven, Captain Hornbrook, and Captain Met-

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calf. The remains were taken to the United States by the December transport, and towards the latter part of January, 1911, they were interred, with military honors, in the national cemetery at Arlington, overlooking the Potomac at Washington, D. C., the city of his birth.

MAY HE REST IN PEACE.

John R. Volz.

Manila, P. I., July 4, 1912.

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FIRST PAPER  
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FILIPINOS





## FIRST PAPER

### GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FILIPINOS

—X—

To investigate and reliably describe a country or a people, so as to give a just appreciation of the real existing conditions of either, it is not only necessary to be familiar with the natural resources of the former, but it is of greater importance to understand the character of the latter. It goes without saying that the investigator must not only be in touch with all classes, but he must also gain the individual confidence of those with whom he comes in contact. This latter is the more imperative because of differences in race, language, religion, civilization, manners and customs, and climate likewise—differences which more or less widely separate the country he is studying from his own country and people.

To accomplish the desired end, then, he must live among the subjects of his investigations and with them, speak a language they speak, know their history, traditions and political aspirations, respect their religious beliefs, at least tolerate, if he does not understand, their superstitions and, as far as is consistent, conform to their manners and customs. He must moreover interest himself in their troubles, not only in the way that appears best for them from his point of view, but also with due consideration for their ideas, wishes, and prejudices in the matter. He must bear in mind that the "other man" has a country and a people of which, in all probability, he is both fond and proud, and that he has inherited a religion, a language, and manners and customs

which were those of his ancestors. These things he has from his childhood been taught to honor and revere, and to all of them, no matter how obsolete, unintelligible, or barbarous they may appear to a stranger, he is undoubtedly as sincerely and firmly attached as is the stranger to the kindred things of his own country.

Conformity to some such precepts and method is about the only way to gain the desired confidence, and it is only after it has been gained that the "other man" will unbend, and, so to speak, lower his guard, enabling a correct understanding of his appreciation of things and events to be reached. In a word, he who studies another, especially of alien race, must be willing to put himself in the other's place, condescending to look at things through his eyes and endeavoring to appreciate them from his standpoint. Only in this way can he hope to gain an insight into the other's mental workings and thus account for motives and actions that otherwise may appear inexplicable to him.

The writer, in studying the Filipino during a nine years' residence in the Philippines, has endeavored to comply with the precepts and method he lays down. Moreover as translator of many of the reports made by the provincial governors, when the census of the Islands was taken in 1902, he had exceptional opportunities of seeing the natives as painted by themselves, especially in the reports of such of the native provincial governors as were supervisors of the census of their provinces. As a result, he has found, by adding the information contained in them and that derived from other sources, to his own personal observations, the following to be the general characteristics of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands.

The Filipino is a Malay. Owing to admixture with other races, however, the various tribes of the archipelago differ more or less from one another. Yet with the exception of the Negritos, their general physical characteristics and languages show a common origin. In gen-

eral terms the Filipino may be described as short, thick-set, well built, of good muscle, and very active. For his size and weight he is very powerful. He has straight black hair, thick nose and lips, high cheek bones, good teeth, large intelligent black eyes, and a well developed forehead. In color he varies from dark brown to almost white.

Many of the women are exceedingly beautiful. Nearly all of them have handsome figures, small delicate hands and feet, a wealth of black hair, of which they take great care and are justly proud, a clear complexion, wonderful eyes, and a fine erect carriage. Even among the peasantry and laboring classes they retain their good looks far past the prime of life. This is probably because what is known in Europe and America as the "struggle for existence", with its ravages on the human frame, is unknown to them; for nature has provided bountifully for the inhabitants of these islands. There is such an abundance of plantains, bread-fruit, mangos, papayas and other natural food-stuffs growing spontaneously, that it may safely be stated that work, so far as providing for daily bread goes, is practically unnecessary save for a very few days in the year. Beyond this daily bread, the wants of the natives are very few and are easily supplied. As a consequence it seems that old age comes to them gently, and without stamping on them that haggard, careworn appearance so common to those of the same class who have reached middle life in less favoured climes.

These islanders, by their mode of life, up to the present simple and free from excesses, once they have arrived at the age of puberty, are ordinarily healthy and long lived. On the other hand the death rate among children, owing principally to the lack of proper care in the matter of diet, is very heavy. As soon as a child is able to reach out, it is allowed to eat whatever it can lay its hands on. Thus most of the ills from which their children suffer are a result of the over indulgence care-

lessly permitted by the parents. The Filipino child as a rule sleeps when it wishes during the day time, and is allowed to remain up at night as long as it pleases. It eats when it is hungry, is never whipped, and rarely cries unless suffering from some bodily ailment. Though very much petted by its parents and all who come in contact with it, it is fairly well behaved and while shy with strangers, it is very respectful to its parents and elders. It is usually very scantily clad, if clad at all, and always appears to be fat and happy.

The Filipino adult is essentially conservative in his opinions and mode of life. As a rule he is slow to adopt new ideas or methods, and will resist, stubbornly though passively, all innovations that are suddenly or violently thrust upon him. If, however, they are presented with tact, he will examine them and if he is convinced that there is any advantage to be gained by so doing, he will adopt them.

In general he is law-abiding and perfectly submissive to what he recognizes as the constituted powers. He has indeed a great respect for constituted authority as represented by its officials, but for the law itself, as an abstract principle, no matter how much he may dread it as a concrete fact, he has no respect whatever. He looks upon it merely as an instrument or engine to bend his will to that of someone else. As a matter of fact all that he really respects in connection with it is its administrator, who, if he knows how to make himself personally agreeable and looked up to, can enforce bad or oppressive laws with less difficulty and with a better general result, than a person of less dignity and popularity could administer laws that the individual Filipino himself recognized as greatly superior and more liberal.

In his intercourse with strangers he lacks aggressiveness and is easily browbeaten. To all appearances he is shifting and vacillating in his opinions. In common with the other Orientals, he does not possess what is so characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon races—a burning desire,

commonly disguised under the name of "loving one's neighbour as oneself", altruism, and the like, to meddle in the affairs of others. Consequently he is perfectly willing that others should do and think as best suits themselves, so long as this is no source of immediate or direct inconvenience to him. He very rarely expresses his opinions on any subject unasked, or gives one "a piece of his mind", particularly if by so doing he thinks he is likely to wound or give offense. But he is a keen judge of character. Before answering a question or expressing his views, he will make a mental endeavor to ascertain the views of his interlocutor, with whom he is quite likely to agree merely to avoid friction or to get out of entering into what he considers a useless discussion of subjects on which he has already made up his mind. It is only with difficulty that he is moved from his original convictions by argument, and therefore he cannot understand how anyone else may be persuaded into a change of opinion.

In all business of an official nature, he is ceremonious and prolix. He approaches it with great formality out of respect for the position of the person with whom he is treating as well as for his own. In coming to the point, he is not given to "cutting off corners". In conversation with strangers or casual acquaintances, he very rarely corrects a mistake or endeavors to remove a false impression when he has reason to suppose it to be deeply rooted, for apart from being naturally polite he is anxious to please. At times he will even go further, making statements which he very well knows are at variance with facts, if he thinks that by so doing he will be agreeable to his hearer. This is especially the case in matters not directly important to him, and so he often confirms a stranger in erroneous opinions when he thinks that these are based on fixed preconceived ideas of no matter what origin. Indeed he is very well aware of the scanty thanks accorded to those who rudely shatter the idols of others, even though they

may be only of clay. He has no hesitation in leading one astray if he thinks it is to his advantage to do so. For these reasons his expressed views on any subject of a serious nature, above all if he has any interest at stake, should be accepted with caution. The best way to elicit information from him is to adopt a system of round-about conversation concerning the subject at issue, and then as much attention should be paid to what he leaves unsaid as to what he actually says.

In disposition the Filipino, especially the Tagalog, is kindly, genial, and sociable. He has a fairly keen sense of humor but he is highly sensitive to ridicule. He is reserved with strangers and while he may be suspicious of them, he endeavors not to show it. From generations of intercourse with the Spaniards his manners are grave and formal as well as courteous and polite. His deportment really sits easily on him, and, though he refrains from betraying it, he inwardly resents what he considers coarseness or lack of breeding. The tone and manner of his address to his own people and to strangers of long residence in the country, are very different from those he uses in his intercourse with Americans. He will not enter the house or office of a European without removing his hat, but he will not unlikely omit this ceremony in the case of an American. This does not arise from a desire to cringe to the one or to be insolent to the other. It is based upon his observation of the lack of those little courtesies of every day intercourse between Americans themselves, and he sincerely thinks that he is pleasing and flattering them by imitating them.

In respect to classes he is perfectly willing to look up to and respect them. Though ready to try raising himself to the level of those he considers above him, he heartily despises anyone who shows any tendency to come down from the class to which he thinks he belongs, or who attempts by collectively raising a lower to a higher, to realize what might be called the "dead level" of an abstract democracy. What Americans call "the dig-

nity of labour", is meaningless to him. He can see nothing to admire or respect in it as an idea, because he considers work in itself merely an inconvenience to be avoided if possible, though not to be ashamed of if necessary. Consequently he refrains from performing services for himself if he can have them performed for him by others.

Like all other Orientals he considers hospitality a sacred duty, binding on rich or poor alike, and he always cheerfully fulfills it. In entertaining his guests, he is lavish to the limit of his means and often beyond them. Until very lately, there being no hotels or inns except perhaps in one or two of the larger cities outside Manila, a traveler in the provinces, unless he had acquaintances in the towns he visited, had to stay at the "convento" or rectory, the town hall, or in the house of some one of the inhabitants of the place where night might overtake him. To propose to pay for anything received in the way of entertainment in a private house, no matter how poor the owner might be, was to offer an insult and to be guilty of a breach of good manners.

The Filipino is quite as fond of money as any Caucasian and is willing to do as much as others to acquire it. But he has no appreciation of its value in the European or American sense of the word. His idea is that it should be used while he is able to enjoy it and not be hoarded until he is past the age of doing so, leaving it for someone else to spend. Consequently while young he will squander it in gambling, horse-racing, and especially in cock-fighting, the latter amusement being as popular with him as bull-fighting is with the Spaniard, or horse-racing is with the Englishman, or base-ball with the American.

In his business dealings he is generally shrewd enough, feeling no more scruples than the members of other races in driving a bargain. At times, however, he will haggle absurdly or ask exorbitant prices according to some caprice of the moment. If he takes a liking to

the person with whom he is dealing or desires to do him a service, he will often sell at cost, or even below it, just as he will perform services for inadequate remuneration or perhaps for none at all, trusting to recoup his loss of time and money in some other transaction with the same person or by overcharging someone else. If, on the other hand, an intending purchaser has made himself distasteful, or is indifferent, and there is no immediate necessity that presses, no price however high will tempt the Filipino to sell, nor will he depart from the price he has once set though he will be perfectly polite in his refusal. Any attempt to beat him down, or any argument to show him the advantage to himself of accepting an offer, is but a waste of effort. At the same time it is very possible that he will sell the article in question at a lower price to someone else.

If the Filipino is lazy, it is more from the absence of an incentive, or to speak more correctly, of what he considers a necessity for working, than from any distaste for work itself. Moreover he considers time of no importance. Foreigners, who generally are in the Philippines only to make all they can in the shortest space of time, so as to return to their own country to enjoy the fruits of their enterprise and energy, readily see how much their capital could profit by his labor, were the Filipino willing to work steadily for wages, but they brand him as worthless because he cannot be depended upon to do so. For himself or to his immediate personal advantage, he works well and rapidly, regardless of hours or time; but he cannot be brought to see any good in working one instant longer for the enriching of others than is absolutely required. When he applies himself he makes a fairly good mechanic. He is apparently slow, yet if left alone at a task with which he is familiar, he will show a remarkable amount of progress. Any attempt to hurry him, however, is more than likely to have an effect contrary to the one desired.

As a river or harbor boatman, he shows an amount



of energy, determination, and courage that is truly admirable. This can be vouched for by any one who has made a trip up the Rio Cagayan del Norte, say from Tuguegarao to Eschague, at any season of the year, or who has taken part in the lightering of freight to and from steamers at Vigan when, as is very often the case, the sea on the bar at the river mouth of that place is a trifle rough.

As a student in good condition, he learns rapidly and well. So true is this that as a rule the Filipino youth at the start will outstrip a European companion. But according to foreign teachers his capacity for absorbing knowledge is soon reached and in the long run he falls behind. This is said to be a source of disappointment to the American teachers, who are not prepared for such an outcome, though it possibly arises from a failure on the part of the Filipino to appreciate the "might-come-handly" theory, or from a lack of ambition on the part of the youth, who perhaps is a carpenter by trade, to take a course of biology, or of a dressmaker to make a grand showing in calculus. In the majority of cases where the scholars go beyond the three "R's", it is purely with a view to qualify for the Civil Service and thus become eligible for some government employment which will preclude the necessity of manual labor.

As a civil employee the Filipino is fairly trustworthy in anything he really undertakes, though he is liable, for the sake of getting rid of importunate persons, to be ambiguous in his answers or to promise what he does not see his way to perform. This arises not so much from an intention or desire to deceive as from a lack of moral courage to say "no".

He is fond of borrowing money and though slow in repaying it, he never repudiates a debt of his own contracting or one contracted by his parents or the head of his family. He is by no means shy in asking and it is hard to make him take "no" for an answer. On the other hand he does not resent a refusal or the granting

of only a part of what he asked for. He takes great interest in the affairs of his immediate neighbors and friends, and consequently develops considerable activity as a gossip.

The Filipinos in general and the Visayans in particular make, when well led, excellent soldiers. They may be lacking in resourcefulness and deficient in initiative, but they certainly possess physical courage, and death has not the terrors for them that it has for the average European. They will undergo great privations without murmuring, and obey blindly without stopping to question whether the order received is lawful or not, leaving the responsibility for ulterior consequences that may arise with the officer in command. Should the officer ever shirk this responsibility or leave the blame to rest on a subordinate, his utility as a commander ceases and that soldier is no longer to be depended upon in any emergency.

As a house servant the Filipino is, if properly handled, very good. By treating him gently, firmly, and justly, one has little trouble with him. No matter how unimportant, trivial, or arbitrary an order may be, if it is given seriously and quietly, as though obedience were required as a matter of course, the Filipino servant will speedily though perhaps unsuccessfully endeavor to carry it out. In this he is unlike the Chinaman, who has a set way of doing things and is unwilling to depart from it. But any vacillation on the part of the master or any display of a tendency to consult the taste, wishes, or convenience of the servant, or any attempt at facetiousness will always result badly. To no people in the world can the proverb that "too much familiarity breeds contempt", be more aptly applied than to the Filipinos of all classes.

Whether by nature or by art, the Filipino has great command over himself and rarely gives way to his temper or allows it to get the upper hand. With him wordy altercations or angry squabbles are rare. When, however,

from no matter what cause he loses control of himself and passion gets the better of him, his moral pendulum seems to swing to the other extreme of the arc and even beyond it. He becomes a fiend incarnate without sense of personal danger or of moral or physical responsibility. He is as dangerous to those in his immediate vicinity, whether friend or foe, who attempt to interfere with him, as a "musth" elephant or a wounded grizzly bear at bay.

As an illustration of this the murder of his wife and mother-in-law by a famous Filipino artist some time ago in Paris is cited. While the tragedy was going on, a son and brother of its victims was calmly walking up and down a courtyard below, though he knew his mother and sister were being killed. This displays the strangely impassive side of the Filipino character. (1)

Taking to heart whatever he considers an insult or an injury, he is vindictive and waits patiently until the opportunity of avenging it in greater measure, or with impunity, presents itself. On the other hand he rarely or never harbors resentment for punishment in cases in which he realizes that he is wrong.

Like Orientals in general, he has a keen sense of justice, but he can see no reason for the law's delay. In this connection, he likes the proverb, "bis dat qui cito dat", (he gives twice who gives quickly), and punishment administered immediately is by far more effective as a correctional measure than after a protracted trial such as lawyers love. Procrastination of the law's workings appears to him merely a means of avoiding punishment if he knows he is guilty, or an endeavor to procure an unjust conviction if he believes himself to be innocent. Punishment may correct him individually for offenses committed, or the fear of its repetition may prevent him

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(1) This created quite a stir in Paris at the time but the court before which he was tried found extenuating circumstances in that the parties in question were semi-savages. For a detailed account of this affair see "La Gazette des Tribunaux" of Paris, February 9th, 1893.

from committing them again, but to punish one for an offense with any hope that the example may cause others to refrain from the infraction of any law or ordinance is practically useless.

In spite of the cheapness of Tuba and Nipa alcohols, commonly known as "Vino", drunkenness is a rare vice among the natives, though of late it is becoming more common. The daily report-book of the Santa Cruz Police Station showed more cases of drunkenness among them in the last three months of 1909 than during the whole of the five previous years.

In religion, the members of the civilized tribes are as a rule staunch Roman Catholics and as such believe in God, love their families, and leave it to the Church to define the articles of faith. Since the American occupation, many of the poorer and more ignorant classes have joined the Aglipayan schism or some of the numerous Protestant denominations introduced from England, the United States, or Germany. The most of these changes, more especially among the educated classes, have been from personal or political motives, a fact which many of the converts not only make no secret of but openly proclaim. As a rule impending death makes them return to the faith in which they were born. What the effect of the Protestant proselytizing may have on the rising generation is hard to forecast, but on adults of the present it simply amounts to taking the faith they have had away from them without giving any in return. In spite of the teachings of all Christian denominations, the Filipino mind, like that of all other Orientals, is strongly tinged with fatalism, and as a result, in accepting the inevitable, he is very much a philosopher. He bears his own troubles and reverses, no matter how severe they may be, with stoicism, but to the sufferings of others not immediately connected with him, he is absolutely indifferent.

Many authors accuse the Filipino of a complete lack of any sense of gratitude. This however the writer has

found to be an error. In all probability it arises from the Filipino's failing to show what foreigners consider a proper appreciation for something he has had forced upon him, which, no matter how highly prized by the donor, the Filipino did not want, or for which he had no particular use, while something he did want was withheld. Gifts like these, whether in the shape of commercial or political reforms, generally strike him as being by far more to the present advantage of the donor than to himself and it gives him little concern that future generations of his people may possibly reap some benefit from them. The writer, however, has found that the Filipino, if treated fairly and considerately, is just as grateful for a favor as any member of any of the many other races and nationalities he has come in contact with.

The necessity of blind obedience to parents and the heads or elder members of families, as well as to those whom they consider are in authority over them, is recognized to its fullest extent. So also is the obligation of carrying out their orders at all costs. This idea of blind obedience has in fact often been pushed to its logical conclusion by followers of the insurgent leaders pleading an order from those they considered in authority over them as a reason for committing acts of bloodshed or violence; and it seemed a strange doctrine to them to be held individually responsible for carrying out such an order. The victims of such orders very rarely harbored any great resentment or grudge against the persons who executed them but concentrated the weight of their resentment against the person by whom they were issued.

Filipino society is very patriarchal and there are no fixed lines or impassable gulfs dividing it into classes. The divisions, such as they are, shade imperceptibly from one into the other, blending into a not inharmonious whole, in which the claims of kinship, no matter how far removed, are everywhere recognized as obligatory. In this respect it is very much like the organization of the

old Scotch clans. A Filipino, no matter how well-to-do either socially or financially, would never think of denying kinship with the poorest or most obscure relation, however slight the connection or remote the relationship.

Among themselves their intercourse is characterized by respect and courtesy, and it is not considered a sign of education or good manners for one set to despise or look down upon another. They rarely speak harshly of, or criticise each other to strangers unless there is a case of some personal grudge to satisfy or of an injury to ventilate. They are rather prone to seek excuses for the shortcomings of their neighbours. In respect to immediate family ties, members of families are very closely united. They consider sharing whatever they have to be a matter of course. Thus persons in the prime of life will toil to support a number of hangers-on who are relatives too young or too old to work for themselves. The younger ones in their turn contribute to the support of their elders in their old age.

In the intercourse of families and between relatives of the third and fourth degree, great respect is paid to age and primogeniture. People of the same class, parents and children, never forget the distinctions due to age and precedence. From childhood they are carefully taught the observance of the delicate shades of respect between the different degrees of relationship, and this is sometimes shown in their intercourse with one another by the use of certain set forms of speech applied according to the degrees of consanguinity and seniority.

Parents are, paradoxical as it may seem, very exacting and very indulgent at the same time. They have a great aversion to separation from their children, whether legitimate or not. So strong is this aversion, that it is no uncommon occurrence to find parents, children, and grandchildren as well as nephews and nieces all living under the same roof. When the younger ones marry, the couple generally return from church to the house of the parents of one of the contracting parties. As a rule

children up to legal age and even after, live with their parents.

Marriages between relations, within the third and fourth degrees of kinship, are looked upon with a certain degree of repugnance. Once married, however, no matter what offences they may commit against one another, and if there be no open and scandalous infidelity on the part of the wife, the parties carry out in its integrity the biblical injunction to "cleave to one another". Absolute divorce is unknown, as there is no law in the Islands that can dissolve the marriage tie, and legal separations are considered more or less discreditable to both husband and wife. Whether this is the cause of great forbearance on the part of both parties, or the result of it, is hard to say, but the forbearance exists and as a consequence drunken husbands on the one hand and screaming viragoes on the other, are practically unknown among these people.

Marriages are generally celebrated according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, or in the case of schismatics according to those of the denomination to which the parties belong. Civil marriages are rare, and as a rule take place between natives and foreigners who are not Catholics, or persons whom, for canonical reasons, the clergy of the Catholic Church have refused to unite. Among all classes and under all circumstances, civil marriages are not regarded by Filipinos of either sex as binding (2) with the same moral force, or as entailing the same moral obligations, as religious marriages. As a matter of fact they are looked upon more

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(2) Many marriages, religious and civil, were contracted during the first three or four years of American occupation between Americans and native women. Some of the Americans seem to have felt the obligation to be so slight a one, that it is believed that were an authenticated list of these marriages published in the United States, a wide field would be opened to prosecutions for bigamy, to say nothing of abandonment.

as a means of legalizing temporary cohabitations than anything else.

The Filipino is jealous of the honor of his wife or "querida", and careless almost to indifference about that of his daughter or sister. Nor is he very particular as to what his wife's antecedents may have been before he married her. It is not meant by this that immorality is more rampant or more tolerated among Filipinos than among other people or nationalities, but there is perhaps more charity. Consequently a lapse from virtue on the part of an unmarried woman is looked upon as a misfortune to be deplored rather than as a crime to be punished and a case of antenuptial incontinence on the part of a girl, provided it has not been openly scandalous and promiscuous, is not regarded as an unpardonable offence, any more than it would be in a man, nor is it considered as an insurmountable barrier to marriage by either of the contracting parties.

Although Filipina women do not usually marry early, grandmothers at thirty are not uncommon. Such as do not marry, and these are very few, generally retire from the world to the seclusion of a convent or beaterio in some capacity or another, and consequently the "old maid" of Europe and the United States is practically unknown. The Filipinas, no matter what their conduct previous to marriage may have been, as a rule make good wives and tender mothers, and are very devoted to their husbands and children. The "mother-in law" is also a "rara avis". No Filipina would brook any interference between herself and her husband, so long as she lives with him. Whatever his shortcomings may be, he is her "marido", (husband), and as such always occupies the first place in her consideration.

No matter what their social or financial circumstances may be, the maternal instinct is very strong with them and they have not that aversion to motherhood which has of late become so characteristic of the middle classes of the Anglo-Saxon races. Whether this be due



to racial instinct or to the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, which places prevention of conception, abortion, and murder in the same moral category, is hard to say, but the fact remains that the Filipina is proud of her "olive branches" and regards them as a manifest testimony of her husband's affection. A couple without children are looked upon as objects of commiseration both by themselves and their friends. Having no children of their own, they generally adopt some and treat them in every way the same as they would their own offspring.

There are undoubtedly many unmarried couples living together "by common consent", (3) for there is no race of women on earth more willing to enter into temporary as well as permanent alliances. The average concubine, however, at least to all outward appearances, is as well behaved as the average married woman the world over. This is possibly because the parties to such unions, though not socially recognized among the better classes to the extent of being formally received into the circles to which they may properly belong, do not so lose caste as in other countries, nor are they relentlessly ostracized by their families or friends. Furthermore, the children of such unions are not cast out upon the charity of the world or consigned to the stern mercies of some foundling establishment (4).

Parents as a rule take care of and provide for such offspring, and it is no very uncommon thing to see the illegitimate children of a husband's dead mistress brought up and cared for by his proper wife, especially if she

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(3) These irregular unions are now far more common than formerly, having increased in proportion to the decrease of the power of the Catholic Church. The clergy always used all their influence to break them up by insisting on the parties marrying.

(4) The proportion of illegitimate births in the Philippines has increased in the last decade at a ratio of about ten per cent for each year over its predecessor.

has none of her own. But even if she has children, she does not seem to be able to find it in her heart to visit the sins of the father on his unlawful progeny. The lawful wife does not as a rule openly object to her husband's maintaining his illegitimate children in a reasonable manner, even should their mother be living, so long as he has severed his connection with her. No one indeed would attempt to separate an unmarried mother from her child on alleged religious or moral grounds.

According to Anglo-Saxon standards, this condition of affairs is highly immoral, and yet in its way it perhaps has its advantages. Up to quite recently there were very few Filipina public women promiscuously plying their trade as such, and even at present the number is comparatively small. About seventy-five per cent of the registered public prostitutes in the Islands are Europeans, Americans, or Japanese, who have come to the Philippines for their special purpose in the course of the last ten years. (5).

Filipina women are generally amiable in their disposition, though mildly and sometimes fiercely jealous. According to early writers, they, especially the Visayans, were given up to unbridled sensuality. This however is no longer the case. Instances of sexual depravity and unnatural practices among them are now rarer than among the more highly civilized European races.

With money at her command, the Filipina is very extravagant. She is fond of jewelry, often considering it, apart from its ornamental purposes, as an investment. She also loves fine clothes, handsome horses, and carriages. Owing to the cheapness of horse-flesh and vehicles, and the low rate of wages, it is a poor family indeed that does not possess a private conveyance of some

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(5) According to foreign medical men who have been established in Manila for many years, venereal diseases have increased in the last eight years about five hundred per cent.

description, even though they may have to "make war pay for war" by renting it out when not in use. (6).

In misfortune however, she recognizes that she has to bow to fate and, to all outward appearances, she takes her reverses gracefully if not cheerfully, not wasting her time, souring her disposition, or annoying her friends by useless lamentations or repinings over past prosperity. She generally makes the most of her present conditions, whatever they may be. Under all circumstances she makes a careful and frugal housewife. A poor white man marrying, or living in concubinage with, a native woman or a mestiza, will find the union to be very much to his pecuniary advantage, for she is an excellent business woman and will buy and sell, no matter in what quantities, more advantageously than he possibly could, and she will manage his household most economically. The Filipina has another advantage over her American or European sister in so far as she has much less actual manual labor falling to her lot. In one branch alone, domestic service, about seventy-five per cent of the household work is done by men or boys, whereas in Europe and the United States the contrary is the case.

The manners of the Filipinas are very gentle and quiet. Among their own people or with Spaniards, who from centuries of association understand them, they show a number of little graces in their intercourse with persons of their own age or with their elders, that are very attractive. In conversation they are self-possessed and sprightly, without however being boisterous, self assertive, or hoydenish. They never ape the masculine in manners, speech, or dress. Their language is always direct, sometimes to a degree that shocks the mock modest susceptibilities of a senseless euphemism. Still

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(6) There are in Manila about 2500 public vehicles dedicated to the transportation of persons, and as many more private ones; or about one to every ninety persons of the 240,000 that comprise the population of the city.

they are in all essentials modest and well behaved. They never talk "at" one, or endeavor to attract attention. Whether all this is the effect of climate, temperament, lack of energy and animal spirits, or the result of the religious education that most of them have received in greater or lesser degree, it is hard to say. But in any case Filipina women of education have a peculiar charm of their own that is very engaging.

They are fond of social gatherings, public or private entertainments, dancing, church processions, religious festivals, and theatre going. They are also great gamblers, the principal game among the women being "Panguingue", which is a complicated combination of six or eight packs of cards very much resembling "Bezique". They moreover speculate freely in lottery tickets, raffles, and races, and there are those among them, who in common with the men win and lose large sums at "Monte" or in the cock-pits. It is but fair to them however, to state that excess in these things is as rare among them as among women of other countries. Not looking upon them as either sins or crimes, any more than Americans so look upon "Progressive Euchre" "Bridge", or "Poker", they are more frank and open in the practice of them. Of late, lawn-tennis has become popular among the members of the well-to-do classes and baseball among the poorer.

In common with the men they have artistic tastes and instincts, and the majority of them who have received any education at all beyond the three "R's", and some who have not, draw, paint, or embroider with great taste and many with remarkable skill.

All Filipinos have a keen ear for music, of which they are very fond. It is true they have not yet produced composers, performers, or singers of more than local celebrity, but a remarkably large proportion of them play and sing very well. Their principal instruments are the violin, harp, piano, bandurria, and guitar.

The ordinary costume of the men consists of a knit

undershirt, white or colored, over which is worn a "camisa china", a sort of loose sack or blouse without collar or cuffs, of plain white cotton, piña, calibo, or sinamay of any color. The nether man is encased in loose drawers of some cotton stuff, either plain or colored, and plush "chinelas", slippers, without socks protect his feet. The head is covered with any kind of hat, hard or soft, of felt, straw, or buri. In the more remote provinces this is replaced by a "salacot", a species of hard mushroom-shaped hat, more or less elaborately ornamented with silver around the edges, and a circular plate or ball of the same metal on top.

The men of the better classes as a rule wear clothes of light cloth, silk, or cotton drill, cut in better or worse imitation of the European fashions. Leather or canvas shoes are worn, and the principal object sought in the whole costume appears to be comfort for a hot climate.

The majority of the native women of all classes, in Manila as well as in the provinces, dress in what is known as the "Mestiza" style, which, apart from being graceful, easy, and modest, is, from a hygienic point of view, particularly well adapted to the climate. This costume consists of a low-necked bodice of some light material such as "Piña", "Calibo", or "Sinamay", with immense open sleeves, over which is worn, shawl-wise, a large kerchief of the same material folded diagonally, so that the points reach the waist in front and behind. Under this is worn a chemise which reaches to the ankles and over which is a white petticoat more or less elaborately ornamented with lace, open work, or embroidery of various colors, according to the means and taste of the wearer. The outer garment is an overskirt of "sinamay", "jusi", imported piece-goods, silk, or whatever they can afford. It is sometimes cut with a pointed train that is gathered up and held in front with one hand while the other holds a fan.

Outside of the overskirt is generally worn a piece of

more or less elaborately ornamented black or dark colored stuff called the "tapis", very like an apron, that goes completely around the hips and reaches to a little below the knees. This sets off a good figure wonderfully and also improves the appearance of a bad one. The tapis is a distinguishing mark between the Spanish creoles, Mestizas, and the full-blooded Indians, or natives, and is supposed to be worn only by the latter.

When attending religious ceremonies, and only then, the Filipina covers her head, using for this purpose the lace mantilla as worn by Spanish women, or a "velo", (veil) consisting of a piece of light transparent black veiling about a yard and a half square and more or less elaborately ornamented with dots, beads, spangles, or the like, or a plain black veil of finer or coarser close woven material according to her means or taste. Any of these head coverings, when worn by one accustomed to them, can be made very graceful and effective.

Corsets are very rarely worn and stockings on very formal occasions. The usual foot-gear consists of "chinelas", (heelless slippers), "chorchos", (heelless slippers with cork soles about half an inch thick), "zapatillas", (high heeled slippers) and "zapatots", (any kind of heeled shoe). These are generally of plush, brocade, silk, kid, or leather of any color, and more or less elaborately embroidered with gold or colors and beaded according to taste and means.

This costume has, from a woman's point of view, the advantage of being capable of any amount of ornamentation and of being made from any material from the most delicate "piña", or the richest brocades, to the coarsest "sinamay" and the cheapest imported piece-goods. The embroideries of some of the skirts alone have been known to cost from ₱ 500.00 to ₱ 1000.00. All classes have excellent taste, and although the colors worn are what the Europeans would call glaring, they are well selected, well combined, and capitally suited to the wearers. One ornament worn by all classes, rich and

poor, young and old, at all times and on all occasions is a necklace made of champaca, sampaguita or ilang-ilang flowers strung on a thread of abacá. These are very fragrant and are hawked about the streets. As they cost but a few centavos they find a ready sale at all hours and in all quarters.

The Mestiza dress, rarely varied, is worn by the women of all the civilized tribes and is very becoming to them. As long as they stick to it, they are quite charming and attractive and always appear at their ease. When however they venture, as some of the would-be better classes unfortunately do, into corsets and European-cut clothes, they sometimes make curious mistakes in their applications of articles of dress. The same persons that one has seen and admired in their native costume are hardly recognizable in the conventional garb of Western civilization. Their charm has vanished and they have become stiff, awkward, and ungainly in their bearing, and conscious and strained in their manner, and have more the appearance of housemaids on a holiday than of persons of refinement.

The native costume in all its glory can best be seen at Antipolo on Saturdays and Sundays of the month of May. There at certain hours of the day the crowd in the streets presents a mass of the richest and most vivid possible combinations of color from black to white. The scene dazzles the eye and beggars description. It can only be compared to a moving and ever changing mass of gigantic and gorgeously variegated double tulips.

In their person and dress, all classes are remarkably clean, even the poorest of them changing every article of clothing three or four times a week. This, coupled with the fact that they bathe on every available occasion and that the vast majority of them for the greater part of the time wear neither shoes or stockings, is the reason that a Filipino crowd, no matter how dense it may be or how close the building in which it is assem-

bled, is never offensive, save for perfumes, good, bad, or indifferent, of which they are very fond. In going to or coming from their homes, the laboring classes are very neat in their appearance, for as a rule they put off their working clothes on leaving their work. When misfortune overtakes them, no matter what other economies they may put into practice, their wash bill is the last one they think of cutting down.

Their homes and immediate interior surroundings are very clean and in this particular could serve as models to many other nationalities with greater pretensions to cleanliness. Travelers are often fond of calling attention to what they are pleased to call the misery and filth of the poorer Filipinos, but of their own knowledge the critics generally know little or nothing of the same conditions prevailing among similar classes of their own countries. Had they ever been thrown among their own poverty stricken countrymen or visited them from some other motive than mere curiosity, they would realize that cleanliness or filth, is, in a measure, only relative, and that while it may look well on paper to run down the Filipino and his surroundings, the quarters of the great cities of Europe and America inhabited by the poorer classes, as well as the conditions of these classes themselves in respect to personal cleanliness and surroundings, would by no means be the gainers in a fair and impartial comparison between them and our Islanders.

The interiors of their houses are more or less elaborately ornamented and decorated according to their means, for they are fond of pretty things in the shape of furniture, pictures, hangings, bronzes, glass and china-ware, and especially of plants and flowers. In the selection and arrangement of these things, all classes display remarkable taste and artistic judgment.

Recent American and English writers, more particularly in the last six or eight years, and especially the American newspapers of Manila, have united in placing the Filipino on a very low plane, and some American



statesmen have not only denounced them as savages and ingrates, but they have declared it their opinion that a part of them are incapable of civilization. Many of these criticisms of the Islands and the Islanders are based on very superficial observations made in the course of a few weeks' sojourn in Manila, under the auspices of some bevy or another of native political mountebanks. These oracles of information, just as rats are said to desert a ship when sinking, are of the kind who out of sheer selfishness turn from one country or party to another. Many of them threw over Spain for the Filipino Republic and the Filipino Republic for the United States, in their anxiety to obtain and retain public offices and employments. Many of them were later required, or "allowed", to resign, if they were not absolutely dismissed from their positions, while others who knew how to shape their course and trim their sails, still remain somewhere and somehow on a convenient pay-roll.

Such men, though bright plausible talkers, were more anxious to accomplish their own personal ends than to impart real information. In their intercourse with American officials and visiting tourists, they always tried to ascertain the preconceived ideas of their interlocutors. Then by telling only as much as they judged would be acceptable, or by giving opinions of what they thought should be the case, as positive statements of what it actually was, they naturally confirmed the big white brothers in just the opinion, one-sided and erroneous, that under the circumstances they were bound to get and have.

It is on some such second-hand information, derived from sources like the above, that many who have had much to do with the shaping of American policy and opinions in regard to the Philippine Islands and how they should be governed, have undoubtedly based their judgment. Is it not a matter of record that of our makers of policy and of our colonial legislators, anything more than a very small minority was never within a thousand miles of the archipelago? Under these circumstances

and considering that the Filipinos in manners and customs, character and characteristics were then, as they still are, utterly unlike any people we heretofore had ever come into contact with, it is not to be wondered at that grave errors concerning them should have been made. The only wonder is that these errors have not been graver in themselves and more far-reaching in their effects on the governing of this people.

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SECOND PAPER  
GENERAL CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS PRIOR  
TO THE KATIPUNAN REBELLION OF 1896.



## SECOND PAPER

### GENERAL CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS PRIOR TO THE KATIPUNAN REBELLION OF 1896 (1)

While the Spanish administration of the Philippine Islands was far from perfect, it has been painted, for the English-speaking world, in much darker colors than it really deserved, and that principally by persons whose knowledge of it was mostly superficial, second-hand, or in a very few cases based on actual experience in the archipelago. It has therefore been commonly condemned out of hand by the English and American general public without having had a fair hearing, or indeed without any hearing at all. The information leading to such condemnation was largely based on ex-parte statements of persons smarting under some real or imaginary grievance. It is the familiar story of the usual results of unsuccessful or frustrated schemes and enterprises involving the exploitation of the Islands or their inhabitants to the personal benefit of interested parties. These schemes would have turned out just as their promoters wished, had they received the countenance of the colonial government, but the rub was that they were either disapproved or they were sanctioned as undertaken by others.

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(1) On the principle that two wrong actions do not make one right one, the comparisons in this paper would be odious, had they been made merely as a "tu quoque". But they were not so made. They have been set forth in order to assist anyone who has patience to read, to form his own standard by which to measure conditions such as they then were.

It may be said that no colonial government is quite perfect, and rarely is any considered to be such even by the people of the mother country or by the colonists themselves. More rarely still does any give complete satisfaction to either or both at once, even though they are necessarily, to a greater or lesser extent, in sympathy with it as forming part of the national government.

It is therefore not to be wondered at that the Hispano-Filipino government fared badly at the hands of writers and critics of other nationalities, who were openly hostile to the country it represented.

The supreme government of the Philippine Islands came directly under the ministry of Ultramar (Colonies) in Spain, of which ministry it formed a special branch. This branch included a Council for the Philippines in Madrid, to which all measures and projects regarding the Islands were referred. There was also a special bureau in the Spanish Exchequer which was in charge of all financial matters pertaining to the archipelago.

The insular government proper was under a Governor General, who was a high ranking military officer. As direct representative of the King and the home government, he was clothed with very extensive powers. These, since he could proclaim martial law whenever he considered that the circumstances warranted his doing so, amounted practically to the power of life and death.

The Governor General was assisted by two deliberative bodies, the Junta de Autoridades (Committee of Authorities) and the Council of Administration. These could discuss and, in conjunction with the Governor General might suggest measures concerning the Philippines to the ministry in Spain; but such measures became laws only after they had been passed and approved by the Madrid Government. They had authority, however, to enact such local ordinances as

were necessary to put the fundamental laws, made in Spain, into action in the archipelago. Thus the expressed views of these bodies would necessarily carry great weight, but they were in no way binding on the action of the Governor General. Not only were their functions solely of an advisory and executive nature, but he could summon or adjourn them at his pleasure. The existing laws, however, provided for a considerable amount of local, i. e., provincial and municipal, autonomy. (2)

The Governor General was in supreme command of the Spanish and Colonial land and sea forces stationed in the Islands. At discretion, he could assume the direction of either or both, though the land forces were directly under the command of the "Segundo Cabo" (Second Chief or what would be equivalent to the present Division Commander), while the sea forces were under the Admiral of the Filipino Squadron. He was also ex-officio Presiding Officer of all civil deliberative bodies of the insular government.

The details of this government were carried out by the Departments of Hacienda (Exchequer and Finance), and Fomento (Executive Administration). These departments were further subdivided into departmental bureaus, such as Customs, Agriculture, Manufactures, Public Works, Education, Justice, Forestry, etc., each under its respective chief. The chiefs of these departments and bureaus, though appointed by "Royal Order" direct from Madrid, were under the immediate authority of the Gov-

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(2) See statement of Cayetano Arellano before the Phillippine Commission, April 14th, 1899. Also that of Manuel Sastron before same Commission, May 14th, 1899.

General Joseph Wheeler in an interview at San Francisco, March 7th, 1900, says in substance that under the Spanish regime they (the Philippine Islands) had practically a system similar to that known as our "territorial system" whereby they had authority to make their own laws and govern themselves. The two deliberative bodies mentioned in the text are in all probability what he referred to.

ernor General, for they, as well as their departments and their branches, were subject to his inspection, criticism, and orders.

While land and sea forces stationed in the Philippines were for the time being under the supreme command of the Governor General, the routine departmental details of their affairs were managed respectively by the Ministers of War and Marine in Spain.

The different provinces of the Islands were divided, for administrative purposes, into two classes, Civil Governorships and Military Commanderies. The first were established as a rule in those provinces in which the greater number of the inhabitants were collected in organized municipalities, and the second in provinces in which the bulk of the population consisted of the wild tribes, "infielos", now known as the non-Christian tribes, that lived in a semi-nomadic state or were merely collected in "Rancherías".

Up to 1886, provincial affairs were managed by officials known as "Alcaldes Mayores", who combined the executive and judicial functions in their own persons. In the above year, however, this was changed and the two functions were separated. These officials were replaced by Civil Governors and judges of the Court of First Instance.

The local affairs of these provinces and commanderies were administered by officials of the "Politico" (Executive), Judiciary, "Hacienda" (Exchequer) and Religious (3) branches of the general colonial government. Each province and commandery had a staff of subordinate employees pertaining to these branches. Their numerical strength was in proportion to the extent and importance

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(3) All priests, whether secular or regular, who were in charge of parishes, received a certain percentage of the sums collected in their parishes for cedula tax and thus were in a measure stipendiaries of the government. In this paper, therefore, they have been classed among the officials of the province, though strictly speaking they, ex-officio, formed no part of them.



of the province. The functions of the above cited local branches are sufficiently explained by their nomenclature.

In such of the provinces as were under purely civil administration, the "Jefes Politicos", Political Chiefs or Governors, almost invariably Spaniards, were officials of the "Administration" (Executive Department): and the "Jefes Político-Militar" (Military chiefs or commanders) in charge of the Military Commanderies, were officers of the Army and Navy, according to the location of the commanderies. In some cases these Military or Naval officers united in their own persons the functions of all the administrative branches of their commanderies, with the exception of those of the religious.

The provinces under civil administration were divided into Pueblos (Towns and Townships), and the pueblos were further subdivided into Barrios, (Hamlets, Wards or Districts) and in the Military commanderies, the wild tribes were as a rule divided into "Rancherías."

There was a judiciary that consisted of an Attorney General in Manila ("Fiscal") and of the dependent "Fiscales" in the provinces, who fulfilled the functions of attorney general, district attorney, and public prosecutors as we understand them.

There was a supreme court divided into two sections, civil and criminal, that formed part of the "Audiencia", or appellate courts. There were also superior courts, (Courts of First Instance), in Manila and a judge of the court of first instance in the capitol of each province. There was a justice of the peace in every pueblo or township. The judges of the superior courts, some of whom were Spaniards and some natives, were appointed from Madrid. The justices of peace were appointed from Manila.

Cases originated in the justice's court, and if not terminated there, went to the higher courts according to their importance or on appeal. The final court of appeal in the Islands was the "Audiencia" or supreme court in

Manila, but from it cases could be taken on appeal to Spain.

In 1887, the Spanish Penal and Civil codes were introduced, and though the laws in themselves were excellent, the procedure was cumbersome, antiquated, and prolix, and admitted of great delays in the dispensing of justice.

The Governor General was ex-officio Presiding Officer of the Municipality of Manila, and the Civil Governor of the city, appointed from Madrid, was vice-President. There was also a first and second Alcalde, (Mayor and vice-Mayor), fourteen Regidores (Aldermen), appointed from Manila, a secretary, and the necessary staff of clerks, messengers, and other employees.

The office of Civil Governor of Manila was appointive, as also originally were those of the Regidores. These, however, had virtually become a self-perpetuating body. While their term of office was limited to two years only, they practically elected their own successors, although as a rule they did not serve for two successive terms.

The Regidores of Manila were further subdivided into committees, such as of Ways and Means, Public Works, Public Health, Audits and Accounts, Lighting of the streets, Building of new markets, Building of new cemeteries, Police, etc., the same Regidores serving as members of several different committees at the same time.

The cities of Iloilo, Cebu, Batangas, Vigan, Nueva Caceres and Jaro had similar, though not so elaborate, civic organizations, modeled on that of Manila. There was also, in most municipalities, an official known as the "Capitan Chino", who was the head man of the Chinese located there, who practically managed the Chinese colony and who was the go-between for them and the civic administrations.

For the purposes principally of tax collections and of registration, the rural and urban populations were

divided into groups called "Barangays", each consisting of about forty of fifty families. Every group had a head man, "Jefe de Barangay", whose duty it was to keep the accounts, collect the taxes, and the like, and though this office was considered onerous and there was no salary attached to it, there must have been some emoluments, for there seems to have been no difficulty in getting persons to occupy it. The incumbents of this office were selected every two years.

That the Filipino Colonial Government, according to Anglo-Saxon standards, was defective in its machinery is a fact. That many of its officials may have been corrupt is beyond question. Still both of these defects were very much exaggerated, not only by foreign travelers, but by Spaniards themselves. The latter were usually intensely patriotic, but they were not far from the first to criticize and roundly abuse the government and its measures, above all when as "Outs" they were discussing the "Ins". At the same time they would bitterly resent a foreigner's doing the same thing. The criticisms of the Filipinos of a certain well known class were still more bitter.

In these discussions, no allowance was made for existing conditions however abnormal, and no tales, no matter how wild or improbable, were denied circulation. Little justice and no mercy were shown, when men and measures of the opposite party came in for discussion or criticism. In this manner, many rash statements, originating in personal or party motives, were put forward by discontented Spaniards or natives, and accepted as facts by foreigners who were not in a position to ascertain the truth concerning them. Such statements later found their way into newspapers, magazines, or books as the "statements of a Spaniard of distinction", or they would be "authentic information given by a leading merchant of Manila who was in a position to know", or the like. Hence it often happened that correspondents or authors accepted at their face value, and took no steps to

verify, declarations, no matter how sweeping or far reaching, made by strangers on unfamiliar subjects, and then embodied them without even investigation in their next letter or book. The public they were written for, provided their prejudices were backed up or their preconceived opinions confirmed, accepted and cited them as incontrovertible facts. For this there was no other and no better reason than that they appeared in such a journal or magazine, or in a book of such or such an author.

As a Colonial Government the Philippine administration suited Spain, just as the present government of these Islands administered by the Philippine Commission suits the United States; and as it would have been folly in the past to expect Spain to shape her policy or to conduct her colonial affairs in accordance with the views or desires of other nations rather than of her own, so were it folly now to expect that the United States will look to foreigners for guidance in Philippine affairs. Those who did not like the Spanish Colonial Government, such as it was, were at liberty to do what Governor Taft, in a speech made at Iloilo, is credited with having advised certain complaining outsiders to do, when they did not like the conditions then existing under the American Civil Government—leave the Islands.

Whether the Spanish Colonial Government was better suited to the Philippines and their people than is the one administered by the present Philippine Commission under the authority of the United States, may admit of discussion. That the Spanish Government was better liked by the majority of average Filipinos of all classes and conditions does not admit of a doubt.

The follies and blunders of England's administration of her colonies in North America and other places have been ignored, forgotten, and glozed over by the generality of English and American writers. On the other hand, the follies and blunders of Spain's administration of her colonies the world over, have been pointed out, remem-

bered, held up to vituperation, and condemned by them to the fullest extent. Accenting their sweeping accusations without investigation therefore, and unqualifiedly condemning Spain because of the shortcomings of some or many of the Spanish officials, ought to be as far from common justice and consistency as it would be to condemn the Government of the United States on account of the maladministration of the funds of the "Freedman's Bureau", or because of the Star Route scandals, the frauds from time to time brought to light in the administration of the Post Office, or the scandals in connection with the purchase of public timber lands, not to mention other things. What American of average information can candidly claim for the civil administration of the great cities of the United States, above all for the richer and more important ones, anything like purity of government and freedom from corruption, as often as hands are held up in holy horror of Spain's administration of the Philippines or her other colonies?

That the Spanish colonial administration and system, during the three hundred and ninety years it lasted, may have been good, bad, or indifferent, depends very much on the point of view from which it is criticized. But after all has been said for and against it, one fact supremely worthy of notice remains, a fact which all writers seem so far to have left in the background or to have studiously ignored, and that is that of all nations from the beginning of the Christian era down to the present time, Spain with the aid of this very system held her colonies in undisputed possession by the colonists themselves longer than any other nations ever did theirs.

The richest and most important British colonies of the North American continent were discovered, conquered, or acquired by treaty; but owing to the tyrannies and the abuse meted out to the colonists by Great Britain, they were lost to her between the beginning of the seventeenth and the last quarter of the eighteenth centuries.

France started settlements in Canada and Louisiana in the seventeenth century but by the last quarter of the eighteenth, Canada had been wrested from her by England, while Louisiana, ceded by treaty to Spain and again returned to France, was finally purchased in 1803, by the United States. In these two colonies the French language, except in a few Canadian districts, has at present practically died out and has been replaced by the English.

Brazil, discovered by the Portuguese and settled by them in the sixteenth century, became an independent empire in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and at that time, all that remained to Portugal of her once vast colonial possessions in Africa, India, and China, were some unimportant places on the coasts of these three countries.

Spain commenced the colonization of the Antilles in the last decade of the fifteenth century and the first colony lost by her was the Island of Jamaica, taken from her some hundred and sixty years later (1665), by England, when Cromwell was Lord Protector. This was followed by her loss to France of many of the smaller West Indian islands, which were eventually taken from that country by England. The western part of the Island of San Domingo, Haiti, passed from Spain to France in 1714 by the Treaty of Ryswick, and in 1801 became a Negro Republic. The remainder of the Island was abandoned by Spain in 1863, after she had held it for over three and a half centuries. It is now a republic practically under the protectorate of the United States. Puerto Rico and the Philippines were ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris, December 10th, 1898. Through an assisted rebellion followed by the Spanish-American War of 1898, Cuba finally, in 1902, became an independent republic, after having been occupied by the American forces for about four years. (4)

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(4) Later 1908-9 there was a revolution in Cuba and United States troops had to be sent to restore order.

Mexico was the first colony lost to Spain by reason of the rebellion of a part of its inhabitants. It has been stated by Mexican writers that this rebellion came about as the result of bickerings and struggles for supremacy in that country between the Masons of the York and of the Scottish rites, the combatant factions in the war of independence being generally known in Mexico as "Escoseses" (Scots) and "Yorkinos" (Yorkers). This statement must be accepted cautiously.

The rebellions involving the loss by Spain of her South and Central American colonies appear to have been brought about largely by certain native agitators, materially assisted by French, English, Irish and other foreign unemployed military adventurers, who after the close of the Napoleonic wars, swarmed in Europe. Captain, afterwards Admiral, Cockrane of the British Royal Navy was also very prominent in affording them assistance by sea.

It is a curious fact that in nearly every case, the loss of her colonies by Spain is directly traceable to material, though indirect, assistance rendered by other countries to the local agitators. It was these, assisted by foreign sympathy and money, who fostered in the colonies a spirit of discontent and rebellion. In scarcely any case did the people themselves make any particular complaints of abuses, as did the inhabitants of the British colonies of North America. Once these rebellions started, money and arms appear always to have been forthcoming from other countries, thus assuring the rebels a success that in all probability they would otherwise never have attained. This assistance seems to have been extended in compliance with a survival of the foreign policy pursued by England in the reign of Henry VIII, Elizabeth, Charles I, and during the Commonwealth under Cromwell, and to all appearances, was rendered

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Havana newspapers asserted that this revolution was brought about by the ex-Consul of the United States with a view to necessitating American intervention and annexation by his country.

as much with a view to the crippling of Spain as a European power, as out of any sympathy for the real or imaginary wrongs or sufferings of the colonists. In no case does it appear that the people of the revolted colonies reaped any immediate material advantages over their former conditions. Whatever solid benefit there was usually went to the leaders, whilst the people were left with increased personal expenses, and the countries formed from the colonies were burdened with increased taxation and with greater financial obligations than they had before.

As the Spanish colonies were considered a part of the Spanish Monarchy, the colonial system may be said to have been based on the proverb, "Lo que hay de España es de los Españoles", (What there is of Spain, belongs to the Spaniards), just as the Monroe doctrine of "America for the Americans" embodies the general policy of the United States. While the emigration of Spaniards, (5) en masse, to the Philippines and other Spanish colonies was not encouraged, trade and commerce between the archipelago and the home peninsula were greatly fostered. Spaniards and Spanish interests were protected very much the same as Americans and American interests are protected by enactments to the effect that in all government contracts, American materials shall, when possible, be used to the exclusion of all others, or by

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(5) As up to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the only direct communication between Spain and the Philippines was via the Cape of Good Hope, such Spaniards as came to them, over and above priests and officials, generally "cast in their lot" with the Islands and remained until they had made a fortune or died. After the opening of the canal however, the class of Spaniards in the Philippines changed. Public service became a refuge for such hangers-on, great or small, of the leaders of the revolution in Spain (1868), as were "impossible" in that country, or whom the leaders wanted to get out of their way, or whose claims on them for some government employment were too strong to be denied recognition. Consequently the archipelago was gradually overrun with needy adventurers, many of whom later become political agitators of the worst description.



tariff and shipping laws that effectually protect American manufacturers and ship owners in American markets and ports.

This system of commercial policy answered very well so far as Spain and her colonies were concerned, for between them trade was practically free. It cannot be denied, however, that it bore heavily upon those foreign merchants in the Philippines, whose dealings were principally in commodities produced in, and imported from, other countries, between which and the Philippines no free trade existed. This hardship was felt more particularly by the British merchants established in the Philippines. They as well as the British public at home complained bitterly of a system which protected Spanish products in a Spanish colony, while against them as well as merchants of other countries, there stood a customs tariff which, small as it was (about one third of the rates at present in force), when added to certain port charges levied on ships not flying the Spanish flag, gave a distinct advantage to Spanish producers and ship owners both at home and in the colonies.

The British merchants in the Philippines, like their fellow countrymen at home, were in policy free traders. As such they could not or would not understand why any system of policy, commercial or otherwise, satisfactory and apposite to Great Britain, should not be equally so to any other nation, especially as the contrary interfered with trade advantages that all might have reaped had conditions been such as they desired. Under these circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at that they extended considerable sympathy, if nothing more, to any person or political party proposing, by rebellion or other means, to bring about a change that was likely to redound to British advantage. It is not strange either that British writers and the British nation in general, with their overbearing intolerance of, and characteristic contempt for, everything not British, branded as retrograde and incapable of progress a na-

tion whose foreign or colonial policy was not modeled on distinctly British lines, or at least on such as were favorable to British trade interests.

The keynote of the general Filipino situation, from a British point of view, at the time immediately preceding American intervention, was struck by Foreman when he expressed the hope that America would substitute a better government and one satisfactory to foreigners who have vast trade interests in the Islands. (6) This hope, placing as it does the interests of transient strangers above those of the permanent inhabitants or the natives themselves, clearly expresses the British ideal of the relations that should exist between Great Britain and foreign countries beyond the sea.

In the exaltation of the commercial ideal, England always took the lead, and the colonies, apart from being an outlet for her surplus population, became her fields for commercial and industrial enterprises to the exclusion of all else. By creating artificial wants and necessities in them she could offer reciprocal advantages to the home manufacturer and the colonial trader, regardless of any advantages to the native inhabitants or of what their desires or real wants might be. Americans, as the latest and most advanced development of the Anglo-Saxon ideal, are preeminent in carrying their commercial ideal to its logical conclusion. To such an extent is this the case that from the keenness displayed in the pursuit of wealth, it may be said without fear of contradiction that the "almighty dollar" is at the present time practically the only standard by which anything is measured in the United States. Consequently the American colonial policy must be, within limits, necessarily the same as the British in respect to foreign countries or colonies.

The French and German merchants in the Philip-

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(6) "The Phillippine Islands" by John N. Foreman, page 63, edition of 1899.

piners, as well as those of the nationalities whose commercial policies were more akin to that of Spain, were more philosophical than the English. Instead of inveighing against conditions which they of themselves were powerless to modify, they endeavored to make up for the lack of trade concessions, which they would willingly have accepted, by either working in with the Spanish merchants and native consumers or by a more economical management of their business. (7)

It has been stated by many that no progress or advance could be made under the Spanish Government. Accepting or rejecting this statement as an axiom on which to base an argument one way or the other, should depend upon what is understood by progress, and upon the kind of person by whom the statement is made. The responsibility for this statement would appear to rest with English and American writers, the generality of them having started out by assuming that whatever was Spanish was necessarily bad beyond redemption. In their writings they have followed this assumption up without considering the adverse circumstances with which Spain had to contend or the trying conditions with which she was confronted.

The Spanish Insular administration, bad as it was alleged to have been, could point with reasonable pride to many reforms and improvements in the Philippines. A cable connecting Manila with Hong-Kong and through that place with the outside world, had been laid in 1880. Telegraphic communication had been established between

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(7) There is at present no ground for complaint of discrimination from foreign merchants in respect to trade restrictions, customs duties, etc., as they are all confronted with a uniformly high tariff. Owing to this tariff the prices of many imported articles have advanced from fifty to one hundred and fifty per cent, but the only persons that suffer are the native and resident consumers, importers having put up their prices to meet the duties. There is a very general complaint among importers that not only has the volume of trade decreased, so far as they are concerned, but that the profits on such as exists are less than they formerly were.

the principal towns of Luzon. There were lines of subsidized mail steamers plying regularly between the larger ports of the Islands. A railway had been built under government guarantee from Manila to Dagupan, opening up the richest agricultural country of Luzon. The coasts of the Islands had been lighted in the most important places and new light-houses were in course of construction. (8) The Pasig River walls had been built from the Bridge of Spain to the river mouth, the entrance to which had been protected by stone jetties and improved by dredging. There were some forty three bridges of masonry or a combination of masonry and wood, strong enough for the use of vehicles of all descriptions, over the Pasig river and the various "esteros" (creeks or estuaries) that intersect Manila, to connect the streets of the different districts and suburbs of the city, and under thirty-seven of these bridges loaded barges could pass.

The pier of the Santa Cruz bridge had been commenced and carried from the bed of the Pasig river to its surface. Other important works had been planned and estimated by the department of "Las Obras Publicas" (Public Works). Among them was one for straightening, deepening, and facing with masonry, the "esteros" of Manila (9). That would not only have enhanced the beauty of the city but would have afforded vastly increased facilities in water communications to the surrounding country and the harbor.

In this respect too the provinces had not been neglected. In the neighborhood of all the larger towns, bridges of masonry or wood had been built and roads

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(8) Since that time several new light houses have been planned and one new one commenced, while the work on two, for which the Spaniards left the material, has been concluded. Beyond this, with the exception of harbor beacon-lights, the coasts of the Islands are at present very much in the same condition as they were when the Spaniards left them in 1898.

(9) The plans are on file in the "Bureau of Archives", Manila.

had been constructed (10), serving as a means of communication, though where water ways were available, the greater part of the produce of the Island was transported by river from the interior or by sea from one coast town to another.

A little over half the masonry work of the sea walls and breakwater of the new port of Manila had been furnished, and up to the breaking out of the Spanish-American War in 1898, work on the remainder was going on actively. There was a system of electric lighting for both the city and suburbs of Manila. This until replaced by another company, was able to furnish lights for streets, public buildings, and private houses. The Manila Water Works had been completed in 1887, and water was pumped some five miles, from Santolan to San Juan del Monte, where vaulted over-setting and distributing reservoirs had been constructed, while mains had been laid not only to Manila itself but as far as the suburbs of Paco, Malate, Ermita, Binondo, Tondo, Trozo, Santa Cruz, Sampaloc, San Nicholas, San Lazaro and Gagalangin. Public buildings and private houses were furnished with pure drinking water free of charge, the only expense that had to be incurred by householders being the necessary piping and plumbing on their premises. In various parts of the city, there were several ornamental public fountains as well as a large number of public hydrants from which those who were unwilling or unable to go to the expense of fitting their houses with piping, could draw water free (11). There were also the necessary fire plugs and an organized fire brigade.

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(10) These bridges and roads suffered severely between 1896-99 and from neglect and lack of repairs. Such of them as had not been destroyed during the Katipunan rebellion were allowed to go to ruin during the War of Conquest.

(11) The most of these free hydrants for some unaccountable reason, have been done away with since the American occupation. In all the districts mentioned with the exception of the Walled City, Binondo, Santa Cruz and San Nicholas, by far the greater

It is true that improvements had been slow in materializing, but this was owing to a lack of ready funds wherewith to carry them on rapidly. Besides there appears to have been an unwillingness to increase taxation in order to meet and overcome this condition. From what can be gathered, the Spanish policy seems to have been to "pay as you go" for improvements undertaken by the state, rather than to burden the colony with bonds or debentures, profitable investments indeed to monied corporations, but a drain on the country in the interest they draw.

Education and especially primary instruction had not been forgotten by this government. Over and above the parochial schools, academies, colleges, seminaries, and the university, managed by the religious orders, there was a very complete system of public municipal free schools, which under General Weyler's administration had been increased to some 2167 in number. These were very well attended by both sexes, each having a separate school. The official ratio was one school for every 5000 inhabitants. Instruction in these schools was

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part of the dwellings were and still are small bamboo and palm leaf constructions. While in most cases these small houses are owned by their inhabitants, the actual value of them would not justify the expense of laying piping in them, even were the water free. Thus it is on the poor and laboring class that this suppression of the free hydrants bears heaviest inasmuch as at present they either have to carry water a much longer distance than they formerly did, or pay others to carry it. As all householders who have water in their houses have to pay water rents in the case of these small houses, when they have water laid on, the rents have been increased about twenty per cent. The whole population of Manila, rich and poor, feel aggrieved at these water rents, as the money for the original installation of the water system was given to the city by the Spaniard, Señor Carriedo, under the express condition that the inhabitants be furnished with water free. Any extra expense incidental to the water supply over and above his gift, was to be borne by the city at large. Consequently water was furnished free from 1877 up to the time of the American occupation.

given by some 3700 teachers (12) of both sexes. As a result the Philippines could show a greater number of natives in proportion to the population, who could read and write, (13) to say nothing of those who could only understand and speak the language of the mother country, than any other Asiatic colony of any European power.

There was a nautical school under the auspices of the government in Manila, at which boys from all parts of the islands were not only taught the theoretical parts of a seaman's profession but were also given practical instruction in seamanship and fitted to become mates in the merchant service or cadets in the Royal Navy. There was also a free school for the teaching of trades, handicrafts, drawing and the like. All of these schools were well attended and gave excellent results. (14)

The many reforms and improvements introduced by the Spanish government into the Philippines from 1881

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(12) This gave a proportion of about one teacher to every 2200 of the total population, including the wild tribes.

The detailed curriculum of studies pursued in the Spanish educational establishments in the Philippines may be found in "Exhibit VI" of the report of the first Philippine Commission. That paper, however, written by Felipe Gonzalez Calderon, devotes so much space to indirect vituperation of the Spanish administration and the Catholic Church, as well as to the airing of the author's own particular views, that its value as a document from which an impartial reader can draw any but ex-parte conclusions, is seriously impaired.

(13) According to General Anderson, nearly all Filipinos could read and write and there were many schools. General Charles King stated that nine tenths of the people could read and write, and that there was a fair education everywhere. Emilio Aguinaldo stated that two thirds of the Filipinos could read and write. Lieut. J. D. Ford, U. S. N., stated that there was hardly a man or woman of the middle classes that could not read and write and that the children were given an early education.

(14) These schools were discontinued by the American authorities for six or seven years, though they were far and away better equipped and had a larger attendance than anything that has since been created to replace them.

to 1896, though made with the best intentions, produced no immediate beneficial effect on the natives. The change involved did not at once appeal to them because it was necessarily accompanied by an increase of taxes and custom dues, which caused a general rise in the cost of living.

The annual estimates called for an expenditure of about ₧ 17,500,000.00 (\$ 8,700,000) and the estimated sources of income showed a slight excess over this sum. Moreover there were no general colonial, or local municipal, debts based on loans, the interest on which would have to be wrung out of the inhabitants for the benefit of foreign investors. In the face of these figures it cannot be said that the people of these islands were heavily burdened with taxes, or that they received an inadequate return for such as were levied upon them (15).

The much talked of pillage of the people was in one sense a myth. The state may have been robbed to a

(15) The receipts and expenditures for the year 1897 were distributed about as follows:

RECEIPTS		EXPENDITURES	
Direct taxes .....	₧8,496,170	General charges ....	₧1,507,900
Customs .....	6,200,550	State.....	74,000
Monopolies .....	576,000	Grace and Justice,	
Stamps .....	646,000	gaols, public wor-	
Lotteries, etc. ....	1,000,000	ship, etc.....	1,896,277
Crown property ....	257,000	Treasury (including	
Miscellaneous .....	298,090	Custom House	
		Guards).....	1,393,184
		Civil Service, includ-	
		ing "Guardia Civil"	
		Constabulary, ....	2,198,350
		Education and Public	
		Works .....	615,198
		Army and Navy....	9,608,990

The expenditures and consequently the direct and indirect taxation for 1908, were more than double the above and included the Constabulary and Coast Guard service, though not the Army and Navy, which makes the expense of the present civil government proper much greater in proportion than formerly.



limited extent, by not receiving all the taxes collected, or it may have suffered by having had some of its funds occasionally diverted to other purposes than those intended, and some small amounts may have found their way into the pockets of the officials who collected or administered them, but this was not in a degree or to an extent anything like what has been alleged (16). It is true that there were certain perquisites and vails pertaining to many offices. But these, although not provided for in the estimated salaries of the incumbents, were fully as lawful as are the fees of Sheriffs, Collectors of Revenue, or Consuls of the United States (17).

The tribute, as theretofore levied on the Indians, was

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(16) Many reports of official peculations were current at the time of the American intervention in 1898. One of them referred specifically to the palace of the Governor-General in Manila, which was to replace the one destroyed by the earthquake of 1882, and on which all work had been stopped. The story was to the effect that the work had not only been reported by the colonial authorities to the Madrid Government as finished, whereas such was not the case, but the money allotted for the building as well as for subsequent repairs, instead of being applied to its purpose, had found its way into the pockets of the Governor-General and other insular officers.

The writer endeavored to substantiate this report but was unable to do so, or to find any one who chose to make a positive statement backed up by any Spanish or Colonial Budgets, Official Reports, or documents of a like nature to support it. The custodian of the official state-records of the archipelago submitted to the writer the original plans and estimates for the work in question as far as it had gone. Considering that the material was very largely composed of hewn and squared red granite imported from Hong-Kong the estimates did not seem excessive. It was also stated that the monies drawn from the treasury for this building had been applied to the purpose for which they were intended.

The same conditions were found to apply to many similar statements, in which assertion has been accepted, and eagerly swallowed as proof, though on investigation of the papers of the "Obras Pùblicas", no foundation can be found for them.

(17) The fees collected by the Sheriff of New York, the Collector of the Port of the same city, and the United States Consuls at Liverpool and other foreign ports, were popularly supposed to be far in excess of the regular salaries of these officials.

abolished in 1883 and was replaced by a poll tax represented by a "Cédula Personal", which was paid by all classes alike. This was a cause of complaint on all hands as it necessitated a change in the system of taxation. Till then the Indians, who formerly paid the tribute, became liable only for other taxes, but the Spaniards, Europeans, and foreigners generally, who had paid no tribute, became liable to the cedula charges, which they looked upon as an extra tax.

The cedula charges were levied on all and ranged from one peseta (\$0.10) up to twenty-five pesos (\$12.50) annually per capita, in proportion to the income of the person on whom the charge was levied (18).

The people individually were not oppressed. Full blooded natives were by law allowed privileges that were denied to Spaniards, Spanish Creoles, and Mestizos (19). Among these was the right to cut, free of charge, timber, bamboo, and other forest products for their own use from the public domain (20). They were allowed for their own benefit to occupy and preempt public lands for agricultural and other purposes, and there was no land tax. The natives were left very much alone to manage their own private affairs as they saw fit. They were not interfered with by the authorities, nor nagged nor worried in their occupations, amusements, or mode of life. No effort was made to dragoon them into habits of frugality or industry which were foreign to their nature, and for which, so far as they could see, no necessity existed, because owing to the climatic conditions, absolute want and hunger were practically unknown.

It has been the fashion among writers to hold Spain up to odium and execration as wantonly reckless of, and

(18) The "cedula" (poll tax) is now, 1909, two pesos (\$1.00) levied on all persons alike. This is harder on the poor than the rich.

(19) Mestizos: half-breeds between natives and other foreign races, in fact any persons known to have Indian blood in them.

(20) This right has been abolished.

indifferent to, the expenditure of human life (21). She has also been described as an inveterate persecutor and exterminator of the aboriginal races she conquered or colonized. An impartial examination of history demonstrates that these accusations are not based on facts. Even if they were, Spain had not therefore been worse than any other nation. England, during the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, certainly persecuted bitterly and unrelentingly in England, Scotland, and Ireland. In the latter country especially, she made as determined an effort towards the extermination of the Irish race (22) as Spain has ever been alleged to have made towards the extermination of native races in her dominions in any quarter of the globe.

The massacre of Glencoe and other proceedings of

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(21) It has been estimated that in the United States in the four years, 1901 to 1904, there were upwards of thirty thousand persons who came to their death at the hands of others by murder, manslaughter, homicide, and legal executions.

Taking the reports of the Inter-State Commerce Commission as a basis, there was an average of over twelve thousand persons killed outright and a hundred and sixty thousand injured in railway accidents during the same period.

(22) The Earl of Essex, Elizabeth's governor in Ireland, seems "to have waded through a sea of blood in his endeavor to subjugate that country and exterminate the Irish race, respecting the vitality of which he had formed too low an estimate \* \* \*. He massacred some two hundred O'Neils by stratagem \* \* \* and later put to death several hundred persons, principally women and children, whom he discovered hiding in the caves of Rathlin \* \* \*. Sir Walter Raleigh under Essex took part in the Smarwick massacre and was distinguished for his willingness to hunt down Irish rebels as mere wild beasts whose leaders might be smitten down by assassination if necessary \* \* \*. In his unscrupulous dealings with people of other habits and beliefs than his own, Raleigh was a representative Elizabethan Englishman \* \* \*. Drury hanged over four hundred persons in Munster in one year \* \* \*. The horrors of this war are impossible to exaggerate \* \* \* and so on during the reigns of Elizabeth, the Stuarts, the Commonwealth and the houses of Orange and Hanover " See Encyclopedia Britannica for more detailed accounts.

the Duke of Cumberland in Scotland, as well as the deportation of the highlanders from that country, are matters of history that shed no glory on England from a humanitarian standpoint. The atrocities committed in the Spanish Main, 1167-71, by Morgan and the ruffians he commanded, are unparalleled in history, and yet he was acting under a letter of instructions from the English Governor of Jamaica (23). The excesses committed by the English when, under Draper and Cornish, they captured Manila in 1762, are far from creditable to humanity. In respect to persecution for religion's sake, a very fair idea of what it amounted to in England can be formed from Macauley's essay on "Hallam's Constitutional History" as well as from Dr. Lingard's "History of England".

English writers of both history and romance have expended a great deal of sentiment over the expulsion of the Moors from Spain. As a result, it is very generally believed that the Moors suffered some serious wrong or wanton injury. The fact that the Moors were originally the aggressors and invaders of Spain, overrunning the country and offering the inhabitants the alternatives of Islamism, slavery, or the sword, is ignored. The further fact that it was only after eight hundred years of continual warfare that the Spaniards regained the mastery over their own country is likewise not put in its proper light (24). These same writers are discreetly silent on the subject of the expulsion of the French

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(23) For grim cold-blooded cynicism, the letter of instructions given to him by the Governor of Jamaica, when he made his attack on Santiago de Cuba, is worthy of note.

(24) As a matter of fact the expulsion of the Moors from Spain was nothing more than a demonstration of the superior vitality of the Iberian race found in the peninsula by the Moorish invaders upon their arrival. This invasion, which reached as far as Tours in France, was, unlike the Saxon or Norman invasion of England, unable to hold its own. The invading race, in spite of its esthetic and intellectual superiority, in spite of the arts and sciences it introduced, lacked the racial stamina necessary to hold on to what

settlers from the province of Acadia, Nova Scotia, by the English, who certainly had nothing like the provocation the Spaniards had received from the Moors (25).

In the face of such historical facts, English writers are hardly in a position to point the finger of scorn at Spain as a persecutor and exterminator. In spite of their oft reiterated statements to Spain's injury, which have met with such ready acceptance by the English-speaking public, the incontrovertible fact remains that the only colonies of European nations in which the races found in them when they were first discovered, now form any considerable part of their present population or participate to any appreciable extent in their present government, are precisely the countries conquered or colonized by this much reviled nation, and developed under her severely condemned colonial system.

The difference between the Spanish and the Anglo-Saxon colonial policies seems to have been that the former was governed by religious, and the latter by commercial motives. While the Anglo-Saxon policy contributed toward the increase of the wealth of the world, it has resulted in the practical extermination of the aboriginal races. The Spanish policy, on the other hand,

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it had conquered; and gradually the peninsula was, inch by inch, reconquered by the descendants of its original inhabitants, and those of the invaders were finally driven out. This was but a natural consequence, according to the theory of the survival of the fittest, and it was also supported by the incontrovertible logic of the fact that when two races come into contact, the weakest goes to the wall. This has been paralleled in the removal of the Indian tribes of North America from one reservation to another, in order to make room for the immigrants from the overflowing population of the once colonies, now states, of the Atlantic seaboard, and now the races to which the aboriginal tribes belonged have practically become extinct.

(25) In 1715 France renounced all claims to this province in favor of England. Later, in 1755, an English squadron came to the coast and as much of the French population as could be, was forced on board the English ships of war and scattered haphazard at various points along the North American coast.

evidently had in view the preservation and civilization of the native races, and not the removal of them to make place for Spaniards. As a matter of fact, the aboriginal races of the Philippines as well as of other countries formed from the Spanish colonies, whether they revolted from Spain or remained under her until they were wrested from her, have mostly increased in numbers and in material prosperity. Their descendants today are the owners of the lands over which their ancestors had roamed as savages when Spain first assumed dominion over them.

Spanish moral influence must have been very powerful. In spite of the fact that the native races were always, as they still are, numerically in the ascendent, the populations of the countries formed out of Spain's revolted colonies, excepting in a few minor and insignificant details, are distinctly Spanish. They still retain in a greater or lesser degree, Spain's language, manners, customs, and modes of life and thought.

On the other hand, in the United States, formerly in part the colonies of North America, in parts of South America, Australia, and New Zealand, to say nothing of the Pacific Ocean, all the aboriginal races under the Anglo-Saxon colonial policy, have become practically extinct. Their lands have gone from them and are now the property of immigrants from other countries. Where any of their descendants still exist, they in some cases enjoy very much abridged political rights, but in others they are reduced to the mere state of "hewers of wood and drawers of water."

Individually Spaniards and Filipinos got on very well together. There was much social intercourse between them. Spaniards married mestizas or full blooded native women without losing caste in the colony or at home. This was the case because under Spanish rule, the general social position of women in the Philippines was equal to that enjoyed by the women of any country in the world.

The educated among the natives of the archipelago were eligible to places of trust, honor, and emolument under the Spanish crown, both in the Philippines and in Spain. They held commissions in the Army and Navy, took their regular turn of promotion in both these services, and the majority of civil servants of the Spanish Insular administration were Filipinos. Those whose services were efficient and faithful were rewarded with titles and rank. A native of Tondo, for instance, became Spanish Minister of War. A few years ago, a native of Pampanga was appointed Governor of the Spanish possessions on the West Coast of Africa. Many were appointed to high civil positions as well as to judgeships in the various courts in the Islands, and a proof of the fitness of their selection lies in the fact that many of them are still on the bench under American administration. In a word, the native Filipinos came in for as large a share of "loaves and fishes" as there might be. They had indeed a greater proportionate share (26) in the administration and offices of the Philippines than ever was or is accorded to the native inhabitants of any non-Caucasian colony of any nation of the world, excepting perhaps some of the English West Indian Islands, where the bulk of the population is composed of the descendants of African negro slaves.

Prior to 1896, the Filipinos had every reason to be as contented a community as could be found in any colony. The Spanish rule imposed few burdens and delivered them from many misfortunes. If progress in the modern acceptance of the word was rare, the material want and misery that usually accompanies it in other and more progressive countries, were rarer still. General living

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(26) Under the American rule the number of civil employees is much greater than it was under the Spanish sovereignty, though the proportion of native to American employees both in the Federal and Insular services is much smaller now than it was under Spain.

expenses were a fourth of what they are today (27). Money had a greater purchasing power, and local and general taxes were collectively about a fourth of what they are at present. The vast majority lived in competence if not in affluence, and by far the greater portion of the cultivated land was owned by natives.

The magnificent houses in Manila and the provinces, with after ten years of rebellion and warfare still exist, and the ruins of those destroyed during that time, but not yet rebuilt or replaced by others, are incontrovertible witnesses to the fact that not only was there a great amount of wealth in the country but it must also have been widely distributed and freely spent.

There had been an onward march of general progress. The population and exports had increased steadily (28). It is safe to say that no British, Dutch, or French colony of a like, almost exclusively native, population could compare in prosperity with the Philippine Islands up to the breaking out of the Katipunan rebellion of 1895.

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(27) R. F. Pedro Torra, S. J., in estimating the wages that should be paid to schoolmasters, states that there were provinces in the archipelago in which a man can get on as well as anybody for P 4.00 or P 5.00 (\$2.00 or \$2.50) per month, and that in Manila or its vicinity P 50.00 (\$25.00) would be sufficient. See statement of R. F. P. Torra before the Philippine Commission, July 10th, 1899.

"A laborer who earned P 0.20 (\$0.10) per day for 300 days in the year could live in luxury." See "The Philippine Islands", page 320, Edition 1899, by John Foreman.

An average of these two sums, estimates of different classes of work, would give P 27.50 (\$13.75) per month as sufficient to live on with decency and comfort.

(28) The average balance of trade as computed from the Custom House returns was, between 1885 and 1896, a little over twenty per cent in favor of the Islands annually; that is to say that in the above period, about P 28,000,000 in cash found its way into the Philippines to pay for the difference in value between the exports over the imports. Since 1898 to 1909, the contrary has been the case. The values of imports have exceeded the exports and consequently the difference had to be drawn from the Islands in money.



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EDITOR'S NOTE, (Cf. p. 53). Along the same line of thought, (note 21), and serving somewhat as a reminder of the old proverb that "people who live in glass houses should not throw stones", the following statistical paragraph is quoted from the N. Y. Freeman's Journal Sept. 2, 1911:

"The recent burning at the stake of a negro at Coatesville, Pa., recalls that nearly five thousand public lynchings have taken place in the United States in the last twenty-five years, and of those put to death about forty have been burned at the stake. So far as is known the first man to be killed in this manner was Henry Smith, a negro, who was killed by a mob at Paris, Texas, in 1893. He was accused of the murder of a white woman and after he had been bound with fence wire to a steel railroad rail, wood and rubbish were heaped about him and the dead woman's husband applied a match to the pile. Two more negroes were burned in 1893 and in 1894 three were burned together at Madison, Fla. The lynching was made the occasion of a general holiday and the victims were flayed before being burned. They were charged with murdering a woman.

Negroes have been burned at the stake in nearly all the Southern States and in Kansas, Colorado, California, Pennsylvania and Delaware. There is no record of any one suffering imprisonment or any other penalty for participating. Many of the victims have been burned for killing white men. The Delaware lynching occurred in 1903, when George White was burned on Sunday in a public square in Wilmington for the murder of Helen Bishop. One white man, Antonio Rodriguez, a Mexican, was burned at the stake in Rock Springs, Texas, last year. He was charged with murdering a Mrs. Henderson."

In the same issue of the Freeman's Journal, Captain Blunt's plea for more fair play and less bigotry in our

popular judgment of Spain and Spanish policy, is admirably seconded by the writer of the following: "A critic in the New York Times, reviewing Irving Berdine Richman's 'California Under Spain and Mexico' touches a topic that often claims attention, but does not always receive the reasonable interpretation which he suggests. He writes:

'We talk much about the cruelty of the Spaniards toward the Indians, with a complete indifference to the black record of our own race in that respect. The story is told in this book of the earnest and Christian effort of Spanish officials and priests to rescue the Indians from the oppressions of adventurers; of their high words of warning and rebuke and of the lengths to which they went to save their imperiled wards.

Against their efforts avarice contended successfully; the difference is that while the Indians suffered as much from the English colonists, it is not easy to find any English Governor or minister who labored as did the Spanish officials and priests to avert that disgrace to the white race, and it is much easier to find English clergymen and statesmen who acquiesced in and encouraged the exploitation of the Indians than it is to find Spaniards who did so. May it not be that what we have sanctimoniously asserted to be a Spanish trait was, after all, a trait of human nature? When Nicolas de Ovando, Governor of Hispaniola, wrote in 1503 that the Indians would not work for wages, Ferdinand and Isabella replied firmly that what was required of the Indians should be required of them "as free persons, as they are, and not as slaves." Yet there were Indian slaves in Massachusetts a century later.'

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THIRD PAPER  
SECRET SOCIETIES OF THE PHILIPPINES



### THIRD PAPER

## SECRET SOCIETIES OF THE PHILIPPINES

In countries where climate and environment render the material conditions of life easy and where, as in the Philippine Islands, the prominent characteristics of the races are not individuality and aggressiveness, forms of government are not ordinarily likely to be burning questions of paramount interest. Unless heavily taxed, harshly tyrannized over, or unduly interfered with in pursuits and amusements of immemorial custom, the inhabitants, within limits, are rather indifferent to government and rulers alike. They will pay but little attention to abstract wrongs. They will be little concerned about securing political privileges which they have never possessed and for which they have never felt any necessity or desire.

In the Philippines, however, there was, as everywhere else, a certain number eminently dissatisfied with the existing order of things. The more contented the majority of the inhabitants appeared to be, the more anxious this class became to create a spirit of discontent and thereby to bring about a radical change. Like their kind the world over, the fewer they were in number, the more utterly intolerant they became of all dissenting opinions, and the more strenuously clamorous in denying that any moral, social, or material progress could be achieved except by themselves and the means they approved.

As in other countries, this class furnished the political agitators of the Philippines. Some of them, in rare instances, were actuated by a sincere desire to

better the conditions of their countrymen. As a matter of fact, however, the great majority were anxious for a change which, if it would not place them at the head of affairs, would at least afford hopes of gaining a footing among the ruling classes. Thus they designed to gratify their personal ambitions for notoriety, power, or wealth.

To create a spirit of discontent and to bring about an artificial condition of affairs, under which the agitators could realize their aspirations, it became necessary to work upon the people, till then fairly contented. These were to be made to believe that they were suffering under some great material wrong or injustice. They had to be shown that some right or privilege, theretofore possessed, was being withheld or had been taken away from them. Popular hopes were to be aroused that some great benefit would be obtained by overthrowing the existing form of government and by substituting some other, of which the agitators themselves, however, had but a vague, indistinct, and rudimentary idea. To realize this end and to disseminate their ideas, there was no engine so powerful or so apposite as a secret political society.

Up to a comparatively recent period, the Filipino masses were mostly a home abiding people. They rarely moved from one place to another outside their own province or neighborhood. Among them, furthermore, there were practically no social gulfs to bridge over. Hence secret societies could be of little use in furthering merely social ends, because every one was perfectly known to his neighbors. There was also little or no necessity for them as mutual aid associations because family ties are very strong and all invariably help one another in financial and other matters. According to the general Filipino view of such things, a secret society, therefore, could have only one end, some political object, aiming at the overthrow of the governing powers of the country

To the Filipino agitators, therefore, a secret political

society, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, meant nothing more or less than a political conspiracy. The roles to be played and the rewards to be reaped by the leaders were naturally of the greatest prominence, whilst those of the rank and file were of comparative insignificance. But the attainment of their object by violent or occult means, rather than by the more open and pacific methods of evolution and time, was something that the law, as it stood, prohibited or withheld. Consequently it is by no means surprising that when the political agitators first made their presence felt among the hitherto contented inhabitants of these Islands, they chose secret societies, whose avowed objects were social or political, but which really were vehicles for furthering disturbances, revolt, and rebellion.

Of secret societies the world over, no matter what their declared or ostensible object may be, it can generally be safely stated that the more exclusive, the more ritualistic, and the more mysterious they are, the more respect and awe they will command from nine tenths of humanity, east or west, and the greater will be the number of applicants for admission to them. Some of these applicants seek, under their auspices, shorter and more convenient by-paths to social, political, or commercial advantages and standing than are afforded by the ordinary beaten roads of individual popularity, merit, or industry. Others feeling the "magnificence of the unknown"—"omne ignotum pro magnifico"—are attracted by the supposed great secrets, which serve as a lure and a goad to human curiosity.

These societies, as a rule, are divided into grades or degrees with general or special grips, signs, and passwords, enabling members personally unacquainted to recognize one another as fellows or colleagues when they first meet. Advancement from the lower grades to the higher, or even good standing in the grades themselves, depends upon a member's blindly carrying out the work assigned to him by his superiors. As first, therefore, he

is but little nearer to the realization of his ambition or to the gaining of the final secret, than when he was a postulant. In fact only such individual members as are most energetic and successful in carrying out the work allotted to them are correspondingly advanced.

Individual initiative and aggressiveness are supposed to be the distinguishing characteristics of the European races in general and of the Anglo-Saxon in particular. These traits allow any number of their members, without resort to secret societies, to form political parties or coalitions, and to work for the attainment of any definite object under chosen temporary or permanent leaders. Whether the object is attained or not, the party easily resolves itself into its individual units again, if it is expedient to do so. The members will nearly always govern their collective or individual action according to the dictates of their judgment. Or they will make changes of policy or they will compromise to suit the exigencies of the moment without endangering the unity of their organization, or the fixity of purpose necessary to the accomplishment of their ulterior object.

The Oriental however—and the Filipino is an Oriental—does not possess these traits. Instinctively, and possibly without being aware of it, he looks to an oath-bound secret association to give him the strength and moral courage which he lacks as an individual. Consequently when he embarks in it, no matter how indefinite or obscure its general ends, or its means of accomplishing them, he adheres to its work more tenaciously and follows his leaders more blindly than ever would a European in an ordinary political organization, in which leaders and followers claim and are allowed a certain elasticity of action. Such elasticity of action cannot obtain in an oath-bound secret association, whose leaders and followers both, the latter according to the measure of what they are permitted to know, must keep their eyes steadily fixed on a rigid, cut and dried program.

While the heads of directing committees of secret-



political societies may have in view both definite objects and detailed programs of the means of attaining them, it is for obvious reasons inexpedient that the general run of the subordinates should possess the same knowledge. Members of the lower and numerically greater grades, and especially the more recently initiated, cannot be given more than a superficial idea of the nature of the work to be done outside of the particular grade or degree to which they belong, nor are they wisely made acquainted with means and details until the time for action arrives. On the same principle, a general commanding an army does not take the rank and file of it into his confidence. He does not explain to them in detail the general policy dictating and governing his plans, or the minutiae of the operations by which he proposes to put them into execution.

No matter in what country a society may be located or of what races it may be composed, most of its members necessarily are unknown to one another personally, if the organization is of many ramifications over a widely extended territory. The proceedings of a local branch or lodge being secret and kept to itself, the members can know only as much or as little about the sentiment or conditions (1) of other branches elsewhere or about the actual state of the whole society, as their leaders choose to impart to them. It can therefore be readily appreciated that the leader of such a local branch or lodge has

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(1) The records of many of the branches of the Filipino secret societies of Manila and other places in the archipelago, seized by the military and civil authorities, show that the memberships of these branches was often enormously exaggerated by local leaders. Thus a branch in Tondo, which all told may have amounted to some twenty or thirty members, was represented to another branch in Pasay, on vice-versa, as amounting to many hundreds. The leaders of these respective branches, while perhaps perfectly well aware of the real state of affairs, nevertheless presented the exaggerated figures of the other branch to the members of their own to spur them on in efforts to make others join and thus to surpass other branches, a procedure which was fairly successful.

infinitely more power over the collective action of its members, if not over their individual wills, than have the leaders of two or more political parties over their followers. A political party's local proceedings are very measurably open to discussion, not only by its own members but by its opponents. They are also subject to the general comments and criticism of such as may be neutral or even indifferent. All these circumstances obviously contribute to a notable limitation of power on the part of merely political leaders.

While the greater number of the rank and file of secret societies fail to take this fact into consideration, the leaders do not. The more secretly perfect their organization and the greater the docility of its members, the better are they enabled to go collectively to greater lengths than they would in all probability be willing to go as individuals in a general action. A body of soldiers will advance to an attack when ordered, because, no matter how desperate the undertaking or great the danger, each man in the line believes that his comrades will advance the same as himself. They also know that they have every reason to count upon the support of the remainder of the force of which their particular organization forms a part. To require any one among them to advance alone, or to expect that any leader would rush forward without reasonable confidence that his men would follow him, would be the acme of folly.

It may be said that so far a great deal of this paper has been devoted to secret societies generally and very little to those of the Philippines in particular. But if the reader will bear in mind that what has here been said of more advanced and better instructed races and nations, applies with greater force to the Filipinos, he will realize what a powerful influence these societies exercised over a race which in the main was, and largely still is, simple minded, credulous, and superstitious, and how collectively they could be lead much farther than at the outset their individual members had any wish or in-

tention to go. He will also be more likely to appreciate the fact that, owing to the character of the Filipinos and to the conditions under which they lived, secret societies in the latter half of the nineteenth century and more especially towards its end, had a very great deal to do with the politics of the Islands.

It has been stated that Mariano Marte founded masonic lodges in various parts of the Philippine Islands as early as 1834. They did not prosper, however, and they were therefore dissolved. Inasmuch as this statement lacks confirmation, it is given here only for what it is worth.

The first secret society in the Philippine Islands of which there is any authentic record, was a masonic lodge under the name of "Luz Filipina," organized in Cavite in 1860 by two officers of the Spanish Navy, Mendez Núñez and Malcampo. The latter of these was afterwards Governor General of the archipelago (2). This lodge received its charter from the grand lodge of Portugal, was subject to it, and was affiliated to the Portuguese lodges established in Macao and Hong Kong.

In 1868, after the mutiny of the Army and Navy in Spain, headed respectively by General Prim and Admiral Topete, (3) when Queen Isabela II was driven from the throne and the visionary Spanish republic was established for a time, a masonic lodge with a wealthy native for secretary, was founded by foreigners in Manila, while

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(2) His administration was so weak that it gave rise to a mutiny in the regiment of artillery stationed in Manila. This he condoned and hushed up, but Moriones, who succeeded him in 1877, found conditions so bad that he was forced to put it down with an iron hand. For an interesting account of this affair see "The Inhabitants of the Philippines", F. H. SAWYER, page 14,

(3) Both these officers owed their rapid promotion to the high rank they held and to the favor and protection of the Queen,

Prim, who was an ambitious adventurer and political time-server, was later assassinated in the streets of Madrid. Topete, who appears to have been conscientiously republican, retired from public life on the advent of Alfonso and died shortly after.

others were founded, one in Pandacan, one in Cebú, and another in Cavite.

The founders of these lodges were Spaniards of advanced anticlerical, and of what in Europe and in the United States at the present time would be called communistic or anarchistic views.

In 1884, what is known as the Cavite revolt broke out (4). Many of the leaders and participants, who were of the masonic body, were executed, imprisoned, or banished from the Islands. On the other hand, others were screened and protected by the higher Spanish officials, many of whom were also masons. In spite of this, however, Filipino masonry for the time being was under a cloud, and the Spanish masons disassociated themselves as much as possible from the mestizo and native element.

Up to 1884, only Peninsular Spaniards or Europeans, as a rule, were admitted to membership in the lodges founded by them in the Philippines. But gradually pressure was brought to bear on Don Manuel Morayta, at the time Master of the Grand Orient of Spain. As a result, Creoles, Mestizos, and Indians (5) of advanced radical and revolutionary views, joined the already established lodges and subscribed liberally to their funds. There they found brethren who, though perhaps unwilling to go to the extremes they proposed, either as regards political ends or the means to accomplish them, yet extended to them a certain amount of sympathy and moral support.

In 1888, Marcelo H. del Pilar left the Philippines and proceeded to Spain, where he became a close

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(4) See paper on Revolutions and Revolts.

(5) By Creoles are understood persons of European descent born in the Islands. Mestizos are persons whose fathers or mothers were full blooded natives, or Indians, or had Indian blood in their veins. Indians are full blooded native Filipinos.

associate of Don Manuel Morayta. (6) Through the latter's influence, Pilar procured charters from the Spanish "Grand Orient" for the establishment of masonic lodges whose memberships were, if expedient, to be composed entirely of Indians. According to a general belief, some one hundred and eighty masonic lodges were founded in Luzon and the other islands of the archipelago between that date and 1893. Over and above the usual routine masonic work, these organizations propagated distinctly separatist doctrines. This enormous increase of so-called masonry, under ordinary circumstances, would have been astonishing, to say the least. Proselytizing is forbidden in masonry. It is consequently fair to suppose that the Filipino masons ignored or disobeyed this precept, and that these lodges must have been founded by persons who proposed to use them as a cloak for other purposes.

What would seem to give strength to this view is that, from this time on, the Spanish masons disavowed the Filipino masons, and that the latter used the power and prestige that had been given to them by their charters to turn their lodges into mere political clubs. They first founded the lodge "Nilad", and from it other lodges, in which the work of evolving the "Liga Filipina", and later the "Katipunan", was carried on under the screen of masonry. The lodge "Patria" was founded by Faustino Villaruel, who was afterwards shot for his participation in the insurrection of 1896 against Spain. About this time an alleged masonic lodge for women was founded in Manila.

A notorious Filipino agitator, a certain José Anacleto Ramos, states positively that it was he who first

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(6) Later, in 1900, Morayta was elected to the Spanish Cortes, but his election was contested on the ground that he was responsible for the loss of the Philippines by having introduced masonry into them with a view to bringing about a revolution. He admitted substantially that this was a fact, whereupon the Cortes refused to seat him.

founded Filipino masonry in the archipelago, and that he did so with the specific object of antagonizing the religious orders and of stirring up trouble. To quote his own words, "it was I who brought about the insurrection by establishing Free Masonry in the Philippines, thus incurring the ire of the Friars, and their persecution of it in turn brought about the revolution" (7).

Such a condition of affairs can hardly be realized or understood by American or English masons. In their countries, masonry, in common with many other secret societies of more or less recent creation, is practically nothing more than a very closely united, though very widely extended, mutual aid association. But it can easily be seen how so wide spreading and far reaching an organization, comprising as it does within its brotherhood, men of all nationalities and of all conditions of life, could have been abused by those who, using the relations it afforded them with persons who would otherwise

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(7) José Anacleto Ramos was one of two children whose mother died when he was very young. His father, who was practically penniless, then married the daughter of a rich landed proprietor of Pandacan. When his second wife died childless, he made an effort to secure her fortune for his children by his former wife, and though he was prevented in this by the intervention of the second wife's family, the children were given a small amount of land from the stepmother's estate.

Later Ramos became a notorious agitator, went abroad, and established a small shop in London, where he became a mason. On his return to the Philippines, the prestige of his connection with the English masonry, enabled him to enter the lodges of the European masons established in the archipelago.

According to his own statement, he claims to have brought about the Filipino rebellion of 1896 by establishing masonry among the natives of the islands with a view to using it to bring about an uprising.

After the downfall of Aguinaldo, he went back to Japan; but he again returned to the Philippines in 1906-7, and has been, in secret, an antiamerican agitator ever since.

meet them as strangers, established other secret societies whose means and ends masons as a body might disavow and recoil from.

Be this as it may, whatever stand masonry may take in Anglo-Saxon countries in regard to the Catholic Church, there can be no doubt that in the Latin or Catholic countries of the continent of Europe and in South America, the brethren of the square and compass are and always have been bitterly and actively opposed to that religious organization. This applies with greater force to the Philippines. The persons who introduced masonry into these Islands, as well as those who joined it after it was introduced, were as a rule advanced radicals or anticlericals. There is every reason to believe that their efforts were directed towards breaking down the Church, which, of all the institutions they wished to overthrow, was the strongest and most conservative. They hoped that, once it was gotten rid of, others would surely follow, and that on the common ruins they might erect a government similar in form to that of the earlier period of the first French Republic. Thus they aspired to rise to prominence and power. Thus masonry in this archipelago was converted into a political hot-bed in which the "Liga Filipina" and the "Katipunan" were planted and in which they grew and flourished.

In 1888, an organization known as the "Committee of Propaganda" was started. It consisted of Doro-teo Cortez, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Pedro Serrano, Deodato Arellano and others. Its work was to raise funds from such members of the well-to-do classes as they could induce to contribute, to carry on an active literary campaign against the existing order of things, the Catholic church in general and the religious orders in particular. It was also devoted to the introduction of extreme political doctrines into the Islands. This committee was essentially revolutionary in character and a very large majority of its members were masons.

In the same year, Marcelo H. del Pilar and Mariano Ponce (6) went to Spain. With money provided by the "Committee of Propaganda", they started a paper in Barcelona called "La Solidaridad". In this organ the extreme views of the "Propaganda Committee" were set forth and advocated. Later, owing to its having fallen foul of the authorities in Barcelona, this paper was transferred to Madrid and eventually it came into the hands of Morayta, with Marcelo H. del Pilar, Dominador Gomez, and Eduardo Lete among the principal collaborators. What purported to be a masonic lodge was established in its offices. It was given the name of "La Solidaridad", the title of the paper itself, and its principal work was the fomentation of the Filipino rebellion.

In conjunction with Morayta, Marcelo H. del Pilar also started the "Asociación Hispano-Filipina" in Madrid, drawing into it some seventy or eighty Filipinos who were in that city. Among these were Dr. Rizal and the brothers Juan and Antonio Luna. As far as it could this association carried out the ideas enunciated in the "Solidaridad", which, with practically no circulation in Spain, was extensively circulated free of charge, in the Philippines, by the "Committee of Propaganda."

In May, 1892, Rizal returned from HongKong (7) and proceeded immediately to organize the "Liga Filipina". Three days after his arrival in Manila, he called a meeting at the house of a Chinese mestizo named Ongjungco, and among those present were Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista,

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(6) Pilar died in Barcelona in great misery after the foundation of the "Katipunan". Ponce remained in Spain and later went to Japan, returning to the Philippines in 1908-9. He started a number of societies with distinctly anti-american tendencies, looking towards Japan as a model of government and as a source of assistance.

(7) See paper on Revolutions and Revolts.



Domingo Franco, Apolinario Mabini, (8) (later Aguinaldo's secretary and principal adviser), Ambrosio Flores, Juan Zulueta, Numeriano Adriano, Timoteo Paez, Pedro Serrano, Moises Salvador, Estanislao Legaspi, Andres Bonifacio, Teodoro Plata, Deodato Arellano, Bonifacio Arévalo, Faustino Villaruel, Aguedo del Rosario, Francisco Nacpil, Ambrosio Salvador, and others, all more or less directly connected with the rebellion against Spain in 1896. Many of them had escaped capital punishment for participating in that uprising, and took an active part in resisting the American forces in the "War of Conquest", 1898 to 1901.

Rizal addressed this meeting, telling those who attended it that he had called them together with a view to forming a secret society. Its ends were to be the advancement of the country and the freeing of it from Spain. He then submitted a number of provisional resolutions and rules, which were unanimously adopted. As soon as a committee consisting of Ambrosio Salvador and Deodato Arellano was appointed to elaborate and develop Rizal's project, the meeting was adjourned, subject to the call of the president.

The banishment of Dr. José Rizal, Doroteo Cortez, and Ambrosio Salvador later in the same year upset their plans for the time; but, in 1893, after considerable correspondence with, and numerous visits to, Rizal at Dapitan in Mindanao, to which place he had been banished, the "Liga" resumed work. Governed by the resolutions that had been offered by Rizal at the first meeting, the "Supreme Council of the Liga Filipina" was elected. It consisted of the following members: Domingo Franco, president; Deodato Arellano, secretary and

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(8) Mabini, with some two hundred other prisoners, was sent to Guam by the United States authorities, where he remained for nearly two years. He was eventually allowed to return to Manila and died of cholera a few months after his arrival. He was one of the ablest Filipinos but was bitterly opposed to American intervention in the form it had assumed.

treasurer: Vicente Francisco, fiscal; Juan Zulueta, Estanislao Legaspi, Timoteo Paez, Andres Bonifacio, Francisco Nacpil, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Ambrosio Flores, councilors.

Rizal though absent in banishment, remained the guiding spirit of the "Liga" and the power behind the throne. Branches of the league were established in the various districts of Manila and its immediate environs, as well as in the more distant provinces. In the latter, but slow progress was made.

When the league was a year old, (1894), its members agreed to dissolve it. This determination was arrived at on account of the bickerings and discords that were continually springing up among the members. There were differences of opinion in respect to the handling and disposition of the funds of the society. There were also fears of discovery by the authorities, who had become aware of the society's existence and revolutionary intentions. At the meeting of the leaders, it was decided to gather in all the books, lists, orders, and announcements that were in circulation and to burn them, thus doing away with all compromising documentary evidence. The "Liga" then, to all appearances at least, was dissolved, but its members found no difficulty in carrying on its work through the Filipino masonic lodges.

After the dissolution of the "Liga", there remained a permanent committee composed of Numeriano Adriano, Deodato Arellano, and some twenty or thirty others of its most prominent members. They were known as the "Compromisarios" (9). They had no special organization and worked almost independently of one another. Their principal mission was the propagation and distribution of "La Solidaridad", and the collection of funds for the support of that paper as well as for the revolu-

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(9) Compromisario. A person pledged or compromised, alone or with others, to a certain line of action.

tionary delegations in Hong Kong, Spain, and elsewhere.

The mission of these delegations was to foment among foreigners an interest in, and sympathy for, the projected Filipino rebellion, as well as to procure arms, ammunition, and money. The "Compromisarios" also devoted themselves to keeping alive the spirit of revolt and discontent among the Filipinos, until the end of 1895, when the "Katipunan" of Andres Bonifacio took this part of the work off their hands.

The "Liga Filipina", open as a rule only to well-to-do persons, was organized by José Rizal and his associates. But Marcelo H. del Pilar, early in 1892, had advised the formation of an association similar in its ulterior aims, but open to artisans, servants, laborers, and the poorer classes generally. He had drawn up minute instructions concerning this organization and forwarded them from Madrid to Rizal in Manila, but the latter, possibly wishing to start his own society first, had not put them into immediate execution. Eventually Deodato Arellano, Andrés Bonifacio, Ladislao Diua, and Teodoro Plata, who had been commissioned by Pilar to carry out the details of his scheme, proceeded to organize the "Katipunan."

Immediately after the banishment of Rizal, which occurred July 12th, 1892, Andrés Bonifacio called a meeting of certain members of the "Liga Filipina", to discuss the affairs of that society and, on the evening of July 14th of the same year, they assembled at his house in the district of an Sta. Cruz.

The names of the six members of the "Liga" who attended this meeting were Andres Bonifacio, a native of Manila and warehouseman of the German firm of Fresel and Company; Teodoro Plata, also a native of Manila and by profession an "Official de Mesa", i. e., assistant to the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Binondo; Deodato Arellano, native of Manila and a clerk in the Office of Public Works, Valentin Diaz, an Ilocano and an "Oficial de mesa" in the Court of First Instance of

Quiapo; Pantaleon Torres, a native of Manila and second clerk of the First Class in the "Intendencia de Hacienda" (Exchequer), who in reward for services had been given the medal of Civil Merit by the Spanish Government; and Ladislao Diua, a native of Cavite and a law student in Manila.

The meeting was called to order at nine o'clock and the subject of dissolving the "Liga Filipina" was broached. Bonifacio opposed its dissolution, but it was pointed out to him that, owing to the elements of which its membership was composed—Spaniards, Creoles, Mestizos, and full-blooded Indians—and because the three former classes could not be depended on to carry out the program of the "Liga" to its logical conclusion, the society, as it stood, was not only in danger of going to pieces, but was also a source of peril to its members.

Pantaleon Torres then addressed the meeting and suggested remodeling the "Liga Filipina" and forming from it a purely Tagalog society. In that event its members could be depended upon. It was to be called "Ang Kataas-taasan Kagalang-galang Katipunan nang mga Anak nang Bayan", or the "Supreme Worshipful Society of the Sons of the Country" (10). His proposition was warmly supported and the "Katipunan" (Secret Society) started from that date. It was further agreed to extinguish the "Liga" and to push the "Katipunan", with a program calling for the complete independence of the Philippines.

This organization was much akin to Rizal's league. Although three of the members of the committee that founded it were those that had been originally designated by Pilar for that purpose, the remainder were ordinary members of the "Liga". The following list of the first supreme council of the "Katipunan" shows that it

(10) This was generally known as Andres Bonifacio's "Katipunan" (Secret Society) and was commonly designated by three K's, to which were occasionally added the letters N. M. A. N. B., which addition represented the full title of the society.

comprised these three men, as well as other prominent members of the "Liga Filipina": Deodato Arellano, president; Andres Bonifacio, secretary; Valentin Diaz, treasurer; Ladislao Diua, Teodoro Plata, Bricio Pantas, councilors (11). These two organizations overlapped each other, so to speak, for from July, 1892, when the "Liga" was first organized, through 1893 when the "Katipunan" started, until 1894 when the "Liga" was supposed to be definitely broken up, both societies were in existence.

In form and organization the "Katipunan" claimed to be masonic (12). It used regalia and a ritual similar to those used in masonry. It had its grips, signs, and passwords and made use of a fantastic, and to the Indian mind, awe inspiring initiatory ceremony. Its membership was divided into three degrees or grades.

To insure the success and the unity they desired, the original founders drew up a paper, performed the ceremony of the "Pactode Sangre"; or blood pact, and signed the document in their own blood (13).

To test the fortitude of a postulant, he was stripped naked, a rope was bound round his waist and a bandage was placed over his eyes. Then he took the preliminary oath. A poniard was next put into his hands and he was told that a "Katipunero", who had been discovered betraying the secrets of the brotherhood, had been condemn-

(11) These names as well as those of the "leaguers" and "compromisarios" are given, not because they can be of any great interest to the public, but in order to show the connection of the various societies with one another. Most of the prominent members belonged to all of these organizations in succession.

(12) Whether this society was a true masonic society or not is at present a matter of secondary importance. What was of importance at the time of its formation was that by the Filipinos it was believed to be a true masonic organization, and under that belief gained a prestige and importance both in the Philippines and in other countries that otherwise it would have lacked.

(13) To use the words of the narrator of the foregoing<sup>2</sup>, who claims to be one of the original "Katipuneros"—"We initiated ourselves by making a bold though not dangerous incision in the left arm, and signed our names in blood."

ed to death for his treason. To test his sincerity, he, the candidate, had been selected to carry out the commands of the society and to act as executioner. The unhappy victim, of course, was a lay figure; but the candidate with his eyes bandaged was not supposed to be aware of the deception. His arms were then unbound and among other things he was made to leap through flames. The fortitude of the postulant having thus been tried to the satisfaction of the master presiding at the ceremonies, he was ordered to be unbound by his sponsors, but before this was done he was addressed as follows:

"Brother, the courage you have shown is a sufficient proof of your love for, and of your determination to adhere to, the Katipunan. It proves that you are prepared to extirpate the slavery of your country. The cord with which you are bound represents the chain of subjection and the moment we loose it, you became a slave redeemed from slavery. The bandage that closes your eyes is the veil of ignorance which sank you into the abyss of misery, and this we also remove that you may open your eyes and see both the evil and the good."

This address being finished, the cord was loosed and the bandage removed, the initiators in the meantime donning cowls. The candidate was then tendered an oath that read as follows:

"I, N. N., swear in the presence of the Katipunan and of my beloved country, that I will defend the brotherhood, respect and blindly obey the Senior Brothers and Chiefs of the Katipunan, and cooperate with and assist them in their necessities. I also swear that I will defend my country and will not consent to its subjugation by other nations, and to fulfill this oath I will sacrifice my goods and blood."

This oath was signed with the candidate's full name, written with his blood.

The society was first propagated and organized by means of triangles, that is to say, it was the duty of each new member to bring two other members. Under Boni-

facio it made great strides and carried on an active political propaganda, distributing pamphlets and proclamations tending to stir up the people against Spain and the religious orders. This organization by triangles had the further advantage of protecting the members, more especially the leaders, against betrayal by their fellows or inferiors. The members of the lower grades were unacquainted with those of the higher or knew them only by specially chosen symbolical names. All real names, however, were a matter of record in the archives of the society, though they were unknown excepting to the immediate officers in the next higher group. It was only as they were advanced that members became acquainted with those who composed the higher grades. These symbolical names were used in correspondence or in other communications in order to avoid complications with the police. At times, however, the very ignorance of the true status of the bearers of these names caused conflicting claims on the part of the chiefs, who wanted to command in the revolution according to their standing in the "Katipunan".

The avowed program of the "Katipunan," as altered from the original one forwarded from Spain, and divested of all circumlocutions and ambiguities, called for the expulsion of the religious orders, the confiscation and distribution among the people of their property and estates, the death of all the insular Spaniards, and the establishment of a Communistic Republic in the Philippine Islands.

Andres Bonifacio (14) was beyond doubt a remark-

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(14) Andres Bonifacio was not only the president of the Katipunan but also the idol of its members. Some time previous to the outbreak of 1896, he sent word to Emilio Aguinaldo, at Cavite Viejo, where he had a small fishing business, and persuaded him to join the Katipunan. When the rebellion of 1896 broke out, Andres Bonifacio was in command of the rebels at Naic, province of Cavite, to which place Aguinaldo, who himself was ambitious to lead, sent a party of his own adherents. Bonifacio was subsequently brought before a drum head court-martial and shot.

able man, possessing an extraordinary influence over the class of Filipinos to which he belonged. He displayed so great an amount of energy, audacity, and intelligence that he was given the predominance over all his companions, and as a result, in 1893, he brought about the deposition of Arellano from the Presidency and had Roman Baza elected in his stead. Baza, however, showed so little character and initiative that Bonifacio deposed him also and put himself at the head of the "Katipunan". Under his own leadership, it increased enormously in Manila and in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas, though in the remaining provinces it made but little progress until after the agreement of Biac-na-Bato, December, 1897. Some who joined it did so out of sympathy with its objects, but many more became members from fear of its menaces, knowing that the society did not stop short of assaults, kidnappings, and murder to enforce its views, orders, or demands on rich and poor alike.

From this time on, masonry in the Philippines gradually dwindled away, the Spanish members disavowing the Filipino brethren and disassociating themselves from them, as has already been said. But the "Katipunan" drew into its fold the vast majority of the members of what the Filipino political agitators and revolutionary leaders (15) had foisted on their ignorant and prejudiced

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(15) Many of the more active and violent political agitators and revolutionary leaders were undoubtedly masons in the universal acceptance of the term, as also were many of the Spanish of all ranks. There can be no question that at first these latter directly protected the former, thus aiding them to bring about a condition of affairs that resulted in the loss of the Philippines to Spain.

The belief that the Katipunan was an uprising of Free Masons against the Catholic Church in the Philippines not only prevailed among many Filipinos, but was participated in by the correspondents of the American newspapers (1896-1900) in the islands, and by at least one distinguished United States senator, (Hoar), as is demonstrated by his speech in the United States Senate, April 17th, 1900.

There can be no doubt that the reports expressed in the daily press as well as on the floor of the Senate, went a long way



fellow countrymen as true masonic societies, which, whatever they purported to be or not to be, as a matter of fact, were nothing more than advanced revolutionary organizations.

In the early part of 1896, Bonifacio took decisive steps towards an armed rebellion. Various deputations had from time to time been sent to Rizal at Dapitan, to confer with him and solicit his advice and instructions. The last of these visits was made by Andres Bonifacio himself, accompanied by Pio Valenzuela, just before the Katipunan outbreak in August, 1896.

Large sums of money had been collected by the "Katipunan" from wealthy persons by means of promises, persuasions, or threats. Arms and munitions were purchased, of which considerable amounts were landed in the provinces of Batangas, Tayabas, and Cavite.

The "Katipunan" also endeavored to open negotiations with Japan. They sent a petition signed by some 5,000 persons to the Mikado praying for the annexation of the Philippines to his empire. This petition was received by the Japanese government and by it turned over to the Spanish government.

In spite of this apparently friendly act towards Spain on the part of the Mikado, it is difficult to say just what encouragement the Filipino agitators received from Japan. There can be no doubt that later, 1898-99, for one reason or another, the Japanese officials, if not with the privity of their government at least of their own accord, coquetted with José Ramos, already mentioned, (a Filipino who was naturalized a Japanese subject under the name of Ishikawa), José Javier, Mariano Ponce,

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toward confirming the above belief in the minds of a great part of the American public, viz: that this uprising was a masonic movement against the alleged tyranny and oppression of the Catholic Church, and had much to do with influencing the Military, Naval and Civil authorities of the U. S. Government to support the Katipunan Government as represented by Aguinaldo in the last six months of 1897 and the first of 1897.

Galicano Apacible, and others, envoys of the "Katipunan", and were willing to sell them arms and ammunition in any quantity they could pay for, to be used against either the Spanish or American authorities.

In 1896, the excitement due to the agitation of the "Katipunan" reached fever heat. It was determined that on a given day, August 30th, of that year, a general uprising should take place and an energetic program should be put into execution. Owing to a quarrel among some of the conspirators, however, the plot was discovered on August 19th, some ten days before the general outbreak was to take place. The authorities commenced to make arrests. Bonifacio and his immediate associates fled from Manila, and the Katipunan society became the revolutionary government of 1896.

But this was by no means the last of it. After the rebellion was crushed by Polavieja and immediately after the agreement of Biac-na-Bato between Primo de Rivera and Aguinaldo, Macabulos began working to form a central committee of the "Katipunan" and with it operated in the provinces of Tarlac and Pangasinan, and in the border towns of Zambales, La Union, and Nueva Ecija. This committee kept the revolutionary spirit alive and organized until the return of Aguinaldo to the Philippines under the auspices of Admiral Dewey on May 17th, 1898, (16).

Later, when Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States by the treaty of Paris, December 10th, 1898, and when the organized resistance of Aguinaldo's Government to the American forces occupying the Islands was overcome, the Civil Commission assuming the reins of government, what remained of the original "Katipunan", as well as what had been added to it from 1896 down to the so-called pacification, apparent-

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(16) That the Katipunan remained in full though occult force after the collapse of the first government represented by Aguinaldo, is proved by the killings, not to mention other acts, on good authority, carried into execution by its orders.

ly died away, so far as the general public was aware. Many of its members, under such of its old leaders as were able to make their peace with the new government, resolved themselves into the "Partido Federal" or the "Partido Nacionalista".

It was thus that the "Katipunan" had brought about the revolution against Spain in 1896, and it was that society that carried it on to the success it eventually achieved, until checked by Polavieja, and from that to the empty convention of the Biac-na-Bato. Prior to this convention, the local leaders and chiefs of the revolutionary movement had rallied around Aguinaldo, receiving their instructions from him and carrying out his decrees. After the Biac-na-Bato agreement, they flocked to the Katipunan fold to organize themselves more effectively, holding assemblies, drawing up acts, and promulgating decrees. Heretofore the organization had been confined to the Tagalog provinces. It now invaded Tarlac, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Zambales, and the Visayas provinces, using arguments when practicable and force where necessary, to persuade or drive the unwilling or indifferent into secret plotting or open revolt against Spain.

The "Katipunan" had for its primary object the concerted and combined action of its members against the common enemy, the Government. As an organized body, it exercised all of its functions in secret, and strove to attain its ends by enforcing solidarity and joint action on the part of all its members. It was their business to outwit and deceive all such Government officials as they might have to come in contact with.

Within itself the power of the "Katipunan" over its members was absolute. This was regulated in detail by its own laws, its own standard of honor, and its own penal code. The only two crimes it recognized were disobedience and disloyalty. Its punishment for them was death. The Katipunero might lie, rob, or murder if he chose, provided his action did not affect or injure

the interests of the "Katipunan." But did he disobey its mandates or betray its secrets to the authorities, even under torture, there was then no place in the Philippines so remote as to hide or shelter the unfaithful Katipunero from the far-reaching arm of his society. Thus a terrible menace, like an invisible sword of Damocles, sooner or later bound to fall, was forever hanging over the heads of the members of this fearful organization.

In enforcing solidarity and in punishing disobedience and treachery with death, it was of course merely protecting itself and securing what the majority of its members believed to be the greatest good of the greatest number, without any sentimental regard for truth or good faith in the abstract. Deception, fraud, or treachery towards the Government were enforced under the same tremendous penalties with which they were punished whenever attempted against the society itself.

There is no reason to believe, however, that the "Katipunan" and its influence on a very large mass of the Filipino people at the present writing, is quite a thing of the past. There are still very many survivors of the "Katipunan" of 1892-96, and the greater part of them unquestionably exercise an immense influence on the masses of the population. Their views may not always be adopted and their advice may not be followed at once, but they are always at least listened to and respected. These men who learned their political creed in the school of Andres Bonifacio, are still largely fanatical believers in violent measures to bring about Filipino independence. A combination of them and of the present political parties may some day breed a new revolt, possibly as formidable to the power of the United States in these Islands in the future as was that of 1896-7 to the Spanish rule in the past (17).

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(17) A "Katipunero", who had been in high standing in the original "Katipunan", in discussing the relation of that society to the present government, said with cynical frankness; "you Americans should not forget that the measure with which you

About 1892-97, contemporaneous with the "Katipunan", another society, calling itself "La Guardia de Honor", came into existence and was later a thorn in the side of Aguinaldo's government, to which it was as bitterly opposed as it was to the "Katipunan".

The so-called "Guardias de Honor" were at the outset a religious confraternity, composed of men and women under the name of "Guardias de Honor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario." Their self-imposed duties and obligations consisted in reciting the rosary daily, as well as other prayers, and in carrying out certain supererogatory religious devotions and exercises. Later, as a kind of sect, it developed great strength in Pangasinan. Some of its original members in that province had undoubtedly been members of the original religious organization, but the newer members were led into the worst forms of fanaticism by a few crafty and unprincipled persons, whose only object appeared to be to exploit them for their personal benefit.

At first they interfered with no one, but later they took to making proselytes by force, enticing them into the woods or kidnapping them outright. After putting them through certain initiatory ceremonies and forcing them to take certain oaths, they gave them a false diploma, purporting to make them members of the original society. On account of the still widely spread superstitious nature of the Filipinos, the sect, like many others in the Island, was easily developed. It recognized no political party, and while pretending to be fervent Catholics, its members in the more remote districts devoted

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measure, will be the one by which you will be measured. As you sow you shall reap. What was done with the Spaniards will be done with the Americans. The Americans taught the Filipinos treason and to use arms against their masters, the Spaniards, and to rise and to rebel against them. These happenings are fresh in the minds of the Filipinos and they have not forgotten them. They have profited by the lesson and will put it into practice at the first opportunity."

themselves almost entirely to plunder and kidnapping.

In its new phase, it was at once forbidden by the Spanish Bishop of Vigan, denounced by parish priests both secular and regular, and was rigorously hunted down by the Spanish "Guardia Civil". In spite of all this, however, its leaders did not abandon their practice on the superstitions and passions of their followers. Making the society a means of an alleged new system of religious brigandage, a certain Valdez, who might be called its leader, is credited with having acquired considerable wealth.

On the arrival of Aguinaldo, accompanying the American expedition under Almíral Dewey, the "Guardias de Honor" recognizing no leader but Valdez, increased enormously in numbers. They declared themselves independent and posed as the champions of the friars and of the Catholic Church against the "Katipunan" and the revolutionary government. Using this declaration as a cloak, their exploits and irregularities increased proportionately. As may be supposed, Aguinaldo and his government opposed them and thereby incurred their bitter hatred.

After the conclusion of the treaty of Paris, these fanatics entered upon what may be called their third phase. Many natives who had received an injury at the hands of the Malolos government, or who were not in sympathy with the "Katipunan" as represented by Aguinaldo's ephemeral republic, enrolled themselves in this association and proceeded actively or passively against the hated society of the three K's. A great pretence was made of rescuing the Spanish prisoners, especially the friars, that were held by the revolutionary government. This was not from any love for Spain or out of sympathy with the priests, but merely to embarrass the new republic, which was most cordially hated by them.

The principal leaders in the field at that time were Valdez, already mentioned, and a certain Pedroche, the

former in Pangasinan and the latter in Tarlac and Nueva Ecija. Their followers amounted to some five thousand or more men, some armed with rifles of one kind or another, and a much larger number armed only with bolos or lances. It can easily be imagined that they spread terror wherever they went.

In 1898-9, Pedroche, who was a man of great personal courage and determination, went to Camiling with the avowed intention of liberating the prisoners that were held at that place by Aguinaldo's representatives; but he did not succeed in putting his project into execution. On his arrival, Ancheta, Aguinaldo's representative at that place, was very friendly. Under the cloak of this personal friendship, Pedroche was decoyed to an entertainment, and there he met the death that was prepared for him.

Among the members of this sect, there were undoubtedly many sincere, though misguided, persons whose object was the defence of the Catholic Church against the attacks of the "Katipunan". These however were only a small minority. The "Guardias de Honor" generally, abusing the name of an organization that was originally good in itself, had degenerated into nothing better than fanatics of the worst description. The majority of them were brigands, kidnapers, and murderers. Their only possible redeeming quality was their opposition to the deistic and atheistic tenets of the "Katipunan".

Just what part the "Guardias de Honor" played during the war of conquest and the subsequent pacification of the Islands is hard to say. There is every reason to believe, however, that such of the bands as remained in the field, operated against Filipinos and Americans alike. Eventually their members lost their identity in another semi-religious organization known as the "Santa Iglesia".

In August, 1900, a meeting of the old "Katipuneros" was called, though it is not exactly clear by whom, the minutes on this subject being silent. But according to

their record they met on August 14th of that year, and were certain "Katipuneros" of ultra views, dissatisfied with the position taken by some of the members of that society who refused to continue an armed agitation for the complete independence of the Philippines. After setting a statement of this dissatisfaction before the meeting, they proceeded to the election of officers and to the reformation of the "Katipunan". According to their notion, the "Katipunan" was a government formed to administer the revolution and to further organize a protracted resistance to the authority of the United States in the Islands. The minutes of this meeting, written in both Spanish and Tagalog, show that the following officers were elected: Santiago Alvarez, Supreme President; Macario Sakay, General in Chief; Alejandro Santiago, Treasurer; Nicasio Rafael, and (18) Pantaleon Torres, Administrators. There were present eighty-seven members and as the votes were made unanimous, all of them signed the proceedings.

Just how many members of Andres Bonifacio's original "Katipunan" were included in the new organization when it was started, or how many of them joined it later, is beyond conjecture. But there must have been a large number of them. Such as did not join it and give it their active support from reasons of prudence or of apprehension, nevertheless, beyond a doubt, gave it their covert sympathy and financial assistance.

While this so-called government possessed no territory, it was elaborate in its machinery, having ministers of War, State, Finance, and all the rest. With the President, they were all elected at this assembly and they in turn appointed minor official secretaries, and the like. Later, from time to time, these departments issued edicts, proclamations, orders, and commissions, to say

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(18) Pantaleon Torres was the person who proposed the formation of the original "Katipunan" in 1892. He and Santiago Alvarez had been members of Rizal's "Liga".



nothing of pamphlets, manifestoes, and other papers dealing with the relations of the iusurgent "Katipunero" forces to the people, as well as with the relations the latter were to assume towards the United States, and with the treatment of prisoners of war. These documents were formal and sober in their language, and prudent in their provisions. They demonstrated in fact that those who had issued them had a fair command of language and that to all outward appearances, it was evident that they took themselves seriously.

On December 25th, 1901, another general meeting was called. It proceeded to elaborate a constitution and rules for the Government of the Philippine Islands or, as they called it, the "Tagalog Archipelago". This constitution was very elaborate and involved. It endeavored to embody too many things. It gave immense power into the hands of the executive. It was printed in pamphlet form in Tagalog, and was distributed broadcast through the Islands.

On November 28th, 1901, another "Katipunan" election was held. As its result Macario Sakay was elected President, with Domingo Moriones as Minister of War, Salustino Cruz, Minister of Grace and Justice, Nicolas Rivera as Minister of Internal Affairs, and Alejandro Santiago as Treasurer.

In its religious aspect, this new "Katipunan" proceeded, if not actually to eliminate God as heretofore taught to, and belived by, the Filipinos, at least to substitute for Him a being called "Bathala" (19). This

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(19) In an article entitled "La religion del Katipunan", which appeared in a paper published in Madrid and called "Filipinas antes Europa", Isabelo de los Reyes says that in respect to religion, the advanced members of the "Katipunan" adopted "Bathalism" as expounded by him. "Bathalism" admits no dogma whatever, nor any other gospel than Free Science. It teaches that Spiritualism is the most scientific and rational of all religions that base themselves on tradition. The expounder sums up by saying: "Our god is a supreme being, whether under the name of Bathala or by

deity, according to the mythology extant in these Islands when they were first discovered by the Spaniards, was the presiding deity of the "Anitos", meaning the idols which represented the departed spirits of the ancestors of the aborigines, and which were worshipped by them as household gods.

This action of the "Katipunan" was consistent with the program of its founders, a prime part of which was to overthrow the Catholic Church. They realized that this body was essentially conservative and more than likely, if not to support, at least not to antagonize any regularly organized government, American, Spanish, or other, that might be in force and that did not attack it. Their policy therefore seemed to be to break up existing religious conditions as much as they could, trusting to future events to complete the destruction, and to chance for something more in conformity with their political ideas. Unlike Mahomet, Wyckliff, Luther, or Calvin, the "Katipunan" offered nothing quite positive which they pretended to believe was better than what they aimed to destroy. It was not until some time later, 1901-2, that Gregorio Aglipay, under the auspices of the American Civil Government, according to his own statement, started to organize his schismatic church under the name of the "Iglesia Independiente de Filipinas".

The secrets of this new "Katipunan" were not well kept. There must also have been considerable internal dissension, for in 1902, its president, Santiago Alvarez, was deposed for giving information concerning the so-

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whatever else the people may choose to call him. Our ceremony consists in adoring him by means of our good intentions and philanthropic actions. We believe in no dogma. Our gospel or bible is science, which we should study freely with the aid of our natural lights "

Strange as it may seem, Isabelo de los Reyes, in spite of this remarkable profession of faith, was employed by the Protestant Bible societies to translate the Scriptures into the Ilocano dialect for the use of the Protestant missions in the Philippines!

ciety to the American authorities, and Macario Sakay was elected its chief, and supreme President of the Insurgent Government.

About 1902, some fanatical bands belonging to a society or association calling itself "La Santa Iglesia", known also as "Salvadorista" after the name of its leader, Felipe Salvador, made their appearance in the provinces to the north of Manila. As far as was then known to the general public, their movement was a purely religious affair, with strong aspirations to Filipino independence. According to all information then attainable, the society proposed to realize its object by invoking the interposition of God. To this end its members undertook pilgrimages to the mountains and gave themselves up to fastings, prayers, and penances. One of their exercises was to lie on the ground, face downwards, and pray for four hours daily. As the authorities both in Manila and the provinces felt confident that they could successfully cope with any situation thus brought to pass, they, so long as the "Santa Iglesia" confined itself to appeals to God, took no notice of the society except to ridicule it and its members as a set of ignorant fanatics. In a letter denying an implied responsibility for an attack, in 1906, by a party of "Salvadoristas" on the detachment of Constabulary stationed in the capital of his province, a provincial governor described the "Santa Iglesia" as being on a par with the well known Roman Catholic religious confraternities of "St. Francis", "The Sacred Heart of Jesus" and others. This report must have had some weight. It is very probable that, until this society later asserted its dangerous strength, the Manila authorities for reasons given in another paper, looked upon it if not with favor, at least with a certain amount of forbearance. There appeared to be a tendency to tolerate, if not to encourage any society promising a break or schism in the ranks of the Roman Catholic Church, or seeking to divide its congregations, weaken its strength, or multiply religious denominations in the Islands.

A certain Salvador de la Cruz is credited with having founded this society. So far as is known, he had been at the head of it since 1896; but there is strong reason to believe that up to about 1901-02, it was known as the "Guardias de Honor.". For political reasons the revolutionary government at Malolos, of which Aguinaldo was the head, looked on this organization with disfavor and determined to exterminate it. Salvador de la Cruz, however, managed to escape to Manila. There, in 1898-99, undisturbed by the American Military Government, he continued to administer the society and to collect its revenues.

In the earlier part of 1903, Salvador de la Cruz went from Manila to Cabaruan, in the province of Pangasinan, where he collected a large following and became the head of the organization at that place. The Presidente and town council were practically at his orders and anyone who gave trouble was "boloed". As a result there were about one hundred murders charged to this organization. At Cabaruan, De la Cruz was sentenced to seven months imprisonment for being a member of the "Guardia de Honor". Later, with Felipe Salvador he was one of the sponsors for a church opened in Mamoamarigan, on which a sign was placed to the effect that it belonged to the Aglipayan Church. On the same day, the Aglipayan priest in charge, Teodoro Cadena, who is a son-in-law of Salvador de la Cruz, endeavored to force an entrance into, and to take possession of, the Roman Catholic Church at that place, but was prevented from doing so.

In Cabaruan, Salvador de la Cruz was known among the people as "Apo-laqui" (male God), and he had a companion known as "Apo-bae", (female God). He also called himself "Manuel Salvador del Mundo", and represented himself as Jesus Christ. Many families sold all they had in order to come and live with or near him. Both in Cabaruan and at Urdaneta, the people have been wont to show him the greatest respect and veneration,

rendering him homage by kissing his hand and by other ceremonious actions.

Just what the particular religious tenets of the "Santa Iglesia" may have been at its start, or what they may have developed into later is hard to determine. So far as is known, it has no regular expounders of doctrine, or if it has, they, with the characteristic secretiveness of Orientals, are very reticent on the subject to any persons who are not members. In any case, this paper does not propose to discuss the "Santa Iglesia" in respect to the nature and details of its religious doctrines. It is sufficient to say that, in contradistinction to Andres Bonifacios's "Katipunan" of 1892, or to that of Santiago Alvarez, of 1901, both of which were partly atheistic and partly rather deistic or Unitarian in their tendencies, the doctrine of the "Santa Iglesia", from what has been ascertained, appears to be an elaborated though debased imitation of the Roman Catholic religious ceremonies, grossly distorted by political passions, monstrous superstitions, and degrading practices. The sect is not unlike another party headed by Apolinario de la Cruz, who feigned supernatural powers, and who told his followers among other things, that a Tagalog virgin was to come down from Heaven to wed him. Salvador de la Cruz, however, gave it out that he is the person who is destined to be the father of the regenerator of the Filipino nation.

Politically and religiously, Salvador de la Cruz wields much power among his followers. He claims to be entrusted with a supernatural mission and to support this claim, he has surrounded himself with a great deal of mystery and ceremony. His followers are little concerned about the truth or the fallacy of his pretensions. So long as they believe, it is a sufficient guarantee to them of the sanctity of the "Santa Iglesia" as a body and of its leader as a prophet.

Politically and socially, this society has a very strong hold on the inhabitants of the pueblos of Macabebe, San Simon, Bacolor, Baliuag, and San Miguel de

Mayumo, where alone it numbers more than 8,000 members of both sexes. In the more distant provinces of Tarlac, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, and Ilocos, the membership is many times greater. Many of the old insurgent leaders are supposed to belong to it, and though they may not subscribe to its religious beliefs, there can be little doubt that they are in thorough sympathy with it in its political aims.

There is no evidence connecting the "Santa Iglesia" in any direct way with the "Katipunan" either of 1892 or of that of 1901; nor is there any record of its being a political factor in the sense that it has entered politics by presenting any of its leaders or members as candidates for the elections. There can be no doubt, however, that candidates for such elective offices as there were in the provinces, if they did not bid openly for the support of its members as a body, endeavored to secure their individual votes. There is a strong inference, too, that this society had no small influence on the elections for the Assembly of 1907, as in both the provinces of Pangasinan and Tarlac it is very powerful.

From 1903 to 1906 inclusively, armed bands said to belong to this organization under Felipe Salvador, were prowling about the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. These were supported by the inhabitants, who furnished them with food, clothing, information, and supplies, to say nothing of screening their movements and protecting them generally.

On April 15th, 1906, one of these bands attacked the post of the Constabulary at Malolos, killed several Constabulary men, plundered the barracks, and carried away all their arms. Similar attacks were made at San José and at other places and there is little doubt that the armed bands of his society acted in conjunction with the field forces that were under the orders of Sakay, Villafuerte, Montalan de Vega and others, until these bandolero leaders were captured in the summer of 1906. Since then very little has been heard of the "Santa Iglesia" by the general public.

In 1902, Pascual Poblete, a proprietor and the editor of a paper called "El Grito del Pueblo", and also a notorious agitator and political mountebank, offered his services to the government to organize a society called "La Sociedad de la Paz". The only outcome of his endeavor, however, is said to be that some of the civil officials with whom he was connected in this matter were cajoled out of some five hundred pesos. The society was still-born.

In 1905, "La Sociedad de Intereses Filipinos" was established in connection with various clubs in Manila and the provinces. Their subscriptions and collections, though ostensibly for the support of these clubs, is thought to go toward the support of the "Santa Iglesia". While there is no positive evidence that this is the case, undoubtedly many of their members extend their sympathy to the "Salvadoristas" in their political aspect.

There seems to be an unconquerable inclination on the part of a certain class of Filipino agitators to endeavor to put themselves at the head of affairs, or to come into prominence by means of secret political societies. To this end another "Katipunan" was started. This time, however, according to newspaper accounts, it was with the consent of the Commission authorities.

On November 28th, 1906, Señores Pantaleon Torres, Valentin Diaz, Alberto Bautista, Santiago Alvarez, and Pascual H. Poblete met at the house of the latter, and after rendering respectful tribute to the memory of Andres Bonifacio, founder of the original K. K. Katipunan N. M. A. N. M., proceeded to organize, or as they put it, to reorganize the two former "Katipunans", to be governed by the following resolutions, which, together with a scheme long winded and full of bombast, was published in Poblete's paper, "Ang Kapatid nang Bayan". In substance they were as follows:

1st. To obey and cause to be obeyed the regulations of the former "Katipunan", as contained in a pamphlet to be issued later.

2nd: To endeavor to restore and propagate the

"Katipunan", established by Andres Bonifacio in 1892.

3rd: To pledge to "Bathala" and humanity that their efforts shall be directed to promote the welfare of the Filipinos, to practice mutual aid among the Brotherhood, and to propagate and spread the "Katipunan".

4th: That the above mentioned members of the meeting are to be the leaders of the "Katipunan", and anything agreed upon by them shall be binding on all. That the chairman and secretary shall be changed in rotation every month among these five. The chairman shall have no rights or privileges above the other members and his duties shall be to see that the acts passed by these principal leaders are complied with by all other members.

5th: There shall be three ranks or grades called respectively, "Ktipon", "Kawal," and "Bayani", viz: "Associates", "Warriors," and "Heroes".

6th: Each of the five original members shall subscribe fifty centavos on joining, and twenty centavos each succeeding month. The same shall be paid by all other applicants for admission to the "Katipunan". Señor Poblete is to be the custodian of the money collected by Señor Alvarez, and the accounts are to be examined by any one of the principal leaders when they are assembled.

7th: The funds can be disposed of only in accordance with a vote of three of the founders.

8th: There shall be a meeting of five of the original founders every Sunday at 6:30 P. M., or on any other day or at any hour that may be determined.

9th: All measures requiring enactment must be presented at the following meeting.

There being no further business before it, the meeting was then at 9:30 P. M. adjourned.

Valentín Diaz, .....	Chairman
Pascual H. Poblete, .....	Secretary
Pantaleon Torres, .....	} Committee
Alberto Bautista, .....	
Santiago Alvarez, .....	

It is evident that there could have been very little sincerity or consistency in this movement. The first



resolution starts off by proposing to obey and cause to be obeyed the resolutions of the two former "Katipunans". These were distinctly national in their tendencies. Yet in spite of this, a radical departure is made by aiming at something decidedly pro-American. Therefore it is hardly clear how the consistent support of any number of members of either of the two former societies can be expected, if it is proposed to alter the old program to the extent of changing its tendencies in favor of the occupancy of the Philippines by America or any other foreign nation. As a matter of fact, the whole program is little more than a rambling statement of the platform of the Federal party, and to all appearances, this "Katipunan" was merely a political tool of that party, revamped to influence the elections for the Filipino Assembly.

Resolution N<sup>o</sup> 4 when divested of verbiage, states that the five members starting this "Katipunan" are perpetually to govern it in rotation, and resolution N<sup>o</sup> 6, that Pascual H. Poblete is to hold the funds which Santiago Alvarez is to collect, and that the accounts are subject to the inspection of only the principal leaders, who according to the provisions of resolution N<sup>o</sup> 4, are practically a perpetual or self-perpetuating body. Resolution N<sup>o</sup> 7 provides that the funds can be disposed of only by a majority vote of the founders.

This society, according to all public information, never got beyond the above embryo stage. Neither Pascual H. Poblete nor Santiago Alvarez retained the confidence of their immediate acquaintances or of the Filipinos at large. It was popularly believed, indeed, that both of them were employees of the insular secret service, and that the new society was to be used merely as a trap to catch unwary malcontents and to discover their secret, with a view to betraying them to the authorities.

There is in existence another society called "Colorum", which according to the best obtainable information, and that is very slight, is purely fanatical. It appears to

be given over to any number of beliefs and superstitions, and has its headquarters at San Pablo in the Laguna province. Until lately, the leader of it was a certain Sebastian Caneo. Many of the principal leaders of the revolution against Spain, 1896-98, and of the insurrection against the United States, 1899-1905, are supposed to be among its members. It is governed by a voice supposed to emanate from a cave in Mount San Cristobal, in Tayabas, where its members believe God gives His orders to the Filipino brethren. These caves are also supposed to be depositories where insurgents have hidden away large supplies of arms and ammunition.

What was known as the "Military Club", consisting of officers of the revolutionary government against Spain in 1896-98, as well as against the United States, was founded by Malvar, and there were other clubs each known as "Club Popular", originally founded by Teodoro Sandiko in August and September, 1898, in Manila and the provinces. These, while purporting to be mutual aid associations, are in reality nothing more than meeting places of members of antiamerican political parties.

There may be other secret societies with political or other ends in view, but if there are any of importance, their secrets up to date are well kept. In the face of the then impending election of the New Filipino Assembly, they were not likely to become active political factors.

Since the American occupation in 1898, political parties and societies, both secret and others, such as Freemasons, Oddfellows, Elks, Redmen, Foresters, Eagles, etc., have been founded or introduced into the Philippines. Their membership is mostly made up of persons directly or indirectly dependent on the American government and are practically composed entirely of the Anglo-Saxon races. There is therefore little room to fear that they will allow political agitators to lead them outside of their avowed objects, or that they will endeavour to foment agitation or stir up strife among the natives of the archipelago.

FOURTH PAPER  
FILIPINO REVOLUTIONS AND REVOLTS



## FOURTH PAPER

### FILIPINO REVOLUTIONS AND REVOLTS

#### I

It seems more than mere coincidence that nearly all the disturbances in the Philippines broke out about the same time as did the political upheavals and revolutions in Spain itself or the revolts in her other colonies; or at any rate, they occurred as soon as news of trouble could reach the islands. The conclusion that might be drawn from this is that the Filipino revolutionary leaders were in closer touch with those of Spain than has heretofore been supposed to be the case, and therefore took advantage of the troubles of that country and her other dependencies to create disturbances in the archipelago.

Up to the time of the Spanish American war and the consequent occupation of the Philippine Islands by the United States, it had been the custom of English and American writers to point to the Catholic Church in general and to the religious orders in particular as the primary cause of all the revolutionary disturbances that occurred in the islands during the nineteenth century. They were wont to assert that the only panacea for these disturbances was the expulsion of the orders and the secularization or confiscation of their estates. These ex-parte statements appear to have been based on allegations to the above effect put forward by the Spanish anticlericals generally and the Filipino revolutionists in particular, and as usual, writers blindly accepted them as a founda-

tion for their conclusions without taking the trouble to verify them. They preferred to assume that those statements were correct. Otherwise they would have had to admit, contrary to their cherished theory, that something could be said in Spain's favor. They may possibly also have taken their stand from the fact that they were writing their books principally for the Anglo-Saxon public, the greater part of which, to say the least, was distinctly Protestant if not absolutely anticatholic.

Whatever discussions may have arisen and however much may be said one way or another, impartial investigation demonstrates that the more important disturbances, namely those of 1872 and 1896, appear to have been carefully organized beforehand and to have had their ground prepared for them. They also appear to have been due to the extreme views advocated by a comparatively very few leaders, rather than to the spontaneous uprising of a people aroused by a sense of the wrongs and oppressions supposedly suffered by the many. In other words, these troubles can be said to have come from the leaders down and not from the people up.

The first disturbance in the nineteenth century occurred in Ilocos in 1807 and was followed closely by another in 1811. Both were purely religious in their character. Not that they were cases of the party which favored the secular clergy, rising against the regular orders or vice versa; not that they were due to alleged hardships suffered by the people at the hands of any particular branch of the Catholic Church, but they were directed against the doctrines of Christianity as a whole. In fact the movement of 1811 contemplated the establishment of an entirely new religion under a new god called "Lungao".

In 1814, a rebellion of the natives in Ilocos and other provinces was brought about by the Governor General's proclaiming the equality of the Spanish and native races. The latter had construed this into a reason for refusing to pay the "tribute", which up to that time was

practically the only direct tax levied on them by the Spanish government.

There was a mutiny of the Spanish officers of the native troops in 1822; also another in 1828. But these were purely military in character and were confined to the troops themselves. The cause is to be looked for in the home-land. The troubles were an offshoot of the liberal uprising in Spain against Fernando VII, and had nothing to do with local or religious conditions.

In 1826-1837, there were great disturbances among the native Filipinos, due to differences of opinion among them about the justice of the breaking up of the religious orders, and the confiscation and sale of their properties in that country. One party advocated the expulsion of all the Spaniards, including the religious orders. The other wished to turn out all the Spaniards excepting the members of the religious orders, who were to be allowed to remain and take charge of the government.

In 1841, there was an insurrection of the Tagalogs in the province of Tayabas. They were headed by one Apolinario de la Cruz, who called himself King of the Tagalogs. He pretended to possess divine powers and gave out that a Tagalog virgin was to come down from heaven to wed him. From this union there was to spring a regenerator of the Filipino nation. Part of his program was to tie all the Spaniards, members of the religious orders included, to trees, and to have them shot to death with arrows by the women. His followers were attacked and pursued by the troops. Many were killed and the remainder dispersed. This insurrection was assisted by the mutiny of a regiment of Tayabas Tagalogs stationed in Manila at that time. Apolinario de la Cruz was captured and with many of his 600 armed followers, was put to death. The mutinous soldiers in Manila were shot down by the loyal troops.

The events of 1848, which had so far-reaching an effect on the affairs of Europe, seem to have left the Philippines unaffected. The next disturbance of which we

read was an insignificant attempt at a revolution, coincident with one in Spain in 1854. It was headed by one Cuesta, a Spanish mestizo, who had been educated in Spain and had later been appointed a major of "Carabineros", or Custom House Guards, in Nueva Ecija. His followers were harangued by the Augustinian friars and by them persuaded to disperse. Cuesta was captured and shot, as also were some of his fellow conspirators. Others were banished to different islands.

In January, 1872, there was an uprising, the outcome of a conspiracy, in which the troops at Cavite and a large number of civilians in Manila were implicated. A secret society had been working at this plot for several years, in fact ever since Queen Isabela II had been deposed by the mutinous army and navy in Spain, in 1868, under the joint leadership of General Prim and Admiral Topete.

Ever since the revolution of 1868, Spain, torn by the extreme views of political leaders between advanced republicanism and ultraconservative monarchy, had been in a more or less unquiet condition. The republic had turned out a failure, and the compromise measure of selecting Amadeo of Savoy as King, had not proved a success. Consequently a more than fair field had been thrown open to political agitators of all sorts and conditions, and they were by no means backward in entering it, to air their real or imaginary grievances or to reap such solid advantages as circumstances might offer.

Among these were two Filipinos, the brothers Manuel and Antonio Regidor. In 1868, they began an agitation in the Madrid papers in favor of certain political and religious reforms in the Philippines. Among other things they advocated Filipino autonomy and the secularization of the parishes that had been founded, and till then administered by the clergy of religious orders. A commission, presided over by the Minister of "Ultramar" (colonies), with Generals Gandara and Ceballos and others, among them Manuel Regidor, as mem-



bers, was appointed in Madrid to enquire into the necessity for reforms in the Philippines and to discuss the best means of introducing them.

General Carlos de la Torre, who had been one of the leaders of the revolution against Queen Isabela II and who had been sent as Governor of the islands in 1868, introduced certain arbitrary reforms, which however did not satisfy the agitators. He was willing enough to comply with their demands respecting the religious orders, but he would not consider Filipino autonomy and decentralization. It was to bring this autonomy about that the plot, culminating in the Cavite revolt, was started.

By the time General Izquierdo, who succeeded to the governorship of the island, had assumed office, this plot had become widely extended. It had, in fact, spread to all the towns of the archipelago, which had been flooded with pamphlets and literature of an inflammatory nature in Spanish as well as in the native dialects. The outbreak itself was badly planned, or to speak more correctly, it came to a head prematurely. The military mutineers at Cavite, who were to be the backbone of the movement, mistook some rockets fired on the occasion of the celebration of a local holiday in one of the suburbs of Manila, on January 20th, 1872, for the preconcerted signal between them and the conspirators in the capital. The mutinous soldiers in Cavite arose, as had been agreed, and attacked the Europeans, killing many of them. They also seized the arsenal and offered a stubborn resistance when, in their turn, they were attacked by the loyal troops. The whole affair, so far as Cavite was concerned, was suppressed with great severity.

The plot itself had been conducted by Zaldúa, one of the conspirators. He worked on the employees and laborers of the Cañacao and Cavite navy yards, from whom, on the recommendation of General de la Torre, the Spanish government had demanded the "tribute". From this they had theretofore been exempt, the majority of them having served their time in the Navy. The artillerists and

the sailors stationed in Fort San Felipe and the navy yard had also been worked on, and agreeing to side with the workmen, were ready to mutiny as soon the signal from Manila was given.

Two ex-officers of the Spanish service, Lieutenants Montesinos and Marquecho, who were confined in Cavite, a Sergeant named Lamadrid, and a Spaniard named Cisneros, were the principal leaders of the rebellious troops. All of these were killed in the suppression of the revolt. Three secular priests, Gomez, Burgos and Zamora, and Francisco Zaldua, a civilian, were implicated in the civil part of it, and all of them were later executed in Manila.

Colonel Butler, who up to within a day or so of the mutiny had been Governor of Cavite, had resigned, because he was not in accord with the Governor General's policy. He was succeeded by Governor Rojas, who, with Colonel Sawa's regiment remained under arms in the streets of Cavite all the night of the 20th. As soon as the authorities at the Governor's headquarters at Malacañang, Manila, were aware of the turn affairs had taken at Cavite, they despatched troops from Manila, who left on the morning of the 21st, and it is due to the promptness and energy of Governor General Izquierdo that the military part of the proposed uprising was put down.

There appears to have been considerable friction between the higher naval and military authorities. As a result, Admiral Mac Crohon, in command of the Spanish squadron in Filipino waters, when he was certain that there was to be trouble, weighed anchor and with his entire command, excepting one gun-boat left at the disposal of the Captain of the Port of Manila, sailed to the southern islands. He thus rendered the mutiny of the artillerymen and sailors at Cavite a matter of comparatively little danger or difficulty. Mac Crohon's action in this matter seems hard to explain. In the absence of positive proof, the only logical conclusion is

that, though he favoured the conspiracy in principle, he was not willing to participate personally in the uprising or to take an active part in its suppression.

Many persons, Filipinos and foreigners, lay the blame of this revolt on the religious orders. "The real instigators of the Cavite tragedy were the Spanish friars, etc, etc.," who, according to those sage critics, were anxious to bring about the downfall of some of their enemies, who were members of the secular clergy. A moment's reflection will show the absurdity of such an assumption. The conspiracy which led up to this revolt had been in existence too long and was far too widespread, to have been a sham revolution, gotten up to put a few insignificant persons out of the way. It is really too great a demand on the credulity or prejudice of the general public to ask it seriously to accept the theory that any corporation, religious or other, could exercise sufficient persuasion to induce a body of troops and civilians to become a cat's paw in any such scheme. In an undertaking of such a nature, even the most ignorant of the participants would realize only too keenly that they were risking their lives, liberties, and property, merely to furnish an excuse for doing away with a dozen or so of persons to please the friars. Had these possessed but one fraction of the power and preponderance in insular affairs with which they have been credited, they would have been able to procure the expulsion of their enemies from the Philippines, or they could even have compassed their death by legal or other means, without going to the length of starting a sham revolution, which if successful, must inevitably have resulted in their own downfall. Even if it were admitted for the sake of argument that the members of the religious orders were, individually or collectively, as unscrupulous as their most inveterate enemies would have the public believe, they have always been credited, even by those who hate them most, with possessing a considerable amount of common sense and political foresight. Had they really

been the ones to foment the revolution, as charged—an undertaking which a very little reflection would have shown them could easily get beyond their control—they would have been eminently lacking in either of those qualities.

The only circumstance that could possibly lend some color to the theory of the friar origin of this revolt, was a redistribution by the church of some missions. In the previous year, the Jesuits, who had been allowed to return to the Philippines, were put in charge of the parishes and missions of Mindanao. These had formerly been administered by the Recoletos, or discalced Augustinians, who then were transferred from that island to Luzon, where they were assigned to some of the parishes hitherto in charge of the secular clergy. This, it was said, gave rise to the discontent that ended in the Cavite conspiracy and revolt. This theory, however, is overthrown by the fact that the transfer of the Recoletos took place after the plot, culminating in the mutiny, had been in existence for several years and not before it. Consequently if it had any connection with the revolt, it would be as one of its effects rather than as one of its causes.

As a matter of fact, the principal leaders of the uprising were open and avowed opponents of the friars. Moreover it seems beyond a doubt that the public prosecutor's indictment, charging the projection of a revolutionary government, was based on solid grounds. Hence the so-called "Martyrs of the Friars" were in point of fact merely victims of their own imprudence in having entered into an advanced revolutionary movement that had turned out unsuccessfully. Furthermore those who have tried to connect the religious orders with the Cavite revolt as its instigators have, in the lack of further and more conclusive evidence than any yet adduced, failed to make out their case (1). Later developments made it very

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(1) Benito Legarda, testifying before the Philippine Commission August 12th, 1899, states that the uprising of 1872 is attributed to the native priests.

evident that this revolt was prepared and brought about by the propagandists of the ultra revolutionary ideas then prevalent among many Spaniards both at home and in the colonies.

"Some of the Filipinos, continuing their work, went to Spain, where they founded a newspaper, called "Solidaridad", and a secret political society. This society, of Filipinos united itself to the Masonic society in Spain and they established branches here, and this society with all the characteristics of masonry, converted itself afterwards into the Katipunan society. This society, the Katipunan, made great progress here in the Philippines, for they had to do greatly with the common people; they never had anything to do or mixed at all with the higher class of people here in the Philippines" (2).

Antonio Regidor, in a pamphlet published by him in Paris in 1896, states that the foreign masons distributed arms and ammunition for this uprising, to be used in Negros, Mindanao, and Jolo; also that they furnished two hundred and eighty thousand pounds sterling in cash, which was distributed in Cebú, Bohol, Negros, and Panay. This statement, extraordinary as it is, is given for what it is worth. But as Regidor figured prominently, not only in this affair but also in the agitation that led up to it, it is but fair to assume that he must have known the details of the circumstances of which he speaks.

Taken at its face value, this statement would prove, if the theory of the friars' connection with the revolt be correct, that the friars and masons were working in common—a theory about as logical as the practicability of harmoniously blending fire and water.

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(2) See statement of Benito Legarda before the Philippine Commission August 12th, 1899. The society he probably refers to was "La Asociación Hispano-Filipino" which, as well as the paper "Solidaridad," was started in 1888, some ten years after the Cavite revolt.

There is at present little doubt that the details of the original conspiracy were planned by Manuel and Antonio Regidor, and worked out by Jacinto Zamora and Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, an uncle of a former commissioner of the same name. Another of the prominent conspirators was Maximo Inocencio, a prosperous contractor, from whose storehouse the signal rockets announcing the readiness of the Manila conspirators for the uprising were to have been fired. Though he escaped punishment at the time, he was later, in 1897, executed for complicity in the "Katipunan" outbreak in 1896.

## II

From the revolt that failed in Cavite, in 1872, to the rebellion brought about by the "Katipunan" of Andres Bonifacio in 1896, the islands to all outward appearances were comparatively quiet, unless expeditions against the Moros of Jolo and Mindanao can be called disturbances. In 1883, there were some threats of a revolution, but the sending of additional troops from Spain overawed the would-be revolutionists. This apparent tranquillity did not prevent the secret societies from diligently preparing for another uprising. This was started by what was then known as the "Progresista" movement.

The "Progresistas", as they called themselves, can be said in general terms to have been composed of three elements. These were, first, Spanish and Filipino liberals, anticlericals, radicals, republicans, communists, and anarchists, whose general aims ranged all the way from a limited constitutional monarchy to the overthrowing of all monarchical forms and the establishment of a communistic republic in the Philippines, although their program did not necessarily call for the absolute separation of the colony from Spain. Secondly came the Creoles and Mestizos of the colony, of all political parties, who were more anxious for a greater amount of

political, personal, and social recognition (3) than for executive or administrative reforms. In the third class were the full blooded native Filipinos and some Mestizos, principally "Sangleyes", or Chinese Mestizos, who aimed at complete independence of the islands, freedom from the control of Spain or any other country, and the establishment of a purely national government of Filipinos, for Filipinos, and by Filipinos.

The general tendencies of the first of these three elements have been sufficiently illustrated by the proceedings of the revolutionary monarchists, republicans and communists of Europe, whenever any of these parties happened to be in power, or by the general dogmas of the communists and anarchists of Europe and America. They can therefore be dismissed without further comment.

The aims of the second element were of a more personal and complex nature. They struck, as has already been said, more for social and political recognition than for a reform of real or imaginary abuses or wrongs, or for a separation of the Philippine Islands from Spain. The best illustration of their program is the line of action pursued by one Pedro A. Paterno, in coquetting with the Spanish government on the one hand and with the revolution on the other. So far as his Spanish proclivities were concerned, his conduct terminated in his acting as agent for the Spanish Governor General in negotiating the surrender of the rebel leaders at Biac-na-Bato. On account of this he endeavored to wring a dukedom as well as a large sum of money from Spain in recognition of his services. On the part of the revolutionary government, he was elected president of the revolutionary congress

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(3) This was stated practically in so many words by Apolinario Mabini to the American officers, whose prisoner he was before his deportation to Guam. He said that one of the principal reasons for Filipino opposition to American intervention in the form it assumed was that Americans also would withhold this recognition from them.

summoned by Aguinaldo at Malolos, September 17, 1898. Later with Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda, and Gregorio Araneta, he abandoned that government when he realized that it was doomed, though he was not so fortunate as they were in securing offices under the Civil Government established in the Philippines by the United States.

The aims of the third element can be summed up in the program of the "Katipunan", namely, the death or expulsion of all Spaniards and members of the religious orders, the confiscation and distribution of their estates among the people, and the establishment of a communistic republic for the Philippine Islands.

The first two of these classes were partly composed of men who, since 1868, had furnished the members of the various revolutionary juntas, committees, and agents—in other words, the agitators, who encouraged all discontent in the cities and backed such insurgents as were in the field by furnishing them with moral and material support in the shape of arms, ammunition, money, supplies, sympathy, and information. They were the men who, for years, without going to the extent of publicly committing themselves, had secretly fanned the sparks of discontent and kept alive the agitation against the Spanish government, until it burst out in a flame of open rebellion.

With hardly an exception, these men were mere political intriguers and mountebanks, the majority of them being Mestizos of the Regidor, Rojas, and Yagco class, who principally by aid and patronage received from the government and assistance from the religious orders, had acquired considerable wealth. These men alleged love of race and country as their ends, though these high sounding sentiments were in reality nothing more than the means by which they hoped to attain, each according to his ambitions, the power, wealth, or social distinction they all craved. It was to gratify those ambitions that these men endeavored to bring



about agitations and uprisings against Spain. In their hearts they felt no necessity for such movements among the people, who on the whole were indifferent to the points all the alleged reforms had at issue. Indeed it is doubtful if, amid the agitations which eventually came out of the machinations of the "Katipunan" and of the other secret societies which preceded it, these so-called leaders had any aspirations beyond a desire to fish in troubled waters. Therein lay their hopes that in case the agitation should be successful, they might wring personal advantage from such concessions as the Madrid government might make to the colony, or that they might be rewarded by Spain for abandoning their fellows in case the movement should be a failure. Independence from Spain and the formation of an independent Filipino Government had no place in their original program. Their political principles and morality are very well illustrated by that political and religious trimmer, the famous "Vicar of Bray".

The second class was composed of men whose political horizon was limited to their own immediate surroundings, with Hong Kong perhaps as an Ultima Thule. It included individuals like José Rizal, Mariano Ponce, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Teodoro Sandiko, and the Luna brothers. Some of these attended Spanish, French, or German universities, but they were young men in every sense of the word. In spite of natural talent or of acquired technical instruction, they had no opportunities of applying either the one or the other to the acquisition of that practical education so necessary to those who aspire to the conduct of public affairs. The little they knew outside of their own narrow sphere of colonial life, and that was very little, had been acquired, not from close personal observation and long experience in the world of politics, but principally from a study of ex-parte journals and novels of the Victor Hugo type, where writers devote their talents to holding up to execration abuses long passed rather than to a serious consideration of practical

remedies for actual ills. Their ideas of the machinery of government and their theories of reform had been acquired at meetings of European working mens' political clubs and debating societies, to which they had had access, and the least that can be said of both their ideas and theories is that they were crude.

The members of this category were personally too unimportant in the colony to allow them to look for any recognition or preferment from Spain. Their hopes of political prominence lay in a government, if not completely independent at least so distinctly separated from Spain, that only a very small minority, who were not Filipinos, would be allowed to participate in it. They wanted, in place of the Spanish colonial regime, an autonomous insular administration, if not an independent government.

There was a third class, whose educational advantages, if any, had not even the questionable worth of those of the two preceding divisions. It was composed of simple minded men like Andres Bonifacio who, dazzled by the superficial brilliancy of their more instructed companions, were content to follow their precepts blindly, echoing their utterances and imitating their actions, without knowing what the former meant or realizing what the latter led up to. These men were fanatics and dreamed of a visionary government of Filipinos, by Filipinos, and for Filipinos. The principal features of their policy, as has already been said, was the confiscation of the estates of the religious orders as well as of all the Spaniards and other foreigners, and their partition among the people; also a general redistribution of property in the islands. In a word, they aimed to set up a communistic republic.

In all of these classes, which shaded imperceptibly from one into the other, there were some men who had considerable wealth and others, who, if not wealthy, were at least well-to-do. There were also among them some few who were sincere in their professions. If they want-

ed office and government employment, it was more for the gratification of their personal vanity or for the resulting social consideration than for any material benefit. The vast majority, however, wanted the offices as a means of living without engaging in business, trade, or manual labour. There were others who wanted them merely for what could be squeezed out of them, over and above their legitimate salaries and perquisites.

The members of the first of these classes were the persons who really brought about the revolution against Spain in 1896. Their aim appears to have been to intimidate the Spanish government into putting power into their hands. This they sought to bring about by using the second and third classes as their tools, to be cast aside when they were done with them. But as often happens in such cases, the very elements they had hoped so to use got beyond their control. They were left with the alternatives of becoming the servants of the powers they had evoked, following them as their leaders to lengths to which their material personal interests forbade them to go, or of retiring into private life. The majority chose the latter course. Some of them only emerged from retirement when, in May, 1898, Aguinaldo was allowed by the American authorities to put himself at the head of the revolution that followed the naval battle at Cavite. They joined the Filipino dictator at Bacoor, remaining with him until he proclaimed his government at Malolos. But when it became clear that the United States was not going to establish an independent Filipino republic, or even an autonomous government, and that consequently there would not be offices of importance for all of them to occupy, they abandoned Aguinaldo and offered their services to the United States, which in some cases were accepted.

As can readily be figured out, these elements collectively did not at that time (1872 to 1897) number many more than one per cent of the total population of the civilized tribes of the islands. This, it will be agreed, was

somewhat scanty material for the formation of a party, which as yet had not even decided just how much or how little of the existing form of government it proposed to overthrow, or with just what it proposed to replace it when it was overthrown.

As a matter of fact, the "Progresistas" and the Filipino people were very much in the same relative positions as the "Friend of Humanity" and the "Knife Grinder", as described in Coleridge's satire. The reasoning methods of the "Progresista" leaders closely resembled those of the "Friend of Humanity", and the sentiments of the Filipino people, as a mass, were very much akin to those of the "Knife Grinder". Thus the "Progresistas" at that time could truthfully be described as a head without a body. As no particular grievances existed among the people, so far as they themselves were aware, it became necessary to create them artificial ones. This could best be done by arraying one class against another. In this manner there would be brought into existence a body, of which the "Progresista" leaders could become the head and of whose affairs it could assume the direction and control.

The principal obstacle that stood in the way of creating such a situation was the Catholic Church, as represented by the secular clergy and the regular orders. Over and above being strongly conservative as a body, to say nothing of the strength it derived from its unity of precept and universal practice, it possessed great wealth and influence in the islands. Unable to go any further with their scheme, the "Progresistas" saw that the removal of this obstacle became the main problem to be solved, and one on whose favorable solution their whole success would depend.

The "Progresistas" had absolutely no reason to aim at starting a religious reformation in the Philippine Islands in any way resembling the so-called reformation that took place in Europe in the middle ages. There were no hereditary rulers possessed of sufficient power

or prestige to lead such a movement from conscientious or interested motives. Even had there been, the "Progresistas" would not have been able personally to profit by the consequent spoliation of the church, except perhaps indirectly, as many persons in Spain had profited by purchasing "los bienes nacionales"—national estates—which had been the possessions of the religious orders and had been confiscated by the government on the suppression of those bodies in that country in 1837-38. Moreover the people as a mass felt no particular necessity for a religious change. Even were a reformation started, the "Progresistas" could hardly expect that any body of the people, sufficiently numerous to constitute a working political factor, would break away from the faith in which they were brought up, or if they did so, that they would come over in a body to be a passive tool serving for the advancement of others.

The surest way to bring about the removal of this obstacle was to weaken the Catholic Church by internal dissensions. These they thought could best be fomented by arraying one class of the clergy against the other, namely the secular against the regular. Thus they would create discord and division in the very heart of the body they proposed to overthrow.

No better occasion could have been found for raising strife of this nature than at the time of the heartburnings naturally consequent upon the transfer of the Recoletos from Mindanao, where they had been replaced by the Jesuit missionaries (4), to Luzon. This change, by which

(4) This change of the incumbents of the parishes held by secular priests to incumbents belonging to the regular orders was, in Mindanao at least, brought about gradually; i. e., as vacancies occurred in these parishes by reason of death, removal, or incapacity of the secular incumbents, Jesuits were installed to replace them. See statement of Neil Macleod before Philippine Commission, April 17th 1899.

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[The Recoletos likewise were only gradually assigned to parishes, whose native pastors had died or were removed for canonical reasons.—Editor's Note.]

gradually many of the native pastors of parishes were not succeeded by members of their own secular clergy, coming as it did about the same time as the Cavite revolt and the execution of the three secular clergymen, Gomez, Burgos and Zamora, was used as a stalking-horse in getting closer to the people to disseminate discontent among them. Just what the bulk of the native secular clergy may have felt as private individuals it is impossible at this time to say, but as a body they remained loyal to the Catholic Church.

As has already been said, secret associations were working diligently. The first overt sign they gave was when one Don José Centeno, a man of well known anti-clerical opinions and at that time acting Civil Governor of Manila, is said on good authority to have instigated a procession as a demonstration, and to have countenanced a petition, against the archbishop and the friars by the inhabitants of the district of Santa Cruz. One Doroteo Cruz, a mestizo lawyer, was the principal mover in this. He refrained from signing the petition himself, but he procured some 810 signatures to it. When such of the signers as could later be found were called upon for an explanation of their action, some stated that they had signed it without knowing its contents or purport, others that their signatures to it were forgeries, and all declared that they had nothing against the archbishop and the religious orders. Some of the names appended to it were those of persons who had died before the petition was drawn up.

When it is taken into consideration that out of the 230,000 inhabitants of Manila, nearly the whole of the subscribers were from one district, Santa Cruz, and that there were only 810 signatures to the petition, and that by no means all its signers took part in the procession that accompanied it to Don José Centeno's house, the logical conclusion is that the petition and the accompanying procession were in themselves flat failures. In spite of this, however, the demonstration, such as it was, accom-

plished one of the ends for which it had been originated. It helped to keep alive the agitation started by the "Progresistas" against the influence of the archbishop and the religious orders. This agitation had been further fomented by Rizal's books, "Noli me Tangere" and "El Filibusterismo", and the whole business culminated in the agrarian disturbances at Calamba and Santa Rosa.

These troubles arose from the refusal of the tenants on the Dominican estates either to pay their rents or to obey the order of the court and vacate their holdings. This refusal, if not started, was at least championed by Rizal. When he realized that force would be employed to support the decrees of the court in expelling the recalcitrant tenants as well as to quell the disturbances created by their refusal to vacate, he found it convenient to go to Hong Kong and leave his relatives (5) and friends to grapple as best they could with a situation he had done so much to bring about.

About this time, a Filipino Revolutionary Junta had been founded in Hong Kong. It was composed of political exiles and refugees from justice, and it was particularly active in fomenting discontent in the islands. There was also a great increase of secret societies and among them an alleged masonic lodge for women was founded in Manila.

In the meantime, Weyler had been succeeded by Despujols as Governor General of the islands. Taking advantage of this, Rizal entered into a correspondence with the new official, and after voluntarily making some promises as to his future political conduct, he sought leave to return to Manila on the ground that he intended to start a Filipino colony in North Borneo, part of which island was claimed by Spain. When at length he obtained Despujols' permission, he returned to Manila, bring-

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(5) The Rizal family were tenants of the Dominicans and held a large tract of land at Calamba under a very favourable lease from that order.

ing with him a considerable quantity of inflammatory and revolutionary literature in the form of proclamations, manifestos, and the like, issued by the revolutionary junta of Hong Kong.

As Rizal was well aware that his own baggage would be rigorously searched at the Manila custom-house, he put the documents in question into the trunks of his sister, who was accompanying him on his return from Hong Kong, where he had been residing since the Calamba troubles. Possibly he thought that the trunks of his sister might slip through the custom-house while his were being examined, or that they might not be as thoroughly searched as his own, or if they were and the compromising documents were discovered, that her sex would ensure her more lenient treatment than he would be likely to receive. Be this as it may, the documents were discovered. His sister was not molested because she was a woman. Neither was he, as he had Despujols' safe conduct. But the papers were seized and sent to the Governor General, who placed the responsibility for their introduction into the islands where it properly belonged.

Three days after Rizal's arrival in Manila, in May, 1892, he organized, or rather started to organize, the "Liga Filipina", which immediately proceeded to propagate revolutionary doctrines, as described in the preceding paper. This disgusted Despujols, who became convinced that the Borneo scheme was merely a pretext on Rizal's part to be allowed to return to Manila, and an endeavor to hoodwink the government, his real aim being to carry on further political agitation. In July of the same year, Despujols sent for Rizal and in a personal interview taxed him with his duplicity and with the introduction of revolutionary literature into the country. Rizal denied any knowledge of the whole business, especially the introduction of the revolutionary literature; but when Despujols confronted him with the documents themselves, he, in the endeavor to exculpate himself,



laid the blame on his sister. On the following day, July 7th, 1892, the Governor General promulgated the order banishing him to Dapitan in the island of Mindanao. Doroteo Cortez and Ambrosio Salvador, who had assisted Rizal in organizing the "Liga", were banished about the same time to the province of La Union.

In reference to the cause of Rizal's banishment, it has been stated that the manifestoes and other papers found in his baggage, or rather in that of his sister, were placed there by the secret police. But those responsible for this statement give no authority in support of it. Taking Despujols' well known liberality and generosity of character into consideration, as well as the fact that he, like Rizal, was a mason, and that he was also known to be a strong Filipino sympathizer, it seems hardly probable that he would have been a party to any such proceeding or would have acted as he did on any such mock evidence. It is also hard to believe that in the face of Despujols' safe conduct to Rizal, the police would have manufactured such evidence of their own motion.

Rizal, who in any other country or under any other circumstances would hardly have reached mediocrity, was nevertheless the most brilliant man among all his revolutionary associates. In fact he was the only one among them who was out of the rut of ordinary, everyday, second-rate lawyers and doctors, who, notwithstanding their academic titles, had hardly a local reputation in their respective professions. In spite of the personal timidity he had displayed in escaping from the islands as soon as the Calamba and Santa Rosa troubles became menacing, he was still looked up to by them, individually as well as collectively, and by the revolutionary societies they represented.

The next four years up to August, 1896, so far as demonstrations, disturbances, or outbreaks were concerned, were comparatively quiet. The members of the "Liga Filipina" however, and of the other societies that

were affiliated to or grew out of the "Progresista movement", were busily at work organizing the forthcoming rebellion, enrolling men, and procuring money, arms and ammunition. During that time, indeed, they got a fair amount of all of these together.

In these same four years, Rizal, who ostensibly held aloof from politics, had nevertheless received numerous visits at Dapitan from members and representatives of the various political and secret societies. Among these was one made in 1896, by Pio Valenzuela and Andres Bonifacio of the "Katipunan", to sound him on the subject of an uprising. From the position or part he had taken in the troubles raised by the tenants on the Dominican estates at Calamba and Santa Rosa, he had become more than a mere favorite with the "Progresistas" generally, but more especially with what might be called the agrarian party, composed of tenants and others who were anxious to become possessed of the friar lands and others. Consequently his word was likely to carry the greatest weight with all parties opposed to the existing order of things as represented by the Spanish government, and any advice he gave was more than likely to be followed.

On the return of Valenzuela and Bonifacio from Dapitan, the latter gave out that Rizal was in favor of an immediate uprising. On the other hand, Valenzuela reported that while in principle Rizal approved of an uprising in itself, he did not deem the time ripe for it. He therefore counselled waiting two years before making any open movement. This statement of Valenzuela was confirmed some months later by Rizal himself before the court-martial that condemned him to death.

From Rizal's character, as shown by his former actions in avoiding personal responsibility, it is very possible that he had authorized both Bonifacio and Valenzuela to make the statements they did, the former in order not to allow the enthusiasm of the "Katipunan" to cool down and the latter to serve as a screen behind

which to protect himself from the charge of complicity with the conspirators, in case their movement should not be a success. Just why he should have fixed on a delay of two years is hard to say. There was then, so far as was publicly known, no positive indication of a rupture eventually to take place between Spain and the United States over the Cuban or any other question. He may possibly have had some means that the general public did not have of forecasting future events (6), and his endeavor to go to Cuba a few weeks after his statement to Valenzuela, would seem to lend color to this theory. But be this as it may, had the latter course been taken and the "Katipunan" rebellion been put off for two years, Spain would have been unable to resist and crush it as far as she did, the complete independence of the Philippines might have been an accomplished fact, and American intervention, in the form that it eventually assumed, might never have taken place in the Archipelago.

A short time later, in August of 1896, Rizal, with the characteristic prudence displayed on former occasions in leaving the islands whenever the disturbances raised by his associates threatened to become serious, had started, via Spain, ostensibly for Cuba, having previously applied for and obtained permission from the Spanish authorities in the Philippines to go to that island as a surgeon in the Spanish military service. Just how much sincerity there was in this step on his part is hard to say. But coupled with his starting a political revolutionary society, the "Liga Filipina", instead of the Tagalog colony in Borneo, for which purpose he had been allowed to return to the Philippines in 1892, his arrival in Manila at the very time of the breaking out of the "Katipunan" rebellion would seem to have been more than a mere accident or coincidence.

From what Foreman says, the then Governor Gen-

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(6) The triumph of the Republican party and the intervention of the United States in Spanish colonial affairs in 1897-8.

eral, Blanco, had so implicit a confidence in Rizal's sincerity, that he went to the extent of furnishing him with letters of introduction and recommendation to the Spanish ministers of War and of the Colonies. This confidence must later have been seriously shaken. It was during Blanco's administration that the request for his arrest and return to the Philippines was cabled for Manila to Barcelona. From this Blanco seems in this matter to have had with Rizal an experience somewhat similar to that which Despujols had had some four years previous. When Rizal was returned to Manila, Blanco was still in power (7) and, in his capacity as Governor General, could have liberated him if innocent or could have pardoned him, if he believed him only technically guilty. Inasmuch as he did neither of these, he must have had very strong reasons to believe that Rizal had deceived him as to his real motives in leaving Dapitan for Manila just as he had deceived Despujols in returning to Manila from Hong Kong. Be that as it may, Blanco unhesitatingly turned him over to his successor, Polavieja, who sent him before a court-martial. He was tried, found guilty, and condemned to death, and he was shot on December 30th, 1896.

Polavieja has been severely criticized for this, but in the face of the sentence of the court, he had no alternative but to confirm its finding. This was the more imperative as the country was then ablaze with rebellion. Rizal was the most dangerous man to the Spanish authority in the Philippines.

### III

To return to the chronological order of events, as early as July 5, 1896, a lieutenant of the "Guardia Civil"

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(7) Blanco was relieved from duty in Manila and sailed for Spain in the latter part of December, 1896. Rizal was shot on December 30th of the same year.

reported to the Governor General, in writing, the existence of a revolutionary conspiracy. He also stated that there were some 15,000 men affiliated to it in the valley of the Pasig alone. But nothing was done by Blanco until a month later. On August 6th, he convened the "Council of Authorities", but he adjourned it again on the following day without taking any action in the matter. On the same day, the governor of the province of Batangas telegraphed to Manila that arms, ammunition, and revolutionary flags had been discovered at Taal.

When eventually the storm did burst, Blanco, to say the least, was weak and undecided in his measures. Neither as a statesman nor as a soldier did he rise to the occasion, appreciate the situation, or realize its danger. If he did realize it, he took no steps to ward it off.

In testimony given before the Philippine Commission August 12th, 1899, Benito Legarda states, in substance, that the friars, through Andres Bonifacio, brought about the rebellion of 1896. Like Foreman in reference to the Cavite revolt of 1872, in endeavoring to prove too much he proves nothing at all. His bald and unsupported statement that Andres Bonifacio was an agent of the friars and used as such by them, is practically an assertion that Jose Rizal, Emilio Aguinaldo, Eugenio Silvestre, Modesto Sarmiento, and Sancho Valenzuela, all of whom were more or less closely associated with Andres Bonifacio and were, according to their own showing, actively connected with the uprising of August, 1896, were also agents of the friars. In other words, they were what in police parlance are known as "stool pigeons" or provocative agents. But as all of them, with the exception of Aguinaldo, paid for their part in this uprising with their lives, such a theory is hardly tenable.

On August 19th, the parish priest of Tondo, Father Mariano Gil of the Augustinian Order, discovered and reported to the police authorities of his parish the existence of a revolutionary society. A search was immedi-

ately instituted. Proclamations and other documents as well as the lithographic stones from which they had been printed, were found and seized, and some twenty two arrests were made. That night Blanco was forced to take action. On August 21st, he cabled to Spain that a vast organization with antinational tendencies had been unearthed and brought to light.

The events which took place on the night of and the day following Father Mariano's discovery, alarmed the members of the "Katipunan" in Manila. All who could do so fled from the city. On August 26th, a strong force of them attacked the suburb of Caloocan, (8) but were held in check by the detachment of the "Guardia Civil" at that place, until the arrival of reinforcements from Manila. Then they retreated and disappeared in the direction of the Pasig River.

On August 30, 1896, which day, as it later transpired, was the date set for the simultaneous uprising of the "Katipunan" throughout the islands, the rebels again concentrated about two miles from Manila at San Juan del Monte. They seized the pumping station at Santolan, which supplied Manila with drinking water, and proceeded to attack the powder magazine, near the bridge over the San Juan river, which was occupied by a detachment of artillery. A sergeant of this detachment was killed and several privates wounded, but the detachment was able to hold its own till reinforced by

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(8) Horace L. Higgins in a statement before the Philippine Commission, July 19th, 1899, says in reference to the rebellion of 1896, that "it was a put-up job by the priests. The priests got up the fight at Caloocan". In the "Reseña Veridica de la revolucion Filipina" by Emilio Aguinaldo, he states that the first fight took place at Balintauac, a district of the township of Caloocan, and was started by the Katipuneros under the auspices of the Katipunan. As Aguinaldo had a great deal to do with that rebellion, not only as a leading Katipunero but also later as President of the Filipina republic, it is fair to assume that his knowledge of the real origin of the rebellion was more extensive and more accurate than that of Mr. Higgins.

troops from Manila, on whose arrival the first engagement of the rebellion was fought.

The rebels under the command of Sancho Valenzuela (9), a rich rope maker, made a stubborn resistance, but were beaten with considerable loss. Valenzuela, who had commanded his men from the window of a house, and three other leaders named Eugenio Silvestre, Modesto Sarmiento, and Roman Peralta (10), were captured. Of these Valenzuelo was the only person of any importance.

The defeated rebels sought safety in flight and made for the Pasig river. There, however, they were met by the fire of the gunboats and driven back. They then had some close-quarter fighting with the regular troops that had pursued them on the right bank. A number managed to get into boats and canoes, with the intention of reaching the "Laguna de Bay", but the "Guardia Civil", stationed on the left bank of the Pasig, fired into them and in the confusion most of the boats were upset. The rebel loss in this fight was some two hundred killed.

The same day, August 30, martial law was proclaimed in Manila, and a court-martial was convened for the trial of the captured prisoners. Four days later, September 14th, Valenzuela and his three companions were shot on the "Bagumbayan", or "Paseo de la Luneta", just outside of the walls of Manila.

Up the Pasig river the rebellion spread rapidly or, to speak more correctly, the outbreaks took place very much as they had been planned. At the town of Pasig, a thousand rebels attacked the detachment of the "Guardia Civil" stationed there, and forced it and the parish

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(9) Sancho Valenzuela must not be confounded with Pio Valenzuela, who was the Medical officer of the "Katipunan" and one of the principal witnesses against Rizal and others in the trials for sedition, rebellion, etc. that followed.

(10) Sarmiento, Silvestre, and Peralta had all of them been members of the "Liga Filipina", started some four years previously by Rizal.

priest to take refuge in the tower of the church. At Pandacan, a suburb of Manila, a strong body of armed natives attacked the village, pillaged the church and rectory, drove the parish priest into the church tower, and murdered a Spanish artilleryman. Assistance was sent at once and the rebels were driven out with considerable loss. In this action, a Spanish sergeant was killed and several privates were wounded.

The Governor General still remained inactive. Though the attacks of the rebels on Las Piñas and Binacayan had been repulsed, his inactivity had allowed Aguinaldo and Andres Bonifacio to organize the rebellion in the province of Cavite, with headquarters at Silang. Aguinaldo had issued a rambling proclamation, publishing it simultaneously at Cavite Viejo, his own home, Noveleta, and San Francisco de Malabon. It amounted to nothing more, however, than a general exhortation to the people to rise and take up arms against the Spaniards. During Blanco's inactivity, Aguinaldo had assembled his forces at San Francisco de Malabon and commenced his attack upon Imus.

The town of Imus itself was nothing more than the usual collection of bamboo and nipa houses that had grown up around the estate house, belonging to the Recoleta fathers. This house was a strong building in an enclosure surrounded by massive walls. As some seventeen of the fathers had taken refuge there, Imus had a double object for the rebels. They wished first to secure the place for use as a fortress, and secondly they desired to capture the priests.

The place was taken by Aguinaldo after a siege that lasted long enough to have allowed Blanco to disperse the attacking forces, had he been minded to do so. At least he could have thrown a sufficient garrison into the place to enable it to offer an effective resistance until the arrival of the reinforcements daily expected from Spain. He merely remained on the defensive, however, contenting himself with repulsing the attacks made by



the rebels on Las Pinas and Binacayan, and abandoning Imus and its garrison to its fate. This on Blanco's part was a political as well as a strategical mistake. In the first place, it gave Aguinaldo the prestige of an early success, and in the second, it allowed him to devote the forces he had assembled for the siege to other purposes as soon as the place had been captured.

When Imus fell at last, the captured priests were treated most barbarously. Some were hacked to pieces piecemeal, others were saturated with coal oil and then set on fire. One was impaled on a bamboo, basted with oil, and roasted alive over a slow fire. Four of the seventeen escaped (11).

In the other parts of Luzon, wherever they were found, Spaniards and Creoles were treated most inhumanly and received no quarter from the rebels, above all during the inactive governorship of the weak-kneed Blanco. At Mariquina, a Mestizo and a Creole, who were out taking photographs, were pursued by a party of insurgents and took refuge in a house. One of them was shot as he attempted to escape. The house was then set on fire, burning the other alive. At Naic, the lieutenant of the "Guardia Civil" was killed and his wife and daughter captured. The daughter, a child eleven years old, was ravished to death before her mother's eyes. While a pit was being dug by the captors to bury the mother alive, she was rescued and escaped to Manila on the launch "Mariposa", brought from that place to Naic by two Augustinians. When she arrived at Manila she was a raving maniac.

The insurrection was now well under way in Cavite. The insurgents possessed themselves of nearly all the towns of that province and finally established themselves in them. The country, cut up by deep ravines with riv-

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(11) This account of the treatment of the Recoleta fathers is taken almost verbatim from "The Philippine Islands" by J. M. Foreman, edition of 1899.

ers running at the bottom of them, was an excessively difficult one for the operations of troops. As these ravines and the ridges separating them were parallel to one another, they offered excellent positions for defense. These natural fastnesses had been skilfully improved by the insurgents and a line of defence was drawn across the country at right angles from Noveleta to Imus. These defences were further strengthened by throwing up strong intrenchments and breastworks, especially in front of the towns.

Up to the month of September, Blanco's dispatches and communications to the Spanish government had been misleading and contradictory. At length, after much vacillation, he cabled to Spain for reinforcements and from October 1st, these kept coming in steadily.

The rebellion had now spread to Nueva Ecija, where the governor and other Europeans were forced to shut themselves up in the government house. They would undoubtedly have met the same fate as the prisoners taken at Imus, but for the timely arrival of troops from Manila, who dispersed the rebels with heavy loss.

Blanco, from the beginning of the rebellion, had shown an astonishing lack of ordinary intelligence, energy, and ability in endeavoring to cope with it. Many persons, indeed, went so far as to say that he had knowingly allowed himself to be hoodwinked by the leaders of this movement (12), many of whom were, like himself, masons, and that they had made use of this fact to deceive him as to their real motives and ulterior intentions, making him believe that this movement was directed against the religious orders only and not against Spain as a whole. Consequently when he awoke to the reality of the situation, it was too late to take preventive

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(12) General Blanco was believed to have tolerated the Katipunan. See statement of Pardo de Tavera before Philippine Commission August 23rd, 1899.

measures (13). Towards the end of December, 1896, he was recalled and General Polavieja, who had been sent from Spain to relieve him, took over the command of the Philippines.

Polavieja, apart from having a large force of Spanish troops at his command, was a man of considerable intelligence and energy. Being hampered by neither the credulity of Despujols nor the indecision of Blanco, he took in the situation at a glance. By acting with promptness and decision, he very soon forced the leaders of the rebellion to concentrate their forces in Cavite and to devote their entire efforts to maintaining themselves in that province.

During the Polavieja administration, the only trouble in the city of Manila itself was on February 25, 1897, on which date there was a mutiny of the "Carabineros," or Custom House Guards, at the office of the Captain of the Port. The officer and sergeant on duty were shot by the mutineers, who made off with some arms and ammunition. They were pursued through the suburbs of Tondo as far as the San Lazaro Hospital, and such of them as were not killed, escaped and joined the rebels.

In the course of the next five months, the towns held by the rebels and the works that protected them, were stormed and captured, and the forces of the insur-

(13) Blanco seem to have been Spain's evil genius, not only in the Philippines but in Cuba also. To this latter colony he was sent as governor by the Sagasta ministry in spite of his miserable management in the Philippines, where by his weakness or credulity he had allowed the Katipunan rebellion to gain the headway it did. His administration in Cuba was characterized by the same lack of energy he had shown in the Philippines. It was during his administration that the order to Admiral Cervera to leave the harbor of Santiago de Cuba was given, thereby not only dooming the squadron under that officer to certain destruction by the combined forces of Admirals Schley and Sampson, but also materially weakening the land defences of Santiago itself by the withdrawal of the sailors and machine guns belonging to the ships that had been disembarked to assist in its defense.

rection were reduced to wandering bands. How this was accomplished is fully described by Lieutenant Colonel Don Federico de Monteverde in his book "La Division Lachambre". This paper, however, is not the place to go into the minute details of all such events, with whose logical relations and sequence, or with whose real nature and significance it is rather concerned.

Though the mass of the rebels were armed principally with "bolos" and pikes, they were also fairly well supplied with fire arms of one kind or another. Towards the end of the operations, they even had several modern, eight centimetre, rifled field pieces, though just how these were obtained is not clear.

In a remarkably short time Polavieja accomplished the end for which he had been sent to the Philippines, namely breaking the neck of the rebellion. In doing this he was as unrelenting in hunting out and punishing conspirators in the towns as he was energetic in attacking the armed forces they maintained in the field. His administration has been criticized as being unnecessarily severe in dealing with those who, without actually taking an active part in it as combatants, sympathized with and supported the rebellion.

While this criticism of his severity may be just in one sense, on the other hand it must be admitted that Polavieja's policy was logical and consistent. He recognized the fact that not less but rather more, was to be feared from the rebels who remained at home than from those who went into the field, and that the surest way to overcome the latter was to strike terror into the former.

After having broken up all organized resistance in the province of Cavite, Polavieja proposed to turn his attention to the northern provinces. To this end he cabled to Spain for more troops in order to enable him to garrison and hold the towns from which he had driven out the rebels. These reinforcements were refused on the ground that Spain, in order to face her necessities in Cuba, was drained of every man she could spare.

On April 12th, 1897, Lachambre's division, after having finished its work in Cavite, was broken up. The troops that had composed it were used as garrisons for that and neighboring provinces. On April 17th, Polavieja resigned and left for Spain, alleging ill health as his plea. He was succeeded by General Fernando Primo de Rivera, who already had been Governor General of the islands from 1880 to 1883. As soon as he had relieved Polavieja of his command, he went to the front in Cavite and finished up the little work that had been left undone in that province by his predecessor. Aguinaldo and the remnants of the organized rebel forces were finally driven out and took refuge in the hollow of Biacna-Bato, amid the mountain fastnesses of Angat in the province of Bulacan, while Tinio and others operated in Ilocos and other northern provinces of Luzon.

General Primo de Rivera was not very anxious to make terms with the rebel leaders. Their field forces were beaten and the reduction of their stronghold would only have involved a question of time. But like his predecessor, Polavieja, he was hampered by an insufficiency of troops. The Sagasta ministry was anxious for peace in the Philippines at any price. Primo de Rivera, therefore, entered into a negotiation which was proposed by Aguinaldo and the other revolutionary leaders. He employed Pedro A. Paterno, who had offered to act as his agent. The outcome of this negotiation was that on December 14th, 1897, Aguinaldo and his companions agreed, on condition of receiving a certain sum of money for themselves and an indemnity to reimburse members of certain families for losses sustained by them in this insurrection, to withdraw from the Philippines and engaged to refrain from further agitation against Spanish authority. Pedro A. Paterno was the representative of the Spanish Governor General, while Aguinaldo conducted the negotiation for himself and the other insurgent leaders. They had the advantage of Paterno's advice though, for as a matter of fact he was "carrying water

on both shoulders," working in the interest of Aguinaldo as much as, if not more than, in that of Primo de Rivera (14).

Indeed it has been asserted that Paterno, by exaggerating the strength and resources of the revolutionists to the Spanish authorities and that of the Spaniards to Aguinaldo, was enabled to his own advantage (15) to make his services to both parties appear more valuable than they really were. In fact he practically betrayed both parties, each of which trusted him.

Precisely how and with whom the idea of the negotiation culminating in the Biac-na-Bato agreement originated, is hard to determine. But it seems a matter of some certainty that it originated with the rebels, probably in the patriotic Junta at Hong Kong, which was possibly inspired by its advisers, Consul General Wildman of Hong Kong and the American Consul Williams, of Manila. Be this as it may, it was a master stroke of policy that almost amounted to diplomacy in taking advantage of the following facts:

President McKinley had been elected by the Republican party in 1896 and was inaugurated on March 4th, 1897. The members of that party known as "Jingoes", demanded a vigorous foreign policy. The only country against which such a policy could be carried out with a maximum chance of success and a minimum fatality of consequences in the improbable event of failure, was Spain.

On her part Spain had endeavored by every means in her power, short of surrendering the island of Cuba to the Cuban rebels, to comply with the demands of the United States. As that was a length to which she could hardly be expected to go without a struggle, however hopeless, war was inevitable, and though Spain might

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(14) See "Reseña verídica de la revolución Filipina" by Emilio Aguinaldo.

(15) See statement of Pardo de Tavera before Philippine Commission August 23rd, 1899.

hope against hope, it is doubtful if any purely diplomatic measures could have averted war.

A large number of the politicians and general public of the United States were not averse to war, above all as it promised an easy and certain victory. This was not only flattering to the national vanity, but also held out great possibilities in the way of expansion and an acquisition of territory. The business men, merchants, and manufacturers were also in favor of a war. They were bound to reap rich harvests from the demands for supplies that were sure to be made on them by the government. War with Spain or any other country was naturally also a very popular measure with the Army and Navy. It would insure an increase of both services, to say nothing of the consequent promotion of their members.

The sending of Admiral, then Commodore, Dewey to command the Asiatic Squadron in the fall of 1897, which according to Mr. Roosevelt "was not a mere accident", showed that the United States was preparing for war (16). Moreover as early as November 3rd, 1897, before the agreement of Biac-na-Bato was come to, the United States Consul General at Hong Kong called the attention of the State Department at Washington to the proposal of Aguinaldo's agent with the Hong Kong Filipina Junta, for an alliance between the Filipina Republic and the United States, in view of the possible war between that country and Spain (17).

All these facts indicated to the revolutionists that the advantages to be derived from some such arrangement as the Biac-na-Bato agreement, by which they would gain both time and money, were far and away superior to any that could be derived from the continua-

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(16) See article by Mr. Roosevelt in "McClure's Magazine", October 1899.

(17) See letter of Consul General Wildman dated November 3rd, 1897 in which he treats the subject of a Filipino republic seriously. Senate Document 62., part 2., 55th Congress.

tion of open hostilities. They were indeed greatly lacking in both these elements.

The "Junta Patriótica" at Hong Kong and the rebel leaders undoubtedly took all the foregoing into consideration in making their forecast of the future. The result of this forecast was that, no matter what diplomatic steps Spain might make to avert it, an immediate war between the United States and that country was a certainty.

The general tendency of the agreement of Biac-na-Bato and the reasons for entering into it by him, were explained by General Primo de Rivera to the Madrid Government in his telegram of December 12th, 1897. His action was approved by Práxedes Sagasta, the then Prime Minister, by telegram also, on December 13th of the same year. The first of these two despatches (18) gives an outline of what the agreement amounted to, and shows that the proposals for it came originally from the insurgents.

The revolutionary leaders agreed that on condition they received 1,200,000 pesos, they were to deliver up to the Spanish authorities all arms and ammunition in the hands of the rebels, to evacuate such places as they held, and to refrain from all armed action for three years. It is more than doubtful if they ever even intended to comply with the first or second of these conditions, and it is a matter of public notoriety that once out of the islands and safe under British protection in Hong Kong, they never made even a pretence of complying with the third.

The rebel leaders alleged later that besides the agreement of the treaty, there were certain other verbal promises made by Primo de Rivera relative to the religious orders. These they said were never carried out, and, therefore, they on their part were absolved from their engagements. The Spanish authorities deny the

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(18) See "Gaceta Oficial" Madrid, December 16th, 1897.



existence of any agreement beyond that the rebel leaders were to leave the country, deliver up their arms, and refrain from further agitation. As the leaders of the rebellion never made the details of the agreement public, which they would naturally have done in support of their allegations, had they been true, it is very probable that no such verbal promises were ever made. The Spanish government, therefore, violated no pledges given in the agreement of Biac-na-Bato. So far as it was concerned, all the terms of the agreement were fulfilled on payment to the Filipinos of the 1,200,000 pesos, 400,000 of which was to be paid to the revolutionary leaders on their arrival at Hong Kong, and 400,000 to the chiefs who remained in the islands on the delivery to the Spanish authorities of the arms in the hands of their followers. There was also 400,000 pesos paid to Aguinaldo on the spot, and it was to have been used as an indemnity to such revolutionists as had suffered in person or property and to the families of such revolutionists as had been killed during the war. That is said to have been added by Aguinaldo to the ₱400,000 paid him in Hong Kong and given to the "war fund".

Of the 400,000 pesos left for the leaders remaining in the islands, some was paid to them and some was used by the Spanish authorities in purchasing their arms from the small bands that appeared in the islands after Aguinaldo's departure. It is also said that both Primo de Rivera and Pedro A. Paterno got some of it (19).

The part of the indemnity to be paid to Aguinaldo and his immediate companions who left the islands with him, was taken to Hong Kong, to which place the rebel leaders had decided to retire. A prominent English merchant of Manila accompanied them as a neutral guarantee for the carrying out of that part of the Spanish promise, and he deposited the sum in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank subject to Aguinaldo's order.

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(19) See testimony of Benito Legarda before Philippine Commission August 12th, 1899.

On December 27th, 1897, Aguinaldo and some thirty four of his companions embarked for Hong Kong under the escort of a Spanish officer, a relative of General Primo de Rivera. From all accounts, it appears that after their arrival at that place they lived very quietly on their own resources. Instead of dividing the money they had received from General Primo de Rivera among themselves, or paying the indemnity to the families that had suffered, they turned the whole sum into a War Fund for future use.

Even before Aguinaldo and his staff left the Philippines, there was considerable bickering among the rebel leaders as to the disposal and custody of these funds. This went on in Hong Kong, where later Isabelo Artacho held that the part of it intended for the indemnification of the sufferers by the revolution should be applied to that purpose, while Aguinaldo and others insisted that it should be used for war purposes only. Artacho, to obtain possession of part of the indemnity, proposed to sue out a writ against Aguinaldo, who to avoid service then fled to Singapore. The affair was eventually settled by Artacho's withdrawing his action and leaving Aguinaldo in possession of the funds.

At the time of the agreement of Biac-na-Bato, the strength of the rebellion under Aguinaldo was very nearly exhausted. Had Primo de Rivera applied force, as he wished to do, to reduce their stronghold, instead of entering into negotiations with the rebel leaders in compliance with the Sagasta-Moret policy, there is no doubt that the rebellion would have been crushed completely. Aguinaldo, who was very well aware of this, therefore decided temporarily to disband his forces, giving instructions, however, to a certain number of the Katipunan leaders, to prepare to start the revolutionary movement again in six months. During this time, in expectation of the political reforms which he assured his followers had been embodied in the agreement, no one was to make any movement. But to keep the revolution alive and at

the same time to throw dust into the eyes of the Spanish authorities, the revolutionists adopted a system of local Katipunan committees, which appeared to offer them every guarantee of success in carrying out their object.

The most important of these was the committee of Central Luzon. At the outset it was a supreme assembly in charge of the central provinces of that island. This territory was formed into a species of district under the command of Francisco Macabulos, who had organized it in February, 1898, very shortly after Primo de Rivera had embarked for Spain. He was practically the absolute ruler of this district, and while later he took orders from Aguinaldo himself, he did not do so from the ministry and generals of his government.

Before leaving the Philippines, the rebel leaders had arranged for the continuance of the rebellion by the "Katipunan". Through its operations and by means of instructions and advices from the "Junta Patriótica de Filipinas" established in Hong Kong, the military chiefs left behind in the Philippines were ready to co-operate with Aguinaldo on his return to the islands on May 19th, 1898.

Ponciano Rizal, a brother of Dr. José Rizal, Pio del Pilar, Francisco Macabulos y Soliman, and Miguel Malvar were the persons designated by Aguinaldo to remain behind. In compliance with the Biac-na-Bato agreement, they were ostensibly to surrender the arms in possession of the insurgents to the Spanish authorities, but in reality they were to organize the Katipunan Committees.

Towards the end of January, 1898, Francisco Macabulos had surrendered to Colonel Don Miguel Primo de Rivera and received twelve thousand pesos as an indemnity. General Primo de Rivera issued a proclamation to the effect that none of the persons comprised in the Biac-na-Bato agreement were to be interfered with or molested by the Spanish Civil or Military authorities in the Philippines. Of this Macabulos availed himself in a singular manner a very few days after his surrender.

He started to reorganize his forces and increase their number. Very shortly, some willingly and some unwillingly, every one in the province of Tarlac was enrolled in the "Katipunan". No one dared to interfere with these people for fear of drawing down the ire of General Primo de Rivera.

The policy of Primo de Rivera after the Biac-na-Bato agreement, seems to have been one of conciliation and of blind confidence in the good faith of the rebel leaders and in the certainty of their fulfilling their part of the agreement. Whether this policy originated with him or was dictated by the Madrid Government, is a matter of minor importance. But pursuant to it, incredible as it may seem, Primo de Rivera had already sent 7,000 men back to Spain and more were under orders to leave for home. Its only practical result, however, was to furnish the revolutionary leaders with money to carry out their plans for the future. It also gave them time in which to perfect details and to organize their forces so as to be in readiness for Aguinaldo's expected return to the islands under the auspices of the United States.

Under the actual orders of Macabulos, but ostensibly under those of Aguinaldo, bands of Katipuneros were meanwhile raiding the northern part of the province of Zambales. There on the 6th and 7th of March, 1898, they attacked several places. Finally they went by sea to Aringay and Santo Tomas, where they murdered the parish priest and a peninsular Spaniard, Señor Leter, who was in command of the volunteers.

Batangas and La Laguna were under the management of the Katipunero committees presided over by Ponciano Rizal and Miguel Malvar. The first of these, when he surrendered to General Monet at Calamba, turned in only thirteen rifles. The second, who also surrendered to Moret, turned in only some hundred and fifty unserviceable rifles and a machine gun that had been taken from the steam launch "Polavieja". In spite of the fact that these two leaders received some 75,000

pesos distributed in various sums, according to rank, between themselves and those under their command (20), they continued canvassing in favor of the revolution. In cases in which persuasion failed they employed open or occult violence to bring about conviction and compliance with their views.

The same tactics and depredations as those of Tarlac and the north of Luzon, went on in the provinces of Cavite, La Laguna, Batangas, and Bataan, under the direction of the brothers Emiliano and Mariano Riego de Dios, who had their encampment at Looc, Batangas. There they were allowed to remain armed and unmolested, though they had neither surrendered nor turned over the arms of their commands to the Spanish authorities. These brothers transmitted the orders which Mariano Trias, who was working unceasingly in enrolling men in the low country of Cavite, issued from that province and Batangas, where a force of three hundred well armed men was assembled (21).

While the organization of the future uprising was thus being carried on in the Philippines by the "Katipunan", Aguinaldo and his companions in Hong Kong were not idle. This was especially the case between the end of 1897 and the earlier months of 1898 when the relations between the United States and Spain were becoming more strained every day, and there was every possibility of a rupture between the two countries in the immediate future. The "Junta Patriotica Filipina" at Hong Kong, (of which organization the American Consul-General at that place was the honorary treasurer), as well as such rebel leaders as had not left the Philippines, took advantage of this condition of affairs to keep alive the

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(20) These distributions of money to the various rebel leaders, over and above those cited for the damages suffered during the war, amply accounted for the 400,000 pesos, which Aguinaldo asserted had never been paid.

(21) See "Nuestra Prision" by R. P. Fray Ulpiano Herrero, Manila, 1900; in which, pages 484 to 490, a more detailed account is given.

spirit of hostilities against Spain. They encouraged and maintained armed bands in the province of Cavite, in Northern Luzon, and the island of Cebú. The numbers and strength of these bands were very much magnified by the rebel accounts, to give the movement they purported to represent sufficient importance to warrant an appeal for intervention to the representatives of the United States or other powers. On the other hand, their significance was belittled by the Spanish authorities, who referred to the roving Filipinos as merely "Tulisanes", or brigands. In this way it was thought that no importance would be attached to the movement which the Filipino leaders alleged these bands represented, and that the case would be seen to be insufficiently serious to justify intervention on the part of any foreign power.

Which of these two views was correct at that time is still an open question. But there must have been considerable organization on the part of the rebel leaders, early in 1898, when, in spite of the agreement of Biac-na-Bato, armed resistance broke out again. To speak more correctly, this had really never ceased at all, for between the end of December, 1897, and the beginning of February, 1898, the track of the Manila-Dagupan Railway had been torn up three times, because the company would not decline to transport Spanish troops on its trains. Over and above this small parties of Spanish troops had been attacked in the provinces of Pangasinan and Pampanga, and in some places they had been driven out and their quarters had been pillaged and burned. In spite of the optimistic views expressed by the Spanish authorities, they considered these troubles in the north so serious that General Monet and 4,000 regular troops were sent to disperse the rebels.

There is hardly room to doubt that all of these local affairs were parts of a detailed plan elaborated between the rebel leaders in Hong Kong and those remaining in the Philippines. It can hardly be doubted, either, that

the "sinews of war" for all of these movements were in a large measure derived from the very funds that Primo de Rivera had turned over to Aguinaldo and his followers both in the islands and at Hong Kong, as a consideration for their refraining from hostilities against Spain.

The first indication of any general organized movement on the part of the rebels was on March 24th, 1898, when the "Visayas" regiment N<sup>o</sup> 74, that had rendered such good service under Polavieja's administration in putting down the insurrection in the previous year, refused to march against the Cavite bands and went over to the rebels in a body, taking with them their arms, ammunition, and accoutrements. The next day this desertion was followed by that of another native regiment.

On the morning of March 25th, what has been called the tragedy of the Calle Camba occurred. This affair, according to an eye witness, originated in a house where a number of Katipuneros had met together. A passer-by was attracted by the large number of persons assembled, and after listening to the proceedings for a short while informed the police. The Guardia Civil at once raided the place in order to break up the meeting, and as those attending it refused to open the doors, force was used. This precipitated a riot in which a number of persons, endeavoring to escape by way of the roof, as well as others who joined them in the streets, were killed or arrested.

As this riot occurred immediately after the desertion of the two regiments above referred to, and as many of the persons taking part in it wore Katipunan uniforms and insignia, there is every reason to believe that the majority of those present were in collusion with the deserting soldiers, and were attempting to start an uprising in Manila (22).

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(22) As public assembly was not permitted by law in the Philippines, even in time of peace, such persons as took part in this must have been aware of the grave consequences they were incurring in attending a political meeting against the government just as a new insurrection had broken out.

It is a significant fact that a few days later, a well organized uprising took place in the island of Cebú. It was put down, so far as the city of that name was concerned, only after some severe street fighting. A number of Spaniards and natives were killed. Pillaging and the burning of a part of the city by the insurgents resulted in a destruction of private property to the amount of nearly two million pesos.

That these bands were numerous, organized, and fairly well armed was evident. The Spanish garrison, some 150 men, were driven into the fort and forced to remain there until the arrival of troops from Ilagan. It was only when two batallions arrived, one Spanish and the other native, that the rebels, after some further fighting, were driven from the city and forced to retire to the country districts, from which it was impossible to dislodge them.

Thus a new revolution was started, this time in the Visayas, which, during all the disturbances previous to the Biac-na-Bato convention, had been comparatively quiet and fairly loyal to Spain. This proved that the agreement entered into by the Filipino leaders with Primo de Rivera, namely to refrain from hostilities against the Spanish insular government, was from the start intended to be a dead letter.

#### IV

By this time war between Spain and the United States had become inevitable. It was only a question of days as to when open hostilities would actually break out. In view of this, the "Junta Patriótica Filipina" at Hong Kong, through its agents, had become very active in presenting to several European governments memoranda, of which no notice was taken, begging for recognition of the insurrection and intervention in its favor. Its members in that city as well as the insurgent leaders in arms in the Philippines, had become very



anxious to identify themselves with the United States, and to cooperate with them in expelling the Spaniards from the Archipelago. So great was this anxiety, indeed, that the "Junta Patriótica Filipina" at Hong Kong had offered the American Consul General at that place the post of treasurer, which, as has already been said, he had accepted. Therefore it is not strange that the members of the "Junta" were led by his acceptance to believe that in this matter the Consul General was acting with at least the tacit approval of the Washington authorities. They could not conceive that in the face of existing conditions, an official, occupying a quasi diplomatic post, could so far divest himself of his official status as to accept such a position, unless the country he represented were a party to his action.

Prior to Aguinaldo's departure from Hong Kong and even prior to the declaration of war, which event the "Junta Patriótica", assisted in all probability by its American advisers in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila, had already discounted, the Junta had printed and sent to the Philippines a manifesto of nearly four thousand words, to be distributed among such persons in the archipelago as were known to sympathize with the Katipunan revolt.

This document is replete with inaccuracies in reference to the terms of the Biac-na-Bato agreement. But even admitting that what it alleged in reference to them was so, the Spanish authorities could not have had time, even under more favorable circumstances than those then existing, to carry out the promises it asserted had been made. In this particular the manifesto was both childish and illogical. Its real end appears to have been an attempt to justify the Filipino leaders in their failure to refrain from hostilities, to surrender their arms, and to comply with their part of the agreement. It next proceeds to enumerate a list of "wants", in which a perfectly impossible form of government is outlined. It goes on to "demand" a great many things that the Philippines

already had. It utters such complaints of wrongs that any native, who had never felt that he had either a complaint or a grievance against Spain or the Spaniards, would on reading it imagine that he has just ground for both.

This manifesto, after extolling the virtues, liberties, rights, powers, and humanitarian views of the great North American republic, proceeds to place the Filipino people and revolutionary leaders under the protection and guidance of the United States.

In the events that followed, it is worth bearing in mind that the actions of the United States on the one hand and of the revolutionary government on the other, were based on somewhat Delphic promises of the agents and representatives of the former, and on positively declared intentions of those of the latter; furthermore that both promises and intentions, at the time they were uttered, arose from a profound ignorance on the part of either Filipinos or Americans of the conditions that governed the motives and actions of each other.

General Basilio Agustin arrived in the Philippines on April 11th, 1898, to relieve General Fernando Primo de Rivera as Governor General. On the twelfth of the same month, Primo de Rivera, after turning over the command of the islands to his successor, sailed for Spain. Some ten days later, April 21st, the United States declared war against Spain.

General Agustin was new to the country, unfamiliar with the conditions, and unacquainted with the people. He was moreover hampered with the Biac-na-Bato agreement, made by his predecessor. For counselors he had, on one hand, the Filipinos headed by Pedro Paterno, most of them Katipuneros, and as such ready to betray him at the first favorable opportunity. On the other he could turn to the friars, Spanish officials, and civilians, who while loyal enough to him and to Spain, were strong ultraconservatives. Consequently the least that can be said is that his counsels were divided.

Immediately after the naval battle of Cavite, General Augustin issued a decree, dated May 4th, creating and convoking an "Asamblea Consultiva" or Consulting Assembly. This body was to deliberate and confer with the Governor General, whenever he might deem it advisable to consult it. It was also empowered to propose to the Governor General such measures as it deemed advisable in the interests of the country and people, provided they did not conflict with existing laws.

The Governor General, or in his absence his official representative, was ex-officio its presiding officer. The members, who were called "Councilors of Administration", were divided into ex-officio members and elective members as follows: Ex-officio members were, the members of "La Junta de las Autoridades", the General Chief of the Staff, the Fiscal General or Judge Advocate of the force, the Civil Governor of Manila, the Alcalde or Mayor of Manila, one knight of the Grand Cross of a Spanish order of knighthood, the President of the society of "The Friends of the Country", and the President of the Manila Chamber of Commerce. The elective members were eventually to be elected from among persons of good standing in their communities. But the first twenty were appointed by the Governor General and their names were as follows: Cayetano Arellano, Joaquin Gonzales, Maximo Paterno, Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Manuel Genato, Gregorio Araneta, Juan Rodriguez, Bonifacio Arevalo, Isaac Fernando Rios, Ariston Bautista, José Luna, Ricardo Esteban Barreto, Teodoro Gonzalez, Artemio Ricarte, Pantaleon Garcia, Pedro Serrano, Mariano Trias, Ambrosio Bautista, and José Losada.

From the character of the persons composing both ex-officio and elective members, it will be seen that all classes of the community as well as all shades of political opinion had a representation in it.

This assembly, after agreeing on its rules and by-laws, proceeded to draw up a project for an autonomous

government for the Philippines. Later, in the early part of June, 1898, this was presented to Aguinaldo, but he, having felt the growth of power through the moral and material support of the American commander, and placing full reliance on the intentions of the United States to establish the Filipinos in an independent government with himself at its head, very naturally rejected all overtures from the Spanish authorities.

By the advice of this assembly and with a view to increasing the Spanish forces, General Augustin decided to organize a force of militia. To this end he issued a circular calling for volunteers to join it. Had he given the management of his affairs over to his most inveterate enemy, he could not have been better directed to his own undoing than he was by his advisers in the selection of officers to command this militia. In looking over their names and comparing the position they held in the insurgent army on August 13th of the same year, it would almost appear that Aguinaldo and his councilors had appointed them.

The "Katipunán" had been so successful in throwing dust into the eyes of the Spanish authorities that, when this militia was formed, it was so arranged that only high ranking Katipuneros were selected as officers of it. The proof of this is that, among the field officers appointed to the levies made in the immediate neighborhood of Manila, were Pablo Padilla, Emiliano Riego de Dios, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Mariano Trias, Artemio Ricarte, Pio del Pilar, Mariano Luna, and others of their class.

As soon as the circular, calling for volunteers for this militia, was received in the provinces, large numbers under the auspices of the committees of the "Katipunán", presented themselves and clamored for arms. The government, believing in their professions of loyalty to Spain and that they desired to serve against her enemy, the United States, issued them and in the course of a very few days had the mortification of seeing these

very arms used by the militiamen against the detachments of Spanish peninsular troops that were scattered over the country.

Aguinaldo, as yet in Hong Kong, and the "Junta Patriótica" were endeavoring to come to some positive understanding with the American authorities in China. In reference to this, Aguinaldo states that as early as the month of March, 1898, Commander Wood of the U. S. S. "Petrel", at the suggestion of Admiral Dewey, requested an interview with him, and that between March 16th and April 6th, 1908, he had several conferences with this officer, to whom Aguinaldo suggested the expediency of reducing to writing whatever agreement might be come to. Commander Wood told him he would represent the matter to the Admiral (23).

These interviews were interrupted by Aguinaldo's leaving Hong Kong on April 7th, in consequence of the legal action proposed by Artacho in reference to the distribution of the Biac-na-Bato indemnity funds, and going to Singapore, where he arrived on April 21st. On the 22nd, he was sought by the American Consul General at that place, who told him he had been informed of his presence there by Admiral Dewey, and also that war had been declared between Spain and the United States on the previous day. Aguinaldo asked what concessions the United States was prepared to make and again suggested that whatever was agreed to, be made a matter of record. The Consul General answered that he would telegraph Admiral Dewey about the matter. On the following day he renewed the conference, saying that in reference to Aguinaldo's desire, Admiral Dewey had answered "that the United States would at least recognize the independence of the Philippines on the basis of a naval protectorate: that there was no necessity of putting this in writing, because the promises of the Admiral and the American Consul General were

(23) Extracts from *Reseña verídica de la revolución Filipina* by Emilio Aguinaldo.

sacred and would be carried out, and that "they were not like those of the Spaniards". The Admiral's answer concluded with the statement that "the American Government is very honest, very just, and very rich" (24).

The Consul General and Admiral Dewey were very anxious for Aguinaldo to proceed to the Philippines with the understanding that he was to raise the country in favor of Filipino independence. The Consul General told Aguinaldo that he would telegraph to Admiral Dewey what had been agreed to, in order that the Admiral might assist him in the undertaking (25).

Their last conference was on April 28th, the Consul General informing him that he had received a telegram from the Admiral requesting that Aguinaldo repair to Hong Kong at once. On the 26th, he took leave of the Consul General at Singapore. He was informed that he would be met at the entrance of the Hong Kong harbor by a launch from the American squadron to take him privately on board. The Consul General asked Aguinaldo to make him representative of the Filipino nation at Washington, in order to bring about promptly the recognition of the Philippines by the United States (26).

On April 27th, Admiral Dewey sailed from Mirs Bay, where he had been lying with his squadron, awaiting the declaration of war and the arrival of ammunition. He left directions with the American Consul at Hong Kong, however, that Aguinaldo was to follow him in an American ship of war.

José Alejandrino, an insurgent leader, accompanied Dewey on this expedition (27) with the object of ascertaining if Aguinaldo would be acceptable to the Filipino insurgents as their chief. On his arrival he sounded

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(24) Extract from "Reseña verídica de la revolución Filipina" by Emilio Aguinaldo.

(25) Ibid.

(26) Ibid.

(27) See letter of Consul General Wildman to Mr. Moore, State Department, dated July 18th, 1898. Senate Document 62, p. 337.

them on this subject and, having been assured by them that they would accept him, Admiral Dewey sent for Aguinaldo and some two weeks later, May 19th, he arrived on the United States despatch boat, "Hugh McCullough", accompanied by some seventeen companions.

On arriving at Hong Kong in compliance with Admiral Dewey's despatch to Consul General Wildman, Aguinaldo found that the American squadron had already sailed. Then, on the invitation of Consul General Wildman, he repaired to the American Consulate. They remained in consultation from nine until eleven, and made arrangements for the purchase of 2000 rifles, 200,000 cartridges, and a vessel to carry them to the Philippines. A deposit of 200,000 pesos was made with the Consul General and Teodoro Sandiko to pay for them (28).

On May 17th, Aguinaldo was accompanied to the dock by Consul General Wildman and embarked on the "Hugh McCullough", after having left 67,000 pesos more with Mr. Wildman for a further purchase of arms. This purchase, according to Aguinaldo, was never made nor was the money ever returned. On May 19th, he reached Cavite and Admiral Dewey sent his aide to accompany him on board the flag ship, "Olympia", where he was received with the honors of a General of Division (29).

After the usual courtesies, Aguinaldo asked the Admiral if the telegrams sent by him to the American Consul General at Singapore were authentic. To this the Admiral answered in the affirmative, adding that the United States had come to the Philippines to free the inhabitants from the Spanish yoke, that the United States was rich in territory and money and had no need of colonies, and that he had no doubt the United States would recognize Filipino independence. The

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(28) Extract from "Reseña verídica de la revolución Filipina" by Aguinaldo.

(29) Ibid.

Admiral then asked Aguinaldo if he could raise the country against Spain and carry on a rapid campaign (30).

Aguinaldo answered that he could do nothing until the arrival of the arms ordered of Wildman, whereupon the Admiral offered to send a vessel to expedite matters and offered him all the cannon captured on the Spanish ships, as well as the arms and ammunition captured by the "Petrel" at Corregidor Island (31). The Admiral thanked him for his frankness and said that the Americans and Filipinos should treat each other as friends and allies and that, as he had already said, the United States would recognize Filipino independence. He also told Aguinaldo to devise a national flag and that he would recognize and protect it (32). Admiral Dewey then told Aguinaldo to go ashore and start his army. In the course of a few hours, however, the latter came back to the "Olympia" very much discouraged. But Dewey wanted Aguinaldo's help, and so he urged him not to give up his attempt (33).

Aguinaldo, encouraged by his second interview with Dewey, returned to Cavite Navy Yard and proceeded to make his headquarters in the house of the Commandant of the Yard. From that place he issued his first orders, circulars, and proclamations. A few days later, when Admiral Dewey wanted the Navy Yard for his own purposes, Aguinaldo moved to the town of Cavite and occupied the building that had formerly been the seat of the Spanish Civil Government.

On May 20th, Luciano San Miguel had reported in person to Aguinaldo, who gave him a circular for the Katipunan Committees and instructions to raise the provinces of Luzon. This circular, which changed the

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(30) Ibid.

(31) Extract from "Reseña verídica de la Revolución Filipina" by Emilio Aguinaldo.

(32) Ibid.

(33) See Admiral Dewey's testimony before Senate Committee, June 25th, 1902.



program of the insurgent leaders from that set forth in the manifesto issued by the "Junta Patriótica" in Hong Kong, appears never to have reached the hands of the American authorities. The cause of this was probably a desire on the part of the insurgents to get into a stronger position than they were in, before making their program known.

On May 24th, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation, which in tone and language was unlike any of his former or subsequent public documents. There is strong reason to believe that, if it was not dictated verbatim, it was at least inspired or edited for him. In it he proclaimed a dictatorship with himself at the head. This proclamation was followed by a decree as to the manner in which the war should be carried on and was supplemented by another, in which he states that as the Spaniards proposed to enter into negotiations with the insurgents respecting an autonomous government, he forbids the entertaining of any such proposals from them on pain of death.

The arms ordered from Consul General Wildman arrived on the "Wing-foo", a small steamer which had been purchased by Aguinaldo in Hong Kong. This shipment amounted to 2000 rifles and 200,000 cartridges. These were unloaded at the Cavite Navy Yard and turned over to Aguinaldo, who immediately proceeded to have them distributed in the province. What became of the "Wing-foo" is not clear.

Admiral Dewey had already furnished Aguinaldo with two field guns and ammunition for them; also with 500 rifles and 20,000 cartridges accompanied by certain instructions and advice as to how they should be employed. Admiral Dewey also handed over to the insurgents a steam pinnace that had formerly belonged to the Spanish man-of-war, "Reina Cristina", permitting it to ply freely in the bay under the insurgent flag. Admiral Dewey seemingly attached no importance to this, and as he did not interfere, the insurgents finally

came to consider that their flag was practically recognized, by the Americans at least, on the high seas.

During this time Aguinaldo had started what he called a "navy". . So far it consisted of the steam pin-nace already referred to, the "Filipinas", and some other unimportant vessels of which in one way or another the insurgents had become possessed.

The first vessel of any importance to fly the insurgent flag was the *Compania de Filipinas*, which came into the insurgent hands in a most discreditable manner. This steamer was despatched from Manila by the Company to which she belonged, for ports of northern Luzon on the 18th of April. War having been declared between Spain and the United States before she left Aparri on her return trip, her owners telegraphed instructions to her captain to proceed to the nearest neutral port in Formosa so as to be safe from capture by the United States fleet. Several hours after leaving Aparri, the native crew, led by the second engineer Vicente Catala, a Cuban by birth, in accordance with a prearranged plan, murdered all the Spanish officers on board, consisting of the captain, first and second officers, and first engineer. The steamer was then navigated to Manila by her murderous crew and, flying the insurgent flag, she passed under the guns of the United States men-of-war and anchored in the bay of Cavite. That Admiral Dewey himself did not punish the criminals, or exact their punishment from the insurgent leaders, was probably due to the same reason as he gave for encouraging Aguinaldo to make his attempt to start his Army.

That the "Filipinas", which according to international law was nothing more or less than a pirate, and other vessels were allowed by Admiral Dewey to cruise around Manila Bay and to proceed to other parts of the islands under the Katipunero flag, was a source of no small astonishment to officers of foreign vessels. Some of these officers, in the course of a call on Admiral Dewey, asked for information as to how vessels flying the

flag of the Filipino revolutionary government, were to be treated. To this he replied: "There is no Filipino government, there is no Filipino flag".

Since the landing of Aguinaldo, about May 20th, the land operations of the insurgents were confined entirely to isolated engagements between the Spanish and Filipino forces. With the exception of the defeat and capture of General Peña's command through the treachery of Pio del Pilar at Zapote bridge, and the surrender of Bulacan, Tarlac, Dagupan, and San Fernando, these operations consisted principally in cutting off the small Spanish detachments scattered over the country, the capture and maltreatment of such of the friars as they could lay their hands on, the plunder and destruction of Church and Spanish property, and the land blockade of Manila.

The arrival of General Anderson's force in the last days of June and the first of July not only set at rest any uneasiness that Aguinaldo and his associates may have had respecting a possible sortie of the Spanish forces from Manila, but it also stimulated them to make an attempt at some important coup that would offset the apparent inactivity of the Katipunan forces in the vicinity of Manila, as compared with those in Bulacan and the northern provinces.

The nearest coup in sight was offered by the "Isla Grande" in Subig Bay. To this place the insurgents had forced such of the Spanish detachments in Zambales and Bataan as could get there, and there also a number of civilian employees, priests, women, and children had taken refuge. The Spaniards, in order not to fall into the hands of the Filipinos, had proceeded to fortify the place as best they could; but without artillery, they were unable to put it into a condition to offer even a serious show of resistance, if attacked by any force that had artillery.

To effect the capture of this place and its garrison, the steamer "Filipinas" was ordered by Aguinaldo to proceed to Subig Bay. When she arrived there, she

found the German man-of-war, "Irene", whose commander had already furnished the refugees with food and had also offered take off the noncombatants, an offer that had been accepted by the civilians, priests, and women.

The commander of the "Filipinas" objected to this, but the captain of the "Irene" ordered him off, and as his flag was not recognized, treated him as a pirate. In the face of this, the "Filipinas" returned to Cavite and reported to Aguinaldo that the "Irene" had prevented the compliance with his orders. Aguinaldo reported the matter to Admiral Dewey, who ordered the "Raleigh", under the command of Captain Coghlan, to reduce "Isla Grande" and the "Filipinas" accompanied him on this expedition.

After Coghlan had fired a few shots at the Spanish defences, the Spaniards asked for a parley and as a result it was agreed that they would surrender. The Spaniards, however, remembering the massacre of the 150 Macabebes who had been butchered in cold blood by Aguinaldo's forces after the surrender of Samal, made the express stipulation that they were to surrender as prisoners to the Americans and not to the Filipinos. This was agreed to by Coghlan, and by his order the soldiers, civilians, priests, women, and children were sent on board the "Filipinas", taken to Cavite, and turned over to Aguinaldo. Two Spanish officers who protested against this as contrary to the terms of the surrender, were shot without any further ceremony (34).

It would be hard to find words with which to qualify the action of Admiral Dewey and Captain Coghlan in this matter. Either the latter came to "Isla Grande" with specific directions from the former as to how the prisoners were to be treated, or he did not. In the

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(34) This account of the affair was given to the writer by the Filipino pilot who claims to have accompanied the expedition and who still is in the employment of the U. S. government. It varies in very few particulars from the accounts of it given in the American press at the time.

former case, it is to be supposed that Captain Coghlan carried out his instructions, even though he knowingly agreed to the conditions of the surrender without either the power or the intention of keeping his agreement. In the second case, that is supposing his hands were not tied by specific orders, he made the same conditions with the same intention of not adhering to them, and that without being able to get behind the orders of his commander. On the other hand, it is hardly credible that Admiral Dewey would have reversed a solemn stipulation made by his inferior, even though something similar had happened in the case of the Spanish garrison of Corregidor Island. These had surrendered to the "Raleigh" and been brought to Cavite Navy Yard, but a day or so later they were turned out by the officer of the day, in compliance with an order from Admiral Dewey, and as a matter of course fell into the hands of the insurgents in the town of Cavite.

It has been stated as an excuse that had Admiral Dewey adhered to the terms of the surrender of Subig, he would have had no place to keep his prisoners nor means of subsisting them. Granting this excuse to be valid, it would seem that it would have been generous to allow at least the noncombatants to avail themselves of the offer of the "Irene", instead of turning them over to the mercies of the Katipuneros. This method of disposing of his prisoners by Admiral Dewey, furnished Aguinaldo and his government further ground on which to base a theory of an American alliance.

As a matter of fact, many of the prisoners captured at "Isla Grande", after having suffered many privations and cruelties at the hands of the Katipuneros, died miserably in captivity, long after the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States was signed and ratified.

The first uprising of the Katipuneros in obedience to the instructions given, on May 20th, to Luciano San Miguel, and the circular to the Katipunan Committees of

the same date, occurred at Orión in Bataan on May 29th. Virtually the same methods as those employed there in putting these instructions into execution, were followed in all the other towns around Manila and took effect practically within twenty four hours of one another.

During the night of May 27th, information was sent to the officer commanding the detachment of Spanish "Cazadores"; or Riflemen, at Orión, that bands of insurgents were in the neighborhood and were preparing to attack and plunder the town. Early in the morning of the 29th, this detachment, consisting of some sixty men, was divided into two parties. These were sent out to scout the country, one to the north and one to the south of Orión. Seven Cazadores, however, under command of a corporal, were left to take charge of the town until the expected return of the scouting parties some time during the forenoon of the same day. The Katipuneros, taking advantage of the absence of the troops, proceeded to rise and barricade the town, some of them digging trenches across the streets and others attacking the detachment returning from the north. The commander of the latter, believing he was opposed by a much larger force than was the case, instead of cutting his way through them by a rush, endeavored to first disperse them by repeated volleys. His ammunition was soon exhausted and as soon as the Katipuneros, who had hidden in the bamboo thickets and who for the greater part were armed only with "bolos" or lances, saw this, they, outnumbering the "Cazadores" a hundred to one, rushed the detachment and made short work of it in a hand to hand encounter. They killed every man excepting one who escaped by hiding in the mud of a flooded rice field (35).

Armed with the rifles which Aguinaldo had received from Admiral Dewey as well as those of the "Wing-foo", the Katipuneros of the Cavite coast made similar

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(35) A minute account of this affair as well as of the circumstances leading up to it, will be found on pages 1 to 55 of "Nuestra Prision" by R. P. Fray Ulpiano Herrero, Manila, 1900.

attacks on Bacoar, Cavite Viejo, and a place called "el polvorin" with generally the same results.

The first and only engagement of any importance in the neighborhood of Manila commenced at Parañaque. There on the 28th, the natives had made a sham attack. Pio del Pilar, in command of his Militiamen, under pretence of foiling it, had rushed forward and siezed the bridge over the Zapote river, which was the key of the position. On the 30th, General Peña, believing that Pilar held the bridge for him, advanced, but when his column of some 2,700 men was massed on the road and unable to deploy on account of the flooded rice fields, Pilar opened fire on it and the command was caught in the trap that Pilar had treacherously laid. Being unable to retreat or advance and having used up all his ammunition, Peña was compelled to surrender with his entire force. The Militia stationed at Silang, Indang, San Francisco de Malabon, and Imus, then carried out their part of the program. They deserted bodily to the Katipunans, taking their arms and ammunition with them.

As soon as Cavite Navy Yard was occupied by the United States forces, Aguinaldo, supported by a supposed American alliance, turned his attention to cooperating with Admiral Dewey against the city of Manila by land, while the Admiral prevented all access to it by water. During the month of June, the insurgent leaders drove the Spaniards, weakened by the desertion of the Militia, from such places as they held, and forced them to retire on Manila and its suburbs. These leaders were also very active in burning and pillaging churches and other property outside the city, though in compliance with the strict injunctions of the American Commander, they refrained from making any attack on Manila itself. They confined their operations to strenuous efforts to close in on the city and to cut off all communication with the surrounding country, thus endeavoring to starve it into capitulating.

Whatever verbal understanding there may have been between Aguinaldo and the Consuls at Hong Kong and Singapore, it is very evident from Aguinaldo's action in consenting to leave Hong Kong for the Philippines under Admiral Dewey's directions, from Mr. Pratt's speech in reply to Dr. Santos at Singapore, June 8th, 1898, as well as from his correspondence and that of the Consul General at Hong Kong with the State Department at Washington, that not only Aguinaldo and his followers but others as well looked upon the Filipino insurgents as formal allies of the United States. This belief is also shown in the manifesto sent to the Philippines in advance of Admiral Dewey's expedition as well as in Aguinaldo's proclamation to his fellow countrymen, dated Cavite May 24th, 1898. The statements made in it, as well as those in Mr. Pratt's reply to Dr. Santos' speech above referred to, were not disavowed by the United States authorities, but were allowed to pass unchallenged at the time they were made. From this it is fair to assume that Aguinaldo and his adherents were sincere therein.

Admiral Dewey's subsequent action in taking the insurgent leaders to the Philippines, Mr. Pratt's utterances in public as well as the correspondence carried on by Messrs. Wildman and Williams, leave scant room for doubt that all of these gentlemen went to the extent of knowingly allowing Aguinaldo and his companions to believe that an agreement really existed between them and the United States. If they did not actually confirm them in this belief, they took no steps to disabuse them of their error.

Be all this as it may, the cooperation of Aguinaldo and his forces was accepted by the American Military and Naval commanders in the Philippines. If the Filipinos were not thus formally recognized as allies, they were, for a time at least, treated as such and the insurgent forces were used as auxiliaries (36).

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(36) The insurgent government was allowed to purchase arms, and steamers to transport them to the Philippines, where for some



Before leaving Hong Kong, Admiral Dewey must have been very well aware that, in accordance with the program of destroying the Spanish squadron, the only logical outcome of any engagement he might have with it in Filipino waters would be the sending of a land expedition to the Philippines by the United States as soon as it could be gotten ready, to oust the Spaniards. Therefore it is not unfair to assume that his idea in entering into relations with Aguinaldo was merely to utilize his services and those of his followers as an advance guard until this expedition could be sent. Indeed the Admiral substantially says as much in his testimony before the Senate Committee. In the course of it he gives as his reason for encouraging the Filipino leader to make a second attempt, that he "wanted his help" (37). He does not say just why he wanted it, but the inference is that he had no landing force of his own sufficiently large for his purposes. To hold the city of Cavite and the surrounding country and to prepare the way for whatever American force might arrive, Aguinaldo's assistance was accepted.

About a week after Aguinaldo's arrival, Admiral Dewey went ashore and had an interview with him. He pointed out that while they were acting against a common enemy, they were not acting under a common head, and when he told him "You go your way and I'll go mine" (38), he may not have realized that, under the circumstances, the only construction that Aguinaldo or any one else could put on his words was that he (Aguinaldo) was practically placed in charge of the land operations, while Dewey retained charge of those by sea.

Though aware of Aguinaldo's proclamation and

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time the steamers cruised about Manila Bay flying the Filipino flag. General Anderson also entered into a certain amount of correspondence with Aguinaldo in reference to passes, supplies, etc.

(37) See Admiral Dewey's testimony before Senate Committee June 26th, 1902.

(38) Ibid.

decrees, Dewey seems to have attached little or no importance to them or to the workings of the insurgents. This apparent apathy, if it can be called such, possibly arose from his being unaware of the organization and strength of the Katipunan government or of the rapid headway it had made since the arrival of Aguinaldo. It had been given out to the Katipunan committees that the American squadron had come to the Philippines with their chief and not he with the squadron, to expel the Spaniards and set up a Filipino government with himself at the head of it. It was also given out that he would have such towns as did not rise in his favor, destroyed by the guns of the American ships. The inhabitants, believing that he had the power and knowing that he had the will to carry out this threat, no matter what their sympathies or convictions may have been, obeyed his dictates, rose against the Spanish authorities, and joined the revolutionary movement.

The Admiral was possibly unaware of the manipulation the Filipino militia was undergoing. Indeed all that he knew positively was that Aguinaldo proposed to make a general uprising and attack on May 31st, though in his correspondence he expressed doubts of his ability to do that. These doubts probably arose from his ignorance of the role that the militia, raised and armed by virtue of General Augustin's decree of May 10th, was to play in it. Admiral Dewey states that "he was led to believe that there was a large number of Filipinos under arms, though as a matter of fact there was not a Filipino under arms (39) when he arrived." This conclusion

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(39) In a memorandum furnished to the first Philippine Commission, Admiral Dewey states that on March 30th, the United States Consul at Manila telegraphed: "Five thousand rebels armed in camp near city. Loyal to use in case of war". But on arriving at Manila, it was found that as there was no insurrection to speak of, Aguinaldo was then sent for and allowed to land in Cavite to organize an army "with the purpose of strengthening the United States forces and weakening those of the enemy".

was possibly reached on his part because the Filipino leaders failed to take him into their confidence as to what the Katipunan was doing within the Spanish lines, using the presence of his squadron as a stalking horse.

On the other hand, Admiral Dewey's failure to protest against Aguinaldo's assumption of authority may have been caused by confidence in his moral influence over Aguinaldo and his power to persuade him to forego the fruits of any advantage he might reap from successful minor military operations. Even taking the contrary to be the case, it is hard to see how Admiral Dewey could in this particular have acted otherwise than he did. He had no landing force at his disposal. Until the arrival of troops, he was powerless beyond the range of his guns. He could not enforce any order he might have issued conflicting with Aguinaldo's views. Any such display of lack of power would not only have discredited him and his country before the Filipinos, but it would have placed Aguinaldo in a stronger position as an independent dictator, not only towards his own countrymen but towards foreign powers also, than he possibly could have occupied as merely an ally or auxiliary of the United States. In a word, when the assistance of the Katipunan was invoked against Spain, neither Admiral Dewey nor the Consuls at Manila or Hong Kong, on whom he must have relied to a certain extent for information, were aware of the real conditions in the islands. He did not realize that by associating himself with the revolution in any way, he was playing with fire and starting a conflagration that he would be powerless to either quench or control.

This view is borne out by his own statement: "I did not know then what I know now \* \* \* or I would not have had him (Aguinaldo) \* \* \* I would not have had any of them there" (40).

About this time, June and July, the insurgents were

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(40) Dewey before Senate Committee, June 26th, 1902.

fairly well armed from various sources:—first, the unsundered arms of the men who fought in the first Katipunan uprising of 1896-97; secondly, those issued by General Augustin to the Militia, which practically went over to the rebels in a body; thirdly, those brought in by deserters and others; fourthly, those captured from the various detachments of the Spanish troops that were scattered all over the islands; fifthly, those found in the Cavite Arsenal as well as those surrendered by the Spaniards to the Americans at Naic, Corregidor island, Isla Grande, and other places, but were turned over to the rebels by Admiral Dewey; sixthly, arms furnished by Admiral Dewey and General Anderson (41); seventhly, arms thrown into Manila Bay by the Spaniards and for which Admiral Dewey allowed the insurgents to dive; and eighthly, arms purchased under the auspices of the “Junta Patriótica” and Consul General Wildman in Hong Kong and other places in China.

At the time of the taking of Manila, therefore, it has been authoritatively stated that the Katipuneros had some forty or forty five thousand rifles, and some modern field guns as well as others, which, though antiquated, were still serviceable at short range. They appear also to have had a plentiful supply of ammunition.

Early in June it was intended to bring in another shipment of 10,000 rifles and 3,000,000 cartridges. On consultation with Admiral Dewey, however, Mr. Wildman, who had charge of the purchase, decided not to make the shipment. It was considered that the Filipinos already has as many arms as it was safe to entrust them with.

Due possibly to the probable effect he feared might be produced on the Filipinos at large by the program of autonomy as elaborated by the “Asamblea Consultiva”, or to the impracticability of carrying out a government based on an oath-bound secret society, Aguinaldo and

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(41) See article by General T. M. Anderson in North American Review, February, 1899.

his advisers decided on starting a fixed form of government more in conformity with the ideas of Americans or of other nationalities whom it was important to conciliate. He was not sure of the Katipunan idea, which, under the name of "dictatorship" with himself at the head, he had proclaimed on May 24th. Therefore, on June 12th, he issued a decree proclaiming a "Revolutionary Government of the Philippines" with himself as president. An elaborate constitution, on the lines of that of the United States and Mexico, was drawn up by Apolinario Mabini, who was generally known as the brains of the revolution.

This constitution had been preceded by a sort of decalogue, also written by Mabini, which was nothing more than an effort to instil into the popular heart an insatiable desire for vengeance for real or imaginary wrongs, and which was couched in blasphemous and bombastic language. To any other race than the semisavages to whom he addressed it, this appeal would have called up only mixed feelings of disgust, ridicule, and contempt.

On June 18th, Aguinaldo published his first proclamation as head of the Revolutionary Government. After a ridiculously conceited preamble, he proceeds to outline a method of expelling the Spanish forces and follows this up with a scheme of general and local civil government.

This proclamation, which was forwarded to Admiral Dewey only on July 15th, 1898, was, the Admiral says, the first intimation he had of any desire for independence on the part of the Filipinos (42). It is difficult to see how he could make this statement in the face of the fact that Aguinaldo's proclamation dated May 24th, 1898, in his capacity of dictator, had been outlined by Consul General Wildman (43) and submitted to him for his infor-

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(42) See Admiral Dewey's testimony before Senate Committee June 26th, 1902.

(43) See Senate Document No. 62 page 557.

mation and approval, before it was issued to the Filipinos. It also conflicts with Admiral Dewey's telegram of June 27th, 1898, in which he says "these people expect independence" and that they were "more capable of self government than the natives of Cuba".

On June 23rd, Aguinaldo, in compliance with a vote of his cabinet, issued a message in which he defined the scope and powers of the Revolutionary Government. The only original feature in it was in the clause respecting the appointment of representatives. It said that "the Government shall have the power to appoint as provisional representatives for these provinces, (i. e., provinces not under the control of the Revolutionary Government), those persons who are most distinguished for high character and social position, etc. etc."

This in many cases presented a source of difficulty to the Spaniards in such places where they were in authority, as to how they should deal with persons who had been appointed to offices still dependent on them, but which the Revolutionary appointees invariably declared they had been appointed to without their consent. This may have caused some innocent persons to suffer for guilty ones and vice versa; but these appointees were very well aware of the power and methods of the Katipunan in enforcing its orders and they would hardly have dared to refuse the honors so thrust upon them. This same condition prevailed later to a certain extent during the "War of Conquest" and the "Pacification".

The first American expeditionary land force, under command of General Thomas M. Anderson, arrived on June 30th. Owing to the operations of the insurgents, supported by the presence of the American squadron, all the coast towns near Manila had been abandoned by the Spaniards. In the course of the following two weeks, the Americans proceeded to take up a position along the beach on the road from Cavite Viejo to Manila.

On July 1st, General Anderson accompanied by Admiral Dewey, called on Aguinaldo. During the course

of the conversation they asked him why the inhabitants of Manila did not rise as those of the provinces had done; also if it was possible that they had accepted the autonomy and assembly offered by General Augustin. Aguinaldo answered that the inhabitants of Manila did not rise because they had no arms, but that as soon as Manila was taken, they would join him. He was confident that they were all in favor of independence (44).

Aguinaldo then went on to state that a commission had come to him from General Augustin with a statement to the effect that if he accepted the autonomy as proposed by the "Asamblea Consultiva", they would recognize his rank and that of his companions. They would moreover give him a million pesos and settle the unpaid balance of the Biac-na-Bato agreement. All the offers of this commission, however, had been rejected by him (45). He also stated that this commission then questioned him as to the terms offered him by the United States and what benefits to the Filipino people were expected to be derived from that country. To this Aguinaldo answered that it would be difficult for him to answer their question in view of his promise not to disclose the terms of his agreement with the American commanders. He had called the attention of these commissioners, however, to the acts of independent sovereignty which the Filipino dictatorship had been allowed to exercise under the authority of the American commanders, more especially in the waters of Manila Bay. But Aguinaldo did not tell Admiral Dewey that the majority of this commission were secretly adherents of his and enemies of the Spanish government (46). The General and Admiral then took leave of Aguinaldo, recom-

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(44) Extracts from *Reseña verídica de la Revolucion Filipina* by Emilio Aguinaldo.

(45) Ibid.

(46) Ibid.

mending him to study out a plan to act in combination with them (47).

On July 4th, Aguinaldo made an official call on General Anderson and handed him the scheme of an autonomous government, which he had received from the commissioners from Manila. On being asked by General Anderson if the scheme was agreeable to him, he did not answer directly but endeavored to ascertain the intentions of the United States government in respect to the retention of the Philippines (48).

General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo July 4th, 1898, stating his desire for amicable relations and asking that he should cooperate with him against the Spanish forces. He wrote again on July 6th, requesting cooperation as well as the evacuation of the town of Cavite, suggesting that Aguinaldo utilize his prisoners of war, of whom he had upwards of 4,000, in cleaning it up. This unusual suggestion, namely to work prisoners of war, contrary to all customs of warfare between civilized nations, probably arose from a wish on General Anderson's part to have the place cleaned up for his command without calling on his own men to do the work (49).

On July 14th and 21st, General Anderson wrote further to Aguinaldo, requesting that reconnoitering parties be given the necessary passes, etc., to enable

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(47) Ibid.

(48) For a full description of this call as well as Aguinaldo's return call on him, see article by General T. M. Anderson in *North American Review*, February, 1899.

(49) Aguinaldo has been severely criticized for having made his prisoners of war, of which he had upwards of 4,000, work; but from General Anderson's suggestion, he evidently took it for granted that such was the custom among civilized nations. As for the rations the prisoners received, it is probable that Aguinaldo issued them what his commissariat could afford, though Consul General Wildman in his letter of June 21st, 1898, to Aguinaldo, after making some other suggestions concerning them, advises him to hold the prominent ones among them as hostages and goes on to suggest that rice and water was a sufficient diet for them, as "during the last few years they had lived too well".



them to make a reconnaissance of Manila. In neither of these letters does he assume any other tone than that of an ally, addressing the Filipino chief as "General", "Your Excellency", and the like. This, however, may have arisen from a desire on his part to accomplish by diplomatic means what he was not in a position to do by force.

On July 14th, General F. V. Green, U. S. Volunteers, arrived with the second expedition and disembarked at Parañaque, much to Aguinaldo's annoyance, as he had not been consulted in this matter. On the 24th, Aguinaldo protested against the "advisability of disembarking American troops at places that had been captured by the Filipinos, because, as no formal agreement existed between the Filipinos and Americans, the former might take such a proceeding as an invasion of their rights".

Up to the writing of this letter, Aguinaldo himself had expressed no doubts as to the ulterior intention of the United States; but there seem to have been some misgivings on the part of those surrounding him. In his communication he goes on to say that while he "can answer for his own people, he cannot answer for the confidence that another nation, whose friendship is not yet guaranteed, might inspire in them". In this he evidently referred to the United States. All his questions as to their ultimate intentions respecting the Philippines had always been met with evasive, not to say ambiguous, answers by the American commanders (50).

Three days after his arrival, General Green commenced to make requisitions on Aguinaldo for transportation, supplies, and the like. But Aguinaldo, who by this time had become suspicious of the ulterior intention of the United States, was in no hurry to fill them. A sort of passive resistance was springing up among the insurgents and it was very annoying to the American commanders, in many ways obstructing their plans and

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(50) See article by General T. M. Anderson in *North American Review*, February, 1899.

showing that the Filipino leaders were making every effort in their power to take Manila without American assistance.

General Anderson, in a letter to the Adjutant General of the U. S. Army, states that it is as dictator that Aguinaldo had prohibited the furnishing of supplies by the Filipinos, excepting on his own order, and goes on to say that he had written a protest against his assumption of dictatorship, his proclamations of martial law, and other kindred acts, but that, at Admiral Dewey's request, he had refrained from publishing it. Admiral Dewey's request in the matter was probably based on the fact that all these proclamations and the like had been issued by Aguinaldo prior to General Anderson's arrival and while he, Dewey, was in sole command. Any protest on General Anderson's part would not only have been discourtesy, but also a reflection on his administration, and would have led the insurgents to believe that there was, to say the least, a divided policy. Such a protest might also have resulted in an open rupture with the insurgents, which would surely have come about, had they conceived the idea that it was not the prime and sole object of the American expedition to assist them in establishing themselves in an absolutely independent government.

Had the Filipino leaders by any means become convinced that their idea about the Americans was erroneous, such a conviction might possibly have caused them to accept, as a last shift, the overtures of autonomy extended by the Spanish authorities. Had such a condition come about, it would have left General Anderson with an empty protest hanging in the air, without any adequate means at hand to enforce it. At the highest estimate, his available force did not amount to over three thousand men. He would have had no mere "military promenade" in acting against even Aguinaldo's raw levies. Backed up, as these might have been, by the Spanish forces, they could have offered resistance to any force he might

have attempted to use and the Americans might have become the "common enemy," with himself exposed to a possible defeat in the field.

In the same letter, General Anderson further states that he had underestimated the intelligence, civilization, courage, and industry of the Filipinos. This underestimation of the Filipinos was evidently shared by the authorities at home, as neither he nor they were aware of the thorough organization that the revolution had received from the Katipunan during the four months' respite, December 1897 to May 1898, given it by the Biac-na-Bato agreement.

Immediately after the destruction of the Spanish fleet on May 1st, 1898, Admiral Dewey, after a more or less severe bombardment, could possibly have forced the city of Manila to capitulate. But inasmuch as he was short of ammunition (51) and had no landing force to garrison that city, he was humane enough not to subject it to the horrors of a bombardment with no other immediate object in view than that of destroying it.

After Aguinaldo's arrival and the wonderful growth of the insurgent army, there was during all of the months of May and June no American force to furnish a garrison. The Admiral was unwilling, in the face of Secretary Long's cable despatch in answer to his own of May 20th, to allow the Katipunan forces to occupy the city. Such a proceeding would have been to place the "Katipunan" at the head of affairs in the Philippines. Had this occurred, excepting for the purpose of supporting it in power, Dewey might just as well have hoisted his homeward bound pennant and sailed for the United

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(51) In the forenoon of May 1st, Admiral Dewey, before he was aware of the full extent of the damage he had inflicted on Montojo's squadron, retired to the other side of Manila Bay, in order, according to the newspaper accounts, to allow his men to have breakfast. His real reason, however, was to consult his captains and ascertain if they had sufficient ammunition to continue the action if necessary.

States. As a matter of fact, all that he could do under the circumstances was to wait for the troops that eventually came under Generals Anderson, Green, and Merritt, and in the meanwhile allow Aguinaldo to do as he could or as he pleased on shore.

The arrival of the first land expedition did not mend matters to any extent. The three thousand men who composed it were by no means an adequate force to curb the insurgent army, which from May to July had been steadily and rapidly increasing. While Aguinaldo was carrying on his operations with unbroken success in the immediate vicinity of Manila, there were extensive uprisings of poorly armed bands in the central provinces during May and June. These uprisings, however, if not put down, were at least checked with considerable severity, especially in Pangasinan, by the Spanish detachments consisting of Cazadores, native regular troops, and Pangasinan and Ilocano Volunteers. These, up to the arrival of the Tagalog forces and as long as any fighting against them lasted, were more than fairly loyal to Spain, though, as was not unnatural, as the insurgents were victorious, they went over to them.

In all of these encounters, the native regular troops and volunteers in the Spanish service, excepting the Tagalogs, behaved admirably. It was only after the Spanish detachments had surrendered that, as a matter of self preservation, they joined the insurgent ranks.

Such resistance as there was, however, did not prevent Gregorio del Pilar, Gregorio Mayor, Francisco Macabulos in the North, and Ponciano Rizal, and others in the provinces of Laguna and Tayabas, making great headway.

On June 25th, Bulacan surrendered after a blockade that lasted twenty three days. In the course of this time, the Spanish commander realized that even the hope of succor was vain.

Tarlac, where all the surrounding Spanish detachments, amounting in all to some twelve hundred men un-

der command of Major Flandes, had been concentrated, was surrendered by that officer on July 8th, practically without firing a shot.

Major Flandes could have retired on Dagupan and might possibly have arrived there with some of his troops. But to have done that would have involved the abandoning at Tarlac of a large number of Spanish and native non-combatants who had taken refuge under his protection. Moreover his force was not large enough to have allowed him to furnish the necessary escort for the immense train he would have been hampered with. This train, taking the condition of the roads into consideration, for the rainy season had commenced, could not have moved at a uniform rate of more than half a mile an hour. What men had been left him were not numerous enough to have enabled him to force his way through even the small bands of badly armed insurgents that lay between him and Dagupan.

On July 22nd, Dagupan and its garrison of 800 men was surrendered to Pablo Tecson by Major Ceballos, after a blockade of eight or ten days. It was but a repetition of the conditions at Tarlac—an immense lot of impedimenta, an insufficiency of troops, no base on which to retire, and annihilation staring him in the face if he remained in the town.

San Fernando de la Union, with a garrison of some seventy men, Spanish and native troops, held out under Major José Herrero for five days. On July 31st, when his ammunition was exhausted, he was forced to surrender.

All these events occurred in rapid succession. In each case the Spanish forces were taken at an immense disadvantage in that they were, compared to the insurgents, but few in number. As all telegraphic lines and other means of communication were in the hands of the rebels, they were completely cut off from communication with the nearest Spanish detachments and were thus unable either to render them assistance or, by receiving

warning of their fate, properly to prepare for their own defence.

On the other hand, the insurgents, successful in their first undertakings, were full of that confidence that is always inspired in raw irregular levies by success over trained and disciplined troops. They had a further advantage in that each success gave them a fresh supply of arms, ammunition, and military supplies (52).

It is worth noting that in all of these affairs, though conditions and stipulations were made by the Spaniards and agreed to by the insurgents, there was no case in which they were observed by the latter. After the surrenders had taken place, the Filipinos violated all their offers and promises in the most shameless manner.

When all hope of relief from home was dashed by the knowledge that de la Camara's squadron had returned to Spain, the commanding Spanish General accepted the offer of Mr. Edward André, Belgian Consul at Manila, to negotiate terms between him and Admiral Dewey for the direct surrender of Manila to the Americans.

The idea is supposed to have originated with General Jaudenes, the Spanish second in command. According to Mr. André it came about through a chance conversation he had had with that officer and Don Juan de la Concha, who was in command of such of the sailors of the Spanish fleet as had, after its destruction on May 1st, been disembarked and used in the defence of Manila. The upshot of this conversation was that these officers authorized him to use their names, and he went to call on General Augustin the same evening and to lay their proposition before him. General Augustin listened courteously to what he had to say, without however giving any definite answer one way or the other. Just how the

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(52) At Bulacan they not only captured the arms and military depot, but also some 80,000 pesos. This was turned over to them by the Spanish civil intendant of that province and he was allowed by Aguinaldo to leave the country and make a trip to Europe.

negotiations were carried on is a matter of very little importance but, according to Mr. André's statement, they were satisfactory and were practically concluded by July 24th.

When General Jaudenes took supreme command, relieving General Augustin, August 4th, there were still some points of difference between him and the American commanders that had to be cleared up; but these were adjusted in a satisfactory manner. After he had gained all the time he could in negotiation, as it was his duty to do, he decided to come to the comic opera arrangement of exchanging a few shots «to satisfy honor», and then to surrender on the following conditions: the American squadron was to engage the outlying fort of San Antonio Abad and, after firing a few shots, was to hoist the signal «do you surrender?» This was to be answered by a white flag from Manila, the bombardment was to cease and the city was to be surrendered to the American forces.

In the meantime, the former U. S. Consul at Manila, Mr. Oscar A. Williams, who was apparently Aguinaldo's guide, philosopher, and friend, had already written, advising him to place the Philippines under the United States. On August 1st, Aguinaldo answered negatively in a puerile and verbose letter containing nearly twelve hundred words of drivel. In this he wasted a great deal of time in flattering expressions of admiration for the United States and appealed to abstract sentiments and theories, which common sense and a very cursory glance at history would have shown him are invariably made to yield to expediency, when confronted by actual conditions that conflict with them.

Had Aguinaldo and his advisers applied the ordinary instruction imparted to any schoolboy, they would have remembered the story of the «wooden horse of Troy». They would have been careful in invoking in their quarrel with Spain, the intervention of a power immeasurably stronger than that country or the Philip-

piners or both together. Had they been even a little wise, they would have realized that «*vae victis*», woe to the conquered, is the guiding rule of the victor, because he believes, and believes rightly, that such spoils as are to be had, belong to him. The only argument that can convince him of the contrary is force.

Aguinaldo and his advisers were thus allowing themselves the diversion of writing would-be diplomatic notes and of playing at the game of an imaginary American alliance, the wish of which was largely the "father to the thought". In their plans, all the solid prizes were to be won by them and the empty glory of having enabled them to win was to go to the United States. All this time, however, the American commanders were carrying on the negotiations above described for the direct surrender of Manila to them by the Spanish General in command, a fact of which these Filipino would-be statesmen were kept in the dark.

Had the force under General Jaudenes been in a position to retire on some base, or had he had any hopes of the siege's being raised, or had he been shut up in a purely military work and not in a populous city like Manila, as a soldier he should, and probably would, have made as stubborn a resistance as the circumstances justified, with a view to making the Americans pay as dearly as possible for their victory. Under the existing conditions, he was completely cut off from any retreat by land. A powerful squadron of the enemy was at hand. Armed with guns that enabled it to keep out of the range of any artillery he had to oppose to it, it was in a position to destroy the city and its defences at its leisure. It is hard to see, therefore, how the Spanish General had any better alternative than the somewhat comic opera arrangement he made to "fire a few shots to satisfy honor" and then to surrender the city.

At the first burst, it seems strange that professional soldiers and sailors like General Merritt and Admiral Dewey should have entered into such a plot, more worthy



of the boards of the "Bouffes Parisiennes" than of the shores of Manila Bay. Its details, with Mr. André as a "deus ex machina", were more grotesquely absurd than those of "Croquefer", "La Grande Duchesse" or "Les Carabiniers". It seems strange they should have consented to play the roles assigned to them, for, having allowed André to suggest the arrangement to the American commanders, Jaudenes could have been forced to dance to any tune they might pipe to him. The whole business, indeed, might have resulted in all parties connected with it going down to posterity, accompanied by a burst of Homeric laughter, as objects of scorn and ridicule to military and naval men for all time to come.

But General Merritt's reasons for entertaining the plan of this line of action were wise, sound, and well considered, as conditions then stood. The arrangement agreed upon furnished the only method by which the American Commanders could get possession of Manila without the participation of the Filipinos, or without an open breach and consequent fight with them. Indeed, so anxious was General Merritt to avoid a clash at this particular time that in his memorandum to General Anderson on August 10th, he imperatively forbids any rupture with the "insurgents".

An open breach with Aguinaldo at that time would have been excessively dangerous. The American forces, which at best amounted to some eleven thousand officers and men, were strung out along the beach practically in column, from Parañaque to Pasay, with the Filipino army, then at its perihelion, on its right flank. In the case of a rupture, the Americans would have been compelled to operate against Aguinaldo's forces, consisting of some 15,000 well armed men, in an unknown country, cut up with watery meadows, rice-fields, and bamboo thickets, with whose local topography the Filipinos were as familiar as the Americans were unacquainted. Under these circumstances, a single reverse, no matter how trifling in itself, would have imperiled the

existence of the American army, especially as it was short of ammunition (53). Furthermore, owing to the fact that the ground it occupied was perfectly flat, the American Army could have counted on very little support from Admiral Dewey's squadron. Every shot from his guns, great or small, would have had to go through the American ranks before reaching those of the Filipinos.

These considerations, which in all probability also entered into the calculations and governed the actions of General Merritt and Admiral Dewey, must effectually divest all the arrangements between them and the Spanish authorities for the surrender of Manila, of any comic opera features which, at a first glance, they may have appeared to possess. That in carrying out this arrangement there was some loss of life is unfortunately true; but there can be no doubt that this was sincerely regretted by all parties to the surrender. Besides there was consolation in the fact that had any other course been pursued, the loss of life on all sides would have been immeasurably greater.

General Merritt had already declined to hold any direct communication with the insurgents. Consequently his dealings with them were through third parties, his subordinate officers, the American Consul Williams, and others. His reasons for this were obvious and sound, from both a military and diplomatic point of view. Using them in this particular as he did, he was not in any way bound by any promises they made or line of action they pursued. He could disavow either at his pleasure, should it have appeared expedient to him to do so. That this line of action was open to him was known by his subordinates and the Consul as well as that it was in keeping with the polity and policy of the United States. If this fact was not known to the insurgents, it was a case of "caviat emptor", "let the buyer beware". It was no

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(53) See article by Captain T. Bently Mott in "Scribners Magazine" December, 1898.

part of General Merritt's duty or of that of his subordinates to enlighten them in the matter.

This also explains what has been called the "official interference" of the Consuls and their failure to remember to mind their own affairs. Had eventually any unauthorized action on their part redounded to the the advantage of the United States, they would probably have received due credit for it. Otherwise they would in all probability have got a mild admonition on paper, or perhaps a rebuke for being officials who in their "loyal zeal for the public service, had overstepped their authority" by making personal promises which were not binding on their superiors and from which all were consequently released.

After General Merritt arrived with the third expedition, July 25th, he personally made an examination of the ground and decided that his attack was to be made along the beach. This decision would have been that of any trained soldier. Farther inland the country was too much cut up with rice-fields that could be flooded, ditches, "esteros" or tidal creeks, and bamboo thickets which none but native troops, under the command of officers thoroughly acquainted with the ground, could manoeuvre over. He next decided that it was necessary to get the insurgents out of his way, thus avoiding "entangling alliances" that might give them the right to claim consideration for any share they might otherwise have in the anticipated victory.

To carry out his plan, he gave verbal directions to General Green to persuade the insurgents to evacuate a portion of their trenches and to allow him to occupy them. General Green sent for Mariano Noriel, who was in command of that part of the Filipino lines, and proposed to him to give up about 400 yards of trenches next the beach. This Noriel consented to do, providing he could obtain Aguinaldo's consent. Between two and three in the morning, Noriel returned, saying that Aguinaldo agreed to this on the condition that the request

was made in writing. General Green, to "save time" as he expressed it, said he would post his troops in the trenches in the morning and send his written request afterwards. In this wise, General Green, who had taken command of the land forces on July 28th, got possession on the morning of the 29th of a part of Noriel's position, about a quarter of a mile south of the Spanish entrenchments. The latter extended in a curved line of about three miles in length, around the walls of the city of Manila.

The Spanish garrison amounted to some five or six thousand men and a large number of sick and wounded in hospital. The combined land forces of the three American expeditions amounted to some eleven thousand officers and men, while the Filipinos forces amounted to some fifteen thousand, occupying various positions from the right of the American position at Maytubig to the west and north of Manila. Thus the besieging force amounted in all to upwards of twenty five thousand, without counting the crews of Admiral Dewey's squadron.

On July 31st, the Spaniards made a night sortie, in which they were partially successful, but they were driven back again after some sharp fighting. The American troops lost in killed, wounded, and missing some forty officers and men. The Spanish losses were never reported. During the following week the Spaniards made three more night attacks, without any other result than a total of ten killed and wounded on the American side.

In the meantime the American lines, making use of the Filipino trenches, had been advanced to within about 360 yards of the Spanish position. On August 11th, as there were signs of an impending attack by the Spaniards, the Filipinos moved towards the lines with a view to supporting the American forces, but they were requested to withdraw. When night came on, the Spaniards, under cover of the darkness, made an attack on the American works, but were driven back by the Americans, who followed them and occupied the first Spanish

trench. The fighting continued and the Spaniards, by a furious bayonet charge, forced the American troops to retire to their own lines. These they subsequently had to abandon, leaving four field guns and some rifles in the hands of the Spaniards, who had followed them up. The Filipinos under Noriel then advanced and taking the Spaniards in the flank, drove them back to their original position and recovered the American cannon and arms, that had been abandoned in their hasty retreat (54). These guns and rifles were returned to the Americans on the following day by Aguinaldo's order, in spite of the protest of Noriel, who wished to keep them (55).

On the night of August 12th, the steamer "Filipinas" with 600 insurgent troops, started to sail for Aparri. She was stopped by Admiral Dewey, but was eventually allowed to proceed. This line of action on his part may have arisen from several motives; first, his wish to avoid breaking with the insurgents until after the taking of Manila; or secondly, to reduce the strength of Aguinaldo's forces by the number of men on the "Filipinas", as well as to get that vessel itself out of Manila Bay; or thirdly, to allow the Filipinos to fight the Americans' battles in the north. No matter which of these motives governed his action, the result was that the "Filipinas" sailed for Aparri, where she arrived on August 24th. The surrender of that place was compelled by the insurgent forces and that indirectly prolonged the eventual "War of Conquest".

It is said that General Merritt and his brigade commanders, as well as Admiral Dewey and his captains, were all acquainted with the arrangement that had been made with the Spanish authorities (56). On

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(54) See "The Philippine Islands" by John Foreman, page 615.

(55) "Reseña veredica de la revolución Filipina" by Emilio Aguinaldo.

(56) General MacArthur, in his statement before the Senate Committee, says that he believed that "he was going into a real battle".

the evening of the 12th, General Merritt sent a message to Aguinaldo that, in the assault to take place on the following day, he was not to take part, as it was a fight between the Americans and the Spaniards only.

About daybreak on the morning of August 13th, the Filipinos opened a general fire on the Spanish position. This was answered by a desultory fire of cannon and small arms by the Spaniards. The Americans took no part in this attack, but later General Merritt demanded the surrender of Manila within an hour. This being refused, a combined land and sea attack was made on the city.

At 9:35 a. m., the squadron opened fire. The first shot went high, but the second struck the old stone fort of San Antonio Abad and killed thirteen of the garrison. Some fifty 8 inch shells and two hundred and fifty 5 inch shells were fired. About 11 a. m., the firing from the ships ceased and General Green, who was in immediate command of the land forces, gave the order to advance and assault the Spanish position.

One column, on advancing, found that Fort San Antonio Abad had been abandoned by the Spaniards, who had retired to the shelter of some breastworks in the rear of it. Another column made its way across the fields to the right, in the direction of Malate, and a third advanced along the beach in the direction of the Luneta. As these columns advanced, the Spaniards gradually fell back towards the city of Manila, feebly contesting the ground as they did so.

The insurgents, who were located near the Spanish lines in the direction of Paco, continued the attack after General Green had ordered the firing to cease. At one time, indeed, the American field guns had to be pointed towards the insurgents to enforce obedience to his order. The insurgents on their part pointed their guns at the American forces, but neither side fired. The insurgents, taking another route, then drove the Spaniards in con-

fusion as far as Ermita, just outside the city walls. There Aguinaldo ordered them to cease firing.

General Green followed up his advance by an attack on the city itself. The Spaniards at first made what promised to be a stubborn resistance. They fought about an hour and then hoisted a white flag on one of the bastions. General Green then ordered the firing to cease and, by 1 p. m., the terms of the capitulation were being discussed. For some time after the white flag was hoisted, there was considerable street fighting between the insurgents and the loyal troops towards the Sampaloc and Trozo district, outside of the walls of Manila proper. This finally ceased when the United States forces occupied the city of Manila. From this time on, all revolutions and revolts in the Philippines, at least so far as Spain was concerned, were over forever.

## V

In assigning a cause for the revolt of 1896-98, nearly all writers, English and American, give the same as they gave for that of 1872, namely "the friars" and their "intermeddling in politics". But while the friars may indirectly have had something to do with it, they were by no means its principal or even its secondary cause. Indeed, had the friars, that is, those men comprised in the four regular orders of Augustinians, Recoletos, Dominicans, and Franciscans, at whose door the responsibility for these two revolts has been laid, been left alone to manage the affairs of the Philippines, there can be no doubt that the archipelago would be under the dominion of Spain at the present time, and that without the one hundredth part of either the violence or bloodshed that resulted from wresting it from that power. Therefore the real causes for this revolt must be looked for elsewhere.

As a matter of fact, the loss by Spain of her two principal colonies, Cuba and the Philippines, was due to the results of the revolution of 1868 in Spain itself. The

agitation that brought about the loss of the Philippines, was commenced by Manuel and Antonio Regidor. These men under the auspices of the ultraradical, international republican party and its leaders, which later developed the Commune in France and Spain, started an agitation in the Madrid newspapers, with the object of violently upsetting the condition of affairs then existing in the Philippine Islands.

It should be borne in mind that Spain never conquered the archipelago by force of arms. Putting aside the trifling encounters of Salcedo and Legaspi with the natives, and a few unimportant riots and disturbances, which were all quelled by the existing local authorities, Spain, without having of necessity to send a single soldier, ruled the Philippines by her prestige and influence alone. By avoiding the Scylla and Charybdis of a division of the population into classes on one hand and a false democratic equality on the other, she peacefully maintained her authority over them for more than three hundred years.

The few hundred Spaniards who accompanied Legaspi, and the others who, during the course of three centuries, up to the revolution of 1868 in Spain, were from time to time reinforced by fresh arrivals from that country, did not come with arms in their hands to defend a domination which no one had any idea of attacking and from which none endeavored to emancipate themselves. The Spanish domination in the islands was a recognized fact. No one wasted thought on the possibilities of an uprising nor on the necessity of an army to maintain the Spanish authority. So far as the repelling of foreign invasions went, the inhabitants of the islands had always come forward in sufficient numbers for that purpose.

The real causes that brought about this revolt were various. Any one of them might not have been sufficient in itself to bring about a revolution, but collectively they could not fail to do so.



Ever since the revolution of 1868, the Spaniards, especially the politicians who came to the Philippines, gave evidence of a difference in both precepts and practices concerning the home government. That really served to break down Filipino faith in that uniform loyalty of Spaniards to the Spanish government, which had formerly been one of their chief characteristics. These new comers, however, unlike the British who had migrated to the British colonies, did not leave their home politics in Spain, but brought with them all party heart-burnings, rancors, bitterness, and hatreds. These they aired to their fullest extent, thereby undermining that respect for Spanish nationality as a unit, which was the foundation on which the fabric of Filipino loyalty to Spain rested.

This was not mended by the influx of Spanish officials. Prior to 1868, these had been comparatively few and they were practically permanent residents. The majority, when they went out of office, usually married and remained in the country instead of being, like the new officials, mere birds of passage, who, the bulk of them having been appointed by their Madrid patrons as a recompense for political jobbery, were here today and away tomorrow. These appointees as a rule were utterly ignorant of the duties pertaining to their offices, and were therefore dependent on the native minor officials to do the work they should have done themselves. As soon as they had learned how to do anything, they were liable to be dropped for others, who had to have their political claims recognized. All of this subjected them to the contempt and hatred of the natives.

The radical changes in the laws in 1887, and the lack of a permanent body in which the more intelligent and competent Filipinos and Spaniards in the islands could discuss and express their opinions, if nothing more, as to the expediency of amending such laws as were in force or enacting such as were necessary, was another cause of complaint. No matter how obsolete the laws in exis-

tence may have been, they were far and away better adapted to the conditions prevailing in the Philippines than could possibly be new enactments made in Madrid, where the knowledge of Filipino affairs was at best second hand.

The abolition of the tobacco monopoly in 1881, while undoubtedly a benefit to the islands at large, completely upset for the time being the relations of landlord and tenant, to say nothing of the conditions of purchase, sale, and manufacture of that article. It also resulted in a change in the system of taxation as well as in the method of collecting the taxes, and that necessarily caused a great amount of friction.

There was also another element of discontent. A numerous and steadily increasing class of young men was passing university examinations. Many of them were capable in an eminent degree of entering into the public life of the colonies in government service, but from lack of vacancies, owing to the large number of Spaniards employed, they were unable to find positions. The faculty of the University of Manila, principally composed of Dominican friars, had already addressed a memorial on this subject to the Spanish Government, suggesting the increase of native employees and a corresponding decrease of Spaniards appointed in the islands. In many cases such appointments, they said, meant hardship, not to say absolute injustice, to the natives.

An influx of extreme radical and ultra antireligious ideas had been brought to the Philippines by swarms of political and other adventurers. Most of these in one way or another had made their own country too hot to hold them. Some of them had been appointed to offices and some had been allowed to go to the colonies "where they could do harm". All this brought a disturbing element to the Philippines. Many were ready and anxious to "fish in troubled waters", created either by themselves or by others. They were hungering for any form

of political agitation or revolution, more especially against the religious orders, which they considered stood in the way of the ends they had in view.

There was another disturbing element consisting of young men, who called themselves the "progresistas". Some of these had attended European universities. They had become imbued with the abstract, ultrasocialistic doctrines always more or less prevalent among a large number of continental students. By far the greater number either modify considerably or throw over completely all such theories as soon as the course is finished and they are confronted with the material problems of every day life.

These as well as others had become aware of the weakness of Spain from the various and violent changes introduced by the more or less "liberal" governments in that country since 1868. Such were the first republic, the imported royalty as represented by Amadeo of Savoy, the republic again, again royalty under Alfonso XIII, and the Regency with a running accompaniment of a communistic uprising at Cartagena and a Carlist war in the Basque provinces. The Filipino students had noted the willingness of the ministers of these various governments to risk the sacrifice of colonies or anything else, in order that they might come into and remain in power, so long as there was power left in which they could remain. It was through such returned travelers that the Filipinos became aware of the weakness of Spain and it is not strange that they should have endeavored to utilize this knowledge to bring about a discontent with the existing order of things and a revolt.

There were also complaints of abuses and injustice committed by the Spaniards in their relations with the native classes. But these were enormously exaggerated. The abuses were neither so extensive nor so flagrant as they were alleged to be. They were, indeed, mostly of a minor character, such as no government, no matter how watchful or zealous it be, can entirely correct or prevent.

In this matter, the friars came in for more than their share of vituperation and misrepresentation. This was not infrequently at the hands of Spanish government officials, more especially those belonging to the so called "liberal" parties, who for party reasons were more anxious to bring the friars into discredit with the Filipinos than to preserve peace in the islands. Therefore they did not hesitate to saddle on the members of the religious orders the abuses, exactions, and tyrannies that they themselves had committed. When they could not on account of the nature of their acts succeed in screening themselves behind the religious orders as principals, they gave it to be understood that these abuses were committed at the instigation of, or under pressure from, the friars.

Another source of discontent in the islands was the foreign mercantile firms established in them. These firms had brought with them an immense amount of capital. From this they expected to receive large returns, and their expectations were for many years amply fulfilled, in the shape of interest for money advanced on lands, crops, and other contingencies. The value of the land upon which mortgages had been foreclosed, or were close on foreclosure, by one foreign firm alone, amounted to over five million pesos. To screen their transactions, such firms usually threw the blame, not on the altered conditions of trade and agriculture, which were the real causes of this condition of affairs, but on the Spanish system of government. They pointed out to their creditors or debtors that whatever harsh measures they employed were the results of the pressure brought to bear on them by the Spanish administration.

In the British colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore, there was a large number of adventurers who lived by their wits. For one reason or another, they had not found that royal road to fortune they had hoped to discover. Many of these had been to the Philippines, where they had failed in their undertakings. Owing to the opposition

of the Spanish authorities, they had not been able to exploit the natives to their own advantage or to the extent they had wished. These were always ready to seize on any opportunity to foment political trouble in the neighboring Spanish colony. Only in this way might they possibly rehabilitate their fallen hopes.

The local British colonial newspapers, as much with a view to airing their political opinions as to publishing "news" with which to entertain their readers, kept alive the hereditary animosity of the British nation for Spain. They assiduously revived the memory of enmities that had been handed down from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth.

There were also in these British colonies important mercantile firms, willing and anxious to sell iron-mongery or hardware, whether in the shape of sugar-mill machinery or machine guns, repeating rifles or hypodermic syringes, to all who could and would pay for them, regardless of their destination or of the uses to which they were to be put.

All these British elements raised the hue and cry against the Spanish colonial government and welcomed, for various reasons of their own, any disturbance that was likely to increase their trade profits or to further their political ideas. Consequently the Filipino leaders and agitators found in these British Colonies no lack of persons to extend them such moral sympathy as they craved, or such material assistance as they could pay for. At the same time the British were more than willing to make use of them as cat's paws to pull their commercial or political chestnuts out of the fire.

Another source of discontent was the friars, but this, as has already been said, was an indirect cause and arose from their patriotism as regarded both Spain and the Philippines. In regard to Spain they were always for supporting her authority, and in regard to the Philippines, they consistently opposed the visionary and incendiary policies of the ultra radicals.

It is beyond the peradventure of a doubt that had the friars given the faintest indication, not of sympathy for, but merely of toleration of, the leaders of the revolution and their objects, the religious orders would not have received even a shadow of opposition from the Katipuneros. They were, however, not only Spaniards but men of more than average experience of the world. In their former capacity they were naturally staunch supporters of the authority of their own country. In regard to the Philippines, they could easily foresee that, putting all religious questions aside, the success of the Katipunan in ousting Spain would in a very few years have resulted either in the Philippines becoming a colony of some one of the great European powers or in being divided up among several of them. Consequently they were bitter and consistent opponents of the Katipunan.

The principal grievance alleged by the Katipunan leaders against the religious orders was the lands they were known to have and the money they were supposed to possess. In order to create opposition to them on the part of the people in the Philippines and a condemnation of them unheard by foreign nations, both were enormously exaggerated. Even men who, according to evidence taken at Manila before the first Philippines Commission, were deeply indebted to the members of these orders both individually and collectively for favors received at their hands, did not hesitate to testify before the Paris Peace Commission not only to what was false but to much of which they admitted they only had a hearsay knowledge.

Another cause of this rebellion was that long before the declaration of war between Spain in the United States, the American Consuls in Manila, Hong Kong, and Singapore were in close and constant communication with the insurgent leaders and agitators, and even though these gentlemen may have had nothing to do directly with the first uprising of 1896, they certainly had with that of 1897. Whenever the subject of an

uprising was broached by a Filipino to them or to any other American, he was invariably assured that "we are going to whip the Spaniards and set you free"; also that the American people would as a unit extend its most cordial sympathy to the Filipinos or to any people who rose against a monarchical form of government, no matter where such an uprising might be. Therefore the Filipino believed that the United States Government could not fail to protect and favor the Filipino insurgents, at least indirectly, if it did not go to the extent of an armed intervention in their favor.

Another cause was that at the breaking out of the Katipunan rebellion, the entire armed force of the islands, including Staff, Line, Guardia Civil, Custom House Guards, Marine Infantry, Sailors, Special Corps, etc., did not amount to 15,000 officers and men. Of these not ten per cent of all ranks were Spaniards. Of such as were, by far the greater portion were in Mindanao, Joló, the Caroline Islands, and other remote spots. It can therefore be readily appreciated that this condition of affairs was of itself an incentive to the Katipuneros to tempt the fortune of war.

There had been a rather rapid growth of democratic nationalist ideas, such as by one means or another were bound to spring up among the Filipinos and which, the more they came in closer touch with other peoples and other systems of government, could not fail to have a decided effect upon them. This effect, unless leavened by the presence of a strong, well organized, and disciplined body of peninsular troops, was certain in the end to extend to the native soldiers. Spain, therefore, to maintain her power in the Philippines, should have increased both her army and navy in the Islands. This was the only manner in which she could hope to overawe the agitators and revolutionists or to quell any disturbances that they might create. She could have done this gradually and imperceptibly, without exciting the suspicions or jealousies of the inhabitants. But she

failed to do so and, as a result, was forced to send 30,000 men from Spain to put down a revolt which 5,000, had they been present in the Islands when it first broke out, could have effectually nipped in the bud. If the Guardia Civil in Cavite, instead of consisting of only a scant hundred men, had been three times that strength and had a part of them been Spaniards, the cry of Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo would have fallen on deaf ears in that province.

On the other hand, any increase in the military force would have meant an increase of taxation either for the Islands or for Spain. Up to 1898, the forces in the Philippines, both land and sea, were paid for out of the colonial budget. Had the increase in revenue, necessary to have maintained the increase of force, been charged to the colony, this would have furnished a further ground for complaint.

In spite of all the foregoing, the main cause and principal motive power that started and kept alive the revolution of 1896-98, the first part of which commenced at Balintauac in August, 1896, and ended at Biac-na-Bato in December, 1897, were the secret societies. These began with Masonry, as established in the Philippines, developed into the "Liga" and the "Compromisarios", and finally ended in the "Katipunan". The members of each of these different societies were in touch with members of all classes in the community. They worked on such persons as they come in contact with, by urging the hesitating, encouraging the timid, flattering the hopes of the disappointed, predicting an increase of trade to the smaller merchants, prosperity to the planters, and a division of lands to the tenants of the religious orders and other land owners in the event of the success of the Katipunan cause. In a word they used every effort that ingenuity could devise or imagination invent, to further their aims. When persuasion failed to enlist proselytes, they had recourse to force to fan the spark of discontent into the flame of rebellion, and they succeeded.



According to the allegation of the Katipuneros, the principal cause for this rebellion was the tyranny and oppression of the friars. On impartial investigation, however, they do not seem to have made out their case. From all that can be gathered, it appears that in a majority of instances the friars enjoyed the esteem and respect of their parishioners and were on fairly good terms with them and were well liked by them. This is proved by the fact, for instance, that when on Aguinaldo's orders they were expelled from their parishes, the many abuses and cruelties, to which, according to their accounts, they were subjected, appear, with rare exceptions, to have been received at the hands of members of other flocks than their own.

That in some cases, as at Calamba and Santa Rosa, the friars may have been strict in insisting on the enforcement of the decrees of the courts, respecting their rights, was not only sanctioned but was practically compelled by the circumstances of the situation. According to all law and justice, they were the rightful landlords. Their tenants had already recognized them as such by having entered into leases with them and paid them rents. Any refusal on the part of their tenants either to pay their rents or to vacate their holdings, would not have been sustained in any court in the world.

At the beginning of the rebellion of 1896, it is safe to assert that ninety five per cent of the population of the islands were in favor of the Spanish government. Such discontent as existed, strange to say, was confined to the members of a few well-to-do families of the Tagalogs, Mestizos, and Sangleyes in Manila and the provinces immediately surrounding that city. Even in these, it was not until the Katipunan, started under their auspices with the help of other agitators, intriguers, and plotters, had acquired considerable headway, that there were any thoughts of a rebellion among the masses of the people. Had it not been for the extreme views that the Katipunero leaders had forced upon the country, the

rebellion, by judicious reforms gradually introduced, might have been controlled and the demands put forward completely satisfied. This, however, was not to be. The majority of the leading Katipuneros were constantly egged on by others, who, hoping that by further embarrassing the Spanish government they would be able to force an issue and thereby place themselves at the head of affairs, insisted that all their demands be satisfied immediately. If this was not their object, their action was childish in the extreme. It practically amounted to their demanding that they at once be given a new and complicated toy, exactly like that in the possession of some other child, without taking into consideration the time necessary to construct it.

Between the compromise of Biac-na-Bato and the breaking out of the war between the United States and Spain, some of the Filipino leaders, not in favor of a permanent separation from the latter country, found their way back to the support of the Spanish government. Others wholly in favor of a separation openly declared themselves so, while many more prudently waited till the fortune of war should point to them the best road for furthering their own interests. Thus the three elements, or categories, that had existed among the Filipino leaders up to that time, practically disappeared. In their place rose the so-called National party, consisting almost entirely of the Filipino leaders. It was directed first by the "Junta Patriótica Filipina" at Hong Kong and later by Emilio Aguinaldo at Malolos. This party appealed to the United States to establish it under the form of an independent government in the Philippine Islands.

As to the mass of the people, before it had been worked up by the Katipunan into a national party, it is safe to say that of independence, so far as the abstract meaning of the word goes, they at that time knew little and cared less. Provided they were not interfered with individually or heavily taxed, it was practically a matter of indif-

ference to them under what form of government they lived. The Katipunan and other political leaders had held out to tenants on the estates of the religious orders as well as to those of other land owners, the lure of having these estates divided among them. Similar hopes were cherished by many of the inhabitants of the chief cities and large towns; who looked forward to seizing and making their own the urban property they occupied as tenants. Beyond this they took very little interest in politics proper.

At the time the agreement of Biac-na-Bato was reached, in spite of the destruction of life and property, in spite of the awakening of passions and the calling into existence of hatreds that theretofore had not existed, the majority of the Filipinos, especially of the middle and better classes, were still loyal to Spain. When they realized that, through the weakness of Sagasta's pusillanimous administration, their loyalty had counted for naught, that all political offenses connected with the rebellion were to be condoned, worse still, that the Katipuneros were to be the only recipients of honors, favors, and money at the hands of the liberal government, and over and above this, were to be allowed to continue their agitation through the Katipunan committees, then only did they naturally lose heart and many of them, some from disgust, some from prudence, and some from force, hastened to join their fortunes to the rebellion. They thereby gave it a new chance at life, and this was increased by the promised intervention of the American forces as soon as the war between the United States and Spain should be declared.

The second and most serious period of this rebellion started with Aguinaldo's return to the Philippines under the auspices of the United States in the month of May, 1898. This second period was made possible by Sagasta's administration granting a respite of four months to the Katipunan, instead of making an endeavor to crush Aguinaldo when it could have done so. The moral encour-

agement and material support of the American Consuls at Singapore, Hong-Kong and Manila, allowed it to drag on during three or four months. Later the arms and supplies furnished Aguinaldo by Admiral Dewey, as well as those received from the American Consul at Hong Kong, enabled the Katipuneros to enter on what was practically a second revolution which commenced, so far as the Filipinos were concerned, with the action at Parafique on May 31 and ended with the surrender of Manila on August 31, 1898.

The events that followed from then on, will be treated in the next paper.

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FIFTH PAPER  
THE WAR OF CONQUEST



## FIFTH PAPER

### THE WAR OF CONQUEST <sup>(1)</sup>

The first shot in the "War of Conquest" was fired by one W. W. Grayson of the Nebraska regiment on the night of February 4th, 1899, according to his own statement made to a newspaper correspondent in an interview on August 5th, 1899. As a matter of fact, the war itself really had commenced on May 1st, 1898, when the Spanish squadron was destroyed by Admiral Dewey off Cavite. It was one of the inevitable consequences of the

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(1) Whoever is seeking for a detailed account or a general sketch of military events in the Philippines, from the naval battle off Cavite on May 1st, 1898, to the capture of Aguinaldo at Palanan on March 24th, 1901, will have to go elsewhere. This paper purports only to discuss academically the underlying motives for the Spanish American war, and to set forth the vacillating policy that was pursued in waging it in the Philippines.

To illustrate this statement two examples have been chosen, the expedition to Iloilo under General Marcus L. Miller to occupy that city, and the one under General Frederick Funston to capture the person of Emilio Aguinaldo.

The first shows conclusively how General Otis, hampered by instructions from the then administration at Washington, instead of occupying Iloilo as he could have done without firing a shot, when General de los Rios offered to surrender it to him about the beginning of December, 1899, was later forced to send an expedition under General Miller. This while strong enough to have taken it at a very trifling sacrifice at any time, lay off that place for over a month, vainly endeavoring to secure its surrender by negotiation. When at least the expedition did land, it was met by a conflagration that destroyed the second city in the archipelago, so far as commercial importance was concerned.

The second demonstrates how, untrammelled by vacillating and

Spanish American War. The United States, once started on its "vigorous foreign policy", had no choice but to carry it out to its logical conclusion. In the case of the Philippines, it is possibly true the bow may have been drawn "at a venture", but once the string was loosed the arrow sped on its flight and no earthly power could recall it.

The Spanish American War was the outcome of the "vigorous foreign-policy" advocated by James G. Blaine. Out of this policy, during the first administration of President Cleveland and more especially during that of Mr. Harrison, who succeeded him (1889-1893), grew the "Imperialist policy", whose first fruit was the dethronement of Queen Liliukalani of the Hawaiian Islands. This event was brought about by certain American filibusters, backed up by the American Minister, J. L. Stevens, who requested the landing of some 140 sailors from the U. S. S. "Boston" to protect American interests (2).

The Hawaiian republic was then established, January 15th, 1893. It proceeded immediately to annex itself to the United States. The bill ratifying this annexation was submitted to congress by Mr. Harrison

contradictory orders or instructions, General Funston was able to carry to a successful issue an enterprise which, though insignificant in numerical strength, was, apart from the importance of its results, one of the most daring ever undertaken in any country, and that without the loss of a single man.

Had Spain or the Philippines been anything near an equal match for the United States on land or water, and taken advantage of the latter's delays of military action due to that policy, the whole affair might have resulted in serious temporary disaster or perhaps even ultimate defeat.

(2) President Cleveland sent Mr. Blount as Commissioner to Hawaii to enquire into and report upon the revolution of January 15th, 1893. Mr. Blount in his report said, among other things, that Mr. Stevens' action in the matter was unwarranted and that it was only the presence of the men landed from the Boston that made the revolution possible.



towards the end of his administration, February 16th, 1893, but was never acted on by Mr. Cleveland, who succeeded Mr. Harrison on March 4 1893. Thus for the four years of Mr. Cleveland's second administration, (1893-1897), Hawaii and the Imperialist Policy were left hanging in the air. When Mr. McKinley came into power in 1897, one of the first measures of his administration was to admit the Hawaiian republic to the United States as a territory.

For many years prior to the Civil War, in fact up to 1860, those known as the Southern or slave holding states, though practically a purely agricultural district, were in general terms the richest and politically the most influential portion of the United States. These states had not unnaturally endeavored to increase their wealth, perpetuate their power, and extend their territory, and with it the institution of slavery, by the aid of which they had been able to cultivate the landed estates which were the main source of their wealth and prosperity. Moreover the slaves represented, to a very large degree, their working or business capital.

It may be well to remember that in all the thirteen colonies that formed the United States of America, with the exception of Pennsylvania, negro slavery, at the time of the revolution of 1776, was in existence, recognized and protected by law. Later, when slave labor was found to be unprofitable, it had fallen into disuse and gradually died out in many states: still it was never abolished by either state or federal statute until the twelfth amendment of the United States Constitution was enacted and promulgated December 18th, 1865.

During this time of prosperity, the states in which slavery was still profitable looked around for some extension of territory and naturally their eyes fell on the islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo. During Mr. Pierce's administration, (1853-1857), Pierre Soulé was sent to Spain as Minister Plenipotentiary, and part of his instructions was to negotiate the pur-

chase of Cuba from Spain for whatever sum that country might ask for it. Spain, however, refused to sell.

This resulted in what is known as the "Ostend Manifesto". It was drawn up by the American Ministers, at London, Paris, and Madrid, who convened at Ostend in Belgium by order of Mr. Pierce, the President of the United States. On October 9th, 1854, they declared that Cuba was necessary to the United States and that, if Spain would not sell that island, it should be wrested from her by force.

While the then administration apparently contented itself with Spain's refusal, a large number of the people, more especially those of the Southern states, did not. As a consequence, various filibustering expeditions, that were very popular, especially in the South, were organized by certain individuals, (3) with the hope of repeating the history of Texas. They desired to create a Cuban republic, which would eventually request admission to the United States. As these expeditions were not supported by the United States as a nation, they were unsuccessful. Otherwise Cuba, and possibly Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo also, with their immense wealth in slaves and plantation property, would have been added to the United States as slave holding states and would have given a power and preponderance to the Southern or slave states, that would have made them the predominating power in the Union.

The filibustering expeditions, however, were not a success at that time. The next move of the would-be Cuban annexationist was to foster a rebellion against

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(3) See an article by General Frederick Funston in Scribner's Magazine for September, 1910, which gives a capital description of the organizing and starting of one of many similar expeditions, that had at various time left the United States for Cuba. These expeditions were not successful until the Republican party, with the "expansionists" in the lead, came into power and committed itself to a "vigorous foreign policy", with Spain as a prospective enemy and the annexation of Cuba as a probable result.

Spain in Cuba and to endeavor to establish a republic in that island. Such a rebellion was popular all over the United States, first, because by ousting Spain from the Western hemisphere, it embodied the principle of "America for Americans"; secondly, it was a blow aimed at monarchical institutions in general, and thirdly, it was especially popular in the Southern states for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph.

The War of Secession, however, put an end to slavery in the United States. When it was over, the Southerners no longer had the same material interest in Cuban annexation that they formerly had, although a sentimental interest still remained, and was perhaps stronger than ever, especially as it offered an outlet to ambitions and hopes that had been shattered in a four years' fruitless struggle at home.

"We'll free Cuba" became, so to speak, a war cry by which ardent, adventurous spirits, North and South, could be led to find a neutral ground. There they could join hands without going into details as to whether the majority of the Cubans wanted to separate from Spain or, if they did, whether their condition would be bettered by so doing, or whether they wanted to come under the United States. They were convinced that if the Cubans did not take their view of entering the Union, they could easily be persuaded later to concur in the wisdom or expediency of such a step, by argument if possible, or by force if necessary.

The revolution of 1868 in Spain, by abolishing slavery in the colonies of that country, had practically ruined Cuba, also a purely agricultural country depending for its prosperity principally on slave labor. There arose in that island a large party which, hoping for the direct or indirect support of the United States, aspired to start a new and independent country. Thus they thought they would be able, according to their own ideas and by their own methods, to settle the labor difficulties that were staring them in the face.

The United States, however, was a nation tired of war. Moreover it was just then given up to reconstruction problems and therefore had little time and less inclination to enter into another war with even so weak a country as Spain. Consequently the rebellion in Cuba dragged on, never wholly successful and never completely crushed. This condition of affairs gave an opening to the aspirations of the annexationists of both the United States and the island of Cuba. It enabled them to cloak their desire of annexing the latter to the former under the euphemistic and ambiguous sentiment of altruism (4).

Although Cleveland had never favored it, yet during his second administration the "Imperialist Policy" was strongly advocated by a large branch of the Republican party as well as by many Democrats, who were collectively dubbed the "Jingoes". For reasons best known to themselves, they and certain newspapers, then called "yellow journals", commenced to agitate against the Spanish dominion in Cuba, setting forth as their reason for so doing that the abuses and atrocities on the part of Spain towards the Cubans were intolerable to the United States. If, however, such abuses existed to the extent alleged, they were due to the necessary severities incident to the suppression of the Cuban rebellion. This rebellion had originally been and still was largely supported by a very active sympathy, if not on the part of the United States as a government, at least of a very

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(4) Altruism is susceptible of opposite interpretations by the donor and the recipient. According to the recipient, the donor may be giving something which no matter how precious or necessary, the former does not appreciate or feel the desire for. For instance, money and food are two excellent things; but to a man who is starving, money is valueless, unless food can be immediately purchased with it. On the other hand, to insist on forcing food, in no matter what quantities, on a man in immediate financial difficulties, unless he has a market at hand in which to sell it and thus procure money to relieve them, may be altruistic on the part of the donor but it is hardly appreciated as such by the recipient.

large number of American officials, great and small, as individuals. This sympathy was carried to the extent of allowing the Cubans to hold a "Junta", or Assembly, that sat publicly in the city of New York. Through this Junta, certain officials and politicians entered into relations, indirect but none the less effective, with the so-called Republic of Cuba, which of itself consisted of nothing more than some malcontent agitators in Cuba, of the Junta itself in New York, and of some armed bands under Garcia, Gomez, and other leaders. In the shape of territory it possessed nothing more than the ground on which these bands stood, if it possessed that much.

The native population of Cuba at this time might have been divided into three equal parts, one of them in favor of the revolution, another in favor of Spain, the third "on the fence", and ready to get down on the side on the first that might be successful. Those of the population born in Spain were practically to a man in favor of remaining under that country and its government. The foreigners resident in Cuba were divided in their opinions and desires according to the dictates of their personal interests.

American sympathy with the revolutionists, and the intervention that grew out of it, were not altogether the pure altruism their advocates would have them appear to be. If there were advantages for Cuba in a republican form of government, the eventual positive advantages offered to the United States were believed to be quite as great, if not greater, for the possession of Cuba had been officially declared as necessary to the existence of the United States (5).

The Imperialist and "Jingoes", no matter what their public utterances to the contrary may have been, were in thorough accord with Thomas Jefferson, when, in a letter to President Monroe in 1823, he said that "the addition of the island of Cuba to our Confederacy

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(5) See "Ostend Manifesto" drawn up in October, 1854.

is exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest." They also stood with John Quincy Adams, who went so far as to state that "Cuba gravitates to the United States as the apple, yet hanging on its native trunk, gravitates to the earth which sustains it". The greater force of these statements may be realized when it is remembered that they were made more than fifty years before the war with Spain was finally declared.

In that interim, the Cuban insurgents had been liberally supplied with arms, ammunition, stores, and men by citizens of the United States, whenever they were required. This was the case not because Cuba was mismanaged by Spain, but because that island was coveted as "the most interesting addition that could be made to our system of States", to quote Jefferson once more. Thus Americans for close on to seventy years had been seeking an excuse for the "rounding by the United States of her power as a nation", by the annexation of Cuba. (6).

Since the days of Jefferson, Monroe, Adams, and Pierce, the policy of "America for the Americans" has grown to such an extent that, at present, it may almost be said to be "America, and as much more of the earth as it can conquer and hold, for the Americans." This policy may not be that of the country at large or it may not have been in favor with the majority of citizens; yet the clause disclaiming any desire for acquisition of territory was not gotten into the formal declaration of war with Spain without discussion and opposition, and even then it only applied to the island of Cuba. The Philippines and Puerto Rico were not mentioned in it, and as a matter of fact they had theretofore been rarely men-

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(6) There are many thousands of Americans who have for years been advocating, and still advocate, the annexation of the Bahama and Bermuda islands, as well as Canada and the other British possessions of North America. This is not on the ground of altruism or alleged misgovernment of these colonies by England, but because "they ought to belong to us".

tioned in any of the congressional debates on the subject. Whether this was because Puerto Rico and the Philippines were considered mere side issues, or because the more astute politicians were anxious to keep them in the background in order that, Spain once vanquished, both Puerto Rico and the Philippines could become "spoils of war", to be retained by the victor or given over to their inhabitants, without being hampered by the resolutions of the declaration of war, as policy or expediency might dictate, is at present a matter of minor importance.

It is very doubtful if, at the commencement of the war, the United States had any fixed policy or idea concerning its ultimate intention in regard to the Philippines. Its allowing two months to elapse between the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the sending of troops to finish on land what Admiral Dewey had begun on the water, was ample proof of this, unless indeed the Imperialists trusted the Filipinos would act with respect to the archipelago as the Hawaiians had acted with Hawaii.

The only explanation or excuse that can possibly be urged for the vacillating policy that then prevailed at Washington, is the hypothesis that a determined congressional minority had hurried an undecided majority into a war for which the country, as a whole, was not particularly anxious, for which it was utterly unprepared, and which in a very brief period developed into a far more serious undertaking than it had bargained for. The country, indeed, found itself on the horns of a dilemma. It had either to abandon the war ignominiously or to carry it out to its logical conclusion. Either of these alternatives was decidedly repugnant to America as a nation.

This uncertainty of purpose in respect to the Philippines was largely due to the lack of accurate information at Washington as to the real conditions in those islands. Many false impressions had been received from the United States Consul at Manila, who apparently was prepared to take an ex-parte view of the case and to credit

information received from one source only. He seemed to ignore the fact that that source was made up of persons who had a deep interest in bringing about the intervention of the United States in Filipino affairs, and who were prepared to make any statements they thought would chime in with his views, whether they were correct or not, provided they accomplished their own ends. In the light of subsequent events, indeed, his reports appear better calculated to support the theories and allegations of the radical newspapers in the United States than to furnish an accurate and comprehensive idea of the actual condition of affairs and of Filipino general opinion. In a word, the least that could have been expected of him was accurate information based on facts, and not personal opinions backed up by ex-parte statements of the insurgents and their friends. The correspondence of this gentleman shows either a most remarkable talent for correctly grasping, solving, and deciding out of hand, problems which even the most experienced statesmen would have approached with hesitation, or else a blind reliance on the one-sided information he was able, by means of interpreters, to extract from the insurgent leaders and sympathizers he came into contact with in Manila, during the four short months he was in the Philippines before the declaration of war. Indeed, his letters to the State Department, as published, read more like specimens of provincial newspaper correspondence than like official documents. The inaccuracies contained in them, accepted at their face value, led to a greater expenditure of blood and treasure than can ever be calculated.

The Washington government was led astray at the outset by excessive zeal on the part of its agents, more especially of its Consuls in Hong-Kong, Singapore, and Manila. In common with the vast majority of Americans, these men could not understand how any one, not already an American citizen, could not be desirous of becoming one, in case an opportunity to do so present-



ed itself. They believed that a very large and influential class of Filipinos, if not anxious as a body to become citizens of the United States, were at least willing to allow the United States to direct the affairs of the Islands indefinitely. In thus reporting to Washington, they were no doubt sincere. But the insurgent agitators were not slow to perceive their ignorance as to the real state of affairs. They applauded the idea of citizenship and protectorate. They had no hesitancy in thus confirming those agents in any belief, no matter how erroneous it may have been. They said everything they thought would lead up to American intervention and the accomplishment of their own ideas, trusting to the professed altruism and generosity of the United States to withdraw from the Philippines, when it found out its mistake respecting real Filipino sentiments in respect to annexation.

The Filipino leaders did not realize that a military victory means nothing of itself, and that its only measure is the result it leads up to. To retire from such an expedition to the Philippines, if it did not mean ruin to the country at large, meant it at least to the political party in power, because such a step was tantamount to a confession of having committed an egregious political error. Therefore, on the principle of self-preservation, selfishness may be said to be the first law of nations. Neither a country nor a party, unless absolutely forced, is obliged to sacrifice itself irretrievably, merely to correct a misunderstanding of the conditions that furnished the motives for a certain line of action. In a word, it was a case of one set of politicians endeavoring to overreach the other, but, unluckily for them, the Filipinos had the shortest arms.

The negotiations of the American Consuls at Singapore, Hong Kong, and Manila with Aguinaldo and his associates, were disavowed and disapproved by the State Department. But the administration did not disdain to profit by them. From their despatches to it, it must have been fully aware of what was going on. If it was and

yet did not furnish Admiral Dewey with the means of carrying out his expedition both to immediate success and to its logical conclusion, it is hard to see how, with any show of justice, he could be blamed for making use of such means as he found ready to his hand in accomplishing his object. Under the circumstances, it became his business to weaken or destroy the Spanish forces through Aguinaldo, so as to allow any American expedition that eventually arrived to push forward the work he had begun.

Just what the military policy of the Washington administration may have been, or what policy it proposed to carry out in reference to the Filipino insurrection, is at present hard to say. But the expeditionary forces sent to the Philippines were only small. From May to September, 1898, they amounted to no more than some sixteen thousand in all, or an average of about four thousand men each. Any one on its arrival was individually unable, unless aided by the passive or active cooperation of the Filipinos, to accomplish anything by force. It looked to the Katipuneros, therefore, as though these expeditions had been sent merely to give moral support, and as though the United States had no ulterior motive beyond helping them into power.

There can be very little doubt, however, that the war was undertaken with an ultimate view to the acquisition of territory. But the prevailing idea in the United States as well as with the administration was that this acquisition was to be made at the expense of the Spaniards and not of the Filipinos. It was to involve nothing more than a change of allegiance on the part of the latter from Spain to the United States. It was hardly conceivable by the average American that the Katipuneros or any one else could imagine that any administration or political party would enter blindly into a war, which eventually necessitated upwards of eighty thousand soldiers and sailors in the Philippines at a cost of about a million dollars a day, without some prospect of

indemnification. When the United States realized, however, that the Filipino agitators were not indifferent to who ruled them and would not tamely be content with what practically amounted to a mere change of masters, and that this acquisition of their territory would not be consented to by the Filipinos without a fight, it was too late to recede. The die had been cast and there was nothing else to do but abide by the hazard of the throw.

As to the moral and material conditions prevailing in the Philippines, the American public was completely in the dark, and this was largely due to ignorance. It can safely be said that, up to the declaration of the war, nine Americans out of ten had hardly even heard of the Philippines, beyond that they were a Spanish colony. Consequently the American general public knew little of these islands and of what transpired in them, and cared less.

As a matter of fact, many persons in the United States, at the outset, were bitterly opposed to a declaration of war. Still once the country had embarked in it, they recognized that it was their duty to support the government, no matter what their personal opinions on the righteousness or expediency of the question might be. They believed also that it was the duty of the administration to carry the war out to its logical conclusion.

To do this effectually the administration should have clothed the commanders of both Army and Navy abroad with wider discretionary powers than it saw fit to do. If it could trust to their skill, courage, loyalty, and patriotism to command their armies or fleets in action, it would seem to stand to reason that it could surely have trusted to these same qualities, supplemented with average common sense, to pass on and decide question of local policy, applied to immediate local military conditions. As it was, they had to resort to the telegraph, or to the decisions of persons who were unfamiliar with these conditions. Yet in the end the latter had to be guided in their opinions by the reports of the former.

## II

The first action of the war was the naval engagement at Cavite, in which Admiral Dewey destroyed the obsolete ships of the Spanish squadron, which in tonnage and guns amounted only to about one half of that of his own. As for the torpedo boats, submarines, mines, and other artificial obstructions that the Spaniards were supposed to have placed in the channels of Manila Bay, they existed only in the minds of the newspaper correspondents. The only thing in which the two forces were in any way matched was the courage of the officers and crews. The Spaniards put up as good a fight as was possible under the circumstances. Had they had better guns and better trained gunners, Admiral Dewey's victory might have been none the less complete, but it would doubtless have cost him a great deal dearer than it did.

Considered in any light it was a brilliant victory. Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of his squadron deserve all the credit and even more than has been given, for the preparation and training that assured so decided a success. In spite of his victory, however, the Admiral was unable to put it to any use or to take any immediate advantage of it. The administration in Washington had made no preparations for a landing force to accompany him. It was all he could do to furnish a guard for the navy yard at Cavite.

The forces of the Filipino insurgents, which the American Consuls at Manila and Hong Kong had given him to understand were in existence, turned out to be myths. The proof of this lies in a memorandum furnished to the first Philippine Commission by Admiral Dewey. It is to the effect that the United States Consul at Manila on March 30th, 1898, had stated that there were five thousand Filipinos under arms, "loyal to use in case of

war", whereas beyond unorganized bands, he found no Filipinos under arms after arriving in Manila Bay.

It was in view of this that Admiral Dewey sent to Hong Kong for Aguinaldo, to organize an uprising against the Spanish insular government and to raise the country against the Spaniards. Not until some three weeks later, after that leader had arrived and, with arms furnished by Admiral Dewey and with others brought from Hong Kong and landed at the Cavite navy yard, was he enabled to start the Filipino army and commence the blockade of Manila. Thus it was that Filipino aid was invoked to help us to fight our battles.

On the day following the battle of Cavite, May 2nd, the Spanish flag was still flying over the town of Cavite, separated from the navy yard walls by about 250 yards of open ground. Admiral Dewey then sent a message to the Spanish officer in command, to the effect that if the place was not evacuated, he would bombard it. The Spanish commander asked for time to consult with General Augustin. This was granted and, as a result, Cavite was evacuated by the Spaniards, who retired in the direction of Novaleta, Cavite Viejo, and Las Piñas. Admiral Dewey took no measures to provide a landing force to protect life and property in the town. As a consequence, no sooner had the Spanish garrison withdrawn than the insurgent bands from the neighborhood swooped down on the place, gutted the churches and public buildings, and plundered the houses of the Spanish officials and sympathizers as well as those of their personal enemies among the inhabitants. There was the usual accompaniment of riot and debauchery, to the cry of "Viven los Americanos", and on the following day there was practically little left to protect. (7).

Admiral Dewey has been blamed for not having protected the inhabitants and kept order, after he had

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(7) See statement of Benito Legarda before Philippines Commission, August 12th, 1899.

forced the Spaniards to retire. He had, however, but two other alternatives, either to disembark a sufficient number of men from his ships to hold and protect the place, and that, as Cavite is a fairly large place fortified by stone walls, would have seriously crippled the efficiency of his squadron, or to leave the Spaniards in possession. Either of these courses would have been unwise. The first would have weakened his own command. The second, over and above weakening the prestige of the United States not only with the Filipinos but with other foreign nations, would have been an open confession of weakness, indecision, and haste on the part of the government in commencing operations by ordering him to Manila with an inadequate force at his command to do the work that it should have foreseen would inevitably be required of him when he got there.

In acting as he did, that is, in turning the place over to the insurgents, he in all probability had counted on the discipline of some of the five thousand armed insurgents "loyal to us", that had been reported to him by the American Consul as being in the neighborhood of Manila, to keep order in Cavite.

As for Cavite itself, it is hard to say from which it would have suffered most, a bombardment or the revolutionists. The damage caused by the former might have been more generally distributed over the town as a whole, whereas that caused by the latter, while it was more confined to gutting churches, public buildings and private houses, was more thorough. (8).

It has also been said that Admiral Dewey could have bombarded Manila and destroyed it, or under the threat of a bombardment, he could have forced the Spanish garrison to retire to the interior where, "out of

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(8) "The people came there from the other towns and sacked Cavite completely. There was nothing left further to be stolen in Cavite."

Testimony of Benito Legarda before the Philippines Commission, August 12th, 1899.

reach of the guns of the fleet, the Spaniards could have prolonged the resistance for years". This may or may not be so, but even granting it was, there was at that time absolutely no advantage to be gained by Admiral Dewey in the destruction of Manila, receiving its surrender, or forcing the Spaniards to abandon it. In neither of the latter cases had he a landing force to garrison it. He would therefore have been forced to turn it over to the Katipunero hordes, which would have meant nothing more than a repetition, on a large scale, of the Cavite business, a saturnalia of pillage, rapine, and murder. For this, though powerless to prevent it, he would have been held morally responsible.

As to the retirement of the Spanish garrison to the interior, beyond a doubt that was also a possibility. On the principle of the Scotch proverb that "a pig might whistle, but its mouth's no just made for't," such a retreat might possibly have been carried out; but the Spanish military authorities were well aware that an army has to have some base of supplies from which to draw subsistence and munitions of war. Since in the interior of Luzon no such sources existed, they realized beforehand that whatever force retired on the inland towns would eventually have to suffer the same fate at the hands of the combined American and Filipino forces as befell the garrisons of Malolos, Tarlac, and Dagupan at those of the Filipinos.

Had such a retreat been made, the object of the United States, namely, to have complete liberty of action in the Philippines, would have been seriously trammelled by an alliance with the Katipunero dictatorship. The combination of forces that it would necessarily have been compelled to make, because of and during any such campaign, would have placed the United States in such a position as to render it unable to "give" the island just such a government as it deemed proper for them to have, or to carry out in its own way any scheme of annexation, autonomy, or independence it may have had

in view, except at a much greater sacrifice of American life and treasure than it actually had to make. Admiral Dewey stated the case correctly when, in speaking to a newspaper correspondent in reference to the insurgents attacking the Spaniards, he said "They're saving us lots of American soldiers in clearing out that country over there." (9).

For three months, May to July, 1898, the only representatives of American authority in the Philippines were Admiral Dewey and Emilio Aguinaldo; that is to say, Admiral Dewey represented the United States on the water and Aguinaldo represented Filipino cooperation ashore. There can be no question or doubt that, but for the presence of Admiral Dewey's squadron, the rebellion would have collapsed after the battle of Cavite. The United States forces then, instead of fighting the Filipinos, as they eventually had to do in order to obtain possession of the Islands, would have had to fight the Spaniards. These however would "have known when they were beaten". The consequent evacuation of the country by them and its occupation by the United States would have been as uneventful as was the occupation of Cuba.

How events fell out as they did is too well known to need any comment, beyond that what eventually happened was due to Admiral Dewey's accepting, or rather his asking for the cooperation of the Katipunan. The mere fact of his relations with Aguinaldo and his associates, turn or twist it as one may, amounted to nothing more or less than a request for their assistance and a tacit recognition of them as allies. This recognition was the real foundation on which the Katipunero power was built. At the time of American intervention, the whole Katipunan did not represent the wishes or aspirations of ten per cent of the population of the civilized tribes of the Philippines. Up to Aguinaldo's arrival in May,

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(9) "Chicago Record", August 31st, 1900.



1898, the insurrectionary movement was only kept alive by more or less direct promises made to its leaders by Americans in general and the American Consular agents in particular. Though these real or implied promises were magnified in transmission to the Filipino insurgents in the Islands, both the Katipuneros in the Islands and their leaders in Hong Kong sincerely believed that the persons making them were empowered to pledge the United States in this matter and acted accordingly.

From the battle of Cavite up to the beginning of July, Admiral Dewey's squadron had done very little more than blockade the city of Manila, cruise around Manila Bay, and by its presence encourage the Katipuneros. Some ships had made short cruises to the north of Luzon and some to the southern islands. Their operations were confined to a few unimportant boat landings and an occasional trial of the range of their guns and the skill of their gunners. That the latter was excellent is amply proved by the ruins of more than one church or prominent building of the coast towns.

During the war and the preliminary peace negotiations between the United States and Spain, as well as subsequent to the capitulation of Manila, armed steamers, flying the insurgent flag, frequently made their appearance in Filipino waters. To prevent their preying on the shipping hailing from Manila and other ports of the islands, U. S. Consul Williams, formerly of Manila, was charged with the placing of vessels flying the Spanish flag under the American colors.

During the months of July, August, and September, Aguinaldo had become uneasy as to the possibility of the Americans abandoning the islands and leaving him to a protracted struggle with the Spaniards. Consequently he was especially anxious to establish his government as extensively and firmly as possible. To this end, expeditions were fitted out by the Filipino dictatorial government and allowed by the United States authorities to proceed on their way to the southern is-

lands. These were still being held for Spain by General Diego de los Rios, but it was hoped to stir them up in rebellion against that country. As these expeditions were not actively supported by the presence of the United States land or sea forces, they were as a rule defeated by the Spaniards. Towards September and October more Tagalog expeditions were sent south by Aguinaldo. In many places, from which the Spanish garrisons had been withdrawn, they were successful in establishing the revolutionary government.

For some weeks previous to the capitulation of Manila, there had been considerable friction between the American and Filipino leaders. When the latter, after the fall of the city, had begun to realize that the insurgent forces were not to be allowed to enter Manila in a body, either as conquerors or as allies of the conquerors, the scales began to fall from their eyes. On the morning of Augst 14th, Aguinaldo sent a telegram to General Anderson to the effect that as his Filipino troops had always been promised that they could enter Manila, but as they were not to be allowed to do so as a body, he did not consider it prudent to issue an order prohibiting them from doing so individually. He then proceeded to state that to avoid "any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards," he would send commissioners to confer with him.

While Aguinaldo was thus apparently endeavoring to "save his face" before the Spaniards, he failed to realize that the latter, from the negotiations they had concluded with the Americans, relative to the surrender of Manila, must by this time have become fairly well aware of the relative positions of the Filipinos and Americans, knowing that he and his associates, having served their turn, were to be relegated to a very secondary place.

General Anderson answered the telegram by inviting Aguinaldo to come himself; but this proposition evidently did not suit that chieftain. He sent a reply saying

that, being unable to leave his government, he would send a commission. When it arrived, Felipe Buencamino and Gregorio Araneta were found to be members of it.

Aguinaldo's reasons for not going in person may have arisen from a fear of being detained against his will by the American authorities, or lest, during his absence from his camp, some one else might endeavor to supplant him and seize the reins of power, or again that his troops, bearing in mind his mode of procedure in the Biac-na-Bato agreement, might suspect him of a desire to make special terms for himself. Be this as it may, he had always recognized his inability as a diplomat and therefore invariably entrusted the management of whatever political negotiations he might enter into, to his cabinet ministers, among whom were some persons of more than average ability.

This commission presented to the American commander a paper containing ten propositions. Starting out rather bombastically, it first granted the concession to him of the city of Manila. This concession was as easy to make as it would have been difficult to withhold. The American forces were already in possession and though perhaps as yet unable, from lack of strength, to operate beyond the works defending it, they could have held the city indefinitely against any force the Filipino government could possibly have brought against it. Secondly, it proceeded to make a concession of the water supply, including the pumping station at Santolan and the reservoirs at San Juan del Monte. This was a real and an important concession on its part. Had they so chosen, the revolutionists could practically have cut off the water from Manila and General Merritt, for the reasons given above, would have been powerless to prevent them. Thirdly, it asked for free navigation of the Pasig river by the steamer "Patria", and free entry for produce, etc., into the city; also permission for Filipino officers to enter and leave the American lines wearing their side arms. There was more in this demand than

at first appears. In case it was granted, the "Patria" could carry arms or supplies up the Pasig river to the provinces of Laguna, Morong, and other places. Fourth, it demanded that the Filipinos be allowed their share of the "spoils of war", probably meaning the arms, cannon, trophies, etc., as well as such money as might be found in the treasury belonging to the Spanish Military, Civil, or Municipal funds. The latter they were sadly in want of, in spite of the enormous war contributions that had been wrung out of the country by the insurgents. (10).

Fifth, it asked that certain buildings, the Governor's palace at Malacañang and the convents of Paco, Ermita, etc. etc., be turned over to the revolutionists. This appears to have been merely an effort to fulfill their boast that they would soon sleep and eat where, they alleged, the Spanish Governors and Friars had feasted in luxury. Sixth, it requested that all Spanish employees be dismissed and their places filled by Americans. This also was a very safe request, as the American authorities were hardly likely to retain the Spanish civil employees for one moment longer than was absolutely necessary and would promptly give their places to Americans. This request was supplemented by a rider, that Aguinaldo be given the right to nominate the appointees for such offices as the Americans might make. In other words, he made an effort to acquire the indirect patronage of them. Seventh, it asked that no American troops

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(10) In one town, Gubat, in the province of Sorsogon, the revolutionary government collected in five months, October 1st, 1898 to February 28th, 1899, some ₱ 52, 150.00. The total amount collected by the Spanish government was ₱ 18,000.00 per annum or about one seventh of the Filipino revolutionary taxes. While there are no data at hand to show what the revolutionists collected elsewhere, there is every reason to believe that, within limits, the proportion was about the same.

For details of collections at Gubat, see Exhibit I, Report of first Philippines Commission, dated February 28th, 1899.

be allowed to pass the Filipino lines without permission of their commanders, and the right to treat as spies all Spaniards passing them, excepting under the same conditions. This endeavor to limit the movements of the American troops was clearly not consistent with its demand for the free ingress and egress of Filipino troops to and from Manila as made in the third proposition. Eighth, it asked for the return of the arms of 150 Filipino soldiers who had been disarmed by the Americans on entering Manila. Ninth, it demanded that all agreements be made in writing ratified by the generals-in-chief of both armies. This was very probably the fruit of experience in reference to former verbal agreements. Tenth, it stated that the sending of this commission and the petitions presented by it did not in any way signify an acquiescence in American sovereignty by the insurgent government longer than military necessity demanded.

In drawing up this paper, the insurgents chose to assume that the terms of the capitulation with the Spaniards conferred on the American army only the right to occupy the harbor, city, and bay of Manila, and that by city was meant the territory comprised within the Spanish municipality, without regard to natural limits or such lines of demarcation as would bring all the defenses of Manila and its suburbs within these limits.

General Anderson did not discuss these points; but in answer to the note itself, promised that a plan, showing the territory to be occupied by each army, would be sent to Aguinaldo. This answer was not satisfactory to Aguinaldo. He then wrote to General Anderson that on the following day he would again send his commissioners to settle on limits before coming to a decision himself as to the withdrawal of his troops and other kindred matter.

On August 14th, General Merrit issued a proclamation. The opening paragraph set forth that the United States expeditionary forces had been victorious over the land and sea forces of Spain and had received the surren-

der of Manila. The second paragraph proposed to protect the inhabitants from violence, etc., and to put an end to the existing disorders and anarchy. The four following paragraphs merely announced the establishment of a military government and the appointment of the Provost Marshal's Courts and laid down certain broad police regulations, etc. They appeared to have no natural connection with the first and seventh. The seventh and last paragraph is merely a repetition in other words of the principle set forth in the first two.

The proclamation can be divided into two parts, namely, the first, second, and seventh paragraphs, in which General Merritt justified the presence of the United States forces in the Philippines. He therein assumed that certain conditions existed, ignoring the fact that indirectly they were very largely due to the United States in giving encouragement and sympathy to the Katipunan faction which had plunged the islands into anarchy. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs are merely orders establishing military courts, and in a general way defining their scope and duties. The proclamation as a whole seemed to be little more than a collection of glittering generalities, and to have been drafted with a view of being as noncommittal as possible.

On August 14th, General McArthur was appointed Provost Marshal General of Manila. This appointment was by no means a sinecure. It required a man of more than average tact, determination, and executive ability to put to rights the affairs of a city of nearly a quarter of a million inhabitants, the vast majority of whom were hostile to, and the remainder suspicious of, the Americans.

Notwithstanding the energy of the Provost Marshal and his assistants, a considerable amount of kidnapping (11) was done in Manila by the Katipunan. The victims

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(11) See Statement of Benito Legarda before the Philippine Commission, August 12th, 1899.

were generally persons who had incurred the displeasure of that body. They usually accompanied agents sent to fetch them without offering a show of resistance, even though they knew that they were going to certain punishment, perhaps to death. This passive obedience was founded on the general treatment theretofore extended to the insurgents by the American authorities. There was a firm belief among Filipinos that the kidnappers were agents acting, if not under the authority of the American Commanders, at least with their knowledge and consent. Besides this kidnapping there was, of course, the usual rioting of drunken soldiers in a conquered city, but beyond this the inhabitants received very little annoyance from the American forces.

On the same date, General Anderson was put in command of the troops at Cavite. This took the negotiations with Aguinaldo out of his hands and placed them in those of General Merritt. In view of the undefined policy of the then administration at Washington, General Merritt seems to have shirked responsibility in this matter. He telegraphed to Washington for information as to how he should proceed in enforcing his instructions regarding the insurgents, and it was not until August 20th, that, having finally received instructions, he proceeded on the strength of them to write to Aguinaldo. In his answer to the ten propositions of the Filipino Commissioners of August 15th, some of these were acquiesced in and some were not, and the one referring to the "spoils of war", was ignored.

The substance of this correspondence was that General Merritt could not consent to a joint occupation of the city, which had been surrendered to the United States forces, and that any headway the insurgents had made was due entirely to American assistance. He also stated that he held the city and its outlying districts. He hoped there would be no conflict; yet, as he expected reenforcements from home, he was prepared to enforce his orders. He also directed that the insurgents should

not be allowed to post their troops in such a manner as to make it appear that the American army was hemmed in by a besieging force.

General Merritt gave this letter to an aide-de-camp on his staff with instructions to deliver it to Aguinaldo. He also gave this aid a private memorandum, which he was to show to Aguinaldo in case he displayed a conciliatory spirit. There were only two important items in the letter. One was an assurance that, in the case of the Americans abandoning the islands, Aguinaldo would be left "in as good condition as that in which he was found by the forces of the Government." The other one stated his agreement with the Consul, Mr. Oscar F. Williams, that it would be well for Aguinaldo to send some of his leaders to visit Washington. The remainder of the memorandum referred only to subjects of temporary importance. Mr. Williams' advice in the matter of the Washington envoy was unwise. It evidently arose from his being as much in the dark as to what the administration proposed to do with the Filipino question, as he was in reference to the real conditions existing in the Philippines immediately before American intervention. (12).

As Aguinaldo was away from Bacoor when General Merritt's aide arrived, the letter was left for him and the aide returned on the following day. After receiving Aguinaldo's reply to it, he then made known to him the contents of his private memorandum. This latter pleased Aguinaldo and his associates, but they wanted a construction placed on the clause respecting the condition "in which he was found by the forces of the Government." They were told, however, that if they wished further explanation, it would have to be sought from General Mer-

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(12) Later, when the Filipino congress assembled at Malolos, Felipe Agoncillo, in accordance with Mr. Williams' advice, was sent to Washington by Aguinaldo with the request that he be allowed to at least state the case of the insurgent government before the Peace Commission that was to assemble at Paris. Agoncillo was not received officially at Washington and his request was denied.



ritt himself. Aguinaldo voiced his thanks for General Merritt's desire, expressed in the memorandum, for an interview, but he pleaded ill health as an excuse for not meeting him. His real reasons may have been the same as those that governed him when asked for an interview by General Anderson, namely a fear of his associates.

On August 22nd, General Merritt, so far as the third proposition of the Filipino commission of August 15th was concerned, had already issued an order to disarm all Spanish soldiers entering Manila, as well as all revolutionists; these latter, however, were to have their arms returned to them on leaving the city, and revolutionary officers were to be allowed to enter and leave Manila at their pleasure, wearing their sword and revolvers.

On August 25th, an attempt was made to come to a preliminary agreement between the United States commanders and Aguinaldo, defining the zones to be occupied by the American and Filipino forces respectively. On August 27th, Aguinaldo answered General Merritt's letter of the 20th, to the effect that he was surprised that General Merritt conceived the idea that there had been any agreement that the revolutionary forces were to retire beyond the line designated. He and the commissioners understood, he further said, that his troops were to be withdrawn after the conditions proposed by them were accepted, and as no written agreement had been come to, he did not consider he had contracted any obligation. He then went on to say that had it not been for his blockade of the city by land, the Americans would have obtained possession only of the ruins of Manila; also that while he did not complain of the ignoring of the assistance received from him and the consequent obloquy thrown on him by his people, he promised to retire certain lines.

Aguinaldo's answer also contained an important rectification of the request for the free navigation of the "Patria", which had amounted to asking for free navigation for all vessels under the revolutionary flag. Gen-

ral Merritt in answer told him that the granting of the permission for such navigation rested with Admiral Dewey, who would pass on that matter. He also pointed out that the conditions relative to the withdrawal of the Filipino forces on a definition of lines agreed to by the commission of August 15th, had not been carried out, and insisted that they be complied with in view of instructions received from Washington. In the meantime General Merritt was ordered to Paris as a member of the peace commission. The answer to this letter was accordingly left to General Otis.

Aguinaldo must still have had considerable belief in the alliance theory or an extraordinary faith in what he considered as abstract right ultimately prevailing against concrete might. He must also still have cherished hopes of making some diplomatic arrangements in the future, for he complied with General Merritt's demands without any apparent opposition, even though he must have been well aware that this officer with the few troops he had at his command was, for the time being, unable to enforce them.

General Otis had arrived on August 21st, in command of the fourth expedition, consisting of close to 5,000 men of all arms. He was placed in command of the Eighth Army corps August 23rd, 1898. On General Merritt's departure, August 29th, he took over the command of the Department of the Pacific, as Military Governor of the Philippines, with a command that now consisted of some 16,000 officers and men of all arms in Manila and Cavite.

General Otis, after reading Aguinaldo's communication of August 27th to General Merritt, which had been turned over to him on August 31st, sent a telegram to Aguinaldo at Bacoar, stating in substance that owing to General Merritt's sudden departure, that officer had not been able to answer it, but that as soon as he was able to inform himself on the subject, he would do so.

Aguinaldo, in reply, sent a letter by an aide-de-

camp, congratulating General Otis on his appointment and mentioning at the same time that the aide would acquaint him with affairs of private importance, etc., etc., etc. While there is no doubt that Aguinaldo's aide was instructed to inform General Otis of the views of Aguinaldo and his associates in regard to the relations existing between him and the Americans, there is no record that any return message was sent to Aguinaldo by General Otis.

The correspondence that eventually ensued between Aguinaldo and General Otis was devoted mainly to an endeavor on the part of the former to entrap the General into some written statement, by which he might commit himself to a recognition, direct or indirect, of the alliance theory. The means to that end was a request that before the Filipino troops were withdrawn to the new position, the American General should ask Admiral Dewey to allow free navigation to the revolutionary vessels; also that in case the Americans evacuated the islands in the event of a treaty of peace with Spain on the basis of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, the Filipino forces be allowed to reoccupy the positions they held on and previous to August 13th.

These requests were evidently prompted by a desire to give the revolutionary government a standing on which to base a request for diplomatic interference by any other nation that might be induced to take such a step. In this, however, Aguinaldo was unsuccessful. General Otis was a lawyer of no mean ability himself. Besides he had on his staff officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department, men who had made the law, in its higher phases, as applied to constitutional and international subjects, a special study. Consequently the Americans were able to see through and parry the ruses of the legal and diplomatic lights of the revolution.

It can scarcely be doubted, however, that General Otis' letters, more especially that of September 8th, had the appearance of having been written more for what

the American public would think of them than for any particular effect they would have on the revolutionists. General Otis, if he knew anything at all, must have known that a few terse lines to the point would have been enough to explain the situation. The force he had at his command as well as that which both he and Aguinaldo knew was coming, would have made his few words more convincing than a lengthy document discussing, from an abstract point of view, the conditions then existing. His letters, indeed, were more like the chorus of a Greek play, which explains to the audience, in this case the general public, such parts of the drama as do not appear in the action of the piece itself.

By this time all parties must have realized that the only way a definite decision could be reached would be by an appeal to that "*ultima ratio regum*", the sword. Both sides were anxious, before making this final appeal, to justify themselves before the general public. They wasted considerable time in diplomatic sparring, carried on in excellent Castilian and in better English, in a pretended effort to avoid the inevitable. They thus sought, of course, to place themselves in such a position as they thought they would like to occupy in the eyes of the world, yet seemed not to realize that the world judges the merits of cases of this nature only by the results of the struggle.

In this matter Aguinaldo was perhaps buoyed up by the hope that some other power might intervene in his favor. He forgot that the intervention of the United States between Spain and the Katipuneros was one thing, and that of any other country between the revolutionary government and the United States was another. The Filipino leaders had evidently cheated themselves and their followers into the illusion that, in a struggle for independence, they would receive, if not the material assistance, at least the moral countenance of the great European powers. They did not consider that while England, France, Germany and other nations might

have been willing enough to assist them to a certain extent against Spain, to do so against the United States, flushed as she was with victory, was quite another affair. They did not see that no matter how much these countries may have been privately chagrined at American aggrandizement, they were not disposed to show it publicly or to dispute with the eagle the quarry he had stricken down. Perhaps least of all did they know that even in the event of the success of such a step, whatever nation made it would of necessity have had to assume the sovereignty of the islands, hampered with the same conditions as confronted the Americans.

### III.

By this time relations were becoming somewhat strained between the Americans and the insurgents. The latter became thoroughly convinced that if they wanted to gain their independence, they would have to fight for it. They therefore began to make their plans to meet the inevitable. Aguinaldo thought it advisable to change to a safer and more centrally revolutionary place, and Malolos, in the Province of Bulacan, was chosen. This place had the advantage of being practically on the line of the Manila and Dagupan Railway, the only one in the Philippines, and of it the insurgents might be said to have held full control. It was also out of reach of Dewey's guns and far away from all American influence. In fact it was quite in the center of the old rebel hotbed.

Aguinaldo had already removed his headquarters from Bacoar to some three miles north of Manila. On September 13th, General Otis ordered him to move still farther away. He obeyed the order on the night of the 14th, by moving his army to Malolos, withdrawing not only his main force, which amounted to some eight or nine thousand men, but also the detachments he

had stationed at Caloocan, Binondo, Santolan, Santa Mesa, Pandacan, Santa Ana, Pasig, and Pasay, in all some seven thousand five hundred more. About the beginning of September, Macabulos, who up to that time had been in supreme command of the separate Katipunan government established in the provinces of Tarlac and Pangasinan and the border towns of the provinces of Zambales, Union, and Nueva Ecija, came under Aguinaldo's immediate command and joined his forces to those under the central revolutionary government.

Aguinaldo declared Malolos the provisional capital of the Filipina Republic. A congress was summoned to assemble there on September 15th. About a hundred deputies responded to this summons, among them being Pedro A. Paterno, and the later Filipino Commissioners, T. Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda, and Gregorio Arana. These deputies were all Tagalogs and mere creatures of the Katipunan and Aguinaldo. Whenever they voted, they cast their votes absolutely as he dictated. (13). This "Asamblea Nacional", (National assembly), was opened on the 15th of September and a message from the President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, was read to the representatives. Pedro A. Paterno was elected President, or speaker, of the Congress, Benito Legarda, later Commissioner and Delegate to Congress, was chosen as Vice-President, and Pablo Ocampo as Secretary.

This congress immediately proceeded to vote seventy five thousand pesos (\$37,500.00 U. S. Cy.) per annum to Aguinaldo for salary and expenses and also, on September 21st, issued a decree imposing military service on every able bodied male Filipino over 18 years of age, excepting those holding office under the Revolutionary government.

On the 29th of September, the ratification of the in-

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(13) See statement of Benito Legarda before Philippine Commission, August 12th, 1899.

dependence of the Filipina Republic took place with a most elaborate program. Congress was in session. The deputies and secretaries of the new republic, and the President, Aguinaldo, took the oath of office. One of the features of the day was a gorgeous civic procession, at the head of which rode four of Aguinaldo's red-trousered body-guard escorting the Filipino standard. Next followed several companies of cavalry, under the command of Colonel Gatmaita, who, to make himself more conspicuous, wore a cloak taken from a Church image of the archangel Saint Michael. In the middle of the procession was a large float richly decorated and drawn by six well-caparisoned horses. On the float sat a young girl representing the new-born republic, with a Spanish banner torn into shreds under her feet. Behind the float came the recently proclaimed President followed by his secretaries. This procession made a triumphal march through the district and dispersed at the church of Barasoain (14). After the procession there was a grand banquet at which were present the president, representatives, and chiefs, and a few Manileños.

As has already been said, when General Otis took command, Aguinaldo's letter of August 27th was still unanswered. He was not slow to see the advantages to be gained by accepting Aguinaldo's view of the conference of August 15th, as set forth in that letter. On the strength of it he assumed that there was no agreement at all between Aguinaldo and General Merritt and thus left himself at liberty to act as he pleased in the future and to define the territory to be occupied by the American and revolutionary forces as expediency might dictate.

In his letter of September 8th, General Otis stated that, according to the laws of war, the city of Manila and its defenses belonged to its captors, the American troops. Answering Aguinaldo's allegation that it was he

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(14) See Padre Ulpiano's "Nuestra Prision."

who prevented the Spanish forces from retreating to the interior by blocking Manila and that if it had not been for that blockade, the Americans would have come into possession only of its ruins, Otis pointed out that had Spain's subjects been contented with their lot, there would have been no war between that country and the United States, that the war was undertaken for humanity's sake, and so on. He might also have gone on to point out that the Filipino expedition was merely an incident arising out of the Cuban war, which originally was the main point at issue between the United States and Spain.

The argument that the war had been undertaken for humanity's sake was hardly likely to appeal with much force to Aguinaldo and his associates. His interest and theirs consisted in getting the upper hand in Filipino affairs, to which end they had started the Katipunan and the rebellion of 1896. They assumed that the American expedition had been sent to the Philippines with the express purpose of assisting them in their purpose. What lent further color to this theory of theirs was the fact that Admiral Dewey had lain with his squadron in Manila Bay for over three months without demanding the surrender of Manila, as he could have done at any time under the threat of a bombardment in case of a noncompliance with his demand.

It would have been enlightenment, indeed, had they known that Admiral Dewey's real reason for acting as he did, was because he had no landing force to put into Manila as a garrison, for he hardly wanted a repetition, on a large scale, of the doings of Cavite. As a matter of fact, the revolutionists up till then had construed Dewey's action into a desire on his part to have them organize a government to which to turn over Manila; but in view of the trend affairs were now taking, they commenced to look upon American intentions with suspicion and alarm.

General Otis's letter went on to say that those who surrendered actual possession conferred "a discretionary



power which can neither be shared or delegated." In this, however, his principle differed from Admiral Dewey's practice, especially at "Isla Grande" and other places, where the latter officer had invariably turned over to the insurgents all places and prisoners that had surrendered to him.

In another part of his letter, he pointed out that the Filipino flag could be allowed to be flown on the high seas only after a recognition of the Filipino revolutionary government as a belligerent power. In concluding that subject he shifted the burden of the answer to his question upon Admiral Dewey, who was in charge of all such matters; but he went on to doubt the Admiral's power to grant their request. Respecting the clause asking that, in case of a return of Spanish sovereignty, Aguinaldo be allowed to occupy the positions he had vacated, Otis stated that neither in law nor morals could this concession be made; moreover, in view of his orders from Washington, he was powerless to accede to the request. He then proceeded to give Aguinaldo until September 15th to withdraw to the lines indicated to him, and then shattered his last hope by informing him that with all these decisions and arrangements Admiral Dewey was perfectly in accord.

Aguinaldo did not comply with General Otis' order immediately, but on September 13th sent a commission with a counter proposition, requesting permission to withdraw his troops just outside the lines prescribed by General Merritt. This was rejected. The commission then asked that General Otis withdraw his letter of the 8th, which was also refused.

Seeing that their object was fruitless, the commissioners told General Otis that the troops would be withdrawn, but pointed out the impossibility of making them do so by an order emanating from the American commander. They therefore suggested that this be put in the guise of a request.

As it apparently was a matter of indifference to Gen-

eral Otis whether the withdrawal of the insurgents, provided they could be induced to withdraw without a fight, was in compliance with an order or a request, he wrote a letter making the latter. On September 15th the insurgents withdrew from the city and suburbs. Not so, however, Pídel Pilar (15) who refused to move his troops from Paco. Aguinaldo sent representatives to General Otis who stated that, if the time allowed was extended, he would have Pilar's troops withdrawn by detachments. This extension was granted by General Otis.

Pilar seems to have been the only one of the insurgent leaders who grasped the fact that at that time the American commanders were not a position to use force. Therefore until they were, he thought he might profit by that condition, complying or not, as he saw fit, with any orders even indirectly originating with them. He allowed no one to pass his lines without a special permit, his troops having even gone so far as to prevent General Anderson from doing so.

General Otis wrote to Aguinaldo concerning these abuses by Pilar and warned him that they would not be tolerated in the future. At the same time he advised Aguinaldo that he might require a piece of land at Santa Mesa to use for hospital purposes. Aguinaldo answered this letter by sending a commission, of which T. H. Pardo de Tavera was a member. This body presented a letter signed by him to the effect that they appreciated the expressions of friendship and good feeling manifested in General Otis' letter of September 14th and acceded to

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(15) Pilar was a notable character and one of the most determined of the revolutionists. He was unscrupulous, a thorough-paced ruffian and, as good authority has it, a murderer; but he was a good fighter and his troops believed in him. His ambition did not go beyond the command of a division, but he resented any interference with that. He only obeyed Aguinaldo's orders when he considered it expedient for the good of the cause *todo* so. As they did not in this case chime in with his ideas as to the vacating of Paco, he held on to it, to the no small annoyance of the insurgent authorities as well as the Americans.

his request; but in view of the possibility of the Spaniard returning to the Philippines, as a result of the Peace Conference then in session in Paris, the Filipinos wished to obtain some modification of General Otis' demands. As a result General Otis agreed to the only request of any importance made, namely that the time for evacuating the positions held by them be extended to October 25th.

The request for a place to establish a convalescent camp at Santa Mesa was a source of uneasiness to the revolutionary leaders. By the 20th, the revolutionary troops were removed southward by rail, and concentrated near the northern line of the city. General Otis called Aguinaldo's attention to this threatening demonstration. Aguinaldo sent a letter by T. N. Pardo de Tavera, stating that, in view of the excited state of the country due to the revolution, it was incumbent on him to act cautiously. He wanted to avoid internal dissensions. For this same reason he was also forced to enquire into the conditions under which General Otis proposed to establish a sanitarium within the Filipino lines. To avoid further friction, therefore, he did not dare to acquiesce in General Otis' request without coming to a previous understanding.

General Otis answered on September 27th, to the effect that his purpose could not in any way be a menace. It would really place his sick in the power of the Filipinos, etc. He went on to offer the bait that the purchases that would have to be made for this sanitarium would benefit the surrounding country. They would help the small trade that would spring up in furnishing supplies.

By this time Aguinaldo had become very shy of making any concessions. Ignoring the benefits to the surrounding country, which in all probability were a matter of minor importance to him, he pointed out that if a hospital were built, unless General Otis proposed to depend solely on the guaranty of the Filipino government, an American force would have to be placed there to pro-

tect it. He judged that in view of the inexpediency of a dual occupation by Filipinos and Americans, it might be a source of danger to the harmony existing between them. He urged that he was forced to consider the millions of souls whose security and interests might be compromised in the case of a conflict. Such an arrangement therefore required a written agreement. Moreover he could not act without consulting the representatives of the people.

On October 10th, General Otis answered to the effect that the convalescent camp was not necessary, and that in fixing limits and boundaries, he would be guided by the capitulations with Spain, which the United States was bound to observe.

In the whole of this correspondence General Otis made an effort peacefully to obtain a foothold on Santa Mesa heights. That would have put him in possession of the low ridge that runs from the Pasig to the north of Manila, and would have given him the only commanding position near the city. Aguinaldo evidently saw through, or thought he saw through, General Otis' design. The chieftain was not disposed to accede to it, nor, at that juncture, was General Otis prepared to employ force to back up his request.

On October 2nd, the Spanish American Peace Commission, to attend which General Merritt had given over command on August 22nd, held its preliminary meeting at Paris under the presidency of the Hon. John Day, with Mr. J. B. Moore as Secretary. On December 8th, the Commission again met for discussion. The form in which the treaty was to be drafted was settled. The President of the Spanish commissioners protested against it, declaring that they had been compelled to yield to brute force and an abuse of international law. The document itself was signed on December 10th, 1898.

There was only one incident of importance during the sessions of the commission. Felipe Agoncillo, who represented the Malolos government, though refused a

hearing, handed a document to both commissions. It was to the effect that the Filipinos had gone to war to gain their independence and not to fight against Spain in the interest of the United States.

Toward the end of November, or the beginning of December, 1898, General Diego de los Rios, senior officer of the Spanish forces in the southern islands, with headquarters at Iloilo, sent his aide-de-camp to Manila on a mission to General Otis. The substance of his message was that he was convinced that the treaty, then under discussion in Paris, would result in the concession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. As the city of Iloilo was surrounded and practically blockaded on the land side by the revolutionary forces, he would therefore be pleased to turn it over to the United States, whenever General Otis desired, withdrawing the Spanish garrison to Zamboanga. He was of the opinion that it would be to the advantage of the United States to take possession at the earliest possible moment.

This proposition was discussed by General Otis. While he did not consider that it was necessary to take any immediate action, he nevertheless thanked General de los Rios for his offer to evacuate the town in favor of the United States. He also sent him a message to the effect that as soon as the negotiations of the peace commission showed definitively that the United States would succeed to Spain in the government of the Islands, he would accept his proposition.

In acting in this manner, General Otis was very naturally cautious as to the acquisition of territory and the responsibility attached thereto. In the first place he was by no means certain as to the exact outcome of the proposed treaty. He knew, what General de los Rios did not, that the action of the Peace Commission at Paris was by no means final. The powers of the Spanish Commissioners might be plenipotentiary but those of the American Commissioners were not. The Madrid Government might consider itself bound by whatever the

terms of the treaty called for, but the American government did not consider itself so bound, because, before becoming an absolutely irrevocable instrument, the treaty was subject to discussion and approval by the United State Senate. This, coupled with the fact that the treaty was actually passed by that body only after considerable discussion, proves that General Otis was justified in what might appear to have been over cautiousness. In the second place, as a military commander, he did not consider himself called on to assume the defense of an open town, the right of possessing which was still in doubt. He did not see that he should protect it against the Filipino troops, if he could get any one else to defend it for him. He had the more reason to be unwilling to go south since expeditions and supplies for the revolutionists had all along been allowed to sail from Manila for the southern islands,

As soon as the conditions of the treaty of Paris were agreed to, December 10th, 1898, General Otis was advised by cablegram, and this advice must have reached him by the 12th. On the 14th, in view of General de los Rios' proposition, as well as of a petition received from the business men of Iloilo, he cabled to Washington that the latter had asked for American protection, that the Spaniards were still holding out, but would receive American troops, that the revolutionists were reported to be favorable to American annexation, and also that he could send troops to occupy the place. He then asked if he should take action.

As no answer was received from Washington until December 19th, General Otis took no immediate steps in the matter. But he must naturally have been very anxious to secure peaceable possession of the city, the second commercial importance in the islands. The earliest opportunity would have suited him, the more so as the revolutionists were reported to have made an attack on the city, and though the Spaniards had repulsed this attack, they were still hard pressed by the Filipinos.

General Otis conferred with Admiral Dewey on this matter. The former was anxious to act immediately, even in the absence of specific instructions from Washington. But the Admiral, since General Otis had asked for instructions, thought it wisest to wait for them. Moreover both were of the opinion that General de los Rios would hold out until the American troops came to relieve him,

In this matter General Otis must have realized the immense disadvantage he was under as a Commander in a country like the Philippines with only limited authority, or rather with none at all, so far as the sea forces of the expedition were concerned. Had he in this particular case been in a position to give an order to the latter, he could have secured the possession of the city of Iloilo before it was destroyed. On the other hand, as it eventually turned out, he would have had to defend it. But the revolutionists, seeing the Americans in possession and a naval squadron to assist in its defense, would undoubtedly have had more hesitancy in attacking them than in attacking the Spaniards, who had no such assistance. One result, however, would seem to have been fairly certain, and that is the city would not have been burned.

Just what ground either General Otis or Admiral Dewey had for assuming that General de los Rios would hold Iloilo indefinitely against the revolutionary attacks, thereby needlessly exposing his troops to losses and perhaps to a defeat, after having been ordered to abandon it by his own government, is hard to say. It would seem that as Spain had ceded the Philippines to the United States by the treaty of Paris, the least the United States could do through its General in command of the Philippines, was to take over at once such places as the Spaniards were prepared to evacuate. By General Otis' own showing in his cablegram of December 14th, he had the men to do it with.

On December 23rd, General Otis received a cable

gram from Washington directing him to send the necessary troops to Iloilo. But he was advised it was important that there should be no conflict with the revolutionists. The cable operator at Capiz had already informed the superintendent of the cable company at Manila that General de los Rios would leave Iloilo on the afternoon of December 24th, and General Otis was so informed on that day.

General Otis immediately telegraphed to General de los Rios that in the course of the next two or three days he would send a considerable force to Iloilo and that its commander was ordered to confer with him. There was no direct cable to Iloilo, however, and as the telegraph line between that city and Capiz, one of the northern towns of Panay, had been cut, telegrams for Iloilo from Manila were carried by the Spanish gunboats from Capiz and Iloilo. It so happened that the gun-boat had sailed at 5:35 p. m., and that General Otis' telegram arrived at Capiz at 5:50 p. m., just a quarter of an hour too late to be forwarded to General de los Rios.

When General Otis found that he could not reach General de los Rios by telegram, he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Potter to Iloilo by the "Butuan" on December 24th. Colonel Potter reached that place on the 26th. As he found the insurgents in possession of the city, he landed and had an interview with the British Consul. On his return he reported to General Otis that the town was quiet, with Aguinaldo's flag flying, but that he was unable to come to any conclusion as to what would be the probable results of the arrival of the expedition then preparing under General Miller.

On December 25th General Otis received a telegram from General de los Rios dated the 24th. It was to the effect that the treaty of Paris was signed and that, in accordance with orders from his government, he would repair to Manila by the end of the month.

Immediately on hearing that General de los Rios had left Iloilo, General Otis ordered General Marcus P. Miller



to proceed to that port. In case the Spanish forces were still in possession, he was to take over the command of that city from the Spanish General.

The orders given to General Miller were accompanied by minute instructions as to how he was to proceed to endeavor to gain peaceful possession of Iloilo from the revolutionists, in case the Spaniards should have abandoned it. They went into details concerning the form of government to be established and also dictated, in substance, just what General Miller should say to the Ilongos. In a word, General Miller was sent to a place, the actual conditions of which were completely unknown to him and to the American authorities in Manila. He was a commander who should have been clothed with the largest possible amount of discretionary power, but his hands were more completely tied than had ever been the case of any one at the head of a similar expedition despatched to accomplish a like object.

General de los Rios had already waited for nearly a month since sending his aide-de-camp, Major Castroverde, with his proposition to receive an American garrison, but he got no definite answer as to when it would be sent. He was being continually harassed by the attacks of the Filipinos who outnumbered him. Since Iloilo is but two days' sail from Manila, he in all probability thought that in waiting ten days for the arrival of the American relieving force, after the information of the cession of the islands to the United States had been received, he had done all that was required of him. He not unlikely thought that if in this time General Otis took no steps to protect this newly acquired territory, it was not incumbent on the Spaniards to do so for him. Therefore he made his arrangements to start for Zamboanga on the 24th. On that day he withdrew his garrison without molestation from the insurgents who, probably knowing that they would get nothing but hard knocks from him, made no attempt to stop him.

Later an endeavor was made to shift the responsibil-

ity for the abandonment of Iloilo upon Spain. But at headquarters in Manila they certainly must have been aware of General de los Rios' intentions. Even if they were not directly aware of them, the petition sent on the 14th by the foreign merchants in Iloilo must have shown that these latter were. After General de los Rios' communication in November, had it been desired to have the Spanish garrison remain, some positive understanding in the matter could surely have been reached by the two Generals.

On the following day, December 25th, a small detachment of Filipinos took possession of the town and arranged to police it, refraining from any molestation of the inhabitants. The next day, the revolutionary forces that had been investing the city, entered and took possession in a perfectly orderly manner. Don Juan Leon, a well known citizen of the place, took temporary charge of the civil government of the city.

On December 26th, General Miller's expedition, consisting of the transports "Newport" and "Pennsylvania" convoyed by the U. S. Ships "Baltimore" and "Petrel" and the gun-boat "Callao," started from Manila for Iloilo. The general took with him a number of native soldiers who had been in the Spanish service. These were to be turned loose in Panay in the hope that, as an indication of friendliness to the Filipinos, it might cause the revolutionary authorities to come to friendly terms with General Miller. Later, on January 21st, 1899, another batch of 600 Visayans, who had also been in the Spanish service, was sent. General Miller got orders to receive and presumably disembark them at Iloilo or its vicinity. It was thought they would give less trouble there than if sent to other points.

Just what General Otis actually expected to accomplish by sending these prisoners of war to the insurgents at Iloilo is hard to imagine. In all previous cases where native troops of the Spanish service fell into the hands of the revolutionists, they either were butchered,

as at Samal, or were induced by moral suasion or physical force to join the revolutionary forces. Thus this method of disposing of prisoners served merely to increase the number of the enemy.

This expedition was also accompanied from Manila by certain alleged representative men of Iloilo who were to help to persuade the inhabitants to favor yielding to General Miller's command; but this commission turned out practically a failure. On arriving at Iloilo and finding that their own people were in possession of the city, the wavering ones among them changed their views. They appeared then to be afraid to express an opinion to the Ilongos in support of American occupation.

It seems strange that the military branch of the revolutionary government should have been ignored as much as it was. After all, it represented the force of that government. As long as it remained in power, those of the civil element who were not in accord with it, were not likely to have very much to say one way or another.

General Otis evidently jumped at many of his conclusions. For instance, he referred to "a widely prevailing sentiment in the city" in favor of receiving General Miller's force "without resistance." How he could have come to that personal conclusion in this particular matter, unless it was from the foreign business men of Iloilo, who by no means represented even a small minority of the inhabitants of that place, is hard to say. Colonel Potter, who had been sent to Iloilo by General Otis on December 24th, was back in Manila by the 29th. His stay at Iloilo had been so brief as to preclude the possibility of his learning any thing from the natives. Moreover he had already stated that he was unable to come to any conclusion as to what would be the result of the expedition then preparing under General Miller. The conclusions of General Otis as to the sentiments of the Ilongos were therefore mere matters of guess work, based on the opinions or desires of others.

It seems there were some further communications between General Otis and Admiral Dewey respecting this expedition, and the latter even went so far as to suggest that General Miller's expedition be recalled. This determined General Otis to leave the war vessels and a part of General Miller's force "to confront Iloilo," and to scatter the remainder among the other ports of the southern islands.

On December 30th, the Washington government was informed that all military stations outside of Luzon, with the exception of Zamboanga, had been evacuated by the Spaniards. It was also told that the inhabitants, "who may be denominated as insurgents more or less hostile to the United States", had taken possession of them, and that while some of them could be re-taken without friction, all could have been so occupied before the 23rd of December, "when Spain withdrew her forces without our knowledge".

In making this statement, though he adhered to fact, General Otis endeavored indirectly to throw the responsibility for this condition of affairs on the Spanish authorities. He ignored what was glaringly evident, namely that so far as relieving the Spanish garrisons was concerned, he alone was to blame for not having done so. General de los Rios had advised before December 10th that he was ready to turn over these places as soon as General Otis was ready to receive them.

General Otis also chose to ignore the fact that from the time of the arrival of the American forces in Manila Bay and all during the armistice with Spain, pending the negotiations of the peace commission, Aguinaldo had been allowed by the United States authorities to equip expeditions and to start from Manila Bay against the Spanish authority in the southern islands, thus in spite of the armistice, indirectly carrying on the war. Consequently if the revolutionary forces blockading Iloilo had acquired a development that now meant a problem to the Americans, it was very largely due to these very

expeditions. That General de los Rios would hold that place indefinitely under such circumstances was hardly to be expected.

According to a despatch of General Otis to the Adjutant-General of the Army, Aguinaldo's original cabinet had resigned and a new one was formed. It consisted principally of "irresponsible men, who demand complete independence and a war with the United States." That the old cabinet had resigned was fact. But this despatch seems to imply, without saying how or why, that the old cabinet was composed of persons of greater responsibility and more favorably disposed towards the United States.

Another very important fact, of which no notice at all seems to have been taken, is that there was a Filipino assembly, such as it was, in session. This new cabinet, no matter how responsible or irresponsible its members may or may not have been as individuals, was certainly ministerially responsible to its government. Both they and Aguinaldo alleged that they were acting under the authority of the Filipino assembly. The despatch also stated that there was a large number of insurgent troops in the field in Luzon, that there were 5,000 in the immediate neighborhood of Manila, and also that there was a threatened uprising in that city.

In the same despatch, General Otis stated that the great majority of men of property desired annexation. Any means of knowing this with certainty, however, must have been of the most limited nature. The statement must have been based upon impressions gathered from members of English and other foreign mercantile firms in Manila. The greater part of these were more or less extensively holders of property which had been acquired principally by the expedient of mortgage foreclosures. Such individuals as well as concerns were likely to be losers by legislative enactments, were any revolutionary Filipino government to come into permanent power.

There appears to have been much dissatisfaction

among the revolutionists and many conflicts between them and the inhabitants. This dissatisfaction was due to the fact that the revolutionary forces had been restrained from entering Manila. By the plunder of that city they had hoped to recoup themselves for the pay due them but not received. The conflicts with the inhabitants were perhaps the result of an awakening on the part of the latter from the illusion that the Katipunan had thrust on them, namely, that the American forces would support the revolution in everything. When it was found that this was not the case, they made an endeavor to shake off the grasp that had been fixed upon them.

General Miller duly entered the Iloilo roadstead and anchored there. But in order not to alarm the Ilongos with the prospect of an American occupation, he left his transports some thirty miles away at Point Luzaron. He might as well have brought them with him, however. The revolutionists had an excellent service of information. They were in all probability aware of the number of men each ship had on board. When he arrived, the revolutionists' flag was found flying in two places in the town, but was lowered in the afternoon. The revolutionary garrison at that time consisted of about 800 well armed men, 1,000 hardly armed, and 1,000 armed with shot-guns, pikes, bolos, etc.

As soon as the expedition anchored in front of Iloilo, the revolutionary General sent an aide-de-camp to call on its commander. The aide endeavored to ascertain if General Miller was going to interfere with the revolutionists. The General informed him that he had already written a letter, addressed to the revolutionary General and to the people of Iloilo, and setting forth the object of his visit.

General Miller's letter to General Martin Delgado stated in substance that, when the expedition started, it was under the belief that the Spanish troops were still in Iloilo, and that they would transfer the city and government to him in accordance with the stipulations of

the treaty with Spain. On his arrival, however, he finds the city in possession of Filipino troops. He then goes on to state that the commission of Ilongos will explain his purpose more in detail. He mentions the men from Panay on board the "Union", who had been captured in the Spanish service. These would be turned over at a later date, that they might return to their homes, etc., etc. No demand, direct or indirect, for the possession of Iloilo is made, but it is requested that a commission be sent to confer with him.

This letter was sent by an aide-de camp, accompanied by two other aides and the commission of representative Ilongos that had been brought from Manila. General Delgado, assisted by other revolutionary authorities, received this party. The first question asked of General Miller's aide was whether he had brought any message from Aguinaldo. On learning he had not, and when General Miller's letter had been read, the revolutionists stated they had no power to act in cases affecting the Malolos government. Though they were courteous and polite, they showed no disposition to yield, unless forced to do so.

On December 20th, General Miller had a conference with the committee of Ilongos he had asked for in his letter to General Delgado. After he had explained to them at length the conditions from his point of view, they answered that they had no power to surrender the city without Aguinaldo's consent. He then asked them if they would oppose him in the event of his landing. To this they gave no answer. He then asked if they would have their troops march out and allow him to take peaceable possession on the 31st. To this they promised an answer on the following day.

On the same date, December 29th, the leading merchants of Iloilo had sent a letter to General Miller. It amounted to a request not to land his force, in view of the loss of life and property that was likely to ensue. General Miller in his report pointed out that it was

largely at the request of many of the signers of this letter that the expedition was sent, and commented on their inconsistency. Without departing from the truth, he might have added that not only the conditions then prevailing at Iloilo, but in the whole of the Archipelago, were very largely due to the moral encouragement and material assistance that had been extended to the Katipuneros both prior and subsequent to 1896, by the foreign merchants of Iloilo and Manila.

The merchants of Iloilo were paying their export and import duties to the revolutionary authorities. General Miller later requested authority, which was not granted, to close the port or to compel the payment of the duties by them to his officers. General Miller also complained that large amounts of provisions, supplies, etc, came in American steamers to Manila, and were shipped from there to Iloilo through the Captain of the Port of Manila, a thing he could not understand.

The revolutionary forces had evidently increased. They were estimated at 12,000 men, 2,500 of whom were armed with modern rifles. It became evident that a landing of American troops promised great loss of life among non-combatants and much destruction of property. Owing to the delay in making it, an attack had become a much more formidable matter than it would have been if it had been made on General Miller's arrival. General Miller, however, expressed no doubt of being able to take and hold the city with the force at his command, though he thought it might be prudent to have another regiment sent him.

In one of his despatches General Miller pointed out that, owing to their having been allowed to exercise the powers which they had seized without meeting a vigorous protest, backed up, if necessary, by a display of force, the revolutionists were daily becoming more confirmed in the belief that they had a right to these powers. He maintained that the longer they were allowed to hold to this belief, the greater, the harder, and the



more costly would be the task of undeceiving them. He therefore urged that he be allowed to occupy Iloilo at once.

In the meantime, General Otis had received orders to extend military government with all despatch to the whole ceded territory. He was also to publish the proclamation of the President of the United States, of which he sent General Miller a copy. In view of its contents he recommended him to proceed with caution and, unless forced into it, to avoid an action, in case he met with any very decided opposition. He further directed him to remain in the harbor and await orders.

The local government of Iloilo, to which a copy of this proclamation had been sent, returned no answer to General Miller. The President's proclamation was laughed at by the people, who thought that the putting off of the attack was due to fear. On December 30th, an answer was sent by the revolutionary authorities. It was to the effect that they were dependent on the Malolos government and were in accord with it. Without express orders to the contrary from that government, they would resist a landing.

General Otis appears to have failed to inform General Miller that he had modified the President's proclamation. Consequently the proclamation, as published in Iloilo, did not tally with that published in Manila. When copies of the proclamation as published at Iloilo reached Malolos, as they soon did, it was found to clash with the proclamation issued by General Otis at Manila. This caused Aguinaldo and his government considerable uneasiness as to the ultimate intentions of the United States.

During the month of January, 1899, the situation became more serious. The revolutionary forces in and around Iloilo increased in numbers. By the end of that month they amounted to over 16,000 men, four thousand armed with modern rifles and the remainder with all kinds of arms, guns, pikes, bolos, etc. The garrison

was continually throwing up earthworks about the mouth of the river.

This proclamation placed General Miller's expedition, which had a sufficient force to capture and hold Iloilo, in a ridiculous light. The Americans lay in their transports before an unfortified town, undefended by any artillery, excepting some old smooth-bore cannon, abandoned by the Spaniards. They had the place at the mercy of the guns of the naval vessels. This situation must have been intolerable. As long as action was postponed, it gave encouragement to the revolutionists.

Had the Filipinos been driven out of the city, they probably could have opposed the further advance of the landing force beyond its military limits. But this would have been the case under any circumstances, excepting that of a complete collapse and surrender of the revolutionary government, an event which was hardly to be expected just then. Even had this occurred, the country would have had to be cleaned up of the roving parties of disbanded troops, which would have infested it. In spite of all this, the orders received from Manila enjoined patience and forbade an attack.

General Miller entered into a protracted correspondence with the local government. He endeavored to convince it that it should submit to the authority of the United States. He used the argument that the object of the American expedition to the Philippines was to free the Filipino from the Spanish yoke, and that, since by the Treaty of Paris, the United States had succeeded to such rights as Spain had formerly possessed, the best thing the Filipinos could do was to submit quietly. Since the surrender of Manila, however, the Filipinos saw in all this that "freeing them from the Spanish yoke" meant nothing more to them than a change of masters. In place of the Spaniards, they were now to have the Americans. The argument, therefore, failed to carry conviction with it. Had General Miller been allowed,

instead of chopping logic with the Ilongos, to tell them plainly from the first that, unless they were prepared to surrender their city peaceably, he was prepared to use force to make them do so, they might or might not have complied with his demand. But in either case he would have been no worse off than he was in the end. Eventually he had to use force to gain possession. As long, however, as he was willing to write letters, the Ilongos were willing to answer them. By so doing they at worst were only putting off the evil day.

It appears that about this time a Lieutenant H. du R. Phelan, an acting assistant surgeon, had an interview with the local Visayan government authorities. As General Miller makes no mention of him in letters or report, he would seem to have had no authority and his action was likely purely voluntary. Had his effort been successful, General Miller would certainly have taken advantage of it. On the other hand, in case of its giving rise to any unpleasant complications, he would as promptly have disavowed it.

In this interview, Dr. Phelan endeavored to induce the Ilongos to accept the conditions of the treaty of Paris and to receive the American garrison. His arguments to this end were lacking in logic, and, so far as mere academic discussion went, the Ilongos had far and away the better of it. The whole affair would appear to have been carried on more for the impression his statements might produce on the people and political parties of the United States, than on the persons to whom he apparently addressed them. Thus Dr. Phelan's mission, whether self imposed or not was, so far as its object was concerned, practically a failure. All he succeeded in getting was a statement to the effect that in case Aguinaldo should order the surrender of the city to the American forces, it would be so surrendered at once.

In this whole business General Miller seems to have been unfortunate. The result was the usual one under

similar circumstances. He pleased nobody, not even himself. This, however, taking into consideration the nature of his expedition and the instructions he received, which were to be "conciliatory but firm," is hardly to be wondered at. The General was virtually required to tread two diametrically opposed paths at the same time. Conciliation at the outset had been construed as fear, and the Filipinos refused to be beguiled any further by his ambiguous, altruistic blandishments or glittering generalities. But his orders from Manila forbade him to employ force, the only means by which firmness of purpose could be manifested to the Filipinos.

In a personal letter, dated January 31st, General Otis practically lays the blame for these complications on the former's too close adherence to the iron-bound instructions of his original order from Washington. Major Malory, familiar with the views and conditions at headquarters, was then sent to him as a sort of monitor to enable him to act in concert with them. This letter discloses one thing of which very few persons at that time were aware, namely that action in the Philippines was directed wholly from Washington, and that this direction was governed by a vacillating policy, the object of which appears to have been to maintain the "status quo" in the Philippines, until the treaty of Paris, then under discussion in the Senate, was confirmed. Once that end was realized, the then administration could enter upon the pleasant paths of Imperialism, carrying out the expansion policy as it liked, to its full extent, so far as the acquisition of the Philippine Islands was concerned.

The revolutionary government was undoubtedly very anxious for peaceful relations with the United States, that is to say, if they could be established and maintained in accordance with its ideas. These practically looked to the withdrawal of the American forces, and to being allowed to do exactly as it pleased, wheth-

er right or wrong, at home or abroad. In the meantime, it counted on receiving the protection of the United States and desired that such protection should especially consist in shouldering the responsibility for all its actions, no matter what consequences might arise from them. Had the United States thus consented to an autonomy, protectorate, or regency, in fact, to anything short of the complete, absolute, and unlimited sovereignty of the Philippines, it would have placed itself in the position of an individual gratuitously assuming the guardianship of some small, irresponsible and wayward child at a distance from him, for whose actions he is held responsible but over whom he has no immediate control.

#### IV.

By this time the war-fever in the United States had cooled in one sense, though in another it burned more fiercely than ever. On the one hand there was quite a large class of persons who, though on altruistic principles in favor of the original idea of the war with Spain, were not in favor of expansion, or of a war of conquest for the acquisition of territory. The majority of these, however, were principally busily occupied in attending to their own personal affairs. Once the "freeing" of Cuba was accomplished by the withdrawal of the Spanish garrison and an "independent" republican form of government promised, they paid no more attention to the war. It was their profound belief that the mission of the United States had then been accomplished. They thought that once a monarchical form of government had been changed for a republican one, all would run smoothly. Consequently they judged that all was over, excepting the repatriation of the American troops.

There was another class which, though in principle opposed to the war, had at the outset been carried away by the enthusiasm of the "jingo" and the expansionist

party, and had joined in the intervention policy, but as a temporary measure only. Among those who composed it was quite a number of persons who had time and inclination to think for themselves. Their first burst of enthusiasm over, these began to have misgivings as to the real sources of the trouble in the Spanish colonies. They entertained doubts as to the actual conditions existing in them prior to American intervention. A new idea began to dawn on them, and that was the possibility that the alleged anarchy and misrule had arisen more from the efforts of an insignificant minority of the colonists, assisted by outside influences to overturn the existing government, than from a majority that really felt itself oppressed and downtrodden. It began to look as though this minority in the archipelago was merely snatching at the shadow of an abstract republicanism, which promised them personal, concrete advantages. To play this game they had no scruple in letting go the advantages that the majority of their fellow colonists derived from a mild paternalism which, while it offered the masses few opportunities for the development of the theories of demagogues, imposed few material burdens and protected them from many ills.

These two classes or parties, if they can so be called, were daily gaining ground in the country at large as well as in the Senate and House of Representatives. But they did not recognize that the time for their pacific theories was past. They did not see that, if they were not prepared to accept the inevitable results of the war, they should never have entered into it. They should also have borne in mind that to renounce the fruits of victory no matter whether sweet or bitter, was to renounce the victory itself; that no matter how much, from an ethical standpoint, they might wish to repair the mistake of having entered into the Spanish American war without counting beforehand the cost in money, blood, and political principles involved, nothing now remained but to go on with what had been begun. It was

due to the country to carry to a successful conclusion the war that arose or the policy that grew out of their action. Any other alternative would practically have involved the commencement of the decadence of the United States as a nation.

It therefore became necessary for the Expansionists, Imperialists, Jingoists, War Party, or whatever name individually or collectively they called themselves, to coax Congress along to the ratification of the treaty, as agreed on at the Paris conference. The country did not realize it, but the parting of the ways had been reached and passed. A return to the path that had been entered was possible but absolutely inexpedient. Such a step would have amounted to the complete renunciation on the part of the United States of any future right to participate in the affairs of any country outside its own limits. It would have involved a tacit acknowledgment that our first effort in that direction had been conceived in ignorance, fostered in uncertainty, and matured in failure.

As has already been said, actual hostilities between the insurgent government and the U. S. troops commenced on February 4th, 1899. It is immaterial whether they were commenced by the Filipinos, as claimed by some, or by the Americans as asserted by others. As a matter of fact, the tension that existed had become so acute and the eventual rupture was so certain that no one in the islands or in the United States who knew the real conditions in the Philippines was surprised. The only source of wonder is that both the insurgents and the Americans had been able to hold off so long. Doubtless each had been waiting for the other to strike the first blow in order to be able to justify himself toward the rest of the world.

The immediate result of the breaking out of hostilities was that the United States Senate, on the following day, approved the treaty of peace as drawn up by the American and Spanish Commissioners in Paris on December 10th of the previous year. In accordance with

it the Philippine Islands passed from under the crown of Spain for ever, and became an irrevocable appanage of the United States.

That the Filipino leaders were disappointed and disgusted at this outcome is not to be wondered at. But they should have realized that the day for small national governments has passed. They should have known only too well that to give them the independence they clamored for, would be to turn the islands over to bloodshed, anarchy, and ruin. Common sense showed conclusively that any action on an immediate independence proposition on the part of the United States would have been incompatible with either of the two objects with which the Spanish American war had ostensibly been undertaken, namely, giving the Filipinos a better and a more stable government than they had received under Spain, or the acquisition of territory by the United States.

There can be no doubt that, at the outset, the administration contemplated assisting the Filipinos to form an independent government of their own, or creating an autonomous one under the protection or suzerainty of the United States. But a very short time sufficed to convince the American commanders in the Philippines and, through their reports, the statesmen at home, that the only way to accomplish the first object was unconditionally to hold the islands for the United States. It was clear that, in spite of the crude constitution proclaimed by Aguinaldo, any government by and under such men as Mabini, Sandico, Villa, and others whose political faith was embodied in the tremendous tenets of the Katipunan, amplified by Mabini's famous decalogue, apart from giving the Archipelago a worse government than that of the Spaniards had been or was likely to be, would have opened the door to a series of legalized vengeance with results worse than the horrors of the reign of terror during the first French revolution, or those of the Paris Commune of 1870-71. Precisely such an outcome as well as the incompetency of



the Filipino revolutionists for self government, was proved by the barbarities committed by them at Imus and Naic (16), when those places fell into their hands in 1896. And all this proof was made doubly certain by the shameless Filipino violation of the capitulations between the Filipino leaders and the Spanish officers, whenever the latter surrendered to them in 1898. (17).

These atrocious barbarities demonstrated one of two things, either that the Filipino leaders were as unreliable, barbarous, and bloodthirsty as the savage hordes that followed them, or that they had not sufficient authority over the latter to restrain their excesses (18) and force them to respect the capitulations of surrender into which they, as victors, evidently entered voluntarily. It was conclusive, therefore, that to turn the islands over to them would have been to initiate a reign of wanton and irresponsible bloodshed which would have ended in the ruin of the country or would have necessitated another intervention on the part of the United States or of some other power or powers.

The second possible object of the war, annexation, in face of what is set forth in the preceding paragraph, needs not be considered in this paper. It so turned out that whether the United States of America wanted the Philippine Islands or did not, whether they were necessary to it in pursuit of its policy or were not, whether that policy was a wise one or not, the country had no alternative but to hold on to what had come to its hand.

Another reason that showed the incompetency of

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(16) For a detailed account of this see "The Philippine Islands" by John N. Foreman. Edition 1899, page 519.

(17) At Samal, 200 Macabebe troops in the Spanish service were butchered in cold blood by the revolutionary forces in spite of the positive stipulation that their lives should be spared. See "Nuestra Prision" by R. F. Fray Ulpiano Herrero, Manila, 1900.

(18) The excesses committed at Cavite when that place was turned over to them by Admiral Dewey, in May, 1898, and the destruction of churches and church property in the neighborhood of Manila are ample proofs of this.

the then Filipino leaders was their ignorance in assuming that American consular officials had any power to pledge their government to action, no matter how shrewd or intelligent these officials may have been in forecasting it along any given line or policy.

It has been stated on good authority that, about March or April, 1899, there were some overtures between Emilio Aguinaldo, Felipe Buencamino, and Pedro Paterno on the one hand and the American authorities on the other, towards a compromise on the basis of an autonomous government. It is unknown with whom these overtures originated, but Aguinaldo was disposed to listen to them. General Antonio Luna heard of this and, at a cabinet meeting at Cabanatuan, reproached the dictator with wishing to betray the extreme party. It was this party, according to him, which represented the people at large. It certainly did represent the majority of the Filipino leaders and Katipuneros, who, he said, had gone into the field to fight for complete independence. They would be satisfied by no such half measure as autonomy. The conversation became heated. Luna, who had a violent temper, threatened to kill Aguinaldo. The latter, however, managed to avoid an encounter just then. But Luna followed up and struck Buencamino in the face. Buencamino then made his escape with Pedro Paterno and both took refuge in a stable.

Aguinaldo is credited with not having been slow to arrive at the conclusion that, compromise or no compromise, autonomy or complete independence, there was not sufficient room in the Philippines for himself and Luna. He thereupon determined, it is said, to lay a trap and rid himself of the violent patriot for once and all. To this end he summoned Luna to attend a council of war at Cabanatuan.

Luna, as the information goes, arrived with two aides-de camp and a mounted escort of twelve men. After dismounting and dismissing his escort, he proceeded alone to the rectory where Aguinaldo had his head-

quarters. On mounting the stairs, he was met by a junior officer, who informed him that Aguinaldo had left with his command. Luna felt himself slighted and expressed himself very strongly on the matter and prepared to take his departure. As he turned to leave the room, a sergeant of one of the two companies that Aguinaldo had left at Cabanatuan, sprang from behind the door, where he had been concealed, and attacked Luna from behind, inflicting a severe wound with a bolo.

Luna, seeing himself surrounded and realizing that he was practically in the same strait as Andres Bonifacio had been at Naic, some three years previously, drew his revolver to defend himself. Not wishing to be overcome by numbers in a hand to hand struggle in the rectory, he forced his way through his assailants and rushed down stairs into the plaza, to summon his escort to his assistance. On arriving in the plaza, he was confronted by one of the companies that Aguinaldo had left in Cabanatuan to arrest him at all costs. The officer in command, judging that Luna, if arrested alive, would only be a source of embarrassment to Aguinaldo, ordered his men to fire a volley. Luna fell at the first discharge, but he did not die before he had killed a number of his assailants with his revolver.

Aguinaldo now realized that, if he wished to retain any influence with the insurrectionary forces, he must, for the time being at least, give up negotiations on any basis short of absolute independence.

But to return to affairs at Iloilo, the blockade of that place, if blockade it can be called, was still being maintained. The Ilongos continued to strengthen their fortifications, in spite of the warning that had been given them on February 10th, that if they persisted they would subject the city to a bombardment.

On February 11th, four commissioners were sent by the inhabitants to confer further with General Miller, who had demanded the surrender of Iloilo by ten a. m. While this conference was in progress, two shots were

fired by one of the naval vessels as a warning to the revolutionists to desist from working on the defenses. The insurgents, instead of discontinuing their work, answered by firing on the Americans from the fort. About 9.30 a. m., the "Baltimore" and "Petrel" became actively engaged.

As General Miller did not anticipate this, the sailors from the "Baltimore" and the "Petrel" were the first to land. It was only at about 11.45, or 12 noon, that the soldiers commenced to disembark. When they reached the shore, they found that the sailors had advanced as far as the Custom House, but were unable to advance any further. The town was in flames, the insurgents having commenced to fire it at the first shot from the Baltimore. The alcalde of Iloilo, in imitation of the mayor of Moscow in 1812, was observed setting fire to his own house. So effectually did the insurgents do their work that, by the time the soldiers landed, they were unable to advance through the conflagration.

There was later some talk that the town had been set on fire by the shells from the ships of the expedition. Undoubtedly some fires may have originated from this source; but the main cause of the conflagration was the revolutionary forces, as is shown by the reports of Generals Miller and Hughes (19).

From this time on the war went steadily forward. Occasionally the revolutionary forces were successful. But Aguinaldo's older troops, composed to a very large extent of Tagalogs, who had been trained in the Spanish service, gradually dwindled away and were replaced by raw levies. As large reinforcements of United States troops were continually pouring into the islands, the revolutionists, though occasionally making a stubborn resistance, were little by little driven from the field.

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(19) The writer of this paper remembers a conversation with an ex-insurgent officer, in the course of which he described how he and his men, acting under the order of the revolutionary commander, set fire to one district.

What was once a fairly active army, became nothing more than isolated bands, scattered here and there over the country, under leaders more or less prominent, whose only logical object in still keeping the field could have been to secure the best terms they might for themselves.

The fighting which had begun on February 4, 1899, at San Juan and Santa Mesa, and which had resulted in the Filipino forces being worsted with considerable loss, continued. On February 11th, the United States forces attacked and captured Caloocan in Luzon. On the 18th, of the same month, the American flag was hoisted at Bacolod in the island of Negros. There was some fighting in Tondo on February 18th, between the United States troops and the revolutionary forces. The latter, in an attempt to burn Manila, had set fire to the suburbs of Tondo and San Nicolas. On the 23rd, General Otis burned what remained of Tondo.

By the beginning of April, the United States forces had driven Aguinaldo from Malolos and occupied that place. On the 20th, some 140 of General Lawton's command were surrounded and captured by the revolutionists at Binangonan. On the 23rd, Colonel Stotsenberg was killed in a severe action, and on the 26th there was some fighting at Apalit.

On May 2nd, there was a conference between General Otis, the Philippine Commission, and some Filipino envoys of Aguinaldo. On the 8th, the Filipino peace delegates entered General Lawton's lines at San Isidro and on the 22nd, Aguinaldo's peace Commissioners were received by the Philippine Commission and President McKinley's scheme of government was explained to them.

This attempt at negotiations appears to have been abortive, for in the early part of June, there was some skirmishing with the forces under Pio del Pilar. On the 13th, there was an artillery combat commenced at Las Piñas. This developed into one of the severest engagements of the war at Zapote Bridge.

The excessive rainfalls during June and July retard-

ed operations somewhat, but did not prevent General Hall from capturing Calamba on July 27th. On August 15th, Angeles was captured by General McArthur. By this time there were some forty thousand United States troops in the Philippines. On September 1st, there was some fighting in the island of Negros, which resulted in the defeat of the revolutionists. On the 14th of this month, the U. S. cruiser, "Charleston," made an unsuccessful attempt to silence a one gun Filipino battery at Olongapo. On the 23rd, this battery was finally silenced after a six hours bombardment by the "Monterey" the "Concord" and the "Zafiro." This battery with its gun, (a 16 C. M. caliber), was destroyed. On the 28th, General McArthur captured Porac. On October 8th, General Schwan captured Noveleta, after a stubborn resistance.

On November 7th, General Wheaton landed at San Fabian and advanced towards Dagupan. On the 13th, Colonel Bell captured Tarlac and on the 18th, Zamboanga surrendered to the U. S. gunboat, "Castine", under command of Lieutenant Verey.

On December 2nd, Major March, in command of a battallion of the 2nd Volunteers, defeated Gregorio del Pilar at Tilad pass. Pilar was killed in this engagement. On December 20th, General Lawton was killed while personally directing the crossing of his troops over the river at San Mateo.

A glance at the above meager selection of dates shows that, so far as the remainder of 1899 was concerned, all hesitancy on the part of the administration at Washington was over. Operations were consequently being pushed as vigorously as the continually extending area in which they were taking place permitted.

On January 20th, 1900, an American pack train, consisting of some twenty animals, was captured in the province of the Laguna. On April 6th, General Otis was relieved of his command in the Philippines, to be succeeded by General McArthur, who on June 2nd asked

for more troops. On June 15th, Francisco Macabulos surrendered at Tarlac with eight officers and one hundred and twenty men.

In August it was estimated that the United States land forces in the Philippines amounted to 70,000 men, and that the war so far had cost \$ 750,000.00 per diem. Fighting still continued, but gradually the more important revolutionary forces were dispersed. By the end of 1900, the United States forces were in possession of all places of any importance in the Philippines.

## V

Aguinaldo had apparently vanished, some persons believing that he was dead, others that he had left the islands, and still others that he was in hiding. All theories concerning him were set at rest, however, by his capture—one of the most dramatic, if not one of the most romantic, events of the war of conquest. The leading details of this exploit were effected in the following manner: Aguinaldo was believed by the American authorities, to be in hiding somewhere in the mountains of N. E. Luzon. But his exact whereabouts, unknown to them, was only ascertained with certainty after a courier of his fell into General Funston's hands.

After Gregorio del Pilar and some 60 Filipinos had lost their lives at Tilad pass in covering Emilio Aguinaldo's flight from Major Marshes' Battalion of the 23rd Volunteers, the Filipino president retired, with such forces as remained with him, to the province of Abra and from there to the Cagayan valley. When pursuit by the U. S. troops made him unable to hold his own together, he broke them up into small moveable columns to operate in the Cagayan valley. Then, accompanied by Simeon Villa (20), Nazario Alhambra, Santiago Barce-

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(20) Simeon Villa was a Tagalog, a Katipunero of long standing, and a doctor by profession. Aguinaldo had made him a Colonel of the Staff Corps.

He had formerly been in command of the revolutionary forces

lona, and the rest of his Staff, as well as by some 60 of his most reliable men, he established his headquarters at Palanan, a remote town situated in the province of Isabela in the fastnesses of the Sierra Madre, some six or eight miles from the sea. This place was very remote, secluded, and exceptionally difficult to approach. Such roads and tracks as lead to it were jealously watched by the few troops he had with him. These, small as was their number, were amply sufficient for that purpose.

Aguinaldo, evidently intending to continue the struggle, had selected Palanan as a safe place from which to operate and also as a place in which to establish an arsenal for the manufacture of ammunition.

In the earlier part of January, 1901, he sent a courier, a certain Cecilio Segismundo, with communications to Urbano Lacuna, who was in command of the revolutionary forces in central Luzon, to Teodoro Sandico, who was in hiding in Bulacan, and to his cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo, (21) who had been his Minister of War, and

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(21) Urbano Lacuna was a Tagalog who had been holding together what remained of the revolutionary forces after Aguinaldo's flight, and had remained in command of Nueva Ecija. He operated along the line of the Manila-Dagupan railway.

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Teodoro Sandico was a Tagalog, a native of Pandacan, a Kati-punero of long standing, and had been a schoolmaster. Later he went abroad, studying in Spain and in Germany, where he attended the University of Bonn.

In 1896-7 he returned to the East. The next heard of him is in connection with the Filipino Revolutionary junta in Hongkong, in the Cagayan valley in 1898-99. Among a number of barbarous murders and other outrages officially recorded against him, there is one of peculiarly fiendish malevolence. He had kept a Spanish officer prisoner, tied hand and foot for several days, without food or water. When the officer complained of this treatment, Villa ordered a piece of flesh to be cut from his victim's thigh. Dangling this into the Spaniard's face, he said: "There's something for you to eat."

Later in 1897-8 he ran for "concejal", or alderman, of the city of Manila.



was then in command of the revolutionary forces in the Province of Cavite.

His letter to Lacuna was in reference to the affairs of central Luzon. The one to Sandico was a summons to join him at Palanan. He lacked confidence in his entourage, he said, and also informed him of his intentions respecting the cartridge factory. The letter to Baldomero Aguinaldo was the most important of the three. In it, besides touching on the same subjects as those contained in the letters to Lacuna and Sandico, he requested a reinforcement of 400 men, even if in various detachments, to be sent him from the Tagalog provinces. He stated that the bearer of these despatches, Cecilio Segismundo, would serve them as guide to Palanan.

The courier, Cecilio Segismundo, set out from Palanan about January 10th, 1901, and arrived at Pantabanganon February 5th. There, on applying to the local president for means to continue his journey, that functionary advised him to surrender himself to the officer commanding the U. S. forces at that place. The advice was followed. The American officer turned him and where he was engaged with the U. S. Consul General Wildman in purchasing and shipping arms to Aguinaldo.

As soon as the revolution was well under way in the Philippines, he joined Aguinaldo and was made a member of his cabinet as Minister of the Interior. When Aguinaldo was driven out of Central Luzon, he remained in hiding in the forests of Bulacan.

Previous to this, in the fall of 1898, he had been very active in establishing popular clubs in Manila, which were nothing more than nuclei for an uprising of his planning. These inhabitants of Manila were to assist the revolutionists, who were to attack the city from without, in expelling the U. S. garrison.

Later 1905-6, he was elected Governor of the province of Bulacan.

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Baldomero Aguinaldo was a Tagalog and an old Katipunero. He had been associated with his cousin, Emilio Aguinaldo, in the Malolos government as Minister of War, after the assassination of Antonio Luna. When the Malolos Government was broken up, he went to Cavite province, where he commanded the revolutionary forces and held the country for his cousin.

his despatches over to General Funston at San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.

As soon as the contents of this correspondence, written in Spanish intermixed with cipher, had been mastered by the assistance of Lazaro Segovia (22), the matter was minutely discussed by General Funston, Captain Smith, the A. D. C. to General Funston, Lieutenant Mitchell of the 22nd Infantry, and Segovia.

The upshot of this discussion was that General McArthur, then in command of the United States forces in the Philippines, was consulted. The management of the whole affair was turned over to General Funston and he decided that a company of Macabebe scouts, disguised as revolutionary troops, should go to Palanan and personate a part of the reinforcement called for in Aguinaldo's communication to his cousin. This course was decided on because Aguinaldo, hearing nothing to the contrary, would naturally suppose that his letters had been received, and that the Macabebes were the troops sent in compliance with his request to Baldomero Aguinaldo for reinforcements.

As it was impossible, without disclosing its object, to send this column under command of an American officer, and as there was no native to whom so delicate a mission could be trusted, it was decided that General Funston should go in command of it, accompanied by Lieutenant Mitchell and the brothers Hazzard, who were Lieutenants of Macabebe Scouts. To prevent discovery of their purpose and to allay the suspicions of the natives

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(22) Lazaro Segovia was a Spaniard from Madrid. He came to the Philippine Islands as a sergeant in the Spanish army. He deserted from the Spanish service and according to his own showing, joined the revolutionary forces in the latter half of 1898, serving under the immediate command of Lazaro Alhambra for something over a year and a half as first Lieutenant against the U. S. forces.

In May, 1900, he deserted from the revolutionists and was employed by General Funston as interpreter, secret service agent, and spy.

of the towns and districts through which the column would have to pass, it was decided that these officers should be treated as prisoners, who had been picked up on the road, and that a certain Hilario Talplacido, who had been a Major of the revolutionary forces, should figure as the officer in command of the whole force asked for, and Lazaro Segovia should act as Captain commanding the company of Macabebes, which was to represent the first detachment of the four hundred men asked for by Aguinaldo. This arrangement was to last until the expedition should arrive at Palanan. Then General Funston and the American officers were to take command, surprise the place, and capture or kill Aguinaldo. Once this was done, every one was to revert to his normal status. Cecilio Segismundo had been persuaded to accompany the expedition as guide. The Scouts forming the expedition were carefully selected and provided with insurrectionist uniforms and Remington rifles.

Early in March this expedition sailed from Manila on the U. S. gunboat, "Vicksburg", for Casiguran. There it was to disembark and make its way by land to Palanan. During the trip from Manila to Casiguran, Segovia carefully instructed the men who were to personate officers and the scouts in the parts they were to play on their way to, and after their arrival at, Palanan.

In the night of March 13-14, the "Vicksburg" arrived near Casiguran. During the darkness, she stood close in shore and the expedition disembarked at about 12 miles from that place, passing the remainder of the night on the beach. The "Vicksburg" returned to Baler. It was agreed that she should proceed to the coast in the neighborhood of Palanan on the 24th, standing off and on until the expedition should signal her to come in and take it off.

As soon as day broke the expedition proceeded on its way to Casiguran. It remained there for two or three days, collecting supplies for the six days march to Palanan. As Casiguran was a poor place, this was not

only a matter of difficulty but it also involved considerable time. The method of procedure was necessary. As the revolutionary forces lived on the country through which they might be passing, the bringing of supplies either from Manila or from the "Vicksburg", to ration it would have betrayed it from the start.

During the three days that the expedition remained at Casiguran, forged letters, which had been prepared in Manila and purporting to be from Lacuna, Sandico, and Baldomero Aguinaldo, announcing the departure of the expedition and giving the names of Talplacido as in command of it and Segovia as commanding the first company, were sent to Palanan. These were accompanied by a letter from Talplacido to Aguinaldo, stating that he was on his way to Palanan and that he had some days previously captured a party of American surveyors, (General Funston and his companions), whom he was bringing with him. In this letter he also asked that rations be sent to meet him on the road between Palanan and Casiguran, as he was unable to obtain sufficient supplies at the latter place.

On March 17th, the expedition started out from Casiguran for Palanan, a distance of about 60 miles by road and reckoned as a six days march, with rations hardly sufficient for four. On the 21st, it reached a place called Laguyo, where another letter was written by Talplacido to Aguinaldo, asking that provisions be sent to meet it.

The detachment had rather wasted its rations, such as they were, on the first day. Consequently, from the second day, the men had been reduced to an issue of a quarter of the original supply. This was the only means by which what supplies they had could be made to last during the march through a very rough and practically uninhabited country.

On the fourth day from Casiguran, the party reached a place called Dinudungan about eight miles from Palanan. There there was a guard of a corporal and six men of Aguinaldo's force. Through them Hilario Talplacido received a communication from Aguinaldo,

directing him to leave his prisoners with the guard and to come on with his detachment, as it was not expedient that the American prisoners should come to Palanan.

There was no choice but to obey Aguinaldo's order, unless they wished to betray themselves. The "prisoners" were accordingly left with a guard of ten Macabebes and a corporal. But Segovia, who, since the expedition had arrived at Casiguran, practically directed all its movements and took charge of all its details, quietly gave out that in the course of an hour, in order to deceive Aguinaldo's corporal and guard at Dinudungan, he would send back for them, saying that he had met a second messenger from Aguinaldo directing that the prisoners be brought on. This having to leave General Funston and his officers behind virtually placed Segovia in complete command of the expedition. From that time on neither General Funston nor the officers joined it until after the capture of Aguinaldo.

At 8:00 a. m., the expedition, which then consisted of seventy-four in all, commenced its final march. After being half an hour on the road, three men appeared with the rations that had been asked for. These were cooked and eaten then and there, enough, however, for General Funston and the officers and guard who had remained with him at Dinudungan being sent to them.

As soon as the meal was over the expedition resumed its march. During this march Segovia had ordered the men to load their rifles, but enjoined great caution. They were not to attract the attention of the cargadores, or porters, who had accompanied them from Casiguran, or of the men who had brought the supplies from Palanan. About noon the column was met by a sergeant with eleven men, who informed him that he had been sent by Aguinaldo to take charge of the prisoners. His orders were that they remain at Dinudungan.

This was the critical moment of the expedition, but Segovia rose to the occasion. By some means or another he managed to detain the sergeant and his party, while

he sent a messenger to General Funston. The latter, in compliance with the feigned order of Aguinaldo to bring on the prisoners, was already on his way to join the column. He was advised by Segovia to leave the road and allow the Filipino sergeant and his party to pass him. Then he was to push on to overtake the column. Aguinaldo's sergeant would only realize that he had been tricked when, on arriving at Dinudungan, he would find the prisoners had left that place to rejoin the expedition.

At two in the afternoon the expedition arrived at about two miles from Palanan. There remained only the river that separated the party from its quarry. When the river was reached, there being only three canoes, some time was taken up in crossing. But as soon as this was done the ranks were formed and the expedition was marched to the Plaza by Segovia. There he found Aguinaldo's guards drawn up to receive the reenforcement, and Aguinaldo himself, in the company of Villa and Barcelona, was waiting in the balcony of the house he occupied to inspect it.

Segovia formed his column up in line in front of the guards. After having returned their salute he cautioned the Macabebes to remember the instructions he had given them. He then proceeded to report in person to Aguinaldo, from whom he received orders as to how his men should be lodged and cared for. After having made his report he returned to his command. While Aguinaldo was still at the window waiting for them to march past in review, Segovia ordered the Macabebes to fire a volley into Aguinaldo's guards. The latter were so confused at this unexpected attack that they fled in disorder. Aguinaldo and Santiago Barcelona were too much surprised to move and the former, seeing how hopeless the situation was, waved a white handkerchief from the window and offered to surrender. In a few moments they were secured by Segovia. Not so, however, Simeon Villa, who jumped from a window and en-

deavored to make his escape, but was stopped by two shots from Segovia's revolver.

Segovia then proceeded to stop the Macabebes, who by this time were firing at random into the town. A few moments later, after all the real work had been done, General Funston and the other officers and the guard that had been left with them, made their appearance on the other side of the river. General Funston and the officers who accompanied him immediately assumed command. Segovia, Talplacido, and the other natives all returned to their normal positions.

To General Funston, Lieutenant Mitchel, and Segovia is due the credit of having conceived and planned this expedition. To Lazaro Segovia, who gave evidence of possessing an overaverage amount of courage, coolness, determination, executive ability, and tact, belongs the credit of planning and executing the details, particularly after the landing of the expedition at Casiguran, and more especially during the few hours between Dinudungan and Palanan, where Aguinaldo was captured. It was during these few but critical hours that he was thrown entirely upon his own resources.

The method employed, dangerous as it was in every sense of the word, was the only one that could succeed. Had Aguinaldo had five minutes' notice of the real condition of affairs, he could perhaps have offered a successful resistance to the column, which without supplies must inevitably have been destroyed, or he could have made his escape. Had General Funston gone in open command of the expedition, he would have betrayed its object and frustrated its success. On the other hand, it is also very doubtful if the Macabebes would have followed Segovia, had it not been for the presence of General Funston and the other American officers.

This expedition offers one of the rare examples of military history in which it would be impossible for even the most partial historian to give more credit to any one of the participants than another. Each had his part to

play, each part was absolutely necessary to insure success, and each of the actors, Americans, Spanish and Filipinos, played it. The only criticism that could be made is that Segovia might possibly have captured Aguinaldo without the aid of General Funston, whereas the latter could not have done so without that of Segovia (23).

The results of this capture, immeasurably out of proportion to the strength of the expedition, were more important than would at first appear. It practically put an end to all organized and concerted resistance to the United States forces in the Philippines by what, up till then, had been known as the Filipino Revolutionary Government.

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(23) A very interesting and detailed account of this expedition, from which the above abbreviation is taken, was written and published in Spanish and English by Segovia, in Manila in 1902, under the title of "La Aventura de Palanan".

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SIXTH PAPER  
THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

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## SIXTH PAPER

# THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

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Before discussing the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, implanted as a result of the Treaty of Paris, it may perhaps be well to take a brief glance at the policy that prompted American intervention in Filipino affairs, as well as at the peculiar genius of the Americans as a nation.

It has already been said that it is worth bearing in mind that the actions of the United States government on the one hand and of the revolutionary government on the other hinged on certain interpretations of the ambiguous promises of the agents of the former and on the positively declared intentions of the latter. It is furthermore not to be forgotten that both promises and intentions arose from a profound ignorance. The Americans did not know the Filipinos at the time, and the Filipinos knew nothing of the conditions that governed the motives and actions of the American Government.

The United States, since its existence as a nation, had made greater strides towards material advancement and financial prosperity than has ever been paralleled in history. The people were convinced that this advancement and prosperity was due to the form of government under which they lived and not to the people itself. In spite of this belief, there is no reason to doubt, all other conditions being equal, that the American people or nation, to use both words as a synonym, would have been just as advanced and just as materially prosperous under any other

form of government ranging from absolute, hereditary monarchy to Utopian democracy. In other words, it was the Americans themselves and the agrarian and financial conditions that environed them, and not the form of government under which they lived, that made the American nation what it is to day. To assert the contrary would be to say that Negroes, Indians, South Sea Islanders, or a mixture of any of the races, given the same form of government in its strict sense, would have made as good a showing in proportion to the area occupied by them as had been made by the American people (1).

The American people as individuals, however, had been too deeply absorbed in conducting their own personal affairs towards a satisfactory material issue to be able to give much time or attention to the study of the abstract reasons for their collective success as a nation. Their internal polity and foreign policy were therefore turned over to the leaders of the various political parties. These in their turn had brought the people to believe that it was to the form of government, as shaped and directed by these same leaders, and not to themselves, that they owed their national greatness and prosperity. This belief took great hold on the popular mind. It led to a common, popular sense of perfect security in their form of government. Under the influence of this belief, the nation, represented by its political leaders, became anxious that other peoples and nations should enjoy a similar good fortune and a like sense of security. There is

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(1) The examples furnished by the republics of Haiti, Liberia, Santo Domingo, Belize, and Hawaii would seem, however, to point to the contrary. In spite of most excellent and liberal fundamental laws in the shape of carefully drawn up constitutions, these countries had so miserably mismanaged not only their internal affairs but also their foreign relations, that other powers were only restrained from intervening and seizing on their territory "for the good of the inhabitants", through fear of an interposition between them and their altruistic intentions, of a combination of other powers individually as altruistic and collectively much more powerful.

an abstract reason for such good will. Any agglomerations of persons feeling perfectly safe themselves easily wish others to be safe also. Hence comes that doctrine of altruism, through which people justify their interference in the affairs of others on the ground that what is dangerous to others may become dangerous to themselves also. They therefore endeavor to secure safety and to exorcise danger by exact statements and minute definitions, and, though theoretically desirous that the prosperity and safety of others may be as great and their adversity and danger as small as their own, the morality of the means employed to bring about these ends is eclipsed by a dogmatism which judges actions with leniency, while it endeavors to control opinions with a hand of iron.

Because of some such mental constitution or process, we average Americans, individually and collectively, believed that, with very rare individual exceptions, foreigners in general and the Filipinos in particular would come under the government of the United States not only willingly but with alacrity (2).

We thought the only obstacle that lay in the way of the latter's doing so was the Spanish government, holding possession of the Islands against their will. As the Filipinos, however, had given no indication of a desire to come under the United States, the American political leaders recognized that, no matter how desirable such a consummation might be, the initiating of any step in such

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(2) In this belief the leaders of the Republican party had lost sight of a conspicuous fact. Throughout all the revolution gotten up in the Philippines against Spain by the Katipunan society and brought to a successful issue by the assistance of the United States, (See General Merritt's answer to the propositions made by Aguinaldo's Commissioners on August 15th, 1898), in all the airing of their real or supposed grievances, and in all the programs devised by the agitators who started the Katipunan or by the Katipunan which had started the revolution, the Filipinos never dreamt or desired that the Philippines as a country or themselves as a people should come under the United States.

a direction by the United States as a nation would be contrary to international law and national morality.

In the face of this it would have been difficult to make the majority of Americans as a nation accept this doctrine as one paving a way to the acquisition of territory. But the leaders of the expansionist branch of the Republican party evidently came to the conclusion that there was a possibility of getting not only the party but the nation also educated up to their way of thinking. Therefore the program put before the American people by the leaders of the Republican party and accepted by them at the commencement of American intervention between Spain and her colonies, was based on two assumptions: first, that the Spanish colonies were oppressed and tyrannized over by the peninsular government to a much greater degree than was supposed to be the case; and secondly, that a very large majority of the colonists were anxious to establish an independent republican form of government. It was therefore the business of the United States not only to assist them in doing this, but also to guarantee the independence of any such government as these colonies might set up.

Any political party boldly asking the sanction of a war merely to evict Spain from her colonies in the far East and to annex them to the United States would simply have been courting defeat. Such a proposition could not be entertained. But the leaders of the extreme branches of the Republican party presumably came to the conclusion that the end they had in view, namely, the annexation of the Philippines, could be attained in as certain, though perhaps in a more circuitous manner by persuading the country to sanction an altruistic intervention between the Spanish Government and the Filipinos, the oppressor and the oppressed, the tyrant and his victim. To bring about such an intervention it was thought the doctrine embodied in the Ostend manifesto respecting the island of Cuba, with certain limitations, could be put into practice in the Philippines. The best

means of doing this and at the same time of avoiding all appearance of coercion, or the open employment of force in the beginning, was by making use of methods identical with or similar to those employed in Hawaii in 1899.

This scheme was logical enough in its conception, but for its success, it depended on two conditions and these in their turn depended on one another.

The first thing was to find Filipinos who were willing to play the role played in Hawaii by Mr. Dole and the "Committee of Thirteen"; the second was to induce an appreciable number of the Filipino people to back them up in it. But there the parallel ended. The Hawaiian "Committee of Thirteen" were Americans. By the moral support they received from the men disembarked from the "Boston" to protect American interests in Honolulu, they were enabled to bring about the revolution and to depose Queen Liliukulani. It naturally followed that the form of government they set up would not only be strictly subservient to American interests but would eventually demand admission to the United States in one form or another. Over and above this, practically all Kanakas spoke English. As they had been educated under the auspices of American missionaries, they knew little of any countries other than the United States and their own island. To induce them as a whole to accept American domination or citizenship was consequently no very difficult undertaking.

In the Philippines the conditions were very different. The real leaders of the revolutions and revolts that had occurred in those islands had been Spaniards or mestizos. They looked to Spain for their personal advancement. They aimed at nothing more than putting themselves at the head of Filipino affairs, in order to derive such personal advantages as they could from their position. As the sentiment of revolt practically did not exist among the Filipinos, it had first become necessary to create it. Otherwise no revolution could be brought to furnish a reasonable ground on which to base a policy

of intervention. The seeds of revolution were sown by favoring or bringing into existence the Katipunan. This body, however, soon got beyond their control and formed a national Filipino party with complete independence as their goal. Moreover the education that the Filipinos had received had been at the hands of the Spaniards. Consequently any leanings they may have had towards any other nationality than their own, were certainly not likely to be towards the United States. (3).

The leaders of the extreme Republican branches were very well aware that, should the nation become alive to their aims in respect to annexation, the party was very liable to be repudiated and swept from power, unless they could persuade the nation to condone their action. The surest way to avoid the former and to secure the latter was to achieve some very advantageous result in which the nation could find, if not grounds for pride, at least reasons for gratitude because of extraordinary material advantages. Such a result, the leaders could then

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(3) This was amply proved by the fact that it took the presence of upwards of eighty thousand American soldiers and sailors to bring the country under sufficient subjection to admit the implanting of a Civil Government in the Philippines, with the view to making the Filipinos accept American sovereignty. Such an army and all its concomitant influences did it require to enable the annexionists to show the Republican party and the United States the triumph they, as a branch of the party, had achieved in adding, against the avowed principle of the party and country, a territory whose inhabitants, to judge by the resistance they had offered, would certainly never have been brought under control by any other means.

It is folly to say that this resistance to American authority was the result of a few scheming leaders and of the antagonism of a few bad Spaniards and worse friars. To admit such an argument is to give to all three of these categories, especially to the two latter, a moral influence in directing the material affairs of the Filipinos that they were assumed not to possess, which assumption was one of the bases on which intervention rested. No people will undergo the sacrifices it is forced to undergo and the horrors of warfare at the hand of its own partisans, supplemented by those of an invading army, unless their heart is in the struggle.



demonstrate, would never have been achieved by an adherence to the original program.

It is but fair to state, however, that the leaders of the Republican party as well as the then administration had depended on the Consular officials in Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila for accurate information on which to base their actions. Instead of this, however, the information they received had been most misleading and created a very false impression as to the real state of affairs in the Philippines. As a consequence of this, a great deal more was taken for granted regarding an alleged desire of the Filipinos, as a people, to separate from Spain and to come under the United States than the actual facts, had they have been known, would have warranted. (4).

The Filipinos, on their part, assumed *a priori* that the majority of the American nation was in favor of giving an independent republican form of government to the Philippine Islands. This assumption was correct, in theory at least, but the Filipinos did not realize that the American nation had confided its policy and polity to the Republican party. They did not see that, except for some national disaster, the American nation was not likely to withdraw its confidence from that party, even though conditions were encountered that had not been taken into consideration, or circumstances arose that

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(4) This, however, applies to the period previous to the Biac-na-Bato agreement. Till then, a separation from Spain and independence had only been dreamed of by some few leaders of the Katipunan. It had only been during the four or five months' respite granted to the Katipunan from December, 1897, when Aguinaldo left the Philippines in compliance with his agreement with Primo de Rivera, to his return to them under the auspices of Admiral Dewey, that the idea of independence took shape. Later, during the long delay between Admiral Dewey's a victory over the Spanish fleet in May, 1898, and the arrival of the American land forces under General Anderson, that idea crystalized under the form, first, of a dictatorship, and then of an alleged constitutional republic under Emilio Aguinaldo.

had not been foreseen at the outset. The Filipinos had no idea that the American Government might possibly change its policy from that of establishing an independent Filipino government, guaranteed by the United States, to that of assuming complete, absolute, and in definite control of the Archipelago, regardless of what its inhabitants might think or feel.

Between the battle of Cavite and the arrival of the first land expedition under General Anderson, the political party in power at home (5), and presumably the country at large, appear to have undergone a complete change of view respecting the form American intervention in the Philippines was eventually to assume. To such as gave the matter any serious consideration, it became very clear that annexation to the United States was the only logical issue to the situation.

To this end the Americans consuls in Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila, and the commander of the American squadron in Asiatic waters, with or without the privity of the leaders of the Republican party or the then administration, had entered into more or less direct communications with the Katipunan, the former as early as November, 1897, and the latter a very few weeks before the declaration of war in 1898. These communications gave rise to the belief on the part of the leaders of that society that their organization was to be supported in its efforts to bring about a revolution

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(5) It was this party, in conjunction with the "Jingoes" of other parties, that had brought about the intervention of the United States in the Philippines. At the start, it may not have foreseen just what this intervention might lead up to. But it very soon saw that the withdrawing of the United States from the Philippines would mean to that nation what the withdrawing of the Roman legions from the outlying provinces of the Empire had meant to Rome. It therefore became necessary to maintain possession of the Archipelago, even at the expense of deceiving itself and the nation as to the possibility of implanting in it the same form of government, policy, and polity as existed in the United States.

to eventuate in the establishment of an independent republic, and not to become a tool in the hands of the annexionists.

It was therefore with mortification and surprise that a large number of persons in the United States awakened to the fact that the altruistic intention of annexing the Philippines to that country for a greater or less period of time, was looked upon with disfavor by the majority of Filipinos and was resisted by them with force. It was strange to the Americans to hear that, to the Filipinos, American intervention now meant practically a mere change of masters, bringing them no nearer than they were at the outset to the original object for which they had revolted and which, divested of all ambiguities, was an independent (6) form of government, based on their own ideas and not on any particular form of altruism that the Americans might choose to manifest.

The Filipinos and their wishes and aspirations, whether personal or national, were not taken into consideration for two reasons; first, because they were looked upon as children, overgrown ones if you please, who did not know what was good for them and, consequently, whose vagaries as to independent self-government were not to be indulged; secondly, because the United States was master of the situation in the Philippines, and the Republican party in power at home was master of the situation in the United States. Its leaders had succeeded in persuading the nation that its financial prosperity and material advancement depended on their dictating the policy and directing the polity of the nation.

Beyond implanting republicanism, in its abstract sense, in the far East, the Republican party, in insisting on the necessity for annexation there, may have been governed by other and more sordid reasons, which, while quite as powerful as the altruism put forward, were dis-

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(6) Sec document presented by Felipe Agoncillo to the American and Spanish Commissioners who met in Paris to agree upon the treaty of peace signed December 10th. 1898.

cretely kept in the back ground. These reasons were the supposed mineral, agricultural, and forestal wealth of the archipelago. In all of these resources, the country was supposed to equal if not surpass California. These would offer attractive possibilities as investments to corporations and individuals. Moreover the Philippines were supposed to hold out special inducements to all such American clerks, handicraftsmen, laborers, and the like as might choose to come to them. The Philippines were held to be an unexploited "El Dorado", which had been in the possession of the Spaniards for some three hundred years or more, but which they had been too lazy or too ignorant to develop. It only awaited the vivifying influence of the magician's wand of "modern methods", wielded by an American Civil Government in the islands, to raise them to a degree of prosperity hitherto undreamed of, and now while America was in possession of them was the time to realize this golden dream.

All this, however, was found to be a misconception very largely owing to misleading consular reports as to the advisability of American emigration to the Philippines (7), the resources of the Archipelago, the means necessary to their development, the methods by which these means were to be applied, and so on. In this and similar reports, no notice was taken of the local price of labor which precluded the advantageous emigration to these islands of any but persons possessing more or less capital, at least enough to live on, or of government officials, who could live at the expense of the *res publica*, instead of having to depend on their unaided efforts for existence. In a word, it was soon found that, as the population (8), in proportion to its area, was

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(7) See letter of the U. S. consul O. F. Williams to Mr. Day of the State Department, dated July 2nd, 1898.

(8) The population of the Philippines is, in round numbers, 75 to the square mile and that of the United States about 30 to the square mile.

greater than that of the United States, it was no place for the laboring men to "grow up with the country." Moreover practically all land worth occupying already had an owner or a claimant, so there was little room for the "pioneer" class. The cities, towns, and pueblos were, humanly speaking, sufficient to accomodate the population of the district in which they were located. Any wonderful and rapid growth of cities, such as had gone so far towards enriching the United States, was therefore hardly to be looked for in the Islands in the immediate future.

The American flag, however, had been hoisted over the Philippines, and, ethics to the contrary notwithstanding, no one, no matter what his party politics might be, was anxious to pull it down. No one thought of abandoning or getting rid of the place, even though, thanks to the Republican party, it was a white elephant, whose purchase price and maintenance had been and still was enormous (9).

The Republican party should have faced the issue squarely at the commencement. It should have presented the facts to the country at large, which could then

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(9) Spain had been paid twenty millions of dollars as an indemnity for what she was supposed to have in the Philippines since she had been in possession of them. Seven millions of dollars had been guaranteed to pay the friars for the lands that they had been forced to part with. Three millions more had been voted by Congress to relieve distress in the Archipelago. Thus the United States may be said to have invested some thirty millions of dollars in these islands, to say nothing of the cost of the Spanish-American war and the expedition to the Philippines, which has been conservatively estimated as close to a million a day from the declaration of war in April, 1898 to the capture of Aguinaldo in March, 1901. This amounted in all to something over a thousand millions of dollars over and above the usual and ordinary running expenses of the United States for the same period.

This is a conservative estimate and it is believed that, were all the expenses computed, direct as well as indirect, incidental to the war alone, this sum would be found to be far greater.

have decided what it wanted to do and, if necessary, told the Filipinos, clearly and distinctly, from the beginning, that there was no more intention of resigning the islands to their inhabitants than there had been of allowing the Southern states to leave the Union in 1860-66, unless compelled by force to do so.

In doubt as to just how the country would receive such a policy, the party therefore resolved on the more prudent policy for itself and the more dangerous one for the country, of temporizing with the Filipinos, trusting to time to accomplish the miracle of making the Filipinos declare themselves in favor of annexation. The party however was averse to committing itself to any positive declaration as to what were the real intentions of the United States. (10).

Instead of conciliating the mass of the Filipino people, this policy only antagonized them. This antagonism did not openly assume as violent a form as it had done in the beginning, but it was none the less intense and it has become more wide spread. That the avowed "Americanistas" increased in members is true; but the avowed as well as the unavowed anti-"Americanistas" increased in much greater proportion, and persons and classes that formerly had been at least indifferent, became more anti-"Americanista."

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(10) In no case can it be pointed out that any of the American officials in authority stated positively what were the intentions of the United States in regard to Filipino selfgovernment or independence. Whenever that question was forced to the front, the Filipinos were practically told to "wait and see". Each time it was discussed, independence was put off to a more and more remote date, never affirmed and never completely denied. The loop hole of a possible independence was always left open. The discussion invariably ended in the Filipinos having the altruistic sentiments of the United States and the benefits the Americans had conferred on the islands pointed out to them. They were told in more or less euphemistic language that they ought to be satisfied with what they had and content to leave independence to the Greek Kalends.

SEVENTH PAPER

THE POSITION OF THE INSULAR CIVIL  
GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE CATHOLIC CHURCH  
IN THE PHILIPPINES.

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## SEVENTH PAPER

# THE POSITION OF THE INSULAR CIVIL GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE PHILIPPINES.

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It is not the purpose of this paper to give a historical sketch of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. To do that would involve the writing of a history practically of the Islands themselves. All it is proposed to do is to set forth certain facts connected with the present position of the Church in relation to the Civil Government, with only such retrospective remarks as may be necessary to illustrate some particular case in point.

It can be stated in general terms that prior to American intervention, the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines came under the jurisdiction of the Vatican through Spain, and not directly, just as the Roman Catholic Church in Algeria came under the same jurisdiction through France, both being established and maintained in the colonies of those nations. In other words the colonial branches of this Church formed part and parcel of the Church as a body, as it existed in those nations.

To understand the situation of the Catholic Church in the Philippine Islands before American intervention, it must be borne in mind that the Church, under the laws

of Spain (1) had held its temporalities and other properties as a body or corporation, or perhaps more properly, a juridical person. Particular churches and their dependencies, as edifices or estates, were administered by members of the regular orders or of the secular clergy (2). Although such individual members of these bodies

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(1) While the Spanish Government, through special privilege from the Holy See, had the right of presentation of clergymen to parishes, through the Bishops, it made no claim to the absolute possession or proprietorship of the churches, the lands, or establishments of the various Religious Orders, or other religious properties as a part of the *Res Publica* in the Philippines, any more than it did to the property of any lay corporation. See Concordat between the Vatican and the Spanish Government, 1851. Also the Agreement of 1890, by which the Church was empowered to "acquire, hold, and use in proprietorship, without limitation or reserve, all classes of property, bonds, etc." These conditions were embodied in Article 38 of the Spanish Civil Code and made operative in the Royal Decree of July 31st, 1889, and the Royal Order of December 4th, 1890.

(2) Editor's note:—Members of the secular clergy are such persons in holy orders as are not bound by monastic vows or rules. They do not live in community. They are subject to the jurisdiction of the Bishop of their diocese, to whom, as to their immediate chief pastor, they owe obedience according to general ecclesiastical law and to the particular statutes of their diocese. A secular priest is not disqualified from personal ownership of property.

Members of the regular clergy are bound by monastic vows and rules. After taking their vows they are individually disqualified, among other things, from ownership of any kind. They commonly live in monasteries, convents, etc., under the jurisdiction of their own superiors. Religious communities are capable of juridical personality, however, and as such are governed according to ecclesiastical law, but without being subject to the bishop of the diocese in which they live; that is to say, they can acquire, own, and administer property of all kinds, and the management of their temporalities and of their own community affairs is carried on under their own prelates. If by agreement with the bishop of a diocese, a regular priest is assigned to take charge of a parish, his administration of the same is exercised under the authority of the bishop and subject to his direction, inspection, visitation, etc.

Parish priests, whether secular or regular, are personally entitled to their salary, which is commonly fixed by diocesan statutes,

enjoyed the revenues of the churches and other religious establishments they actually administered, whether derived from church property or from allotments of the state, they were never in possession of the churches or their revenues in any other capacity than that of temporary incumbents, removable at the discretion of their ecclesiastical superiors. Therefore neither the rectors individually nor the congregations collectively, attending the churches, were in any sense owners of these establishments, nor yet did these establishments belong to the *Res Publica*. The lands on which they stood had generally been acquired by the Church through gift or purchase. By far the greater number of the edifices themselves had been erected by the religious orders, assisted by such donations of money or labor as piously inclined persons had in one shape or another contributed towards

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and to certain fees or offerings prescribed in cases of personal service, as in the administration of baptisms and marriages and in the conducting of funerals, etc. All other revenues belong to the church or parish fund and must be accounted for to the bishop. A secular priest may use his personal fees and stipends as he sees fit. A regular priest can use such or any other fees, donations, etc., only by permission of his superior, but he generally turns them into the common fund of his community.

It is easily seen, even from these few observations, that the religious orders or corporations derive an unusual advantage from their mode of life and from their thorough organization. Their whole system of work and service and of the fruits thereof, is a kind of socialism in the worthiest sense of the word. No regular clergyman draws a salary from his corporation, in whatever capacity he may be engaged. If he earns a salary on the outside, or otherwise produces works or performs services that bring him emoluments and rewards, all these go to the common fund of the community. One who ponders these facts well will not easily be misled by carping critics and calumniators who insist that the religious orders did not come by their holdings honestly, or possessed them to any one's detriment. Had it not been for the peculiar character and genius of the religious orders, for their business integrity and energy, and for their evangelizing labors, which in many cases were not short of heroic, the Philippines would not be what they are today and, more than likely, they would never have been brought into the pale of Christianity.

them. In some rare cases the erection of churches had been undertaken or assisted by the state.

They were maintained and kept in repair by part of the funds received by their rectors. These funds, while they varied in amounts according to circumstances, could be applied to no other purpose. They were partially derived from certain fixed fees for the performance of the religious ceremonies connected with the celebration and registration of baptisms, marriages, and deaths. While these fees (3) themselves were not large, the expenses attending the ceremonies for which they

(3) The fees were as follows:

For baptismal services for persons of all classes and all races, one candle, value three cents U. S. currency.

For marriage services for Spaniards and Europeans, \$6.25 U. S. money. For mestizos and full blooded natives, \$3.19 U. S. money.

For funeral services for Spaniards and Europeans, \$5.75 U. S. money. For mestizos, \$2.50 U. S. money. For full blooded natives \$2.00 U. S. money, if the priest accompanied the corpse to the grave. If however the ceremony terminated with the services in the church, only half the above fees could be charged.

The poor of all classes and all races ("poor" was interpreted to mean all persons whose means of subsistence were daily wages) were entitled to and received the services free of all charges, so far as the Church was concerned.

Editor's note:—By way of comparison, the following examples of fees or stipends will be interesting. They were enjoined by the Manila diocesan synod, April, 1911, under the present ecclesiastical regime.

Baptisms are of four classes. The classification is not an arbitrary arrangement on the part of the Church, however, but is founded on experience of what is demanded by people according to their social standing and means.

A baptism of the first class calls for a fee of ₱ 66.50, or \$33 25, U. S. currency. The items of charges are listed as follows:

Parochial priest's part.....	₱ 5.00
Use of silver altar with adornments and hangings. ,,	30.00
Three chandeliers, each with 12 candles.....	9.00
Eighteen candles on the altar and four for the great candlestick.....	5.50
Use of cope of the first class.....	2.00
,, ,, cushion and carpet.....	2.00

were charged could be increased indefinitely, according to the magnificence of the ceremonies or the greater or less liberality of the persons requiring them. The monies derived from this source were, except the priest's

Organ and organist.....	„	2.00
Sacristans.....	„	4.00
Peal of church bells, five times.....	„	5.00

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TOTAL P 66.50

A baptism of the fourth class calls for one peso.

Parish priest's part.....	P	0.45
Candles .....	„	0.10
Organ and organist.....	„	0.20
Sacristans.....	„	0.25

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TOTAL P 1.00

Marriages are also of four classes. The items of charges for a first class ceremonial are as follows:

Parish priest's part, including stipend for mass..	P	8.00
Use of silver altar, with adornments and hangings. „	„	30.00
Three chandeliers, each with 12 candles.....	„	9.00
Sixteen candles on the altars and four for the great candelabra .....	„	6.00
Four candles for bride, groom, and witnesses ....	„	1.00
Vestments of the 1st class.....	„	6.00
Cushions and carpet.....	„	4.00
Sacristans.....	„	6.00
Organ and organist.....	„	2.00
Peals of bells four times.....	„	4.00
Fiscal .....	„	1.00
Marriage certificate.....	„	1.00

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TOTAL P 78.75

\$ 39.375

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A fourth class marriage amounts to P. 7.50, or \$3.25.

Parochial priest's part.....	P	4.00
Candles for bride, groom, and witnesses.....	„	.25
Sacristans.....	„	.50
Organ and organist.....	„	.50
Two cushions.....	„	.50
Fiscal .....	„	.75
Marriage certificate.....	„	1.00

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TOTAL ..... P 7.50

part, required to be used in the maintenance and repair of the churches, church buildings, vestments, supplies, etc., and in the pay of the sextons, sacristans, acolytes, and other church servants.

Over and above these sources of revenue, nearly all parochial churches had a certain amount of real estate in the shape of houses and lands. Such properties were administered by the authority of the bishop of the diocese in which they were situated. The revenues derived from this source were used for the benefit of the church or in many cases according to the charitable intentions of donors who gave such properties as pious endowments. Thus the clergymen who administered such estates or properties were, so far as the revenues were concerned, merely agents of the church.

Many of the persons who made statements before the Commissions boldly pleaded for a confiscation of church property on general principles. One was innocent enough to back up his plea by the tentative assertion, that he believed there was a law in the United States to the effect that no corporation was allowed to possess more than \$40,000 in real estate. If this belief was sincere, its very candor and ignorance divested the holder's views on the subject of any practical value. If such a law exists, it is more honored in the breach than in the observance. It is safe to say that there was no state or territory within the United States at any time in which one or more corporations did not possess real state to the above value.

When they were informed that no law existed in the United States, by virtue of which such a confiscation could be made, they suggested the enacting of one, forgetting that the United States was hardly likely to make any such enactment in the face of the immense holdings of real estate by all religious denominations. An attack on general principles on the property of one denomination would necessarily involve an attack on all.

The idea and desire of confiscation were undoubtedly

based on the assertions of persons, not only before the Peace Commission that met in Paris, but also on those of persons who came before the first Philippine Commission in Manila, 1899, to the effect that the Church, represented by the friars, had come into possession of their property by means and methods that would not stand a legal investigation. When the question of real ownership came before the courts, however, it was proved beyond the peradventure of a doubt that not only were the Church and the religious corporations, whether represented by the bishops or the friars, the real owners of their properties, but they had come into possession of them by legal means and methods, sanctioned not only by the laws and usages of the Philippines but by those of the United States also. Furthermore all their transfers of property had been made in conformity with laws governing transfers of a like nature the world over.

The hierarchy, that is, the Bishops, Deans, Canons, Prebendaries, priests etc., whether secular or regular, received certain salaries pertaining to their offices. These were derived from two sources, namely the rents, drawn from real estate belonging to the particular churches (4)

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(4) Like methods of securing corporate resources exist in the churches of practically all denominations, more especially the Protestant Episcopal, in the United States. Trinity Church alone, in New York, possesses real estate in that city which is estimated at from eighty to one hundred and sixty millions of dollars. See *Broadway Magazine*, August, 1898, for details.

Editor's note.—Appallingly rash misstatements about the friars and their lands are commonly heard among Americans of a certain type, who would be the last in the world to admit either that they were gullible or addicted to gulling. The writer once overheard an American officer initiating a brother officer, evidently a new comer, into the great secret of the land-grabbing methods of the friars. It was on a McKinley car in the vicinity of San Pedro Macati and Guadalupe. "See all these lands around here? They all belonged to the friars." "How did they get them?" asked the recent arrival. "How did they get them? Why, they just came and took them!" answered the wise one.

One cannot but regret hearing such evidences of disregard for

or to the diocese and varying according to circumstances; and also certain fixed allotments made by the Spanish colonial government and charged against the revenues of the colonies, as were also other salaries of the government.

When the United States assumed charge of the Philippine Islands, all this was changed. Not only were the contributions from the *Res Publica* discontinued, but in many cases municipalities were allowed to seize and hold church property, thereby preventing the Catholic Church as a body, or parish priests as individuals from receiving any benefits from their use or revenues:

The hierarchy and other ecclesiastical personnel of the Catholic Church in the Philippines included, as has

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simple truth and justice. To any one desirous of getting at the facts in these matters, there are books, published records, and reports accessible, not only in the American Circulating Library of Manila but also in some of the friar libraries, where with a little research any honest and unbiased student can learn to discriminate between the false and the true in regard to a much abused body of men and their business methods.

Had the officer, above referred to, done even a little salutary reading, he could easily have learned that the estate about San Pedro, at least in good part, was Jesuit property as early as 1637, and that far from "just coming and taking it", they had received it as gift from a military man of that time, Captain Pedro de Brito. At that time the total population of the Philippines was only about a half million, most of them savages at that, two facts worth remembering. The transfer was made according to law, as were all transfers of property to the church or to the religious orders, whether the properties were acquired by gift or, as was most commonly the case, by purchase.

It is quite the fashion, apparently, among the half-baked native politicians of the day and swarms of perfervidly patriotic students, to use the term "friars" as a convenient peg on which to hang every imaginable grievance or wrong known in the Philippines. "They squeezed the people", "they dominated the courts", "they ran the government," "they lived vicious lives", etc., etc., etc., are charges heard or read over and over again, but one looks and listens in vain for something approaching tangible evidence and specific testimony in particular specific instances of cases and persons.



already been intimated, both secular and regular clergy. Among the latter were the members of the various religious orders, the Augustinians, who first came to the Islands in 1565, the Franciscans, who came in 1577, the Jesuits, who arrived in 1581, the Dominicans, who came in 1587, the Recoletos, who first established themselves here in 1606, and others, Vincentians, Capuchins, Benedictines, etc., who have come within the past century, some quite recently.

At the time of the uprising of the "Katipunan" against Spanish authority, in 1896, Catholic priests were distributed as rectors among some 536 parishes, of which 160 were controlled by the secular clergy and 370 by the regular priests (5). The majority of the par-

(5) Editor's note:—When the Spaniards first came to the Philippines, it is estimated that the population was 500,000. In 1736, Father Juan de San Antonio gave it as 1,000,000. Statistics, in 1805, placed the population at 1,741,000; in 1840, at 3,209,077; in 1860, at 4,500,000; in 1876, at 6,173,632.

According to the historian, Father Delgado, the clergy in the Philippines, in 1750, were located as follows:

Secular priests in 142 towns ministered to 147,269 souls.

Augustinians	„ 115	„ „ „	252,963	„
Franciscans	„ 63	„ „ „	141,193	„
Jesuits	„ 93	„ „ „	209,527	„
Dominicans	„ 51	„ „ „	99,780	„
Recoletos	„ 105	„ „ „	53,384	„

TOTAL	569	„	904,116	„
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These figures for towns do not include barrios, villages, chapels of ease, missions, etc.; and the number of souls includes only persons registered in the parish books. Children under seven were never counted in parochial population returns.

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According to the "Estado General," etc., of 1886, there were then employed, for the most part in parishes, barrio chapels, and missions

Regular priests	751
Secular „ European and native,	722
TOTAL	1473

Regular priests, not so engaged, but doing University or col-

ishes controlled by the secular clergy were in the richer and more civilized provinces. While it is true that the regular orders had many of the richer parishes, they also had charge of nearly all the poorer and more remote ones, especially those among the uncivilized tribes, as well as all the missions and the schools attached to them.

Although the majority of the 536 parishes of the Is-

lege work, or retired from or preparing for missions in China, Japan, etc., numbered 222.

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According to the official Catholic Directory for 1912, the clergy are distributed as follows:

	secular priests, regulars	
Manila archdiocese,	212	227
Calbayog diocese	45	32
Cebu „	125	60
Jaro „	85	56
Lipa „	59	12
Nueva Caceres „	115	13
Nueva Segovia „	82	18
Tuguegarao „	23	15
Zamboanga „	8	29
TOTAL	753	462

Probably the greater part by far of these regulars is devoted to educational work.

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A close study of troubles arising within the past ten years from native antipathy to the foreign, i. e. white clergy, shows them to be chiefly of political origin. The ogresque word, "friar" is now applied more or less indiscriminately to all white priests and even, in some cases, to the American bishops!

The Catholic population returns for the Philippines as given in the official Catholic Directory for 1912, probably general estimates, amount to over 7,200,000. To the needs, religious and educational, of this vast number, even if it is somewhat in excess of the reality, the services of only 1215 priests is dedicated at the present day! Worthy vocations to the priesthood among the Filipinos themselves are not numerous enough to supply the needs of the Church, nor are they likely to increase according to present conditions. And yet there seems to be a great deal of sympathy among certain classes of Americans for the renegade demagogues

lands were under control of rectors belonging to the regular orders, (the proportion was about five priests of the regular orders to two of the secular clergy), there were, in all the 536 parishes, one or more secular priests, who were assistants to such incumbents, regular or secular, as might be in charge. Furthermore all the deans, canons, and prebendaries were secular clergymen, and nearly all the secular priests were natives of the Islands.

The secular clergy, who were nearly all engaged in parochial work only, could not under ordinary circumstances be removed from their parishes. Moreover they were in a measure stipendiaries of the government and consequently to a large extent dependent on it. Many of the members of the regular orders were likewise engaged in parochial work. While so engaged they were also stipendiaries, but the remainder, who were engaged in missionary work among the Igorrotes and other wild tribes of Luzon and Mindanao, or among the savages and Moros of Mindanao and the Southern islands, who paid no cedula tax, were not. Both the secular clergy and regular priests, as stipendiaries of the Government, drew salaries allotted from certain revenues in the shape of a percentage on the Cedula or Poll taxes of the inhabitants of the parishes. This made their income vary in accordance with the number and wealth of the parishioners (6).

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who still shout against the friars, i. e., white priests of any description!

Throughout the history of the Church in the Islands, efforts were constantly made to get a worthy native clergy. It ought not to be a matter of wonder, to Americans especially, that these efforts were only relatively successful, not because of opposition on the part of the regulars but because of the natives themselves.

(6) Editor's note:—A royal decree of Feb. 7, 1859 fixed the salary of the Archbishop of Manila at \$ 12,000 per annum and of each suffragan bishop at \$ 6,000. This dollar was the Spanish duro, containing five pesetas, each of the value of about a franc.

A royal decree of March 6, 1896 assigned salaries to the mem-

Members of the regular orders, whether stipendiaries of the government or not, were individually independent of it, so far as financial matters were concerned. They and their educational, missionary, and other works

bers of the Cathedral Chapter of Manila as follows: Dean \$ 3,825; Archdeacon, \$ 2,500; Head master of the choristers' school, \$ 2,500; Precentor, \$ 2,590; Treasurer, \$ 2,500; three canons acting one as capitular consultor, the others as assistants to the archbishop \$ 2,000 each; two canons without special title, \$ 2,000 each; six prebendaries, \$ 1,500 each.

The Provisor and Vicar-General of Manila received a salary of \$ 3,000 if he was not a prebendary; or if he was, \$ 1,650. The same office in Nueva Caceres, Nueva Segovia, Cebu, and Jaro was salaried \$ 2,000 each place.

In 1884, parish priests received \$ 180 for each thousand cedula in the official poll of the parish, except the parishes of Cebu, Bohol, Samar, Leyte, Misamis, and Mindoro, where the rate was \$ 212.50.

Parishes were classified according to the number of souls they contained. A parish

1. de primera entrada had from 1 to 5,000
2. de segunda „ „ „ 5,001 „ 10,000
3. de primera ascenso „ „ 10,001 „ 20,000
4. de segundo „ „ „ 20,001 „ 30,000
5. de termino „ „ „ above 30,000 souls.

A parish "de segunda entrada" was obliged to have, besides the parish priest, one assistant; "de primer ascenso," two assistants; "de segundo ascenso," three assistants; "de termino," four assistants.

Missions were active or parochial, in the latter case the conversion of the wild inhabitants of the place being practically completed. Active missions were equivalent to a parish "de primer ascenso"; parochial missions had the rank of a parish "de segunda entrada."

By a royal decree, dated July 10, 1894, the salaries of the clergy were fixed as follows.

Parish priests "de 1ª entrada".....	\$ 500.
„ „ 2ª „ (also missionary parish priests) »	600.
„ „ 3.er ascenso (also priests of active missions) »	800.
„ „ 2ª „ »	900.
„ „ termino..... »	1200.
Assistant parish priests..... »	200.
„ mission „ »	400.

and enterprises were supported out of the resources derived largely from the estates of their Orders. But, unlike the secular clergymen, they were liable to be sent anywhere it might be deemed necessary or expedient, according to the judgment or even caprice of their superiors.

Prior to the breaking out of the Spanish-American War, the American public knew little of all this and cared less. Owing to the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of the United States are non-Catholics, it is by no means astonishing, of course, that the reiterated assertions of the more violent American anti-Catholics and Spanish anti-clericals and radicals were perfunctorily accepted without any questions being asked. There was little desire to get at the real merits of the case, more especially as there were comparatively few Americans who had anything beyond a vague knowledge that such a place as the Philippine Archipelago existed. Among these there were fewer still who were in a position to lay claim to any accurate information concerning them.

American statesmen and politicians had given their attention to affairs nearer home. Up to the time immediately preceding the breaking out of hostilities with Spain, their interest as well as that of the general public of the United States, so far as Spain and her colonies were concerned, was centered almost exclusively in Cuba and the Spanish Main. Under these conditions the average statesmen and the average citizens of the United States were forced to depend for information on some few books of travel, most of which on investigation have proved to be neither unbiased in their sentiments, impartial in their statements, nor correct in their conclusions. Largely through them the American general public was wrought up to the belief that, owing to the Catholic Church, a condition of affairs, analogous to what might be expected from a combination of the Blue Laws of New England and the Inquisition, as it existed

in Europe in the middle ages, was actually in existence in the Philippines at the time of American intervention.

The principal avowed cause for the intervention of the United States in the affairs of the Philippine archipelago was to redress the wrongs of the Filipinos, to remedy the misgovernment of the Islands, and to abate the abuses that had arisen under Spanish rule. Of these abuses, the principal one put forward was the alleged tyranny and the despotism of the Roman Catholic Church. To such an extent indeed had this been proclaimed that it was believed to be a fact. It consequently had become axiomatic, without further investigations or inquiry, to lay all the real or imaginary shortcomings of the Spanish government of the Philippines, regardless as to what their real sources or nature may have been, to the influence of the Catholic Church on that government.

As soon as the Treaty of Paris was concluded and the Archipelago passed from Spanish to American rule, the President of the United States, through the Secretary of War, appointed a Commission with a view to enquiring, among other things, into the abuses that it was taken for granted existed in the Philippines. This commission was presumably clothed with powers to recommend measures for their abatement, if not to put into execution such measures as might be determined on as immediately necessary to accomplish the desired end. But whatever this commission was empowered to do or to leave undone, it was certain to do nothing to stultify itself or the administration that had created it, by finding a condition of affairs in reference to one of the alleged sources of abuse and misgovernment, namely the Catholic Church, different from what at the outset had been assumed to exist. From no point of view it could consistently take would it have been politic or expedient that it should have done so. It would have been folly, therefore, to have expected this commission, composed as it was entirely of Protestants, one of whom, moreover, was already on record as having

condemned the Catholic Church as it was in the Philippines (7), to carry out its investigations in anything like a friendly manner, or even in an unbiased spirit, so far as the Church was concerned.

The above is made manifest by reading the reports of the examinations of such as came before it. According to those reports, the Commission appears to have gone exhaustively into all subjects, such as laws, civil administration, finance, schools, labor, and Chinese immigration. The mineral and other resources of the Islands were also fully gone into and persons testifying on these subjects were questioned at length and minutely. When it came to questions on the Catholic Church, however, and its relations to the country and to the people, its lands, possessions, revenues, or administration, the report fails to show that any effort was made to sift the evidence presented or to reconcile conflicting statements. There was no sign that there was any particular desire for an extended knowledge of the situation, so

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(7) See *The Philippine Islands and their Inhabitants*, by Professor Dean C. Worcester, September 1st 1898, pages 339 to 349.

Professor Worcester throughout his book never misses an occasion to hold the Catholic Church in the Philippines up to ridicule and contempt through its ministers. He is careful in his arguments, however, to base them only on quotations from other writers, but through them he indicates his opinion on the subject as clearly as though he had expressed it distinctly in his own words. In doing this he cites Foreman as his authority and gives as his reason for doing so (page 313) that he is "a loyal Catholic". After making a quotation covering more than three pages, Worcester states that "it is not from lack of similar facts within my own knowledge that I quote him so extensively, etc."; but he refrains, however, from giving those facts.

In quoting Foreman, the learned Professor makes two mistakes; first, Foreman was not a Catholic, and even if he had been, his writings show him to be anything but a loyal one; secondly, he weakens his own argument by not adducing the best attainable evidence in support of it, namely the facts within his "own personal knowledge", instead of quoting Foreman, who in this particular case is at best but secondary or derivative evidence.

far as that Church was concerned. The line of enquiry pursued appears to indicate that this particular subject was one upon which the Commissioners had already made up their minds. It seems to point out that any deeper investigation or discussion was not only lacking in interest, but was also a waste of time, and that all they wanted to hear was such testimony as could confirm their previous opinions for presentation to the American public.

Witnesses testifying against the Catholic Church were allowed to wander at will over the wide fields of glittering generalities, instead of being required to confine themselves to the narrower limits of positive statements of absolute facts. The majority of the statements appear to have been based upon hearsay rather than upon direct personal knowledge. This report also shows that certain witnesses appear to have been recalled from time to time to testify against the Catholic Church and its administration, and that, on each of such occasions, their statements became more elaborated and more bitter. In the intervals between these examinations, they apparently acquired the idea, justly or unjustly, that statements against the Catholic Church and its administration would be more acceptable to the Commission than testimony in its favor.

Take the testimony of Manuel Jerez Burgos, for instance, which was devoted almost entirely to subjects connected with the relations of the Catholic Church and its priests, regular and secular, to the people. The whole of it consists of nothing more than sweeping general statements. Even though the questions, to which they purported to be answers, indicated very clearly that the Commission would have been well pleased to have him make some specific allegations, he either could not or would not to do so. He was persistently evasive by going into generalities and ignoring any pointed inquiry. It was only when one of the Commissioners practically put the answer he wanted into the witness' mouth, that the latter gave out anything near a specific reply.



The same applied to the answers of T. Pardo de Tavera and Benito Legarda, as well as of others. Their testimony amounted in substance to mere general statements that the friars were a bad lot and that they had tyrannized over the people and abused them, but just how and in what particular instances was not shown.

In the early part of 1898 and previous to the break between the military power of the United States and the Revolutionary Government, wherever the insurgents under Aguinaldo had occupied the country and wherever his authority had reached, all the members of the religious orders and a great number of the secular clergy had been forcibly expelled from the churches and parishes they had theretofore occupied and administered. In nearly all cases these churches had been pillaged and in some instances had been completely destroyed. The places of all clergymen thus expelled had been taken by native secular priests. Under the auspices of the Revolutionary Government, these natives administered those churches and parishes, into which, in a very large number of cases, they had simply installed themselves. Some of these were persons who for canonical reasons had been expelled or suspended from the priesthood of the Catholic Church. Later, for one reason or another, many had broken away entirely and joined the Aglipayan schism. When the American forces drove the insurgents from such places as they occupied, these persons were technically in "peaceable possession" of the churches, religious establishments, and parishes they had thus violently usurped under the auspices of the Revolutionary Government. But as a matter of fact they were, as is evident, nothing better than violent interlopers. They had seized and occupied churches and parishes without competent authority from the Bishops to whom they owed obedience and who represented the Catholic Church as a body.

During the American Military Government, in force from 1898 to 1901, Church property had been used by it

for any and all purposes. Churches, convents, seminaries, colleges, rectories, and schools, in Manila as well as in the provinces, were used as barracks, stables, storehouses, canteens, hospitals, or for any other purpose, military or civil, for which they might be convenient. Furniture or fittings of the establishments so used, if not plundered by the revolutionary forces or the inhabitants of the country, were in many cases broken or destroyed by the troops or the civilians, accompanying the American army. Much of it was carried away by them as "souvenirs". Many churches and other religious establishments had been burned or destroyed in the course of military occupation. There was also much other religious property that had never been occupied by either the American Military or Civil Governments.

As early as Sept. 7, 1899, the Commission asked whether the Filipinos would enter upon a war to save their religion. This question must have originated in an effort to ascertain how far, within limits, the intervening government could go without danger of starting a religious war.

In 1901, when the Civil Government, as represented by the Philippine Commission, assumed the reins of power, much of this Church property that had been occupied by the troops, was abandoned little by little, as the military necessity for its further use ceased, and presumably reverted to its proper purposes, while some was turned over to the Civil Government (8). In surrendering property

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(8) Notably what was known as the San Lazaro Hospital and estate, situated in the suburbs of Manila. This was a charitable bequest managed by the Fathers of the Franciscan Order as an establishment for the treatment and care of lepers and other persons suffering from contagious diseases.

Immediately on the occupation of Manila by the American forces, one Felipe Calderon, a mestizo lawyer who had long been an avowed and bitter opponent of Spain and the religious Orders, Tavera, Maus, Bourns, and others induced the American military authorities to take possession of it on the ground that the Franciscans

used by the Military Government, the rule had been and still was to recognize as valid the claims of those who were in peaceable possession at the time of the United States Army's occupation of the places where such property was located. This policy, apparently fair enough on its face, was ambiguous, to say the least. It opened the door to the exercise of a considerable amount of private judgment, not to say caprice, on the part of in-

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were in unlawful possession of it as being state property. Without making any serious investigation of the subject, the military authorities acted on Calderon's statement. There is nothing very astonishing in the fact that Calderon and the other Filipinos, who were bitter enemies of the Catholic Church as it existed, should have signed the complaint in question; but what is astonishing is that two American officers, one of the regular and one of the volunteer service, should have done so, because as individuals they could have had no possible interest in the matter and as officers they hardly did so by order. When the military government was superseded by the civil, the former turned the hospital and estate over to the latter. The Franciscans appealed to the Courts and from that time up to the present the estate has been in litigation.

Calderon, together with the Commissioner, Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, made similar representations in respect to the "Colegio de San José," of the medical department of Santo Tomás University. The results were similar. In each of these cases the Government acted on the ex-parte statements of individuals who were well known as avowed and bitter enemies of the regular orders. Only in the case of the college of San José, it never assumed actual possession, as it had of the San Lazaro Hospital and estate, although it had enacted a law preparatory to doing so.

Editor's note:—The government is still in possession of San Lazaro Hospital and apparently the Franciscans are ousted from it for good. It is said that in the San José College case, the supreme court was ready to hand down a decision in favor of the defendants, namely the Church as represented by the administrators of the institution and its estates; but in view of a compromise, at least so the whispered story runs, between the highest civil and ecclesiastical authorities, that decision was not formally pronounced. The compromise seems to have put a stop to all litigation, the government retaining possession of San Lazaro, unjustly as many think, and being pledged, as is supposed, to offer no further opposition to the Church in regard to San José and other similar properties, held as pious endowments or "obras pias".

dividual officials wherever they surrendered property that had been occupied by the United States or the Insular Government.

In defining what was meant by "last peaceable possession", it allowed those who might be so disposed to recognize as "last peaceable possessors", persons who, under the auspices of the Revolutionary Government, had driven out the parish priests and other representatives of the Catholic Church, regular or secular. So far as the American Civil Government went, these persons were not only technically but actually in "peaceable possession." They had occupied it by force before the advent of the American troops, in despite of its rightful owner, the Catholic Church, which at that time was unable to prevent them doing so. Apart from the Aglipayan schismatics, many municipalities had also seized on Church property. There is furthermore little room to doubt that there were many cases in which officials chose to avail themselves of the ambiguity of this announced policy, to recognize either the schismatics or the municipalities for no other reason than that they were personally opposed to the Catholic Church.

This line of policy has given rise to the often asked question, "Is the Insular Government, as represented by the Civil Commission, hostile to the Catholic Church in the Philippine Islands"? On calm reflection the answer without hesitation or circumlocution is affirmative.

There are doubtless many persons, some members of the Insular Government and some not, who will protest vigorously against this assertion, alleging that, as there is no direct evidence to sustain it, it is consequently untrue. Such persons lose sight of the fact that not all conclusions are reached by means of direct evidence or positive proof. There are many things unhesitatingly accepted and firmly believed as facts, for which only moral conviction exists, and of which material proof for the time being is lacking.

The statement that the Civil Commission, which

governs the Philippines, is hostile to the Catholic Church, is one of the above nature. Its truth or fallacy must be determined by circumstantial evidence. Results reached up to the present time rather than aims proclaimed at the start must be scrutinized. Therefore the case will have to be argued backwards, so to speak, from effect to cause rather than from cause to effect.

Among other officials created by Aguinaldo during his ephemeral government, there was a "Head" of the Filipino Church. To occupy that position one Gregorio Aglipay was selected, a priest who had been excommunicated from the Roman Catholic Church. The Filipino government invested him with the title of bishop and gave him the rank, privileges, pay, and uniform of a Brigadier General of Insurgents. (\*) Aglipay usually made his appearance in public in this uniform, wearing also a sabre and revolver. He later headed a band of insurgents in northern Luzon, in the district commanded by Tinio, who, disgusted at his methods and excesses, issued orders to bring him before a drum-head Court Martial. He would undoubtedly have been shot had the proper parties been able to lay hands on him.

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(\*) Editor's note.—In January 1899, in Vigan, Aglipay was appointed "Ecclesiastical Governor." There was a grand fiesta on that occasion, the new dignitary himself officiating. After the church ceremonial, a ball took place at which, among other things, a native clergyman was seen dancing, and that in the presence of his "ecclesiastical governor!" It was a sight that proved too much for many of the Katipuneros themselves.

On the 25 of the same month, another ceremony took place. The people were assembled to kiss the new flag and to swear fealty to it. Some two thousand Igorotes had come down from the hills, and they too were solemnly sworn in. After that Aglipay reformed the clerical dress for out of doors. All the priests, and the seminarians as well, had to be uniformed as captains. When the seminary boys were out for their walk, they, including the priests that were with them, looked like a small regiment of captains. The "Ecclesiastical Governor" himself donned the uniform of a general, with sword, gold lace in abundance, and other ingenious adornments!

About the latter part of 1902 and the earlier of 1903, Aglipay appeared in Manila. Having made his peace with the Civil Government, he started the Independent Filipino Church, of which he appointed Governor Taft as president. He also appointed a number of laymen as honorary bishops, among them Commissioner Pardo de Tavera and other Filipinos, many of whom had been prominent and active opponents to the American forces. Governor Taft courteously declined to accept the presidency of the new church but, according to statements published by Aglipay, accompanied his refusal with expressions of sympathy for him and for his new church, at the same time assuring him that he would find it supported, if need be, by American cannon.

Though the American press of Manila warmly supported this schismatic movement at that time, it cast doubts on the veracity of Aglipay's statements that he was backed by the American Civil Government to the extent he asserted. To these doubts Aglipay replied through the press that not only had he stated the truth but he also had documentary evidence which he could produce, if necessary, in support of his assertions. Whether Aglipay's statements, involving the Governor in an implied official promise to follow a certain line of action in reference to the new schism, were true or not, is a matter of very little importance. But what was important was that these statements at that time were allowed to pass unchallenged by the Civil Government. Consequently the Filipino public believed them to be true and that was all that Aglipay wanted. He thus accomplished the object he had in view, namely, to secure for the new schism an appearance of official support and sanction.

On the strength of the popular belief, Aglipay persuaded some priests of his province of Ilocos to join his schism. These, on breaking away from the Roman Catholic Church, forcibly retained possession of churches and Church property that they had formerly administered as

priests in good standing subject to their Catholic bishop. They resisted the installment in their places of clergymen sent by the proper ecclesiastical superiors of the Roman Catholic church in the Philippines. They believed, as Aglipay had led them to do, that, in accordance with the alleged promise of Governor Taft, they would, if necessary, be supported by the United States forces and maintained in possession of the churches and Church property they had thus usurped.

In some cases, municipalities under the Insurgent Government had seized and held churches and Church property and refused, even after the American forces had taken possession, to recognize the ownership of the Catholic Church.

In both of the foregoing cases, the Church, through its Bishops, had protested and appealed to the Civil Government to be reinstated in the possession of these churches and their dependencies. To these appeals the Civil Government answered practically by calling attention to the "peaceable possession" policy above referred to. It informed the applicants that the ownership of such properties would have to be determined by law. In this way, though it did not actually recognize the rights of the seceding schismatics and the municipalities, yet by refraining from putting the Catholic Church in possession of its property by executive order as requested, instead of abandoning it to the more tardy and apparently more uncertain action of the courts, it put the Catholic Church on the defensive. It gave the impression that it entertained grave doubts as to the validity of the Catholic claims. By forcing the Church to incur great expense in prosecuting these cases in the courts, it furthermore caused that organization no little financial embarrassment. What gave still greater force to this impression was that no other acts of the Insurgents or of their government beyond those in reference to Church property, were recognized to the same extent by the Civil Government.

In some cases, when these claims were tested in the courts and after judgments in favor of the Catholic Church were given, the necessary machinery for putting it in possession was not put into motion or, if it was, the action of the Government was so tardy and lacking in energy that not only the Aglipayans but the general Filipino public assumed that, if the Civil Government was not actively and openly hostile to the Catholic Church, it was at least in active sympathy with the schismatics. Further color was given to this assumption by the fact that much of the Church property usurped by the schismatics was part of the property, the so-called Friar lands, of which the religious Orders had been the last peaceable possessors at the time of American occupation, and which had subsequently been purchased from these Orders by the government, though the churches themselves, as well as their rectories and immediate dependencies and certain other urban church property, were not included in the sale. The government, however, by entering into negotiations for and consummating the purchase of these estates, had practically recognized the validity of the title of the Orders to them. Therefore on the principal that "the greater includes the less", it is fair to assume that if the title of the Orders were valid so far as the property sold was concerned, they were just as valid so far as they concerned the churches and Church property they refrained from selling. It would therefore follow that if these churches and Church properties did not belong to the Catholic Church as a corporation, they did belong to the religious Orders, which formed a part of the Catholic Church in the Philippine Islands. For the Government to require the Catholic Church, or any part of it, to go to law to establish a title to what was already practically recognized by that Government as belonging to that organization, was to place the Church on the defensive. It amounted to a tacit recognition of a right on the part of the schismatics and municipalities to seize



and retain church property at their pleasure. This line of action or rather of inaction, allowed the schismatics and municipalities to entertain the belief that had arisen, rightly or wrongly, namely that if the Civil Government would not openly support them in their usurpations, it would at least put off until the last possible moment such action as would assist the Catholic Church in evicting them.

In the winter of 1903-1904, when the Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia obtained judgments in the courts, supporting the claim of the Catholic Church as a body to certain Church property, Aglipay made a personal appeal to the Governor General to intervene and have the judgments of the Court suspended. The ground he urged was that to allow these judgments to be carried out and the Bishop of Nueva Segovia to take possession, would be to place the usurping schismatics on the defensive and thus weaken their claim. The matter was referred to the Philippines Constabulary for investigation. What report was made or what action, if any, was taken by the Civil Government, is unknown to the general public. But it looked very much as though the "active competition", hailed by one of the Commissioners as an augury for good, was likely, under the auspices of the government, to become an accomplished fact.

The attitude assumed by the Civil Government in respect to religion in its abstract sense was an avowed impartiality to all or any particular forms of religious belief. But it was not difficult to realize the fact that the majority of the members of the Commission had a decided leaning towards any religious organization opposed to the Catholic Church. It seemed they took special pains to emphasize their tolerance of renegades and outsiders, alike, whether represented by the Aglipayan schism or any of the various Protestant denominations, whether they originated in the Islands or were introduced into them from Europe or the United States. More-

over one of the ablest and most energetic members of the Commission, as has already been said, is on record as being of the opinion, in respect to Catholicism in the Philippines, that "the native competition which would inevitably arise between the two forms of belief might react wholesomely upon the individual workers themselves, etc." (10).

This possibly would all have been very well if there been any other form of Christianity in the Islands to compete with the Catholic Church. But at the time this was written, as well as later, when the United States intervened in insular affairs, the Catholic Church was alone. It is therefore not unfair to infer that this Commissioner, no matter what his views in respect to the Roman Catholic Church might be, would at least be in favor of the creation or introduction into the Islands of any such competing belief. The native Filipino members of the Commission realized that their positions were appointive and that their continuance in office depended very largely upon their getting on harmoniously with the American members, who were in the majority. Consequently they were hardly likely to allow any opinions of theirs on religious or any other subjects to clash seriously with those of their American colleagues, and thus jeopardize their positions.

The most powerful and logical reason for assuming, "a priori", the existence of hostility on the part of the Civil Government to the Catholic Church is that the members of the Civil Commission were hardly likely to overlook the fact that no governing or legislative body that makes any pretension directly or indirectly to consult the will of the people it governs, can count on general popular support or success, unless, as a body, it at least professes the same religious belief as that professed by the majority of the people it purports to repre-

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(10) The Philippine Islands and their People by Dean C. Worcester, September 1ts. 1898, page 349.

sent. A governing body that does not fulfil this condition, if it proposes to rule by any other means than absolute force, is confronted with two issues. It will in the end either have to conform to the religion of the people or make the religion of the people conform to it. If any one doubts the correctness of this way of stating this argument, let him ask himself first, what he considers the possibilities to be for the election of a Roman Catholic executive and legislative body in the United States at large or in any one state of the Union, or how long does he think the United States would consent to be governed by a Roman Catholic President and Congress? And second, provided that any such governing bodies were to come into existence, what would be the prospect of a successful and harmonious administration of the country as long as the bulk of the population remained, as it is at present, distinctly Protestant and unbelieving?

It is therefore well within the range of possibility that, in the face of the immense advantage to be derived from not being confronted with any one dominant religious belief in the Philippines, the maxim "divide to conquer", may have had a certain amount of influence on the Civil Government, though possibly it may not have presented itself or made itself felt exactly in these terms. Instinctively, therefore, the Commission may have acted in conformity with that principle, if not by openly and actively stimulating the "active competition" already mentioned, at least by going as far as it could in that direction without actually committing itself to the official and open support of the Aglipayan schism or any other newly introduced denomination.

It is safe to say that at the present writing, over ninety five percent of the population of the Philippines, possessing any form of Christianity, belongs to the Roman Catholic Church. Nor can any allowance or difference be urged whether the diocesan administration be American, Spanish, or Filipino. The Church itself, therefore, in so far as its relations to the people on the

one hand and to the government on the other are concerned, so long as it remains united, is a power to be reckoned with. That power may be ignored for a time but eventually it will make itself felt. As a matter of fact the Catholic Church in the Philippines, in spite of all the political and other changes that have taken place, is still very strong. So much is this recognized that, from the speech of the Attorney General of the Islands before a meeting of the "Young Men's Christian Association" in Manila, on July 11th, 1905, in which he stated that the effect of the "change in the ecclesiastical administration of the Islands cannot be forecast, etc.," it might almost be inferred that the government of the Civil Commission, so far as represented by the speaker on that occasion, dreaded that the Catholic Church might outweigh it in influence with the native population. If the Church could be divided against itself, however, especially by arraying the secular clergy against the members of the religious orders, or by a schism of sufficiently numerical importance, or by the secession of any considerable number of its members to the various Protestant denominations introduced into the islands by European or American missionaries, so as to divide the population of the Islands into three or more religious parties of nearly equal strength, but with precepts and practice more or less antagonistic to each other, the ideal "active competition," already referred to, would easily become an accomplished fact. Now this might or might not "stimulate individual workers," but it would certainly do away with any dominant religious belief. What is chiefly to be noted, it would also relieve whatever government or party might be in power from the possibility of being confronted with any such dilemma as that described above. It would neither have to conform to any particular belief nor have to make persons of any particular belief conform to it. Under the conditions indicated, any two or more of these new divisions could always be successfully

arrayed and played against the remaining one, as policy or expediency might dictate.

Nearly all the educational establishments in the Philippines, such as the University, colleges, academies, etc., to say nothing of hospitals and seminaries, excepting the primary municipal schools and some other technical schools for the teaching of trades, arts, and sciences, which were under the direction of the Spanish Insular Government, were not only controlled by the religious orders, but the buildings in which they were established, as well as the revenues with which they were administered, were their own property, or, in some cases, Church endowments that had nothing to do with the *Res Pública*. As a consequence the greater part of the teaching and missionary work fell to these Orders. They thus naturally became not only the bulwark but also the directing power of the Catholic Church in the Islands. In their hands the Church maintained that unity of precept and practice which gives it its strength the world over.

When the Civil Commission introduced the American public school system into the Philippines, it is safe to say ninety nine percent of the Christian population was of the Roman Catholic faith. As Catholics they would naturally have been glad to have had at least some rudimentary principles of that faith taught in these schools. But as the Civil Government had no more idea of perpetuating the Catholic faith in the Islands than it had of perpetuating the Spanish language, it proceeded to endeavor to do away with the latter by making English the language of instruction, and with the former by giving no instruction in any religious faith or religion. The only people who would profit by this were the teachers imported from America.

This leaving religion out of the curriculum of the public schools in the Philippines probably arose from the fact that the majority of the American so called "educators" are Protestants, indifferentists, atheists, or

agnostics, who maintain as an axiom that, if morality is taught in the schools, religion of any sort is unnecessary. Catholics, however, hold that morality proceeds from religion, is inseparable from it, and should be taught at the same time, because, admitting the Divine origin of the Christian religion, its precepts must be true, uniform, and unvarying at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances. They cannot be swayed out of their Divine character by ephemeral, extraneous influences. Thus on the principal that the greater includes the less, to teach religion is to teach morality also.

Morality, as an abstract idea separated from religion, is merely a sense of appreciation of right and wrong, which, if it does not emanate from religion, is spontaneously evolved from the inner consciousness of the individual. Admitting this to be so true, each individual would have to formulate his own code of morality. But as individuals vary in taste, temperament, and inclinations, it follows that morality would vary according to individuals. Now it cannot be denied that individuals, in general terms, vary according to propinquity and environment. Thus morality, separated from religion, would also vary until it became nothing more than mere expediency. It would then be more or less elastic according to the laxity or strictness of the individual teacher, who in turn would be governed by the views of the community of which he formed a part.

No doubt it was felt necessary to make some concessions to American Roman Catholics, individually the strongest religious denomination in the United States, though collectively they form but some twenty per cent of the population of the country. So also must it have been deemed expedient to show some consideration for the practically ninety nine per cent of the population of the civilized tribes of the Philippine Islands. The government accordingly graciously consented to permit religious instruction to be given in the school houses during

some hour not taken up by other branches of instruction. This, apparently fair, was in reality a penance to the scholars. The use of the privilege meant that those who took religious instruction had to be kept in school for longer hours than those who did not. For this reason the concession to the dominant religion of the Philippines, apparently fair as has already been said, was in reality more than likely to become one of the most powerful weapons against it. It could not but predispose the mind of a child to look upon religious teaching as an extra and irksome task, considered unnecessary by the educational authorities and quickly noted to be but grudgingly conceded to the parish priest.

A system ignoring any and all religions in the primary instruction of children may be very apposite to the United States. There, owing to the great number of religious beliefs as well as to their widely varying tenets, it would obviously be impossible in a common public school to recognize or teach any one particular creed. But such a condition did not then, nor does it now obtain in the Philippines, where practically the whole civilized population is of one belief. And because of their convictions, there are many parents who, though by no means in affluent circumstances, prefer to send their children to the Catholic schools, where they have to pay for their tuition, rather than to the public schools where they get it free. This is for no other reason than that, in the former, religion is taught and in the latter it is not (11).

If the theory of an "active competition" would be beneficial to the Church, it is not quite clear why it would not be equally beneficial to the public schools of the Philippines. From the above, however, it appears that in the opinion of the Director of Education, as well as in that of the Commission as a whole,

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(11) In Mindanao and the Jolo Archipelago, the public schools attended by the Moros were placed in the hands of a Syrian Turk, who had the Koran taught as part of the curriculum.

this is not the case. In the public schools, a rigorous uniformity of precept and practice is insisted upon as absolutely necessary. The authorities alone have any thing and everything to say, not only as to what shall be taught but, more especially, in the case of religion of any kind, as to what shall not. Neither the scholars, who attend the schools, nor their parents, who pay taxes for their support, are allowed any voice in deciding what even any part of the curriculum shall be or who shall teach it.

It might be urged that, as the teachers from the United States had, as has already been said, no particular religion, it would be a hardship on them to teach something in which they did not believe. But this would be to shift the argument from an essential consideration to one of relatively minor importance. The great question here is, is it in keeping with the blatant professions of liberty and uplift, as made by many Americans in these Islands, to keep five or six millions of Catholics from having what they want in their own school curriculums? By what right are Filipino Catholics deprived of what they conscientiously believe to be an integral part of education? Who are paying for their schools?

The ground taken and acted up to by the American members of the Civil Government in reference to the Catholic Church in the Philippines, may practically be covered by the statement that, while they disclaim hostility to the Catholic Church in general, they are enemies of, and hostile to, the regular religious orders, in other words, the Friars. They personally have no objection, in the abstract, to allowing the Church to remain unmolested in the Philippines, but they have no intention of allowing the religious orders to do so, if they can prevent it without having recourse to positive and direct measures. This is the position in a nut shell.

When it is taken into consideration that the religious orders are as much a part of the Catholic Church, not only in the Philippines but in every other part of the



world, as the stones of an arch are a part of that structure, the ambiguity, not to say sophistry, of any such position as the above is manifest. It is on a par with insisting on the removal of one or more of the stones of the arch, and at the same time disclaiming any desire or intention of injuring the fabric itself as a whole, or of causing its downfall. As an argument, a proposition so absurd on its very face might be advanced to children, but it is hardly worth the consideration of persons who have arrived at the age of discretion. Any one who asks reasoning and reasonable beings to accept it, is simply offering an insult to their intelligence.

To sum up the religious orders, their members were hardy and adventurous pioneers of Christianity. In the evangelization of the Philippines, by persuasion and teaching, they did more for Christianity and civilization than any other missionaries of modern times.

Of undaunted courage, they have ever been to the front when calamities threatened their flocks. In the pursuit of their calling they have witnessed and recorded some of the most dreadful convulsions of nature, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and destructive typhoons. In epidemics of plague and cholera they have not been dismayed, nor have they ever in such cases abandoned their flocks. Whenever an enemy attacked the Islands they were the first to face the shot. Only fervent faith could have enabled these men to bear the soul-trying solitude and absence of real companionship, to endure the hardships, and to overcome the dangers that encompassed them.

They performed wonders in advancing the agricultural and industrial development of the country. They encouraged every good trait in the natives, and when the latter responded to the unselfish efforts lavished upon them, they always found themselves in most friendly, harmonious, and helpful relations with their preceptors.

The friars did much, in fact did all that could be done for education, having founded schools for both sexes, training colleges for teachers, the University of Santo Tomás in Manila, and other institutions.

Hospitals and asylums attest their charity. They were formerly, and even lately, the protectors of the poor against the rich, and of the native against the Spaniard. They consistently resisted the enslavement of the natives. They restrained the constant inclination of the natives to wander way into the woods and to revert to primitive savagery, by keeping them in the towns, or, as they said, "under the bells".

It is difficult to see why the Commission and the Civil Government chose to accept the statements of the Progresistas (12) and insurrectos in regard to the Catholic Church especially as represented by the religious orders, and to assume that the Filipino people, as a body, were bitterly opposed to the religious orders. Possibly it was thought that they ought to be. On impartial investigation, however, it is clear that prior to the outbreak of the Katipunan rebellion against Spain in 1896, although some opposition existed, yet it was confined entirely to the Tagalog provinces of Luzon and was kept alive by the Progresista Party and the recalcitrant tenants of the estates of the religious Orders. A large number of these tenants had been worked on by members of the "Progresista Party", till they not only refused to pay the rent for the lands

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(12) It may be possible that, in order to conform to the general policy outlined by the administration at home, the Civil Government considered itself bound to take the desires of the Progresista party into consideration. But to carry the doctrine of complying with the wishes of Filipino political parties to its logical conclusion, it would be necessary for the United States to abandon the Islands, for from February 4th, 1899, when hostilities first broke out, to the present writing (January, 1907), there has been a steady, armed opposition to the occupation by the United States. At one time, it required the presence of over 60,000 American troops to overcome that opposition.

they held, but claimed the lands themselves. This refusal culminated in the agrarian troubles of Calamba and Santa Rosa in 1888-90. The trouble makers were championed by Dr. Jose Rizal, whose family were tenants of Dominican lands, and had been lifted up out of poverty and obscurity to a condition that was by no means to be despised. One of the conditions of the lease the Rizals first obtained was that, before paying any rent, they were to be allowed to harvest five crops.

The Progresista Party, as has been stated elsewhere, was composed of all classes of agitators from Spain and the Philippines. At its outset its leaders in the Archipelago were principally hungry adventurers from the former country. Their real object was the search for a royal road to fortune. They were the "get-rich-quick" schemers of their day in the Islands. Renegades as they were, and having evil designs on Church properties, they were therefore anxious to get rid of the regular orders. They saw that these stood in the way, not only of the secularization and consequent general spoliation of the temporalities of the Catholic Church, but also of a future general exploitation of the natives in the name of progress. They know well that these orders in former days had often stood between the natives and the rapacity of corrupt Spanish officials.

The ground taken by the Progresistas in reference to the regular orders and the secular clergy, when divested of all circumlocutions and ambiguities, can briefly be stated as follows:—anyone provoking a dispute with a member of the religious orders had to be very careful how he stood: otherwise it might involve him in a dispute with the whole order, which as a body was likely to support their individual member, if they could consistently do so. A conflict with a secular clergymen, however, belonging to no order or association, meant a conflict with practically a single individual, who would have to contend single handed against the whole Progresista Party. The latter's oppo-

sition to the religious orders was therefore at least logical. The presence in the Islands of these Orders was a continual menace to the Progresista hopes, and was also unfavorable to the aspirations of the recalcitrant tenants. And yet collectively the Progresistas and the tenants did not represent any considerable part of the population. On the other hand, the Progresistas had in the Islands no other organized political party, in the proper sense of the word, to oppose them.

It is at least interesting to note that, in reference to the supposed hatred of the religious orders, or friars, by the Filipino people, Manuel Xerez Burgos stated that it did not exist in the Philippines, or at any rate that this hatred was awakened only by the Katipunan in 1891 (13).

The intervention of the United States in the affairs of the Philippines, in 1898, practically obliterated the Progresista Party. It drove the bolder and more violent native members into armed resistance to the American occupation. Others more timid plotted in the cities and pueblos, or kept the field forces supplied with information, to say nothing of arms, ammunition, money, and provisions. The most cautious and far-seeing among them allied themselves ostensibly with the Americans, as they had allied themselves with Spain or the Filipino republic under Aguinaldo. These then went to form the leaders of the "Federal", "Nationalist", and other more or less important political parties that sprang up. The Spanish Progresistas, who had in reality founded the party, withdrew, some to Spain and some to private life in the Islands.

About the time the Civil Government assumed the reins of power, there came into existence with it a numer-

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(13) Dr. Burgos must be referring to some other society, as the "Liga Filipina" was founded in May, 1892, and the Katipunan in July, 1893.

See statement of Manuel Xerez Burgos before Philippines Commission, Sept. 7th, 1899.

ous class of self-selected alleged political leaders. These owed their existence as well as their standing with the people at large, possibly more to the support they were supposed to receive from the Civil Government than to any real or imaginary talents or merits of their own. They were largely such members of the old Progresista Party or ex-insurgent leaders, who, when they found that further resistance was for the time being useless, had cast in their lot with the American Civil Government. As a reward for so doing they were appointed governors of provinces, presidentes or mayors, and consejales, councillors or aldermen, of cities and pueblos. There were other offices and sinecures, too, convenient as a means of buying off open or secret opposers of the civil government, without regard to any special fitness they possessed for the posts they were selected to fill. It was these office holders and aspirants to office who were formed into what was known as the Federal party under the leadership of T. Pardo de Tavera.

As many of these persons, at the time of the insurrection against Spain (1896), as well as during Aguinaldo's resistance to American occupation in 1898 and the following years, had been very active in the spoliation of the churches and Church property, it is easy to appreciate how small was their desire to see the members of the religious orders return to the parishes from which they themselves had expelled them. Neither would they countenance any plan by which the regular priests might remain in parishes from which they had not as yet been driven out. Nor again could they conceal the aversion they had to seeing such priests replaced even by secular clergymen appointed by the American Bishops to fill the vacancies thus created. The reasons for all this were that, in the first place, they feared they might possibly be forced to disgorge what they had already taken; in the second, that they would be denied further opportunities of enriching themselves at the expense of the Church. It is consequently no wonder that they did all

in their power to bring into existence and to keep alive an artificial sentiment, ostensibly against the religious orders, but in reality against the Roman Catholic Church, in accordance with the program of the old Progresista Party.

The Civil Government, for reasons of its own, apparently found it expedient to accept the ex-parte statements of the persons forming the Federal party, in reference to the feelings of the people and the general situation. Consequently it deprecated the return of the members of the religious orders to their former parishes. As a reason for its attitude, it alleged to them that it would be dangerous for them to go back. To the American public at home, it allowed it to be intimated that it would be necessary to maintain a large armed force to prevent mob violence being done to the regular priests, (13) were they allowed to return or remain.

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(13) As a matter of fact, in the few parishes in which the members of the religious orders had remained or in those to which they had returned, for in a number of instances they did return, and that at the request of the parishioners themselves who were alleged to be so bitterly opposed to them, there was little or no disturbance.

Editor's note:—One could make an interesting collection of instances in which, during the past ten years, opposition to the "friars" has publicly been manifested in some part or another of the country. Many Americans imagine, almost fondly, one may say, that such manifestations are what they purport to be. But in many cases, as when American bishops were stoned, or when the Belgian Fathers, or others of recent arrival in the Islands were similarly treated, or as when the Italian Bishop of Lipa was installed amid some insults and attempted rowdyism, or as when quite recently the defenceless women of a purely charitable sisterhood were stoned, insulted, and practically mobbed in the streets of Manila itself, not to cite numerous other examples, the demonstrations were certainly not anti-friar, but were more probably, apart from their savage brutality, evidences of race hatred, and even of anti-American sentiment. To get at the real animus of most of the so-called anti-friar agitation, one has but to read certain native papers. The undisguised glee with which they handle a bit of clerical scandal, when they can lay hands on it, does not argue

The presidentes of the towns and their consejales had grown to believe that, individually and collectively, the members of the religious orders, or for the matter of that, any Catholic clergymen, were "fair game" and would be allowed "no standing in court". They got it into their heads, sometimes for obvious reasons, that any opposition to a friar or priest, no matter what phase of injustice or violence it might assume, could easily be explained away on the ground of "popular prejudice", or if not, it would be condoned by the Civil Government. Whether this belief was a conclusion they drew from the inaction or silence of the Civil Government in these matters, or whether it was the result of any private information they might have had, is of very little importance. It is enough that this belief existed, and the Civil Government did little or nothing to disabuse them of it.

Had the local authorities, more especially the provincial governors, who at first were the direct appointees of the Civil Government, been convinced that a failure on their part to accord to any clergyman the same protection accorded to anyone else in the exercise of his legal rights, and that a failure to make an energetic and determined effort to prevent mob violence to clergyman, whether they were members of the religious Orders or of the sec-

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much in favor of the zeal they loudly profess for all kinds of morality especially clerical. When along the same lines, quite the same people exult and gloat, as they do, over the delinquencies of Americans in private or public life, military or official, does the average anti-friar American take those manifestations as damaging evidence against his own countrymen? As a matter of fact, few Americans realize just what European anti-clericalism means and what it springs from. The first tutors of Filipino crooks, soreheads, or "bad eggs" as the case may be, were renegade Catholics of Spain or of Spanish descent. There is not much ventured or hazarded in the opinion that those same tutors never dreamt that their teaching would ultimately lead to the results it served to bring about. It may not be wholly unwise for certain Americans of the present to look somewhat askance at the "anti-friar" demonstrations of the day. There may be more anti-American and anti-white man sentiment there than is realized.

ular clergy, would meet with prompt punishment, there is not the shadow of a doubt that the alleged opposition to the members of the religious Orders, at least so far as collective or individual demonstrations threatening mob violence to their persons or property is concerned, would have ceased.

Complaint after complaint was made through the Bishops as well as through other channels about the threats of mob violence and the actual maltreatment of Catholic clergymen at the hands of the mobs and rioters in various parts of the Islands. Complaints were made as well of the failure of the local authorities to take notice of these disturbances, or to extend any protection or to give any redress to the victims of them. Yet such complaints, instead of receiving immediate satisfaction, were in many cases laid aside or shelved.

At length, however, the turning point was reached. It was a case in which "the other man's ox was gored". About the end of 1902, or the beginning of 1903, a Protestant missionary, who had been established in the province of Cavite, was assaulted by the inhabitants of one of the barrios of Cavite in the province of the same name. The place where he was holding his service was stoned and he was driven out of the town. In this case the action of the Civil Government was prompt, energetic and decisive. The local authorities were severely rebuked. The missionary was reinstated and the inhabitants of the pueblo informed that, if necessary, force would be used to protect him in the future, and that any person taking part in any further demonstration of a like nature would be severely punished (14).

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(14) The decisive action of the Civil Government in the Cavite case, while it showed no disposition to fail to accord protection to Roman Catholic clergymen, was very promptly taken by the local authorities as an indication that, no matter what action it might take or leave untaken in so far as Catholic clergymen were concerned, it was at least determined to tolerate no interference with clergymen of the Protestant denominations.



As a result of this case, one of the Catholic Societies of Manila, composed almost exclusively of Americans, approached the Civil Government which, in common consistency, could no longer put off action on the complaints that came before it of assaults of a like nature upon persons of the Catholic priests, or the failure of the local authorities to afford Catholics protection or redress. As soon as the provincial governors found this to be the case, the opposition of the populace ceased. As a proof of this, it is sufficient to state that at the present time many members of the religious orders, in many cases at the request of the parishioners themselves, have returned to, and are peacefully in charge of the parishes from which they had been driven out and to which their return was thought to be fraught with so much danger.

This was more particularly felt in the remoter parishes, especially among the Non-Christian tribes in the Cordillera of Luzon and the Islands of Mindoro and Mindanao, where the members of the regular orders were used as missionaries as well as rectors of parishes.

The fact that there are as many, if not more native secular clergymen in the Islands now, might be urged as a reason for sending them as missionaries to these parishes and for dispensing with the services of the regular orders. But for the benefit of non-Catholic readers be it said that, as a rule, missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church to the heathen in all parts of the world are members of the regular orders or congregations. This is a part of the duty of nearly all of them, whereas the administration of regularly established parishes, whose parishioners are already civilized and fixed, generally falls to the lot of the secular clergymen.

It might also be urged that once a country or district is ecclesiastically organized by the missionaries and the parishes established, they should be left to the administration of the secular clergymen and the missionaries should seek other fields for their labors. This, however, is a matter to be decided by the bishops of

their various dioceses, according to the dictates of necessity or expediency.

Many anti-friar writers, with a prodigious show of zeal for the observance of canon law, cited the Council of Trent as forbidding the regular orders to hold parishes. In doing so, however, they forgot that this prohibition only applied to countries whose inhabitants were all Christians canonically organized. As there were then and still are large numbers of Filipinos belonging to various wild tribes, such as the Igorotes, Ifugaos, Negritos, and others in Luzon, or to the Moros in Mindanao, who were then and still are pagans, the whole of the Archipelago was classed as being "in partibus infidelium;" and because such was the case, this particular prohibition of the Council of Trent was inoperative in the Philippines. (15)

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(15) Editor's note:—The first missionaries in the Philippines exercised their spiritual jurisdiction in virtue of very ample faculties granted by various popes, especially those of Adrian VI, May 10, 1522. When the Council of Trent legislation on the organization and government of parishes was promulgated in 1564, many practical difficulties were experienced by the regulars in the Philippines in conforming to the new discipline, which the bishops "de las Indias" were beginning to enforce. A modification of the law was obtained for his Spanish subjects by Philip II from Pope Pius V, Jan. 15, 1568. This was subsequently confirmed by Gregory XIV, 1591.

By the provisions granted by these popes, all regulars in the Indies, (of course in good standing in their orders), were authorized freely and lawfully to exercise the office of parish priest, to preach, and to administer the sacraments to the faithful, (in other respects conforming to the Tridentine decrees); but all was to be done with the permission of their superiors, obtained in their provincial chapters. They were also authorized to hear confessions of the laity without previous permission or faculties of the bishops, and these were enjoined not to make any changes in monasteries of regulars who were engaged in the care of souls.

As this privilege of holding parishes was granted "on account of a lack of diocesan priests", it was valid throughout the history of the church in the Philippines and is still valid today, not only in the archipelago, but in other parts of the world. The reason for granting the privilege then is still strongly in evidence at the present time.

Apart from certain disgruntled Filipino politicians, the persons who make arguments of this matter are, as a rule, those Protestants who are always on the alert to find something to "protest" against. Probably the most of them do not know what a friar is and are not aware of the fact that in the United States about a third of the Roman Catholic clergymen are members of the regular orders or associations, Augustinians, Benedictines, Capuchins, Cistercians, Carmelites, Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, Premonstratensians, and about thirty five or forty different societies or congregations, all approved by the Holy See. A great many members of these are, within the strict meaning of the word, "friars", and they lawfully administer parishes in almost every diocese of the United States.

The Civil Government must have been aware or was at least in a position to ascertain with certainty, that the majority of the remoter parishes, more especially among the savage tribes, as well a large number in the more civilized districts, had theretofore been administered by members of the religious orders. It also knew, or it could have known, that there was not a sufficient number of secular clergymen, either Filipinos or foreigners, to replace the regulars, prevented directly or discouraged indirectly from returning to their parishes. It could easily have realized that by the absence of their priests, these parishes were bound to suffer, so far as religious teaching or administration were concerned. As the Civil Government made no pretense of even offering to assist or encourage the incoming of other priests to administer them, it looked very much as though an indirect effort were being made to starve out the faith in these parishes, so to speak, and thus to cause Catholicism, from want of religious teaching, to die a natural death in the country. In the meantime, like Pontius Pilate, it washed its hands of the consequences in the waters of an artificial situation resulting from a manufactured public sentiment.

Whether the general line of action, or rather of inaction, pursued by the the Civil Government in its dealings with the Catholic Church in the Philippines, originated in the agnosticism that doubts, or in the atheism that denies the necessity of any and all religious beliefs and teachings, is a matter of little moment. But the logical conclusion that it leads up to is obvious, so obvious, indeed, that one may safely say that, had this line not been entered upon and followed out by the Civil Government with a view to breaking up the Catholic Church in the Philippines, it was utterly lacking in logic, consistency, and common sense.

Be this as it may, however, there is no getting beyond the fact that, where a vast majority of the people are of one religious belief, as is the case in the Philippines and the governing powers are of others, the saying, "he that is not with me is against me", applies in all its rigor. Therefore, in the face of the considerations set forth in this paper, it is submitted that to the question, "Is the Insular Government as represented by the Civil Commission hostile to the Catholic Church in the Philippines, Islands?", the only logical answer must necessarily be, "yes, it is", and this because the members of the Civil Commission, either as individuals or as a body, have not been friendly to it.

FINIS.

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
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